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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to develop an understanding of the interaction 
between expertise, managerial role, and subjective behavioural characteristics. 
The research seeks answers to the question: What shapes the managerial decision-
making processes of an expert? 
Four case studies examined the decision-making processes of four domain experts 
who have taken on managerial roles. The studies follow a triangulated approach 
using interviews, observations and psychological evaluations to discover the 
dominant decision making processes of the experts in their managerial roles. This 
study includes interviews with each of the four experts, interviews with people 
associated with them in their work environment, the researcher's observations, 
and three psychological evaluations. 
The research indicates that the subjective characteristics of the experts studied 
may determine the domain in which they became expert, and consequently the 
managerial role that they chose and also the managerial decision-making 
processes that they follow. The experts' decision-making processes seem to be 
shaped initially by their subjective characteristics, second by their expertise and 
last by their managerial role. There was however, an indication that these experts 
dichotomise their managerial decision-making processes to distinguish between 
decisions that directly involve people and other decisions. Managerial 
requirements create situations that require the use of the experts' subjective 
characteristics that are not otherwise used. It is therefore concluded that the 
subjective characteristics of the experts studied have shaped their managerial 
decision-making processes. 
The outcome from a study of four experts is not expected to be valid for all 
experts, however it may add weight to an argument that more consideration needs 
to be made of the two-way interaction between expert and domain. 
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1.1 Aim of the study 
The intent of the research reported in this thesis was to gain a better understanding 
of how experts process decisions. Specifically, the research examines the 
influence of domain expertise, managerial role, and the experts' individual 
subjective characteristics on their decision-making processes. The fundamental 
research question that guides the study is, - What shapes the managerial decision-
making processes of experts? 
How that understanding would be obtained was not at all clear at first, although I 
did have some strong ideas on how I wanted to proceed. I had a strong conviction 
that I wanted to do qualitative research, and I wanted to observe and talk to 
experts. I began a literature review with little real sense of direction, subsequently 
developed a strategy which I followed while continuing to evaluate new 
information as it appeared. As a consequence of this exploratory approach I 
amassed a large amount of knowledge but was unsure how to present it, then I 
read Greenfield's (1996) direction for writing a thesis, which begins, "You have 
followed an intellectual journey across unknown territory. Think of yourself as the 
explorer producing a guidebook to where you have been and what you have seen 
and discovered in the process." (p. 88). Greenfield's advice seemed to me to be 
particularly apt, because in my research I explored many diverse literatures and 
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methodologies before settling on my chosen path, and then on several occasions I 
was compelled to consider additional information that I would not have been 
aware of had I not started this research. So, having recognised my predicament in 
Greenfield's writing I chose to adopt his recommendations for the development of 
the overall structure of my thesis. 
There are, according to Greenfield ( 1996), five key elements to thesis writing. 
You need to explain: 
I. Your starting point and why you decided to embark on the journey 
(literature and the deficiencies revealed by evaluation which lead you 
to undertake the research). 
2. How you decided to undertake the journey (the methodology). 
3. The route you followed and the discoveries you made on the way 
(the substantive research chapters). 
4. How in light of the above you redrew the route (analysis and 
interpretation). 
5. Where you arrived at the end of your journey, how it differed from 
your starting point, and where you go from here (conclusions, 
knowledge added, and directions of future research in the subject) (p. 
88). 
As my research progressed I considered many side issues, which perhaps would 
not have been mentioned had I not adopted Greenfield's guidebook approach. I 
will discuss the consequences of these diversions in some detail later in chapter 
nine, for now all I will discuss is the beginning of this research. 
********************* 
1.2 Motivation 
The research presented in this thesis was motivated by a personal interest in both 
experts and human behaviour that had developed during my years as a human 
resource management practitioner. My motivation was given greater focus during 
2 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
the early stages of my research when I read Einhorn's (1974) paper on expert 
judgment, in which he evaluated the decision making performance of three 
pathologists. Einhorn analysed his data using statistical procedures, and concluded 
that, although the pathologists that featured in his study had provided similar test 
results to one another, their paths to those conclusions were not the same. To 
explain his observation Einhorn suggested that there are possibly many paths to 
the same goal, and more than one way to perform the associated cognitive tasks. 
Einhorn's comment may have been no more than an addendum to his statistical 
evaluation, but given his outstanding reputation I am confident that he included it 
because he considered it to be important; for me it reinforced my resolve to pursue 
a qualitative research perspective. Statistical evaluation of data is a highly valued 
tool, but without qualitative evaluation of the data source the results may 
misinform. Einhorn's comments are perhaps incidental to the main focus of his 
paper, but they caused me to consider why experts, with extensive training and 
experience in the same domain who were given identical information, would 
follow different paths during a decision making process. Drawing on my own 
experience I knew that business consultants, for example, often employ different 
strategies to achieve the same goal when acting on identical instructions. I had 
observed that this behaviour appeared to reflect the idiosyncrasies, or personal 
disposition of the consultant. Could it be that behavioural characteristics, not 
training, or the setting determined the path? This idea appeared to be a plausible 
explanation. Therefore, I chose to examine my research topic from a perspective 
suggested by Shanteau ( 1987). 
While attempting to focus my research I read Shanteau' s (1987) work on the 
psychological characteristics of expert decision makers, and noted his comment 
that while " ... most research is based on formal analyses of objective decision 
properties. There has been little corresponding effort to analyze more subjective 
characteristics of experts." (p. 297) [emphasis added]. Shanteau's comment was 
like that of Einhorn' s, an addendum to his main thesis. Shanteau is an outstanding 
scholar in the study of experts, and I believe that it is reasonable to conclude that 
he included this 'aside' because he valued it. 
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Shanteau's reference to the subjective characteristic of experts indicated to me 
that my own observations while working in a management role as mentioned 
earlier, may warrant further consideration. Although I refer to both authors' 
comments through out my thesis, it is to emphasise the importance that I attach to 
their comments rather than to use their comments to support my argument. My 
motivation, as stated earlier, existed before I read the comments I have referred to; 
however the statements were invaluable to me as I tried to focus my research. 
**************** 
1.3 Research Perspective 
As with all researchers I have a particular perspective based on an ontology 
formed by my background and personal beliefs, which determines the 
epistemology that I accept, and the procedures that I comfortably follow. These 
characteristics are the value laden-ness associated with any scientific research 
(Chalmers, 1982), and need to be recognised and declared (Lewins, 1993). I have 
for many years been involved in business management, and this experience has 
led me to study management theory. In addition, I have a long-standing interest in 
psychology, both as an academic and as a practitioner in human resource 
management. Undoubtedly, the prior interests that I have mentioned contribute to 
my research perspective. 
In addition to my stated prior interests, my belief system is obviously influenced 
by what I accept as rational. Although my early education emphasised the 
traditional, quantitative or objective style based on cause and effect, and I 
obviously retain that knowledge, I now prefer a qualitative point of view. The new 
viewpoint accepts contextual values, allows for the researcher's perspective, and 
dismisses causality as a mental imputation (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Easterby-
Smith Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991 ). Therefore, according to the current philosophies 
on research paradigms, I would describe myself as a constructivist. 
4 
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Being a constructivist implies the adoption of a relativistic ontology. Relativism 
accepts local and specific realities in the form of multiple socially and 
experientially based mental constructions. To a constructivist ontology 1s 
inextricably intertwined with epistemology, because the researcher or 
'investigator' and the 'investigated' "are assumed to be interactively linked so that 
the 'findings' are literally created as the investigation proceeds." (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1998, p. 207). As a consequence of this ontological and epistemological 
position, the research procedures require an interaction between investigator and 
respondent in order to interpret the respondent's mental constructions. Therefore, 
my research relies on hermeneutical techniques and dialectical interchange. 
Simply put, I intend to use the well-established observational case study 
methodology, which is based on interpretation and discussion, to learn about 




My declared research perspective, particularly the interest in management and 
psychology, requires a research topic that is placed in a suitable management 
context. The focus is, therefore, on the role of experts' behavioural characteristics 
in managerial decision-making situations. The unit of analysis is an expert 
functioning in a managerial role. 
Experts are defined in the literature as people with extensive training, experience, 
and skill. It is generally accepted that a minimum of ten years is required to 
become a domain expert (Ericsson, 1997; Shanteau, 1987). It is also accepted that 
expertise requires excellent decision processing (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & 
Pearson, 1987; Simon, 1987; Ericsson & Chamess, 1994). In accordance with 
these definitions, it seems reasonable to expect that experts' decision-making 
processes are firmly established, likely to be stable and consistent, and unlikely to 
be greatly influenced by external factors. 
5 
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Experts, rather than non-experts, are the unit of analysis because they bring to a 
managerial role strongly developed decision-making skills that are unlikely to 
change due to pressure from the managerial role. Additionally, experts have 
apparently followed their personal disposition to become an expert, and to move 
into management. Therefore, these people are likely to display a strong preference 
for acting according to their behavioural preferences. 
******************** 
1.5 Why is this study important? 
The question asked in this research is important because recent work by an 
number of authors has strongly indicated the requirement for a greater 
understanding of the human behaviour associated with decision-making (see for 
example Isenberg, 1984; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993; Haley, 
1997; Lipshitz, 1994; Shanteau, 1987). 
Furthermore, there appears to be a distinct lack of qualitative research in the 
literature relating to experts, management decision-making, and perhaps to a 
lesser extent human behaviour. Quantitative researchers frequently present the 
research community with findings derived from experiments, questionnaires, and 
studies of large groups. This research more often than not does not address 
individual behaviour, context, and the natural setting (see for example Davis, 
Grove, & Knowles, 1990; Doktor & Hamilton, 1973; Nutt, 1998; Willemain, 
1995). 
My study follows a constructivist, qualitative methodology which I believe 
enhances the value of the response to the research question. The choice of 
methodology is significant because it creates an opportunity to provide new 
knowledge from a new perspective. This new perspective can be seen as an 
important attempt to triangulate with existing knowledge to either confirm or 
confound existing hypotheses. Furthermore, given the marked absence of 
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qualitative research identified above, this study helps to fill a significant 
methodological gap. 
One final important reason for conducting this study is that an understanding of 
experts' decision-making may provide knowledge that can be used prescriptively 
to improve the decision-making of non-experts. If non-experts are informed about 
the decision-making processes of experts then they may learn from, and adopt 
experts' decision-making processes to, themselves, make better decisions 
themselves. The possible benefits justify an attempt to gain new knowledge about 
how and why experts act as they do. 
******************** 
1.6 The study 
At the outset this study attempted to explain the decision-making processes of 
domain experts who have become business managers. Domain experts are defined 
as people, who over a period of at least ten years have developed knowledge, 
experience, and skill in a particular field to a level sufficient to achieve the 
recognition of expert status by their domain associates. 
The constructivist, qualitative methodology adopted takes the form of four case 
studies. In each case the respondent is an acclaimed domain expert who has 
chosen to take on managerial responsibilities. However, each case is unique. The 
expert's domain expertise is different, as is the managerial role, and the setting. 
******************** 
1. 7 The main findings 
As a result of my research I have obtained four important insights that lead to a 
better understanding of experts. A synopsis of each follows. The first, and second 
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findings are a direct response to my research questions. The third and fourth are 
issues that I have recognised as important during the analysis of data. Overall 
there is some suggestion that certain facets of expertise can be generalised across 
domains, as obviously can the definition of an expert, but this in no way implies 
that the performance of the experts studied in this research is in its self able to be 
generalised. This research appears to support domain specificity, which will be 
examined in more detail later. 
1. 7 .1 Experts behavioural characteristics appear to dominate 
In each of the four cases the expert's behavioural characteristics appear to 
completely dominate his/her actions. There are clear examples that the experts 
process information in a decision-making situation according to their personal 
view of the situation faced. The goals pursued by experts appear to be totally 
determined by their idiosyncratic behavioural characteristics, and are then 
satisfied by the selective application of knowledge and experience as determined 
by their behavioural characteristics. 
1.7.2 Expertise may be transferable 
Facets of expertise, such as analytical decision-making skills, appear to be 
appropriately used by experts outside of their domain of expertise. This finding 
contradicts indications from other research which suggests that outside of their 
domain of expertise experts are no better than novices (Camerer & Johnson, 1991; 
Carroll & Johnson, 1990). This ability is particularly evident in two of the four 
cases where the experts' managerial roles require them to make decisions that are 
largely outside their domains of expertise. In both instances the respondents 
satisfy the role requirement by using their highly developed analytical skills. 
However, the respondents' adaptive capacities are representative of their personal 
behavioural characteristics. This observation appears to give further support to the 
proposition that personal behavioural characteristics determine the decision 
making path followed, and suggests that experts with differing dispositions may 
not act in the same way. 
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1. 7 .3 Expertise aligns with behavioural characteristics 
In each of the four cases, expertise seem to be clearly aligned with the expert's 
behavioural characteristics. The respondents' natural dispositions appear to have 
guided them toward their domain of expertise, and in each case the expert's 
decision-making processes indicated a characteristic style. Additionally, the 
expert's behavioural characteristics indicated that the expert would adopt specific 
decision-making processes, which suggests that the attainment of particular 
expertise may be associated with behavioural characteristics. Although the 
possibility that this link, in the form of genetically inherited behavioural 
characteristics, may exist is acknowledged by Ericsson and Chamess (1994), my 
research presents the first empirically obtained data to support the existence of 
this association. The decision-making processes of the four experts in my study 
appear to be strongly determined by their innate abilities and/or capacities in the 
form of personal behavioural characteristics. 
1.7.4 An apparent dichotomy in decision-making 
A clear separation in decision-making processing appears to take place between 
decisions that directly involve people, and other kinds of decision. In all four 
cases it is clear that the respondents believe that decisions, which directly involve 
or affect people require greater consideration. The respondent may be a 'people 
person' who tries to ensure that the people for whom he/she is responsible are 
treated appropriately, or one who recognises that his/her goals are best achieved 
through the co-operation of others. Whatever the reason, the distinction was both 
obvious to the observer and acknowledged by the respondents. 
********************* 
1.8 Limitations 
There are four particular limitations to this study that must be acknowledged. 
First, three of the four respondents were known to the researcher before the study. 
However, they are respected experts in their field and unlikely to allow their 
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professional integrity to be compromised by my research requirements, so there 
should be no suggestion of bias. Secondly, as is clearly stated in the research 
procedures chapter, this research is a constructivist, qualitative study, and as such 
does not imply transferability (generalisation) although it may be possible. 
Thirdly, because the respondents are experts in different domains of expertise no 
attempt is made to compare their expertise, only their decision making is 
considered. Fourthly, as the interpretation of the research findings is largely 
dependent on the researcher's idiosyncratic perspective of events and issues, other 
interpretations of the data must be expected. 
1.9 Thesis overview 
There are nine chapters in this thesis. The first chapter titled Introduction is a 
prolegomena, a formal critical introduction to this work. It begins with a statement 
about the aim of the study and its subsequent presentation in this thesis, then there 
is an explanation of the motivation for the research. The chapter continues with an 
statement about the research perspective followed by an explanation of the 
research focus. Next, the issue of the importance of the research topic is addressed 
followed by a brief review of the study's main findings and the chapter concludes 
with a statement about the limitations of this research. 
Chapters two, three, and four form the literature review component of the thesis. 
Chapter two examines the term expert, with the intention of establishing experts 
as a credible unit of analysis. Credibility in this instance implies the consistent, 
reliable presentation of skills such that any inconsistencies in decision-making can 
be confidently assumed to have been caused by external factors. This distinction 
is particularly important. With experts it is assumed that extensive training, 
knowledge, and constant practice in their domain specialisation will ensure that 
they have developed a strong, persistent, and almost unshakeable faith in their 
own ability. This faith is such that when the decision-making processes of experts 
are studied, the activities can be confidently ascribed to expertise, or contextual 
factors such as managerial role, or to idiosyncratic behavioural characteristics. 
Without the established abilities of the experts that form the basic unit of analysis, 
there would be a need to consider several additional factors, such as the 
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respondents' decision-making skills, their experience, their ability in the role, and 
their training. However, by making experts the unit of analysis the importance of 
these variables has, as much as is possible, been eliminated because they are 
essentially part of expertise. 
Chapter three discusses the decision-making literature. This chapter examines 
pertinent decision theory; in particular it considers several perspectives on 
decision-making, and then looks at how decisions are made. Having previously 
established, in chapter two, that experts are particularly good decision makers, the 
intent of this chapter is to examine the decision-making processes that are likely 
to be evident in an examination of expert decision-making. 
Chapter four discusses behavioural factors. In particular the chapter considers the 
highly developed psychological characteristics that experts bring to their decision-
making. The purpose of this chapter is just to identify the behavioural 
characteristics that can be expected to influence experts' decision-making, and the 
form that the influence may take, then to consider how those behavioural 
characteristics can be assessed. Included in this chapter is a consideration of the 
influence, and assessment, of personality and cognitive style. 
Chapter five presents a synopsis of the literature review, then brings together 
some particularly interesting points identified during the literature review to build 
an argument in support of pursuing new knowledge in the area of a perceived 
lacuna. The lacuna in the literature is described, and research questions which 
attempt to develop knowledge that will close the lacuna are presented. 
Chapter six discusses methodology. The research that is presented in this thesis is 
defined as being qualitative. Qualitative research has gained considerable 
respectability and acceptance in the last few decades, but is still considered to be 
developing. Consequently it appears to be prudent to describe in some detail what 
qualitative research implies for this thesis, and to define some terms and 
procedures. The chapter also identifies my position as the researcher, and the 
reasons for selecting the research procedures used in this research. 
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Chapter seven presents a 'thick description' (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Denzin, 
1998) of the four case studies. This chapter is a synopsis of the information that 
was obtained through interviews, observations, and psychological evaluations. 
Although it is a synopsis, the information presented is, I believe, sufficient for 
anyone interested to gain a good understanding of each case. 
Chapter eight presents the analysis of the case studies. The cases are evaluated 
against the set of questions defined in Chapter 5 to provide appropriate 
information to answer my overarching research question. Not only is each case 
assessed, but there is also an assessment across cases. The chapter concludes with 
a summary of the research findings. 
Chapter nine presents a summary of the study, the research design, and the 
research findings. The theoretical significance of the study is discussed, as are the 
possible wider theoretical implications of the study, and is followed by a 
statement on the study's limitations, and opportunities for possible future 
research. 
********************* 
1.10 Some notes for the reader of this document 
There is no other research on the topic covered in my research that I am aware of. 
Consequently, in presenting all the information that is required to understand the 
study, this thesis has become a rather large document (more than 96,000 words or 
approximately 337 pages at 1.5 spacing, plus references and appendices). It was, 
however necessary to explain in detail, citing relevant literature, what the specific 
topic is, and how I went about the study. This made it necessary to present a 
satisfactory review of the literature relating to experts, decision-making, 
behavioural factors and qualitative research, along with the thick description of 
the case studies, and an extensive evaluation of the findings. Nonetheless, I have 
tried to be concise where possible, and only enough information for a good 
understanding is presented in the thick description that makes up chapter seven. 
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For the reader who wants a quick overview, I suggest that reading chapters one, 
five, and nine should suffice. For a more detailed account of the study chapter 
eight should be included. 
****************** 
1.11 Chapter summary 
The aim, focus, and motivation for the study that is presented in this thesis, form 
the opening sections of this chapter. The thesis is about how experts process 
decisions in a managerial role, and the research that underpins it is motivated by 
my long-standing interest in management and psychology. The study is 
considered to be important for two reasons. 
• A number of authors have stated a requirement for research that considers 
human behaviour in association with decision-making. 
• There is a deficiency in qualitative research reported in the literature relating 
to experts, managerial decision-making, and to a lesser extent human 
behaviour. 
The research is a qualitative multiple case study of domain experts who have 
become business managers. The main findings of the study are as follows. 
• The decision-making processes of the experts studied in this research appear 
to be shaped by several factors which seem to form a three-tiered hierarchy. 
The dominant force, within the hierarchy, appears to be the experts' 
behavioural characteristics. At the next level of the hierarchy, and subordinate 
to the experts' behavioural characteristics is the experts' training and 
consequent expertise. At the bottom of the hierarchy, and subject to the 
influence of both behaviour characteristics and expertise, is the decision 
context. 
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• The behavioural characteristics of the experts studied appear to have 
determined the expertise that has developed. This relationship may indicate 
that to develop true expertise there is a requirement for an alignment between 
behavioural characteristics and the requirements of the domain in which 
expertise is expected to develop, which could be described as an innate ability. 
• Expertise may, at least in part, be transferable. 
• Experts were observed to be consistent in their decision-making, with one 
noticeable exception. Experts persistently differentiate their decision-making 
processes in such a manner that they follow different processes for decisions 





An e:tpert is a man who has made all the mistakes, which can be made, in a very narrow field. 
(Niels Bohr) 
The quotation above is one example from hundreds made by famous people. This 
particular example is unusual because it was made by an expert. Niels Bohr was a 
Nobel prize winning physicist, and his comment provides an insight to many of 
the characteristics of an expert that are described in this chapter. The chapter 
draws on the extensive literature about experts to describe the features that define 
'experts' and to explain why experts are an important research topic. Additionally, 
this chapter forms a foundation for the chapters, on decision-making and 
behavioural factors that follow (Chapters 3 and 4). 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section addresses the 
importance of experts to society, and therefore as a research topic. Next, in section 
two, the question - 'What is meant by 'expert'? - is considered. There is no single 
definition of an 'expert' that clearly identifies one, so the question has no clear 
answer. Any consideration of the question raises further questions such as: What 
makes an expert? How do experts differ from non-experts? How should experts be 
defined? these questions become the topics of the remaining sections of the 
chapter. 
CHAPTER 2: Experts 
2.1 Why are experts important? 
When our society is faced with a difficult or unusual situation, the media often 
announces that 'an expert will be called in' to give guidance. Television news and 
newspapers frequently report that experts are being consulted by local or central 
government, or that a foreign expert is visiting to give advise on their specialist 
topic. The media's headline announcement, 'Experts Being Consulted', is 
intended to attract the attention of viewers or readers, to generate revenue for the 
media businesses concerned. That they so frequently chooses to use the banner 
head line 'Expert' clearly indicates a recognition that our society has a high 
respect for experts, and that the media expectation is for society to show an 
interest in the reporting of events involving experts (Shanteau and Stewart, 1992). 
To the general public an expert is anyone who seems to know more than they do 
about a subject. However, the more qualified person is often more cautious when 
referring to a person as an expert. In acquiring knowledge, the qualified person is 
exposed to errors and pitfalls associated with gaining expertise (Simon, 1979; 
Ericsson and Charness, 1994 ). This can make them sceptical about the ability of 
others. Nonetheless, many highly qualified people do defer to experts. For 
example in a recent interview Karl Ludvigsen, a former senior executive with the 
both the Ford and Fiat motor companies, answered a question asked of him by 
saying "no I leave that to the experts" (p. 132) (Thoroughbred and Classic Cars, 
1995). 
2.1.1 To better understand expertise 
Due to their exalted position, experts are fascinating as research material. Some 
fields of research, notably psychology, appear to have attacked experts with an 
application of the 'tall poppy syndrome'. They have only noticed what experts can 
not do (Edwards, 1992). However, experts have long been a source of inspiration 
for artificial intelligence studies and expert systems where experts are viewed in a 
positive light, and it is what they can do that is of interest (Simon, 1979). 
Although researchers developing artificial intelligence and expert systems, tend to 
examine expertise from their own perspective not that of the expert (Shanteau, 
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1992). A stance somewhere between the two appears to be more appropriate, if 
research into expert ability is to develop a beneficial understanding of expertise 
(Ericsson, 1997). 
When experts are studied we are generally attempting to observe their actions 
within a defined field known as their field, or domain, of expertise. We are 
actually attempting to observe experts demonstrating their expertise. It is the 
possession of expertise that identifies people as experts, and it is their expertise 
that we need to study to be informed about experts' decision-making processes. 
People who apparently are 'top performers' have been evaluated by academics, in 
numerous tasks, and found to be capable of superior performance, to perform no 
better than the norm, or to be no better than chance. This inconsistent record has 
lead some to suggest that experts are not really better than novices. (Camerer and 
Johnson, 1991; Edwards, 1992). As a consequence many researchers dismissed 
the 'expert' phenomena (Ericsson and Chamess, 1994). 
However, common observation of skilled performers has continued to support the 
conviction that experts are better performers than non-experts. Some academics, 
perhaps persuaded by the conflict between perceived expert performance and the 
evidence produced by studies of experts, have persisted with the research of 
experts, and found flaws in the early research methodology (Shanteau, 1988; 
Edwards, 1992). Explanation for the inferior outcomes focuses on three flaws in 
the evaluative process. 
• First, 'inappropriate selection' of the expert. The person being evaluated may 
have appeared to be an expert, but was in fact a novice (Shanteau, 1995). 
• Second, the task was 'outside their competence'. Expert competence is 
generally limited to a narrow, and specific domain (Ericsson and Lehmann, 
1996). 
• Third, the task was 'removed from environmental cues' consequently 
requiring the expert to work away from his/her usual working environment. 
Expert competence is frequently dependent on environmental cues that may 
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not be available to them in abnormal situations such as laboratory experiments 
(Einhorn, 1974). -
Although there is now sufficient evidence available to be confident of the 
existence of bona fide experts, instances of non-expert performance by people 
presumed to be expert will continue to be an important concern in the search to 
validate the existence of expertise (Shanteau, 1995). 
2.1.2 Social dependence 
Experts are particularly interesting because of our societal dependence on their 
expertise in so many fields (Shanteau and Stewart, 1992). All endeavours 
requiring a mix of knowledge, training, skill, and experience appear to produce 
people who out perform other participants, and thereby acquire a reputation for 
expertise. The quality of contemporary life is perceived to be dependent on 
experts in business, science, and in technology, plus numerous other areas in 
which expertise determine societies future. The literature on expert decision-
making varies from condemnation to adulation, but is consistent in its continued 
interest in experts, because, as Shanteau and Stewart ( 1992) clearly indicate, 
"research on experts matters - both to researchers and to society at large". 
When we require the services of an accountant, an architect or an engineer we 
expect that person to be an expert in their field. They need not necessarily be the 
best in their field, but certainly capable of excellent achievement within the field. 
Anything less calls into question the person's right to practice in their 
specialisation. We place this condition on the ability of any person that we tum to 
as an expert in their field. Virtually every area of expertise is associated with an 
hierarchical association based on social criteria (Ericsson, 1997). 
2.1.3 Expert status is desirable 
To be an expert is clearly a position of limited occupancy. This is because any 
task that is sufficiently complex to warrant expert competence will, by its nature 
permit few people to achieve expert status. Additionally the expert's position will 
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be constantly challenged by other people aspiring to become experts. An expert 
that cannot defend his/her position by continuous accomplishment at the highest 
level risks displacement by one of the many aspiring 'experts'. Nonetheless, many 
people aspire to the title 'expert', because expertise that is valued by society 
brings to the expert many desirable rewards (Ericsson, 1997). 
2.1.4 Experts are potentially a rich source of knowledge 
Behavioural research often begins with the observation of a representative sample 
of a population. From this sample an understanding of normal performance may 
be obtained. Here, normal means the average (modal) person in the population. If 
the study is attempting to develop an understanding of specific characteristics, or 
abilities, intrinsic to the performance, then the population should be limited to 
those who can consistently produce, at the least, a very good rendition of the task. 
Axiomatically experts are that population (Ericsson, 1997; Shanteau, 1995). 
A group of people who consistently produce better than average 
accomplishments, as experts do, is clearly a group that is rich in skill, and 
knowledge, specifically related to the task being observed. Therefore, if 
appropriate methods are applied to learn about those competencies a wealth of 
knowledge may be gained that has great implications for the benefit of the general 
population (Ericsson, 1997). 
2.1.5 Experts as managers 
I have not found studies of expert managers. It is probable that some studies of 
managers are studies of experts who have become mangers but this has not been 
acknowledged. It must therefore be recognized that there are distinct limitations 
when trying to make comments about experts based on managers generalised 
performance. 
Experts, as I argue later in this chapter, are proficient decision makers, an ability 
that, according to Simon ( 1960), is the most important skill for a manager to 
possess. Although there may be more to successful management than 'good' 
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decision-making, the ability to make skilful decisions is well recognised as an 
important part of management (Bennett and Felton, 1974; Lipshitz, 1994; 
Mintzberg, 1989, Simon, 1987). Therefore we can reasonably assume that because 
experts posses proven decision-making skills that they will be invited to take up 
management roles 
However, we must also assume that experts in any field will bring to management 
more than expert decision-making, and that the other attributes will have an 
influence on their achievements as managers. Experts, such as scientists, teachers, 
and engineers, bring to management positions a strong personal background of 
training and experience that often appears to be lacking in specific management 
expertise, yet they are apparently successful in their new roles. Are the decision-
making skills that are developed during the acquisition of their expertise the key 
to their success? Is managerial skill an integral part of expertise in some domains? 
Experts have been studied in detail by academics, and the main function of this 
chapter is to evaluate that literature, however, little has been said about experts as 
managers. As a generic classification, managers have received considerable 
attention, and the literature relating to management and managers is vast, but a 
review is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, a brief 
consideration of the skills attributed to managers leads to the conclusion that, in 
many instances, experts will have incorporated similar skills into their expertise. 
Managerial decision-making differs from personal decision-making in that it is 
guided by the "managerial point of view" (p. 1) (Bennett and Felton, 1974). 
Successful management is, according to Bennett and Felton distinguished by four 
important characteristics: ( 1) an understanding of organisational goals, (2) an 
ability to work with and through other people, (3) a willingness to accept 
responsibility, and (4) a strong rejection of the status quo. 
The four characteristics identified by Bennett and Felton, have also been 
recognised as some of the distinguishing features of experts (Ericsson, 1997; 
Shanteau, 1987, 1992), and are discussed in some detail later in this chapter. Here, 
I believe it is sufficient to state briefly what features of expertise relate to those 
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characteristics. In experts the characteristics can be seen as an ability to recognise 
and to concentrate on what is defined as important to achieve objectives; a strong 
set of communication skills which enable them to interact skilfully with people; a 
strong sense of responsibility and a willingness to accept responsibility; a drive to 
achieve exceptional performance. 
There has been much research into what 'makes' a good manager, with the intent 
of revealing the configuration, or shape of the effective manager (Bennett and 
Felton, 1974). However, the emphasis appears to have been on what mangers 
should do rather than on what managers do (Mintzberg, 1980, 1989). Mintzberg 
(1989) attempted to correct this situation be identifying ten "roles, or sets of 
behaviour identified with a [managerial] position" (p. 15) that would define a 
manager's work by virtue of his/her authority or status. 
The first three roles identified by Mintzberg, figure head, leader, and liaison are 
interpersonal roles. The next three roles, monitor, disseminator, and spokesperson, 
are informational roles. The last four roles, entrepreneur, disturbance handler, 
resource allocator, and negotiator, are decision roles. Interpersonal, informational, 
and decision-making roles are also consistent with the expectations of expertise, 
as will be made clear later in the chapter. 
Having identified ten roles that describe managers' work, it becomes clear that 
"the managers' effectiveness is significantly influenced by their insight into their 
work" (p. 22), and consequently Mintzberg concludes that three specific functions 
will determine the effectiveness of managers. First the managers must share 
privileged information with subordinates. Second, they must be able to distinguish 
what is most important from the chaos, select appropriate decisions to be made, 
and make use of suitable analytical procedures. Thirdly, managers must manage 
their time carefully to achieve important objectives. 
The three functions that Mintzberg identifies are also clearly identified by 
Shanteau ( 1987) as characteristics of expert decision makers, as were Mintz berg's 
'roles' and the four characteristics identified by Bennett and Felton, both 
discussed earlier. There is therefore, good reason to believe that experts may be 
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well suited to appropriate managerial positions. Experts bring specific and highly 
desirable characteristics to a managerial role, and are potentially excellent 
management material (Simon, 1987). In addition to being able to detect domain 
specific cues, they possess well-calibrated judgement, and they have highly 
developed intuitive decision-making skills (Hammond et al., 1987; Isenberg, 
1987; Simon, 1987). Experts are people drawn from a huge pool of differing 
influences, and who possess a proven special skill or knowledge that has been 
accepted by their associates as excellent. 
All the evidence suggests that experts are well equipped for the complex decision-
making environment that is management (Mintzberg, 1989; Simon, 1987). 
However, as a note of caution it must be remembered that expertise has been 
shown to be domain specific (Ericsson and Smith, 1991). Experts who are capable 
of excellent achievement in their field of specialisation may only be able to 
perform as experts in managerial positions that require the same mix of skills. 
Experts who, as a result of their demonstrated expertise, are selected to be 
managers of endeavours outside of their specific domain of expertise risk the 
consequences of 'The Peter Principle' (Peter and Hull, 1969). However, it appears 
reasonable to assume that most experts will be sufficiently astute to recognise the 
boundaries of their own expertise and seek out other experts to provide 
information on decisions outside their expertise (Simon, 1987; Mintzberg, 1989). 
As I stated earlier, there is little mention in the literature of experts who become 
managers. However, Maccoby (1987) identified 'expert' as one of four 
management styles; the others being protector, facilitator, and innovator. As a 
particular management style 'expert' appears to have inherent benefits and 
problems. Maccoby recognised two benefits arising from having experts as 
managers; experts value mastery of their task environment and they expect high 
standards without excessive managerial control. 
The costs associated with experts who are managers according to Maccoby, is 
their tendency to be inflexible in team situations; experts may neglect to develop 
their subordinates; experts are inclined to view all problems as technical issues 
best solved by logic which creates difficulties when they need to cope with social 
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problems. The tendency to view all problems as technical issues, ignoring 
possible social issues is particularly evident at NASA, an organisation that 
employs a large number of experts (Maccoby, 1987). 
The most important point that Maccoby makes I believe, is that the best managers 
are those who combine styles. Therefore an expert who can bring to management, 
not only expertise but also, well developed social skills to enable beneficial 
interpersonal activities to take place, is more likely to succeed as a manager than 
the expert who lacks such skills. 
2.1.6 Summary 
This section considered several features of expertise that make an expert 
important, including perceived social dependence on experts, experts as a rich 
source of knowledge, and the role that experts' can play in management. Experts 
are important because social criteria most often determines the value of expertise, 
consequently the characteristics that form an expert are important to society (and 
therefore academic research). 
***************** 
2.2 What is meant by 'expert'? 
In common usage the word 'experts' loosely describes a subset of our society. At 
one extreme the subset contains people who know enough about a subject to 
impress less informed people who view them as 'expert'. At the other extreme 
there are 'expert' experts, people who know more about a subject than anyone, 
including other experts. Between the two extremes there are people with a range 
of abilities people who for various reasons are accepted as expert. It can therefore 
be said that this subset of our society contains a hierarchy of experts. Nonetheless 
experts are generally accepted to be a people who is know significantly more 
about a task than others who have not trained to perform that task (Berger, 1988). 
The English term 'expert' developed in the 141h century. Its derivation is the Latin 
word expertus - which defined a person 'known by experience'. This, in tum, 
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derived from the Latin word 'experiri' - meaning to test or prove (Collins English 
Dictionary, 1992). 
The psychologist James Shanteau has studied experts for many years. In a recent 
paper (Shanteau, 1995) he stated that he began his search for a definition of the 
word 'expert' by referring to Webster's (1979) dictionary. He found that it means, 
"having, involving, or displaying special skill or knowledge derived from training 
or experience" (p 16). Shanteau states that he accepts peer identification when 
locating experts, however, he has defined experts as ' ... those who have reached 
the pinnacle of their profession.' (1988), and ' ... those who have been recognised 
by within their profession as having the skills and abilities to perform at the 
highest level.' ( 1992). I referred to the Collins English Dictionary ( 1989) and 
found a similar description to that in Webesters, "a person who has extensive skill 
or knowledge in a particular field". The key difference is that Webster uses the 
term 'special' whereas Collins uses 'extensive'. 
Apparently, over time the literal definition has changed, as we have seen. The 
contemporary literal definition of 'expert' does not include experience. This 
omission is, perhaps, understandable, because colloquial English is not as precise 
as that used by academics; dictionaries are for the "general reader" (p. vii) and 
must reflect common usage (Collins English Dictionary, 1992). For most purposes 
the literal definition of an expert will suffice. However, academic research often 
requires a more rigorous definition to constrain its study of experts to particular 
aspects of their abilities (Einhorn, 1974; Shanteau et al., 2001 ). This line of 
thought will be pursued in the question - 'how can experts be defined?' 
In general terms the designation expert denotes a person who has special and/or 
extensive skill or knowledge in a particular field. More specific definitions may 
be necessary for academic research, and this will be attended to in the last section 
of this chapter. 
Now that experts have been defined in general terms the question of what 
circumstances or events conspire to form an expert can be addressed. 
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2.3 What makes an expert? 
Is an expert a person who has a natural ability, or one who has had appropriate 
training? Perhaps to be an expert requires a mix of both. History records that 
many people have demonstrated outstanding ability and as a consequence been 
acclaimed as gifted. But history tends only to record the achievement leading to 
the acclamation, not the prior history that may explain the acquisition of the 'gift'. 
Genius, talent, gift, and expert, are nouns that have on occasion been used 
interchangeably to describe people who display outstanding abilities (Ericsson, 
1997; Eysenck, 1995; Jensen, 1996). Until early in the 20th century, experts were 
thought to be people with a gift or special talent, and much of the research 
concentrated on detecting innate ability. 
2.3.1 Innate ability 
Sir Francis Galton' s (1892/ 1972) study of eugenics appears to be the first 
empirical examination of outstanding human performance. Galton considered 
genius to be an inherited characteristic. Galton was a cousin of Charles Darwin, 
famous for his work, 'On The Origin of the Species' (1859), and there are 
indications that the Darwin family lineage did display inherited genius (Lykken et 
al., 1992). The grandfather of both Charles Darwin, and Francis Galton, Erasmus 
Darwin, was acclaimed as a physician, poet, and author. Also Charles Darwin's 
son Sir George Darwin was an astronomer and mathematician, distinguished for 
his work on tidal friction. 
Galton displayed the family characteristics; he was an explorer and scientist; he 
founded the study of eugenics, and the theory of anticyclones (Collins English 
Dictionary, 1992). It appears clear now that family connections influenced 
Galton's perception of the true value of inherited ability, and that he reached 
conclusions that cannot be supported, however his work is still considered to be 
important (Eysenck, 1995). Galton claimed that great achievement is based on 
innate ability, motivation and a great deal of hard work (Galton, 1892/ 1972). It 
was his belief that training and persistent effort are necessary to reach the 
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boundaries of personal achievement, although the boundary is predetermined by 
inherited, innate, ability (Darlington, 1972). 
Gallon's fundamental claim that achievement is based on innate ability, 
motivation and a great deal of hard work, is now widely accepted (Ericsson and 
Chamess, 1994 ). However, despite the enormous weight of evidence that Gallon 
produced to support his theory of eugenics it was not fully accepted. Many of 
Gallon's claims relating to inherited characteristics have subsequently been 
refuted (Eysenck, 1995), and some people, including many psychologists, 
continue to dispute the innate ability aspect of his theory (Ericsson, 1997). This is 
the 'nature/ nurture' controversy, discussed briefly at the end of this section. 
People who do not accept that 'nature' predetermines human ability, prefer the 
premise that it is 'nurture' that develops outstanding ability. 
2.3.2 Behaviourism 
By the tum of the century there had been a radical change in perspective relative 
to ability, particularly in psychology. The idea that ability was predetermined by 
inherited characteristics was largely rejected in favour of behaviourist theory that 
assumes all action is a response to our environment. John Watson, the founder of 
behaviourism, argued that humans were at rest until acted on by a stimulus 
(Medin and Ross, 1990). He argued that the stimulus aroused the person and 
caused the subsequent behaviour. The behaviourist's perspective on human 
activity has people automatically moving toward a goal in response to 
environmental stimuli, rather than initiating a particular behaviour to achieve a 
desired objective. Of all behaviourists the most radical, B. F. Skinner, has also 
been the most influential. Skinner's behaviourism theory is mainly based on 
empirical fact (Medin and Ross, 1990). It assumes that human behaviour is a 
response to the environment, which can be manipulated and controlled to 
stimulate outcomes. The analysis of behaviour, in terms of observable events, has 
been used to formulate empirical laws (Skinner, 1974; Weiner et al., 1977). 
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2.3.3 Cognition 
The development of cognitive psychology in the l 950's saw a move away from 
behaviourism, toward the middle ground between the theories of Gatton and 
Skinner. Cognitive psychologists accepted the empirical methodologies that had 
been firmly established, but questioned the absence of research into mental 
processes. In the early nineteenth century Freud developed extensive theories 
related to mental processes (Weiner et al., 1977). However, his purpose was 
different from that of the emerging school of cognitive psychology. Psychologists, 
that is cognitive psychologists, wanted answers to phenomena such as social 
judgement, coping strategies, and perceived responsibility. 
The theory, proposed by Kelly (1955), that prior experience and social context 
determine how we construe the world was a major step forward and brought 
psychological theory relating to personality to its current status. Kelly saw that 
our actions are more than the result of physical stimulus; they are determined by 
personal perception and interpretation of events. Many psychologists, perhaps 
most, accept Kelly's theory that the average person is an intuitive scientist, 
striving to predict and understand behaviour. It is considered normal to formulate 
hypotheses about our world, and then to alter our conception of the world in 
accordance. 
By structuring our perceptions of the world, we are able to anticipate events and 
to master our environment. People are motivated to achieve cognitive clarity, and 
construct systems that make the world (their environment) understandable. There 
is no 'best' conceptual system, nor any that cannot be modified, because we 
choose how to interpret events (Kelly, 1963). The theory of Personal Constructs 
produced by Kelly has been extensively applied to management research, and 
there are many variations of his original Repertory Grid Technique in use 
(Fransella and Bannister, 1977). 
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2.3.4 Nature/nurture 
It needs to be noted that the nature/nurture argument is no nearer to resolution. In 
many activities there are particular physical or cognitive abilities that will 
predispose a person toward success. These activities can be seen to favour the 
nature argument. However, there is some evidence, particularly in musical 
expertise, that ability may not be determined by natural aptitude. Modem teaching 
methods are enabling very young children to achieve results that were previously 
considered to be possible only by gifted pupils. This research is specific to music, 
an activity that is largely based on repetitious practice, and may not be applicable 
to other disciplines (Gardner, 1983; Ericsson, 1997; Ericsson and Chamess, 1994; 
Eysenck, 1995). 
2.3.5 Further consideration of innate ability 
Earlier in this section Galton' s work on innate ability was discussed, here I 
consider the work of Ericsson and Chamess ( 1994) which relies heavily on the 
premise that expertise is an acquired ability, but admits that there may be some 
mediating variable that has not been considered. As Ericsson ( 1997) 
acknowledges, appropriate and extensive practice does not always lead to 
expertise. Nonetheless, Ericsson and Chamess do not appear to accept that failure 
may be due to lack of appropriate ability. 
Perhaps there is some mediating variable that has not been considered. Is there 
some special feature that permits expert ability to form? Ericsson and Chamess 
(1994) suggested that if this link exists, it could counter their argument that 
expertise is acquired through extensive, specific, and deliberate practice, and that 
there is no requirement for innate abilities or capacities. 
Although, Ericsson and Chamess (1994) strongly support the proposition that 
expertise is a completely learnt attribute, they do acknowledge "one critical flaw" 
(p. 744) in the evidence on expert performance. The people who achieve expert 
status "are not randomly assigned to their training conditions. Hence one cannot 
rule out the possibility that there is something different about those individuals 
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who ultimately reach expert-level performance" (p. 744). Nonetheless, they 
consider a requirement for innate ability and capacity to be inconsistent "with the 
reviewed evidence". They go on to state "More plausible loci of individual 
differences are factors that predispose individuals toward engaging in deliberate 
practice and enable them to sustain high levels of practice for many years". 
Ericsson and Chamess suggest that this predisposition may be due to 
environmental factors, or that "preferred activity level and temperament may have 
a large genetic component. Furthermore, there may need to be a good fit between 
such predisposing factors and the task environment for expert level performance 
to develop" (p. 744). There are two important issues here. First, if there is any 
possibility that there is something different about people who become experts, and 
if those individual differences predispose those people towards the achievement of 
expertise, then how has the possibility of innate ability been eliminated? Second, 
if goodness of fit between the predisposing factors and the task environment are at 
all critical, then extensive, specific, and deliberate practice alone seems unlikely 
to result in the acquisition of expertise. 
In addressing the first issue, concerning innate ability, it is interesting that 
Ericsson and Chamess suggest that a genetic component may account for a 
person's disposition, while at the same time discounting the possibility of innate 
ability. Both are by definition present at birth, and it is difficult to distinguish 
between the two. Nonetheless, whether they are genetic or innate appears to be 
less important than the acceptance that behavioural characteristics are 
fundamental determinants of how expertise is acquired. There is evidence that a 
hereditary, or genetic component does account for behavioural characteristics 
derived through the configurable model of genetic inheritance (Eysenck, 1995; 
Lykken et al., 1992). Therefore, the idea that genetic inheritance can account for 
at least some aspects of expertise appears to be valid. 
The second issue arising from Ericsson and Chamess statements, goodness of fit 
between the predisposing factors and the task environment, builds on the first. If 
the acquisition of expertise is dependent upon the existence of some predisposing 
characteristics then either of two possible situations may exist. First, if experts are 
in some way collectively different from other people in respect to the acquisition 
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of expertise, but otherwise the same as one another then it may be expected that 
extensive, specific, aRd deliberate practice could be the only requirement for the 
acquisition of expertise. However, this would suggest that all experts have the 
same predisposition, and this is simply not acceptable. 
A second, more plausible explanation for the goodness of fit, would accept that 
the similarity between experts can be defined by their collective difference from 
non-experts, while also accepting that experts are different from one another. 
Different in that they possess an idiosyncratic predisposition, which will 
determine their goals and the distinct paths they will follow to achieve those goals 
(Eysenck, 1995). Environmental factors such as socio-cultural influences, 
location, and opportunity will undoubtedly influence the possibility of an 
individual becoming an expert, as will the effort that is applied to its achievement, 
but without the predisposition, be it genetic or innate, the development of 
expertise appears to be less likely to occur. 
2.3.6 Summary 
A combination of natural ability, motivation, training, and plenty of hard work 
apparently make an expert. The literature does not clearly indicate that there is 
any hierarchy within the requirements although it seems clear that the last three 
alone can produce a degree of expertise (Ericsson, 1997). However there is also 
strong argument to suggest that the presence of natural ability, along with a 
willingness to work hard for the attainment of expertise, enables superior 
performance (Eysenck, 1995). 
In the context of my research, Kelly's (1955, 1963) theories, in conjunction with 
the cognitive style theories discussed in Chapter 4, may help to develop a new 
perspective on the decision-making process of experts. Experts may be people 
who have exceptional cognitive clarity and consequently superior understanding 
of their environment (their world), due to the appropriate alignment of their 
personality and cognitive style with their personal interpretation of events. 
[Aspects of cognitive psychology and pertinent research from the literature are 
considered in Chapter 4] 
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In the previous section experts were explained in general terms. This section has 
examined the makeup of an expert in terms of how experts occur. The following 
section examines the characteristics that distinguish experts from others. 
****************** 
2.4 What separates experts from non-experts? 
Experts' display defining characteristics that are evident to informed observers 
( Camerer and Johnson, 1991; Ericsson, 1997; Ericsson and Chamess, 1994; 
Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; Shanteau, 1995; Simon and Chase, 1987). Within 
their domain of expertise, experts usually make better decisions than non-experts 
(Simon and Chase, 1987). That experts' make better decisions should be expected 
given the general definition of 'expert' mentioned earlier. However, some 
researchers claim to have found contrary evidence to show that experts do not 
consistently make better decisions (Carroll and Johnson, 1990). This 
distinguishing feature of experts decision-making ability is examined shortly. It is 
followed by a consideration of why experts are different from non-experts, and an 
examination of some of the abilities that enable experts to perform better than 
non-experts' by working 'smarter'. 
2.4.1 Experts are different 
There are differences between expert and non-expert decision-making that 
become clear when the two are observed working on the same problem. 
Obviously experts have superior knowledge and experience within their domain 
of expertise, and this provides them with a greater understanding of problems that 
will be faced. However, it is how they use their expertise that sets them apart. 
Non-experts tend to be goal specific, and work backwards from the goal in their 
search for a solution, as do researchers when attempting to explain an outcome 
(Simon, 1987). Goal specific decision-making implies moving away from the 
problem incrementally, so not lose the direction, in search of the solution. 
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In contrast experts have developed the ability to identify the appropriate path to a 
solution and process available information in a general, non-goal specific manner, 
while working towards their objective (Baron, 1988). As a simple example if a 
non-expert were to be faced with a problem requiring the construction of a 
machine, then the search procedure would probably require taking the machine 
apart to understand how it works. An expert would be familiar with the machines 
workings and therefore be able to select appropriate components to construct a 
similar machine. This analogy also demonstrates another subtle difference 
between expert and non-expert. The expert may use his/her prior knowledge to 
build a replacement machine that incorporates improvements or refinements over 
the original. The non-expert would need to disassemble the machine to build an 
identical copy, and would be unaware of any alternative construction possibilities. 
2.4.2 More appropriate decision-making 
As the example above demonstrates, the two distinct problem-solving methods 
mentioned tend to be mutually exclusive. Working backwards, known as 
means/ends problem solving, is goal specific and does not build experience in 
general problem solving. The method prevents the development of a history of 
problem types by decision makers, but it does ensure that they will attempt to 
reach a solution in the most direct way possible (Baron, 1981 ). Experts, with a 
history of problem solving to call on, will tend to be 'mechanistic' in their 
approach to a solution. They will work through the established procedures that 
make up their expertise to determine a 'good' solution to satisfy the problem, but 
it will not necessarily be the 'best' solution. On occasion, their solutions may be 
technically less efficient than those produced by goal specific search procedures, 
but because of their expertise the solution will be arrived at more quickly and will 
possibly be more appropriate because the decision will, for instance, make better 
use of resources. 
2.4.3 Limitations 
Working towards the problem allows the expert to identify and match problems 
and solutions for future use, but it does tend to lock the expert into 'tried and 
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trusted methods' when new, possibly quicker, or better solutions become 
available. Baron ( 1988) suggests that this may be the cost of expertise. However, 
working backwards may be the only suitable method for solving new problems for 
which prior knowledge or experience is not available. Furthermore, the 
knowledge gained from working backwards does not readily transfer to the non-
goal specific mode of problem solving used by experts, which is demonstrably 
more versatile. 
2.4.5 Generalisation rather than specialisation 
The non-goal specific mode of decision-making that is a feature of expertise is 
particularly interesting. It unexpectedly, but clearly, demonstrates that although 
experts are specialists within a very narrow field of expertise, they use generalities 
to search for answers to problems within their specialisation, not specific solutions 
unique to the problem faced. In contrast non-experts are forced to use problem 
specific solutions because they cannot draw on the breadth of information that is 
available to the expert. 
In summary experts are different not only because they possess greater knowledge 
and experience than non-experts but also because in general, experts have more 
appropriate decision-making skills enabling them to produce better-processed 
decisions. Better-processed decisions tend to be more accurate (see calibration 
below), and more consistent (Isenberg, 1986). Additionally, experts may focus on 
different information and/or use different strategies to perform a task, so experts 
cannot be thought of as being merely faster and more efficient than novices. 
Expert performance is based on different processes. As their expertise has 
developed, the expert's decision-making skills have evolved to use a different 
methodology (Hammond et al., 1987; Simon, 1987; Ericsson and Chamess, 
1994). 
2.4.6 Experts form accurately calibrated decisions 
Calibration, that is good calibration, is dependent on background knowledge, and 
an ability to relate that knowledge to the problem faced. Therefore, experts can be 
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expected to have the appropriate knowledge within their domain of expertise. 
Experts are able to assess the accuracy of the decisions that they make, as they 
make them (Camerer and Johnson, 1991). They gauge the answer against their 
intuitive grasp of the probable answer (Einhorn, 1974). This is a facility that was 
demonstrated by mathematicians, engineers, architects, and many other people 
who used a slide rule to make calculations before the advent of the pocket 
calculator. Slide rules required the user to insert decimal points, a function that 
required an intuitive grasp of an approximate answer. This awareness of probable 
outcomes, known as calibration, is an important component of the consistency of 
expertise, and distinguishes experts from others, because most people are not well 
calibrated (Kleindorfer et al., 1993). 
Earlier I noted that experts use generalities to work towards the resolution of a 
problem. They intuitively use their thorough understanding of the domain to 
identify diagnostic cues, and appropriate heuristics to guide them through the 
decision process towards the best solution (Simon, 1987; Ericsson, 1997). 
Intuition, cues, and heuristics are an important part of the expert's makeup, and 
justify further discussion. 
2.4.7 Intuition 
It is generally recognised that intuition plays an important role in an individuals' 
decision-making. Decision makers frequently rely on their own judgement 
without reference to the processes developed through decision theory (Lipshitz, 
1993). Experts follow this pattern. Consequently, while acquiring their expertise 
they can be expected to develop an ability to apply their knowledge intuitively. As 
a result experts will tend to rely on their own judgement, based on their expertise 
and extensive passed experience, without reference to decision-making aids. This 
reliance on intuitive decision-making frequently produces exceptional results, 
although disastrous results are not uncommon (Shanteau and Stewart, 1992; 
Targett, 1996). 
Expert intuitive judgement may be a combination of heuristics, identification of 
diagnostic cues, weighting information, and other analytical methods that have 
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become sufficiently incorporated into the expert's decision-making processes that 
they appear to be intuitive. (Hammond et al., 1987; Simon, 1987). This 
'automated expertise' (Simon, 1987; Schoemaker and Russo, 1994) would enable 
the expert to make decisions that are apparently intuitive, because the complex 
decision-making processes that the non-expert would refer to, have become part 
of the normal thinking process for the expert. Furthermore, because the expert is 
conversant with a diverse range of decision-making skills, and applies them 
appropriately through intuition, their expert intuitive judgement can actually be 
superior to their formal analytical analysis. This facility enables an expert to 
anticipate formal calculations and to accept or reject them on the basis of their 
intuitive judgement (Hammond et al, 1987; Hammond, 1996; Simon, 1987). 
Intuitive decision-making is quick and simple. However there are two flaws 
commonly associated with intuitive decision-making. Whether an expert or a non-
expert makes them, random inconsistencies and systematic distortion may be 
present in decisions that are based on personal judgement, (Schoemaker and 
Russo, 1994 ). [Random inconsistencies and systematic distortion are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 3.] 
Although there are numerous published studies of expert decision-making 
(Ericsson and Chamess, 1994), our understanding of why a person who possesses 
expertise is consistently able to transcend the achievements of apparently equally 
qualified people is still a mystery. Simon has told Mintzberg that the answer lies 
in habituated analysis, but Mintzberg is sceptical and prefers to consider the 
possibility of additional, as yet unidentified abilities (Mintzberg, 1989). It is 
perhaps because of Simon's interest in artificial intelligence, and his need to 
capture complete thought processes that he is, as Mintzberg states, unwilling to 
accept the notion of intuition as something other than grounded habituated 
analysis. Ericsson and Chamess (1994) align with Simon, and suggest that the 
explanation is lengthy and specific practise. 
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2.4.8 Cues 
Diagnostic cues are indicators or signals that contain important information 
related to a problem, and an expert becomes adept at recognising them (Ebbesen 
and Konecni, 1975; Einhorn, 1974). Cues identify and delineate the problem for 
the expert, and are probably the first indication that there is a problem. Cues may 
relate positively or negatively with one another. Understanding this and being able 
to predict the effect of the relationships is an important feature of expertise. 
Experts, due to their familiarity with the environment, their domain of expertise, 
are adept at detecting cues. However, experts, treatment of cues will differ. 
Experts follow different paths to acquire their expertise; as a consequence their 
experience and training may cause them to process information differently. A 
distinction here is important, an assessment of domain constraints and 
requirements form part of the recent developments in the study of experts, and this 
point is reinforce later under in the discussion about the desirability of a general 
theory of expertise the (J. Shanteau, personal communication, September 29, 
2000). Nonetheless, all experts tend to cluster information. Experts group similar 
cues, or gives them similar ratings to ease the information processing; a coping 
strategy to contend with bounded rationality (Newell and Simon, 1972; Simon, 
1979, 1982). In the process of identifying and grouping cues, the expert is 
measuring the 'amount' of the cue. Many cues are not quantifiable, quality, taste, 
and smell for example, but the expert has to assess the 'amount' of the cue so that 
the degree of influence can be assessed. (Gaeth and Shanteau, 1985; Kleindorfer 
et al., 1993; Phelps and Shanteau, 1978). 
The presence of cues permits an appraisal of expert performance (Einhorn, 1974). 
By evaluating the use of cues, internal validity, construct validity, and judgmental 
bias can be tested. Internal validity is a measure of the expert's ability to 
reproduce an assessment based on the cues. High internal validity, or 
repeatability, is a measure of decision-making reliability, and is clearly a 
requirement of expertise. 
Construct validity in this instance refers to the process that the expert constructs to 
enable decision-making to proceed. Validity of the construct (process) requires 
36 
CHAPTER 2: Experts. 
that the expert's decision-making processes lead to appropriate solutions. By 
accepting construct validity based on appropriate solutions there is an allowance 
for differences in training and experience that experts have when acquiring their 
expertise. Experts will in all probability develop different constructs, or processes, 
to evaluate information, but they will lead to similar solutions. This is convergent 
discrimination (Einhorn, 1974). 
Construct validity should also display discriminatory validity in multidimensional 
decisions. When dissimilar information is processed the outcome should also be 
markedly different. For example the correlation between assessments of the same 
cue by different experts should be higher, than the correlation between the 
assessments of different cues by different experts (Einhorn, 1974 ). 
Cue detection and information structuring are important diagnostic functions for 
evaluating information, and Cues are also important features of cognitive 
perception; Chapter 4: Cognition, will consider both. 
2.4.9 Heuristics 
Herbert Simon is well known for his theories of bounded rationality, which refer 
to the constraints on the information processing ability of managerial decision 
makers ( 1976). Simon is drawing attention to the fact that decision-making is very 
complex, and requires an ability to find, and use, heuristics that permit huge 
spaces to be searched very selectively (Simon, 1978). Heuristics are particularly 
relevant to the expert. Throughout the process of developing expertise an expert 
will be exposed to existing heuristics, and as an expert they can be expected to 
have created heuristics of their own. Intuition and personal heuristics are what 
Simon refers to as analytical skills that have become absorbed by the expert to the 
extent that they are automatic and can be used without conscious effort (Simon, 
1987). [Heuristics are considered in more detail in Chapter 3] 
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2.4.10 Experts make better decisions 
Experts are specialists. They work in a specific, often narrow domain. Experts 
concentrate their efforts on mastering the skills required to be an expert. 
Consequently experts' abilities are confined to the specialised narrow domain in 
which they are acquired; their skills are domain specific (Ericsson, 1997). It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that, because they are masters of their domain, the 
decision-making of experts will be better than that of non-experts who are not as 
familiar with the domain. Reliability, validity, and consistency of expert's 
decision-making have been examined in the performance of bona fide experts 
working in many different roles. Three examples are often quoted; the study of 
parole decision makers by Carroll et al. ( 1982), the study of court judges by 
Ebbesen and Konecni (1975), and the study of pathologists by Einhorn (1974). 
These studies have acquired some importance within the literature, and therefore 
warrant further consideration here. 
2.4.11 Parole decisions 
Carroll et al. ( 1982), considered the performance of parole interviewers' 
predictions and found that it was not good, and could easily be bettered by 
mathematical models. This study is interesting because it finds that all the 
variables but one, considered by the parole interviewers were valid predictors of 
the future performance of parolees. Prison conduct was the one variable that 
appeared to cause the parole decisions to be inaccurate, yet it was shown that 
prison conduct did not correlate with parolees' performance. 
The study showed that the parole interviewers decisions and consequent parole 
recommendations were based on subjective judgement not on a database of facts. 
Additionally many of the judgements were based on an assumed relationship, not 
on a definite correlation. All parole decisions considered as a matter of course the 
parole applicants' behaviour while incarcerated; it was an essential part of the 
parole decision system. This occurred despite the absence of any demonstrated 
link between behaviour while incarcerated and future criminal action. The only 
identified correlation being an inclination toward nonconformity. Additionally, 
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parole interviewers' predictions, in their domain of expertise, were found to be 
consistent and fundamentally accurate. The processes followed were consistent, 
and decisions made were good. However, the parole interviewers' performance 
was clearly constrained by a parole system that ensured bad outcomes by 
requiring a flawed weighting system to be used in the decision-making process. 
The use of scientific mathematical tools devised to predict outcomes provided 
only limited accuracy (Carroll et al., 1982). However, even though the actuarial 
model used as a comparative measure did provide slightly better predictions than 
those of the parole interviewers Carroll et al. concluded that scientific prediction 
was no better. They suggest that at best actuarial models may moderate the 
'apparently' less accurate subjective judgements made by decision makers. It is 
possible that their choice of the word apparently is an acknowledgement that it is 
not a legitimate comparison, having used different information in their actuarial 
model from that available to the parole interviewers. 
The decision process followed by the parole interviewers was seen to be flawed, 
and should not therefore be used as an indictment against expert decision-making. 
The parole interviewers demonstrated the computer jargon 'garbage in, garbage 
out'. As a result of the study by Carroll et al., the Parole Board changed the 
criteria for parole decision assessment to consider specific misconduct and rule 
breaking while incarcerated. The intention of this change was an attempt to ensure 
that the experts' assessment of the parolees' prospects, on release from custody, 
would be better reflected in the decisions taken. The change may remove the 
systematic flaw and eliminate an illusory correlation that Carroll et al. suggested 
as a possible cause of the parole interviewers' predictive errors. 
In summary, the study of parole interviewers demonstrates that experts do make 
skilful and appropriate decisions when valid information is available to them. 
Carroll et al. analysed many of the assumed relationships on which the parole 
interviewers based their decisions and found that in instance where the 
relationship forms a valid correlation then decisions made based on this 
relationship were accurate. 
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2.4.12 Court judges 
The study of court judges, by Ebbesen and Konecni ( 1975), considered the setting 
of bail m a simulation experiment and compared the outcome with observed 
results m the judges' natural domain. The simulation experiment required 
eighteen judges to independently consider eight fictitious case histories containing 
relevant material based on prior record, ties to the area, district attorney's 
recommendation, and the defence attorney's submission. A factorial analysis was 
used to evaluate the judges' response to the four types of information used to 
arrive at a bail recommendation. Results showed that the judges were apparently 
influenced by three of the four types of information: prior record, ties to the area, 
and the district attorney's recommendation. The fourth, the defence attorney's 
submission, had no significant effect on the bail set by the judges. 
For the second part of the study five of the original eighteen judges were observed 
in a real bail-setting situation in court, and their recommendations were seen to be 
markedly different from those of the simulation experiment. The judges' bail 
setting in the court room, their natural domain of expertise, was apparently 
influenced solely by the recommendations of the attorneys, and in particular by 
the district attorney. 
Although there are obvious differences in the judges' performance, in each of the 
settings, the judgements on bail setting were consistent. Therefore, reliability and 
validity are present in each case. The contentious point is the judges' performance 
in the laboratory setting. It is an example of why performance, measured as 
outcome, is not a valid indicator of the exactness of the process that produces it 
(Lipshitz, 1989), and emphasises the importance of evaluating experts within the 
domain in which they routinely apply their expertise. Ebbesen and Konecni 
acknowledged that stopping at the simulation experiment would have produced 
misleading information, which could have supported a false claim. Instead, their 
research indicates that court judges make reliable and valid judgements, although 
the judgements may be different in different settings. 
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In summary, Ebbesen and Konecni have convincingly demonstrated that an 
accurate study of expert performance is dependent on a proper understanding that 
experts interact with their environment; that is, the importance of the naturalistic 
study (Cohen, 1993). This is a clear demonstration of experts requiring 
environmental cues on which to base their judgement; in this case other court 
personnel. However, within each of the experimental situations, Ebbesen and 
Konecni found that the judges were consistent. The authors emphasise the 
importance of recognising that controlled laboratory experiments may not produce 
results equivalent to those gained in naturalistic settings. 
2.4.13 Pathologists 
Einhorn (1974), established what he considered to be "necessary, if not sufficient 
conditions" (p. 562) to define an expert for the purpose of his study of "judges" 
(p. 562) dealing with multidimensional information, in this case pathologists 
evaluating biopsy slides. Einhorn considered that experts' judgement should be 
highly reliable; that is, each expert should produce similar results. Also the 
experts should demonstrate convergent, and discriminatory validity, implying that 
they should use similar analytical methods or constructs. Additionally, Einhorn 
expected experts to be consistent, in that they should use information in similar 
ways. 
The pathologists were asked to evaluate 193 biopsy slides for the presence of nine 
important characteristics, each to be rated on a nine-point scale. They were then 
asked to provide a diagnostic evaluation of the overall severity of disease present, 
rated on a nine-point scale. Finally, the pathologists were asked to re-evaluate 26 
slides, twice, to establish their ability to reproduce their judgement, otherwise 
known as test-retest reliability. The pathologists were not given any information 
other than the slides so that their analyses would not be influenced. The 
multidimensional aspect of the task was preserved so that contextual effects and 
interactions could "play whatever role they normally did'' (p. 564). 
Einhorn used extensive mathematical analysis to evaluate the data. He concluded 
that there was agreement between the pathologist's analysis of the data and their 
41 
CHAPTER 2: Experts 
diagnosis, demonstrating reliability and consistency. He also found convergent 
and discriminatory validity, demonstrating the use of similar constructs. However, 
the pathologists apparently did not attach similar values to the various pieces of 
information presented. Einhorn suggests two reasons for this. First, there may be 
several alternative paths to a solution, and second there may be more than one 
way to perform the cognitive tasks leading to a solution. Consequently Einhorn 
decided that although agreement between experts may be desirable it might not a 
necessary determinant of expertise. He commented that it is often the 
disagreement between experts and subsequent arguments that leads to the 
establishment of new knowledge. 
There are two closely related features of expertise that Einhorn did not examine 
because his experiment structured the task, making consideration of them 
unnecessary. However, he apparently considered cues and creative problem 
structuring to be important. In his final discussion Einhorn states that experts may 
be able to make better use of cues than non-experts. He also suggested that 
experts may be more creative in thinking of solutions. Einhorn recognised that in 
a non-experimental setting problem structuring is important, and he thought that 
the two features would influence how the expert structured tasks. This influence 
was demonstrated in the preceding examples: 'parole decisions' Carroll et al. 
(1982), 'court judges' Ebbesen and Konecni (1975). 
In summary, Einhorn's study demonstrated that the experts studied were 
consistent and reliable in their decision-making processes. He also identified the 
importance of contextural cues and problem structuring. Additionally Einhorn 
suggested, in what appears to be the first acknowledgement of its possibility, that 
behavioural idiosyncrasies may influence the decision process. 
2.4.14 The process/performance paradox 
An examination of parole decisions (Carroll et al., 1982), court judges (Ebbesen 
and Konecni, 1975), and pathologists (Einhorn, 1974) has shown that experts 
make well-processed decisions. Their decision processes follow logical 
associations; they are consistent, reliable, and appropriate. However, two of the 
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three instances also demonstrate that though the processing of information to form 
a decision is good, the end result, the decision performance or outcome, may not 
be correct. This is the process/performance paradox identified by Camerer and 
Johnson (1991 ). 
It is apparent that some researchers evaluate experts' ability by assessing their 
decision processes, and others by evaluating their decision performance or 
outcome. Camerer and Johnson (1991) recognised a clear difference in 
perspective between these two major approaches to the investigation of decision-
making by experts. They identified these approaches as behavioural research and 
cognitive research. 
Behavioural research, according to Camerer and Johnson, is based on an 
evaluation of decision outcomes. This research indicates that experts performance 
is often no better than that of non-experts. Additionally, they claim that 
behaviourists believe that mathematical models often produce superior results. It 
must be mentioned that Camerer and Johnson's suggestion that the study of 
decision outcomes is a behavioural approach is contrary to the opinion of many 
researchers who claim to be following a behavioural approach (see for example 
Lipshitz, 1994, Klein et al., 1993). Cognitive research focuses on the process 
followed by experts. Simon ( 1979) among others followed this path in artificial 
intelligence research. 
I have already argued that expert decision-making processes are good. Carroll et 
al. (1982), Ebbesen and Konecni (1975), and Einhorn (1974), clearly 
demonstrated this. The contentious issue is why, if the processes are good, are the 
outcomes not always good? This question has been answered in part by the 
examination of the work on parole decisions and court judges. First, if the 
information on which the experts have to base their decisions is not correlated 
with the outcome then decision processing will not correct this flaw. Second, as 
the court judges demonstrated, experts are domain dependent. Therefore, it is to 
be expected that away from their domain of expertise contextual cues will be 
missing, and information will consequently be missed, or wrongly assessed. 
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Consistency in expert's decision-making was identified as a problem in some 
early research (Sarbin, 1944; Meehl, 1954) and the image has been perpetuated 
(Camerer and Johnson, 1991; Carroll and Johnson, 1990). Therefore, some 
consideration of the evidence is appropriate. 
2.4.15 Methodological flaws 
Some of the earliest reports claiming to be studies of experts were in fact not. 
Hughes' report of 1917 on grain judges, and the later report in 1962 by Trumbo, 
Adams, Milner, and Schipper, evaluated expert grain judge's performance for 
reliability and validity (Shanteau and Stewart, 1992). Both studies concluded that 
the experts' performance was inconsistent and no better than that of less 
experienced judges who graded wrongly approximately one third of the time. 
The studies of grain judges are suspect for methodological reasons that were not 
evident to the authors at the time of their research. The people accepted as experts 
for the purpose of these studies would not now be acceptable. They qualified as 
experts by virtue of experience and/or peer identification with no apparent 
measure of skill, an essential component of any contemporary definition. 
Therefore, in this case it can be seen that the 'experts' were possibly no more 
expert than the less experienced judges. 
2.4.16 Forecasting ability 
The study of parole interviewers discussed earlier (Carroll et al., 1982), highlights 
the difficulty of the task faced by experts in a very complex and inherently 
uncertain decision-making environment. Parole interviewers faced with a 
predictive decision may have to resort to guesswork like anyone else, and the 
results may not be good. This outcome is not unusual; people generally perform 
no better than chance when making judgement under uncertainty. The problem 
here is that experts may often refuse to accept that they are not capable of 
persistently good performance in uncertain conditions (Carroll and Johnson, 
1990). 
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Experts' knowledge grows as they develop their expertise. This enables them to 
make excellent analytical decisions. They can see new patterns, assess variables, 
and test creative ideas (Shanteau, 1987). They carry out clearly superior 
information processing, usually making excellent choice within their domain of 
expertise, but their ability to predict or forecast future events is often no better 
than chance. However, some experts may not readily accept this negative 
outcome, because they are accustomed to success and have difficulty in accepting 
that their skills are not universally beneficial (Camerer and Johnson, 1991 ). 
2.4.17 Mathematical tools 
In the study of parole interviewers (Carroll et al., 1982), the experts were asked to 
make an unaided assessment of the likely outcomes for future events; an intuitive 
assessment of possible future events. Assessing future events, known as 
forecasting, normally uses sophisticated mathematical tools to calculate 
probabilities. Mathematical tools should be superior to unaided judgement that is 
why they are developed. Consequently there should be no surprise when 
mathematical models produce better-forecast results than unaided experts basing 
their judgement on intuition. In fact there would be some concern if they did not. 
The comment by Carroll et al., that the scientific prediction was no better than 
that of the parole interviewers, referred to the use of mathematical tools, and 
suggests that the parole interviewers performed well in very difficult 
circumstances. 
Comparing the performance of an expert with that of a mathematical model is not 
a fair comparison. It is what Hammond et al. ( 1987) call indirect. By this they 
mean that a persons' intuitive effort is compared with systems that are person 
independent such as analytically derived rules, or equations that are held up as 
standards of rationality. 
For research purposes the mathematical models are invariably provided with all 
the accurate, and only accurate, information required to calculate a result, and the 
calculation is always correct. In reality the selection of an appropriate model for 
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each type of forecast that an expert makes, and the acquisition of accurate data for 
the model, will be vulnerable to the same difficulties that face an expert. 
If, when using mathematical models, researchers were faced with the same kind of 
problems that face an expert then perhaps mathematical forecasts would not 
perform as well as is claimed. An expert can face a combination of difficulties 
brought about by insufficient information, incorrect information and/ or 
inappropriate theory. These difficulties mixed with possible human errors m 
assigning numbers to formula or in making calculations, and the use of incorrect 
models exacerbated by lack of time (temporal constraints that are not imposed on 
a researcher's model), can mask the validity of an experts actions. When expert 
forecasts are wrong, often the decision was appropriate and the result within the 
bounds of an expected outcome, although the actual end result may be sub-
optimal (Carroll and Johnson, 1990). 
2.4.18 Experts may be better than mathematical models 
By comparison, the incorrect outcomes from mathematical models can be totally 
erroneous and meaningless. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that expert 
decision-making is superior to mathematical models in non-routine, complex, and 
theory rich domains of expertise (Camerer and Johnson, 1991 ). Although the idea 
that experts should be capable of making consistently accurate decisions is 
appealing, there is little logical reason to expect it. Consistently accurate expert 
performance must be dependent upon complete knowledge of events within the 
domain of expertise. Anything else is guesswork. Furthermore, it is only in an 
ideal world that an expert is always going to have complete knowledge. 
As an example, we can consider the position of a weather forecaster. These people 
are often well trained and educated with many years of specific experience, and 
due to sophisticated surveillance equipment, have information about the latest 
weather patterns. They can interpret the information available to them accurately 
to identify existing conditions, and they can often make good estimates or 
predictions about future weather patterns. Nonetheless, when complex weather 
patterns are presented, they may be unable to provide more than an indication of 
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the possible weather for the following day due to the uncertain and volatile 
activity of nature. 
2.4.19 A comparison 
A study of expert decision-making that compared an experts' unaided decision-
making, that is without the use of analytical tools, with his/her decision-making 
with the access to analytical tools, would be interesting. This direct comparison of 
intuitive ability and analytical skill should better inform us about the relative 
effectiveness of both cognitive methodologies, as they will employed the same 
basic data (Hammond et al., 1987). However, some people are not comfortable 
with mathematics; others delight in mathematical complexity and relish the 
challenge of mathematical modelling. As a consequence experts who are not 
mathematically inclined are unlikely to easily adopt mathematical methods and 
perhaps lack confidence in mathematical calculations thereby creating a reliance 
on their intuitive judgement. Conversely, experts who use mathematical 
methodologies as a part of their normal processing will readily have access to the 
best analytical data to compare with and possibly support their intuitive 
judgement. Therefore, the human variability may confound the kind of 
comparison proposed by Hammond and his colleagues. 
2.4.20 A mismatch 
Experts can be expected to fail when there is a mismatch between their cognitive 
abilities and environmental demands (Camerer and Johnson, 1991 ). Under 
mismatching circumstances experts are effectively required to work outside their 
domain of expertise, in effect as non-experts. The evaluation of decisions and 
decision-making by outcomes, rather than by the procedure that produced the 
outcome. is widespread but inappropriate (Lipshitz, 1989). Accuracy should not 
be seen as a measure of performance, but as a measure of potential performance. 
Actual performance by an expert can only be evaluated by taking all of the 
decision criteria and prior probabilities into account (Harvey, 1992). 
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Section summary. 
More than knowledge and experience separates experts from non-experts. They 
use their expertise to make better decisions which when analysed exhibit different 
information processing methods from those of non-experts. Experts may take a 
'mechanistic' approach to decision-making, and they rely heavily on intuition, 
cues, and heuristics to make well-calibrated decisions. 
My conclusion, from the forgoing examination of the literature, is that bona fide 
experts do possess superior decision processing ability, although performance 
may not always support this. As Lipshitz (1994), Barron (1988) and others have 
recognised, there is a clear distinction between process and performance and the 
first does not necessarily produce the second. Within their domain of expertise 
experts do appear to be better decision makers than non-experts, at least in terms 
of their decision-making processes. Additionally, experts can produce more 
appropriate and therefore better results than mathematical models when they have 
access to similar information. However, factors external to the experts' domain of 
expertise may cause performance failures. 
******************* 
2.5 How can 'expert' be defined? 
The preceding three questions asked about experts to stimulate answers that 
clarified and examined the important characteristics that distinguish an expert. 
However, the answer to the first question, - What is meant by 'expert'? -
concluded that academic research requires a more rigorous definition than the 
literal one presented. Therefore this section considers the question - How can 
'expert' be defined? - and examines some of the definitions that have been put 
forward by other researchers. 
It is apparent that no single definition succinctly encapsulates the concept of an 
'expert'. In fact this may not be possible. There is a wide range of expertise, and it 
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may be necessary, as Einhorn (1974) has shown, to define the particular 'experts' 
being studied. But that does not excuse us from having a precise description to 
define experts in general, to ensure that experts are being studied. 
There are effectively two camps studying experts: those that accept experts as 
better than normal performers, and those that do not. Shanteau and Ericsson are at 
the forefront of those that do, and Camerer and Johnson appear to lead those that 
do not. 
Camerer and Johnson (1991) chose to define an expert as "a person who is 
experienced at making predictions in a domain and has some professional or 
social credentials" (p. 196). They draw no distinction between people who are 
qualified, and superior performers, unlike Ericsson and Smith ( 1991 ), and 
Ericsson and Chamess (1994). Neither do they distinguish between experts by 
peer selection, as does Shanteau (1988), nor do they follow Shanteau (1995) by 
identifying the best. 
The experts that Camerer and Johnson (1991) identify are the experts that a 
layperson may identify. They include doctors, academics, accountants, and 
scientists as people who, in the eyes of a layperson, are qualified to know the 
answers to questions beyond a layperson's knowledge. This definition is 
extremely simple and convenient because it is easy to locate 'experts' using this 
type of definition. 
However, the statements by Camerer and Johnson (1991 ), indicating that experts 
selected using their criteria do not perform better than non qualified people, must 
call into question the validity of their definition of 'expert'. Are they examining 
bona fide 'experts', or simply qualified people without the prerequisite extensive 
skill, or knowledge, that defines an expert? The additional criteria, used by 
Shanteau (1988), of peer selection may ensure that the 'expert' is indeed an 
expert, not a novice with fresh qualifications and little experience. 
Research credibility is dependent on precise definitions, whatever the subject 
material. This is particularly so with the study of experts, because the word 
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'expert' is in common use in colloquial English, and may create confusion and 
consternation; in the same way that the word 'significant' does - due to its 
statistical connotations. Even if we disregard common usage problems, we should 
still strive to be scientific in our methodology. 
Internal validity that is within the subset 'experts' is an obvious scientific 
requirement, and it is not clear that it is being met. To use the old analogy, are we 
comparing 'apples' with 'apples'? In many instances we are not. Furthermore, if 
we do not accurately, and clearly, define the characteristics that define the objects 
of our research, then we may inhibit the replication of our studies. Consequently 
this restrains the development, and testing of theory, as well as calling into 
question the relevance of our research. 
Eysenck (1995) suggests that guidance, if and when we go wrong, is to be found 
in the scientific wisdom of criticism, replication and improvement. However, my 
criticism here is intended to suggest that improvement, in the form of a precise 
definition of experts, should come before replication. With a precise definition, 
consistently applied, internal validity may be achieved and replication becomes 
meaningful. 
In the remainder of this section I examine some of the existing criteria for 
defining experts, then I discuss what may be required for the development of a 
comprehensive definition of 'experts'. 
2.5.1 Professional and tertiary qualifications 
In any given field of expertise there are very few people who reach the top, and 
their moment of glory is often brief, as others overtake their achievements. 
Therefore, research that examines experts usually examines the less than perfect 
performance. Additionally, the mix of expert and novice will vary from one expert 
to another, and it will vary in the individual over time, as each expert gains more 
expertise. To ensure that a person is more 'expert' than 'novice', educational and 
professional institutions often established qualifying thresholds. Well-established 
disciplines will have a history of desirable performance and achievement to use as 
a benchmark, against which practitioners can be gauged. This may take the form 
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of tertiary qualifications or professional exams (Camerer and Johnson, 1991; 
Ericsson and Chamess, 1994; Shanteau, 1988). 
An inherent problem with defining experts by qualification is that the 
qualification standards are set by 'experts', and are a minimum standard 
(Shanteau, 1995). Some professional qualifications, such as accounting, law, and 
engineering, may require a period of professional practice, or experience, before 
awarding qualifications, though in many professions this is not the case. Very few 
tertiary qualifications have a practical content sufficient to do more than establish 
some familiarity with the application of the discipline involved. 
As a consequence, landscape architects for example, spend several years, after 
qualifying, working on the basics to prove they are 'expert', before being 
permitted to work on projects that involve risk to people and the environment. 
Similarly, medical doctors have to undergo several years as a resident to develop 
and prove their expertise before they can work independently. Therefore, all 
newly qualified people cannot reasonably be expected to be a bona fide expert. 
Some will require a lengthy period of practice in their discipline to achieve that 
distinction. Therefore, I conclude that academic qualifications, in some instances 
be desirable, but they are clearly not sufficient. 
2.5.2 Peer selection 
It is widely accepted by researchers that peer selection is a valid tool for 
identifying experts for research purposes. Nonetheless, identifying an expert can 
pose problems. Shanteau ( 1988) chooses peer selection as a viable method for 
identifying experts, although he acknowledges that peer identification can lead to 
problems. However Shanteau states that he has not been able to find a better 
"starting point" (p206). Shanteau' s (1995) identification procedure centres on 
"consensual acclamation" (pl7) and other forms of recognition such as job titles. 
Shanteau does not elaborate on what he means by 'starting point', but considering 
that he believes "only the best at what they do deserve to he called e>.perts" 
(p.17), it may be reasonable to assume that he has had occasion to 'fine tune' his 
selection of experts, perhaps indicating that peer selection is not a perfect solution. 
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There are many degrees of expertise (Shanteau, 1995), and to be an expert in the 
eyes of 'others' may only imply that the 'others' are less capable, not that the 
'expert' is the best at what they do. Expertise is often a matter of perception. A 
person with a higher skill level than the observer may be perceived as an expert. 
Therefore an expert becomes a person with higher skill, or knowledge, than the 
observer. Consequently the higher (or lower) skilled the observer is, the higher (or 
lower) skilled the expert is. This conundrum has created research problems, which 
have been identified as inappropriate selection (Ericsson and Chamess, 1994 ), and 
justifies the establishment of a well-formed definition of what constitutes an 
expert. 
Inappropriate selection is, surely, a flaw in the rationale used in many of the early 
studies of agricultural judges, and other 'experts', who consequently proved not to 
be better than novices at the task examined (Shanteau and Stewart, 1992). In these 
early studies people were designated to be experts by their peers, apparently in 
deference to their experience, or time served on the job, not their extensive skill or 
knowledge related to the function being assessed. 
However, when Phelps and Shanteau (1978) evaluated the performance of 
livestock judges, the performance of the judges had been tested and proved to be 
better than that of other livestock judges. Phelps and Shanteau selected the judges 
from the Kansas State University senior livestock judging team, a position the 
judges held due to peer selection. The judges were, according to Phelps and 
Shanteau ( 1978), university trained, highly skilled, and had placed first in national 
judging competitions. Consequently the outcome of the study appears to 
demonstrate that peer selection can be successful if the population from which the 
'experts' are selected has the prerequisite skills or knowledge base. However, 
although acknowledgement of experts by their peers is helpful, the possession of 
special skills or knowledge required for expertise is essential (Ericsson and 
Chamess, 1994; Shanteau, 1995). 
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2.5.3 Superior performance 
What is superior performance? Common sense suggests that we should expect 
experts to make better judgements than non-experts. If experts have access to 
superior knowledge, extensive experience, plus proven skill we should be able to 
expect them to consistently produce superior results. Unfortunately the issue is not 
as clear as common sense suggests. As mentioned in an earlier section, Carroll 
and Johnson (1990) discussed several instances of expert judgement and found 
that in many cases the experts were not consistently better performers than non-
experts, and could in some instances be bettered by mathematical models. 
Camerer and Johnson (1991) produced similar evidence in support of their 
'process/performance paradox'. This paradox asks why people can apparently be 
expert at processing information but non-expert when making decisions with the 
information. 
Knowledge, extensive experience, and practice in a specified domain prepares an 
expert for decision processing within that field of expertise (Ericsson, 1997). 
However, their decision-making performance, that is the decision outcome, is 
dependent on the quality of the information available to them for processing as a 
decision. Additionally, the decision performance is subject to external influences 
beyond the decision-making expert's control. Therefore, it can be seen that 
consistent decision processing forms an essential part of expertise (Einhorn, 1974; 
Shanteau, 1995), but consistent performance ( or decision outcome) does not 
(Camerer and Johnson, 1991; Carroll and Johnson, 1990). 
To clarify this important point, consider how an person acquires expertise. It is 
generally accepted that expert ability is established over a development period of 
ten years or more (Ericsson, 1997; Shanteau, 1987; Simon and Chase, 1987), 
through deliberate practice of domain specific functions. There is no evidence that 
during this period any effort is applied to producing a superior, or even an 
improved end performance. All effort is applied to the acquisition of improved 
ability in the task process, not the end goal, which is often not defined. There 
appears to be a tacit assumption that deliberate and prolonged practice will lead to 
an improved performance, but no calculated procedure is followed in order to 
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secure success. Consequently, end performance is not part of the expert domain, 
and it is inappropriate to consider the performance of experts in this area as 
representative of their expertise (Harvey, 1992; Lipshitz, 1989). Nonetheless, 
outcomes do matter to an expert, that surely is why they strive to be expert, and 
outcomes are important to those who look to experts for results. The point here is 
that an expert ability does not guarantee outcomes, because there are many factors 
beyond the experts control, it does however ensure that the process that is 
followed is the best possible under the prevailing circumstances. 
2.5.4 Establishing the existence of superior performance 
Ericsson and Chamess ( 1994), following the earlier definition by Ericsson and 
Smith (1991), defined an expert as a person capable of "consistently superior 
performance on a specified set of representative tasks for the domain that can he 
administered to any subject" (p. 731 ). They claim that this definition "meets all 
the criteria of laboratory studies of performance and comes close to meeting those 
for evaluating performance in many domains of expertise" (p. 731 ). The validity 
of this definition is questionable. For 'any subject' to be able to give a 
meaningful, or non-trivial response, they would need to possess the required 
know ledge and skills to perform the 'set of representative tasks for the domain'. 
In other words it would exclude anybody who did not have the 'expertise' to 
perform the tasks. This definition would only compare 'experts' with '-experts', 
not differentiate between 'experts' and 'non-experts'. 
The definitions presented by Ericsson and Smith ( 1991 ), and Ericsson and 
Chamess (1994) have some similarity to the statement by Shanteau (1995) - "that 
only the best deserve to he called expert" (p. 17). However, in requiring superior 
performance, Ericsson and Smith (1991 ), and Ericsson and Chamess (1994) are 
not selecting the best, just those better than most. They identify superior 
performance as "someone performing at least two standard deviations above the 
mean level in the population" (p. 731 ). Statistical selection does ensure that those 
selected are better than the others within the population, but it does not guarantee 
that they are actually good at what they do. In trivial terms they could be 'the best 
of a bad bunch'. 
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2.5.5 Uniqueness 
To quantify experts, in the way suggested by Ericsson and Charness (1994) above, 
appears to restrict the research to tasks that can be compared with a statistically 
significant population with objectively derived criteria for assessing performance 
across the population. Global standards, frequently, do not exist for the real-world 
problems that experts contend with, and the only standards that are available are 
those set by experts as the threshold to their domain. Furthermore, bona fide 
experts often work in a domain of their own. They have developed their 
competence to a degree that it becomes different from others, not better than. 
Experts in a domain often differ dramatically from one another in how they 
perform tasks, even though their overall performance is of similar quality (Stewart 
et al., 1992). Consequently there is no population to which they can be compared, 
other than the population of experts that they inhabit possibly as the sole 
inhabitant (Shanteau, 1988). 
Leading academics in the field generally accept that an expert is a person who is 
highly trained in a particular field of expertise and has demonstrated an acceptable 
level of competence within that field to their peers; usually demonstrated by the 
achievement of academic or professional qualifications. Nonetheless specific 
studies may require particular conditions to be met. When introducing his study of 
Expert Judgement, Einhorn (1974) asked if the generally accepted definition is 
sufficient, or if more objective criteria should be defined. He set out what he 
considered to be "some necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for defining 
expertise within a given situation" (p. 562). The conditions that Einhorn refers to -
identifying, weighting and combining, and agreement on environmental cues - are 
components of cognitive perception, and determinants of cognitive style. Einhorn 
only briefly touched on this aspect of expert judgement. He referred to the 
problem of extracting "weak signals from background noise" (p. 562), a 
phenomena that as been studied by many researchers attempting to gain an 
understanding of cognitive perception (Witkin et al., 1971; Weisstein and Wong, 
1988; Sutter et al., 1989; Nothdurft, 1991), but apparently not by people studying 
expert judgement. 
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Numerous studies of experts have reported on this subset of the human population 
(Edwards, 1992; Ericsson, 1997; Ericsson and Charness, 1994; Ericsson and 
Lehmann, 1996; Hammond et al., 1987; Shanteau, 1995; Shanteau and Stewart, 
1992; Simon and Chase, 1973). Each report has carefully detailed the findings and 
attempted to explain them in terms of the definition of expert that has been 
adopted. Many studies take the definition of expert as a given, while others define 
experts as they, apparently, feel appropriate (Carroll et al., 1982; Einhorn, 1974). 
The definitions are as diverse as the studies that use them (Shanteau, 1995), to the 
extent that there has to be some concern. Cited research, that has used a markedly 
different definition of experts, may not be valid support for the research being 
reported. 
In attempting to determine what an expert is, there is a desire to demonstrate that 
an expert could be an entity with definable characteristics that will have generality 
across all domains of expertise (Ericsson and Smith, 1991 ). Given the huge 
diversity of activities that experts are engaged in, and the disparity of 
physiological and psychological requirements, an all-embracing theory is clearly 
desirable, but most unlikely for the same reasons that make it is desirable The 
variation in what constitutes expertise in different domains, such as pathology and 
weather forecasting for example is vast (J. Shanteau, personal communication, 
September 29, 2000). 
A general theory of expertise would simplify the research eliminating much of the 
duplicated effort. It would also facilitate the dissemination of prescriptive theory. 
However, experts are a subset of a widely varied human population, which does 
not easily accept generalities. There are many subsets within the human 
population, and cultural studies indicate that the difference within groups is 
greater than the difference between groups (Weiner et al., 1977). 
Different cultures, different social groupings, different education, different access 
to resources, different geographic location, and many other factors combine in a 
multiplicity of ways to form experts (Ericsson, 1995). With such a variety of 
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formative factors, developing an all encompassing theory will be difficult, 
although realistically we can expect some aspects of expertise to be consistent. 
To this point this section has examined some of the existing criteria for defining 
experts, now consideration is given to the requirements for establishing a 
comprehensive definition. 
2.5.6 Two common goals should determine the definition of 
experts 
From the literature several characteristics can be collected that separate expert 
accomplishment from that of non-experts. A selection of the identifying features 
may provide the defining statement that is sought. Following Einhom's (1974) 
lead, experts could be simply people who skilfully apply their acquired training, 
and knowledge in a specialised field. Some scholars have accepted this definition 
as sufficient (see for example Carroll et al., 1982; Carroll and Johnson, 1990), and 
it meets the requirement for clarity and conciseness necessary for a definition, but 
it lacks precision. There is no indication of how well trained, or knowledgeable a 
person must be, and the degree of skill is not established. 
Skill, training, and knowledge are all, to some degree, measurable, and should be 
measured to establish minimum criteria for expert status. These three criteria are 
the fundamental constituents of developed ability and are easily identified. 
Professional and tertiary qualifications exist and may be used to establish a 
knowledge and training thresholds in domains of expertise that have these 
benchmarks. In domains that do not have established benchmarks other criteria of 
a similar standard will be necessary. The skill factor appears to be developed 
through lengthy and persistent practice (Ericsson, 1997), and a minimum period 
of ten years seems to be appropriate (Simon and Chase, I 973; Shanteau, 1995). 
Measurement of these factors will not be exact. There is always a margin of error 
in any measurement, but consistent measurement can be built upon, and permits 
meaningful comparisons to be made (Eysenck, I 995). 
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It is necessary to decide why experts are being studied and what is expected to be 
learnt from these studies before defining experts. To do this there must be a theory 
in place before seeking facts (Eysenck, 1995). That theory will establish goals, 
which will in tum determine how experts should be defined. Clearly scholars 
should establish their own theory to motivate their research, but it is reasonable to 
suggest that one goal for all studies of experts is to attempt to understand how 
experts accomplish what they do. It also seems reasonable to suggest that another 
goal is be able to compare research related to experts with other studies of the 
topic. 
Researchers have two goals in common: to understand the accomplishments of 
experts, and to be able to compare the results of our labour. The accomplishment 
of the first goal is greatly aided by satisfaction of the second. In fact, now that 
there is a large body of literature on experts, the second goal is, in most instances, 
more valuable to the advancement of knowledge about experts, than the first. 
Therefore the goal that should determine the definition of experts is the need to be 
able to compare new work with that of other existing work. Consequently 
parameters are needed that define experts with some precision. The necessary 
definition should establish a clear and concise description of an expert so that one 
can be easily identified. When identified he/she will posses at least the necessary 
qualities to meet the established criteria of expert, possibly more, never less 
(Ericsson, 1997). 
If the term 'experts' is accepted as a classification of a subset of the human 
population with particular abilities, then the subset's position along a continuum 
representing ability can be established by establishing boundaries between the 
subset and other members of the population who posses abilities that differ from 
those of an expert. Once a model is established consideration can be given to what 
should be included in, or excluded from, the classification. This requires some 
consideration of what constitutes ability, how it is attained, how it is identified, 
and how it is measured. The definition needs to be concerned with developed 
abilities, not natural ability which is a subject for other studies, such as giftedness 
and genius (Galton, 1869/1972; Ericsson and Chamess, 1994; Eysenck, 1995). 
This does not exclude people who have special abilities from our definition. It 
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merely excludes the requirement of special abilities as a necessary factor for 
classification of a person as an expert. 
2.5.7 A minimum standard may be sufficient 
For the study of experts, a minimum standard is arguably the only important one 
since it eliminates non-experts. An upper limit would differentiate between 
experts, perhaps separating 'expert' experts, from lesser experts. This may be 
desirable for some studies. When comparing the ability of a chess grandmaster, 
for example, with less able, but still expert, masters of chess (Simon, 1979). 
However, an upper limit does not appear to be essential for defining experts. 
Additional defining criteria to isolate a particular type of expert could be added 
when necessary (Einhorn, 197 4 ), but that then limits comparison with other 
research and may therefore better avoided where possible. 
It has been identified that no single definition is sufficient in its self, but several of 
them identify criteria that are necessary for the definition of experts. Experts must 
have excellent knowledge and extensive experience within a specialised field, plus 
the skill to apply their knowledge and experience appropriately. These are 
essential ingredients of expertise, although possession of these attributes alone is 
not sufficient to define an expert. This can see this by considering Einhorn's 
( 197 4) study of three pathologists. 
Einhorn identified several 'conditions' that were necessary for his study, a 
specific evaluation of pathologists' ability to evaluate information, but did not 
state what would, in his opinion, be sufficient to be sure that he was, in fact, 
studying experts. His three subjects were pathologists, a specialisation requiring 
extensive training and detailed knowledge of disease. However, one of Einhorn's 
'experts' was a resident, a term used to describe a person training as a specialist 
after completing a period as an intern, and was, as Einhorn states, "learning his 
task to some extent" (p. 570). Nonetheless, the resident would have been highly 
educated and trained and experienced in the field, although of questionable expert 
status, particularly in view of the difference between his performance and that of 
the other pathologists. In all probability the resident became as accomplished as 
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the other pathologists, but at the time of Einhom's study he clearly was not an 
expert. 
There has to be a point at which a person moves from being a highly qualified 
novice to an expert. Clearly this transition will not be a moment in time. 
Individuals will require more or less development depending on many factors, 
such as aptitude, dedication, opportunity, etc. so the actual change from novice to 
expert will take place at varying stages of development. 
Nonetheless, to separate experts from non-experts we must have a gauge that we 
can measure experts against. This has been provided by the results of extensive 
research showing that people take a minimum of ten years to develop a mastery of 
their specialisation. Furthermore, it is now understood that without persistent and 
specific practice over an extended period of more than ten years, experience will 
not necessarily lead to superior ability (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; Shanteau, 
1987). Simon and Chase (1973), and Ericsson (1997) mention the need for an 
extensive period of persistent practice to develop 'expert' ability, but surprisingly 
none use this characteristic as a defining issue. However, it appears to be a key 
component in the definition of 'expert'. This development period proves the 
inadequacy of some of the definitions mentioned earlier. In particular it shows 
that for research purposes at least defining experts by professional and tertiary 
qualifications, or using a literal definition is not sufficiently precise. 
From the above we can accept that an expert is a person with at least ten years 
development in a specialised field. This must be included as another necessary 
factor, but it is not in itself sufficient. There are many people who have worked 
for ten or more years in a specialised field who have not developed expertise to 
the level of 'expert' (Ericsson, 1997; Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; Shanteau, 
1987). 
It may not be possible to define experts objectively. Excellent knowledge, 
extensive experience, skilful application of knowledge and experience, and a 
development period in excess of ten years are all strong defining attributes in 
themselves, but they do not completely define an 'expert'. As Ericsson (1997) has 
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stated, there are many people who have aspired to expert status, and have worked 
diligently to develop the necessary attributes, but for some reason they have not 
made the grade. 
Many criteria are said to be defining characteristics of experts but no combination 
of them appears to completely represent the phenomenon. In the final instance the 
definition appears to be subjective. If a person has knowledge, experience, and 
skilled application, which have taken ten years or more to develop, is he/she an 
expert? The only arbiter is performance, which, due to its nature, cannot be 
objectively measured. If it could be measured then we would not have a need for a 
definition, because the satisfaction of the measurement would suffice. The only 
available gauge of an experts' performance with reasonable validity, is evaluation 
by associates. Shanteau (1995) has frequently used peer identification to locate 
experts for his research. [Note: I use the term 'associates' to describe people who 
are involved in the field of expertise, but who are not the equal of the expert, as 
the term 'peers' implies]. 
In summary the essentials for a definition of 'expert' appear to be based mainly on 
prior ability (inputs), not achievements (outcomes), as the list that follows 
indicates: 
• Possession of specialised knowledge. 
• Possession of specialised experience. 
• An ability to skilfully apply both. 
• Acquisition of expertise through appropriate and persistent practice. 
• Achievement of expert status requires a minimum of ten years specialisation. 
• Recognised by associates as better than most. 
2.5.8 Experts who do not meet the criteria 
As a cautionary note it should be realised that new fields of endeavour and 
perhaps rapidly changing fields may permit a person to demonstrate some of the 
requirements of expert ability without having a mastery of the field. For example, 
a person may be at the leading edge of skill, or knowledge acquisition within a 
new discipline, such as computers, and satisfy many of the necessary criteria for 
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expert status, such as recognition by their associates. Nonetheless, although they 
are able to perform at a superior level to their associates, they are not yet 
sufficiently conversant with governing principles that mediate outcomes within 
the new field. Furthermore, they are unlikely to become 'expert' due to the rapidly 
changing nature of the discipline. Therefore their ability, though superior to less 
experienced practitioners, will lack the consistent excellence that is characteristic 
of the true expert, and they should not be considered as 'expert' (Einhorn, 1974; 
Ericsson and Charness, 1994). 
********************* 
2.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I examined the literature that relates to experts. I began by 
considering why experts are important. I discussed a perceived societal 
dependence on experts, and the possibility that an understanding of experts may 
be greatly beneficial for the general population. In this first section I also 
discussed the potential of experts as managers. In many domains of expertise, 
experts appear to combine managerial skills with their more specific task abilities, 
and there are indications that those managerial skills may be transferable to a 
managerial role. 
After the preliminary discussion, I asked the obvious question, what is an expert? 
I attempted to provide an answer through four questions that appeared to be 
important when considering the main question. 
The subordinate questions are presented below, each with a brief synopsis of the 
material presented in answer to the question. 
First question - What is meant by 'expert'? 
62 
Answer: In general terms the designation expert denotes a person who has 
special and/or extensive skill or knowledge in a particular field. However a 
more rigorous definition may be required for academic research. 
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Second question - What makes an expert? 
Answer: A combination of natural ability, motivation, training, and plenty 
of hard work apparently make an expert. 
Third question - What separates experts from non-experts? 
Answer: More than knowledge and experience separates experts from non-
experts. They use their expertise to make better decisions which when 
analysed exhibit different information processing methods from those of 
non-experts. 
Fourth question - How should an 'expert' be defined? 
Answer: A rigorous definition requires that an expert has achieved 
specialised knowledge and experience, and an ability to skilfully apply 
both through appropriate and persistent practice over a minimum of at 
least ten years specialisation, and is recognised by his/her associates as 
better than most in the designated vocation. 
An evaluation of the answers to the four questions above provides a complex 
answer to the main question, what is an expert? The answer is summarised as 
follows: 
( 1) Expert status evolves over time. It may require ten or more years for a person 
to develop sufficient expertise to be recognised as a bona fide expert 
(Ericsson, 1997). This period of ten or more years to become an 'expert' is 
indicated by extensive research and appears to be an important benchmark in 
'expert' research. 
(2) Expert ability is constrained by the domain of expertise (Ebbesen and 
Konecni, 1975, Stanovich, 1999). Through extensive training and experience 
experts develop specific abilities, which are often domain specific. This 
implies that away from their domain of expertise they are non-expert. It may 
be that their skills are appropriate in a different environment, but referring to 
(4) and (5), the expert may not be able to locate the critical information cues. 
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(3) Experts are different from non-experts. As their expertise develops and they 
acquire better decision-making processes (Baron, 1988), they become 
mechanistic in their approach to decision-making. Experts acquire the ability 
to identify the appropriate path to a solution, and process available 
information in a non-goal specific manner while working towards the goal. 
(4) Experts are able to perceive information that is either incomprehensible or 
simply not visible to non-experts (Shanteau, 1992b ). Experts have an acute 
understanding of their domain of expertise. This enables them to identify and 
understand information cues that would possibly be missed by a person who is 
not familiar with the domain. 
(5) Experts can recognise and interpret complex patterns of information and 
critically discriminate between relevant and redundant information (Shanteau, 
1987). This builds on ( 4 ), because an expert is acutely aware of events within 
their domain of expertise they can see relationships between cues. 
(6) Experts are able to manage and manipulate the decision process to 
accommodate their particular expertise (Klein, 1998). This builds on (3), 
because experts have a mechanistic approach to decision-making, they can 
select their preferred procedures. 
(7) Experts rely on intuitive judgement to guide them towards and often provide a 
solution to a problem (Hammond et al., 1978). This builds on ( 4) and (5). 
Experts are acutely aware of events that take place within their domain of 
expertise, consequently they can form intuitive conclusions about probable 
outcomes, and therefore possible solutions. 
(8) Experts are able to assess the accuracy of the decisions that they make as they 
make them (Kleindorfer et al., 1993). This is related to (7). Experts, because 
of their familiarity with their domain of expertise, can use intuitive judgement 
to assess the accuracy of formally derived solutions. 
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From this list of characteristics that distinguish an expert it is seen that all but the 
first two can be- described as cognitive functions. The first (1) is a measure of the 
time required by the cognitive processes to develop all the other abilities listed 
and the second (2) determines the limits of an expert's superior cognitive 
development. 
It comes as no surprise to find that experts are dependent on a highly developed 
cognitive system, because even the most rudimentary observations lead to a 
conclusion that experts posses more knowledge than non-experts. A more 
thorough examination of the cognitive behaviour associated with expertise is 
presented in Chapter 4 [ section 4.1]. However, although expertise appears to be 
firmly based on appropriate cognitive behaviour there is apparently no indication 
that expertise requires above average cognitive ability (intellect), only that the 
abilities associated with expertise appear to be possible due to highly trained 
cognitive functions (Eysenck, 1995). 
This chapter has examined descriptive theory concerned with experts to provide a 
foundation for the next chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) to examine topics that are 
interwoven with knowledge about experts. Chapter 3 examines pertinent decision-
making literature to determine how to evaluate the decision-making processes of 
experts. Chapter 4 examines behavioural factors to consider the mediating 
influences (cognitive) that impinge on the expert. 
******************* 
65 




A review of some critical aspects of decision-making theory 
Experts, as explained in the previous chapter, are particularly good decision 
makers within their domain of expertise. This chapter examines aspects of 
decision-making theory that may be present in experts decision-making processes. 
Consideration is given to the kind of decision-making that individuals can, 
reasonably, be expected to meet in a managerial context. In the previous chapter it 
was established that expertise is a cognitive ability, therefore the focus of this 
chapter is on aspects of decision-making theory that may be susceptible to 
cognitive variables. These cognitive variables are examined under the umbrella of 
psychological factors in the next chapter. 
The chapter begins with brief reviews of (I) the origins of decision research, (2) 
the meaning of decision-making, and (3) decision-making situations. Next, (4) 
decision-making theory is examined with an emphasis on aspects that may 
influence expert decision-making. The chapter concludes (5) with an examination 
of factors that determine how decisions are made, with an emphasis on decision-
making in a managerial context. 
CHAPTER 3: Decision-making 
3.1 The origins of decision research 
It is clear that decision-making has been a subject of academic research for many 
years. There is documented evidence that Aristotle and Euclid discussed decision-
making (Suppes, 1984 ). More recent discussions in the 181h century by 
philosophers, mathematicians, and economists, such as Kant, Bayes, Laplace, and 
Smith, laid the foundations for the study of decision-making. At the beginning of 
this century philosophers, economists, and probabilistic mathematicians continued 
to dominate decision-making research. However, later in the century other 
disciplines, notably management (previously engineering) and psychology, began 
to study decision-making. (for a more detailed coverage of this material see 
Bernstein, 1996). 
********************* 
3.2 The meaning of decision-making? 
Decision-making has in the past been differentiated from problem solving by the 
fact that alternatives were considered to be known to the decision maker, but 
needed to be discovered by the problem solver (Simon, 1966). However, it is now 
accepted that this model does not reflect the circumstances faced by decision 
makers in a business environment, who must often make decisions with uncertain 
alternatives (Simon, 1993). Therefore problem solving is now studied under the 
rubric of decision-making. 
Decision-making has different definitions amongst authors. March ( 1994) states 
that "by far the most common portrayal of decision-making is one that interprets 
action as rational choice" (p. 1 ), but decision-making is defined as "a 
commitment to action" (p. 261) by Langley et al. (1995), and Lipshitz (1994) 
considers decision-making to be "a process of reasoning" (p. 62). Raiffa (1994) 
defined decision-making as " .. . a choice involving uncertainty of outcomes, 
possibly including uncertainties arising from the deliberate, but not completely 
predictable, actions of other" (p. 4). 
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In simple terms decision-making can be seen as a process of finding a path 
between the initial state (problem recognition) and the desired state (problem 
solved). 
******************** 
3.3 Decision-making situations 
Decisions can be made under conditions of certainty, uncertainty, risk, or conflict 
(Schoemaker and Russo, 1994 ). Under certainty, decisions have predetermined or 
known outcomes, and are judgmental decisions; for example is A better than B? 
Decisions under uncertainty are in effect a gamble without knowledge of outcome 
probability, as for example when buying a present for a parent, or opening a new 
business without a market survey. Decisions under risk are a gamble with known 
probability, as occurs when betting on horse racing, or when opening a business 
based on a market survey. Decision under conflict takes place in an environment 
where the competition may attempt to counter the decision, as in chess and many 
competitive business situations. 
******************* 
3.4 Decision-making theory 
There are essentially two separate schools of thought on decision-making, which, 
to a large extent, are mutually exclusive; the normative school and the descriptive 
school (Tversky and Kahneman, 1990). However, both schools are concerned 
primarily with procedural rather than substantive rationality (Simon, 1979b ). This 
suggests that there should be a close relationship between normative and 
descriptive decision theories provided that decision makers act rationally within 
the constraints of their cognitive abilities and the constraints of their decision-
making environment. This ability to act rationally within personal and 
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environmental constraints is known as bounded rationality, and is discussed in 
more detail later. 
Both the normative and descriptive areas of enquiry have developed prescriptive 
theories (Kleindorfer et al., 1993; Raiffa, 1994), and there is now a new 
naturalistic approach, which is primarily descriptive, attempting to establish new 
theories (Doherty, 1993). I now examine each of the theoretical approaches in 
tum, starting with normative theory. 
3.4.1 Normative theory 
Classical decision theory is founded on the concept of a rational actor adhering to 
a set of axioms. This is normative theory. It is dominated by subjectively expected 
utility theory (SEU) and multiattribute utility theory (MAUT). SEU and MAUT 
can function as normative, descriptive, or prescriptive models, but in any of these 
forms they are not accepted as good normative models of human behaviour 
(Doherty, 1993). 
Many economists and mathematicians persistently (and intentionally) ignore 
deficiencies in their assumptions about the environment in which they are to be 
applied, concentrating on the ideal, or normative, model. The normative school 
continues with the ideas put forward by the economists Keynes and Pareto, that is 
with subjective expected utility, optimising, and probability, to achieve the goal of 
the rational decision maker (Simon, 1992). This is classical economic theory, and 
it requires the decision maker to follow a highly rational procedure for making 
decisions. It assumes that decision makers have consistent preferences, know their 
preferences, and know the alternatives available to them. It also assumes that the 
decision maker has access to information about the consequences of selecting 
each alternative, and will combine the information according to the expected 
utility rule, which weights outcomes by their probability of occurrence (Carroll 
and Johnson, 1990). 
In normative terms it is important to be able to distinguish rational from irrational 
decision-making. Rational decision-making, otherwise known as rational choice 
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or rational judgement is, a distinctive behaviour that seems to be appropriate for 
the achievement of specified goals, within the limits imposed by existing 
conditions and constraints (Simon, 1976). Irrational decision-making implies 
decision-making that does not, for any reason, follow the desired process as 
defined by normative principles (Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, 1988). 
3.4.1.1 Rationality 
It is important to my study, to consider the difference in the meaning of the term 
'rational' in the context of decision-making from the perspectives of an economist 
and a psychologist. The following definitions derive from Simon ( 1976). 
• To economists 'rational' is axiomatically defined as maximising over some 
time interval, the anticipated value of a utility function. In other words it is an 
action or choice. 
• To psychologists 'rational' indicates an intellectual process that leads to a 
choice'. 
The distinction between the two is critical for the assessment of decision-making 
from a behavioural perspective, which I write more about later, and explains why 
the study of decision-making by psychologists comes under the rubric of 
cognitive processes (see Chapter 4). 
Rationality is to many authors synonymous with normative theory, and often used 
interchangeably (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). This does not reflect the true 
picture. All normative decisions are by definition rational, but the reverse is not 
necessarily true. Rationality is, by the above definitions, an intention to follow an 
established procedure. This in no way restricts the decision maker from 
proceeding in a rational manner outside the bounds of normative theory. 
Information available is not always accurate or based on correct assumptions, and 
additionally the contingent decisions of others can have unexpected and possibly 
unavoidable consequences. This may cause an erroneous and apparently irrational 
decision, but it will in fact have been reached by following the correct, rational 
procedures. In short, the decision maker is not assumed to be a clairvoyant. 
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3.4.1.2 Bounded rationality 
Early attempts to create artificial intelligence fo11owed the normative model. In an 
effort to imitate experts, computers were programmed to make decisions using 
normative methods. However, a conclusion was reached that the human brain is 
unable to compute calculations in the manner envisioned due to the brain's limited 
processing capacity. This conclusion lead Simon (1957) to propose the widely 
accepted concept of bounded rationality. 
As mentioned earlier many decision theories anticipate that decision makers will 
usually fo11ow rational patterns of action that can be predicted, given an 
understanding of the decision rules and the options available. However, Simon 
( 1945/1957) cautioned that it is impossible for a single, isolated individual to 
behave that a high degree of rationality may be reached. There are so many 
alternatives to be examined, and the information available so vast that it is 
difficult to believe that the decision maker can come close to objective rationality 
Individual choice, as Simon states, takes place in an environment of 'givens', such 
that assumptions are accepted by the subject as bases for his/her choice, and the 
decision makers behaviour wi11 adapt only within the limits set by these 'givens'. 
More recently Simon concluded that any theories that attempt to include 
constraints on the information processing ability of the decision maker should be 
ca11ed 'theories of bounded rationality' (Newe11 and Simon, 1972). 
Simon is confirming that decision-making can be very complex and inte11ectua11y 
demanding. As Lopes (1992) states in her comments about Simon's work on 
bounded rationality, "Simon does not suggest that people are dumb, his argument 
is that problems are hard" (p. 253). Decision-making requires an ability to create 
reasonable approximation procedures and heuristics that wi11 a11ow immense 
spaces to be searched very selectively. This ability to menta11y examine and 
interpret the environment is the basis for the development of inte11ect, and is 
mediated by perceptual ability. It forms the core of inte11igence (Simon, 1978), 
and Stanovich ( 1999) presents evaluation of the role of inte11igence in rational 
decision-making. 
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3.4.1.3 Incremental decision-making 
Bounded rationality is still a rational action, based on decision-making as a 
sequential process. There are decision-making models that are thought to be 'less 
rational', such as Lindlom 's (1959), incremental model. In this model decision 
makers are said to search for alternatives that are only slightly different from the 
existing situation. This happens repeatedly, with the decision maker making 
frequent small changes. Nonetheless, it is usually assumed that these incremental 
changes are arrived at through a rational process. 
3.4.1.4 A prescriptive role 
Classical decision theory not only takes on a normative function it also takes a 
prescriptive role to explain how the rational actor, otherwise known as Economic 
Man, would follow a rational and uniquely appropriate path to a decision (Beach 
and Lipshitz, 1993). The prescriptive role implies that if decision makers behaved, 
as they should then classical theory would also be descriptive of peoples decision-
making behaviour. 
3.4.1.5 Section Summary 
In summary, normative theories may be the best procedures to follow optimum 
outcomes when making decisions, but they have limited value for the individual 
decision maker. This is because normative theories do not allow for the 
environment in which the decision maker is required to make decisions. 
Normative theory prescribes mathematically sound methods by which the 
decision maker may be able to achieve an objective. However, the under lying 
theory that supports normative models is based on human judgement, therefore it 
is difficult to say whether the optimal model or the human representation captures 
the essence of the decision more adequately (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). 
Nonetheless, the fundamental value of normative theories is that they provide the 
optimum solution, often an unreasonable goal for mere mortals, but a worthy goal 
to aspire to (Baron, 1988). 
A crucial flaw in rational decision theory, from the behavioural perspective, is that 
assumptions about rational action do not consider real decision makers (Beach 
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and Lipshitz, 1995; Simon, 1979). First the decision-making rules and the options 
available for decision-making may have little similarity to circumstances faced by 
decision makers, and second due to circumstances best know to the decision 
maker, they may not behave in the anticipated rational manner [although not 
necessarily behaving irrationally]. Therefore, normative theory cannot adequately 
describe observable human decision-making (Beach and Lipshitz, 1993). 
Additionally, mathematical and economic models of decisions frequently do not 
compare favourably with the conditions faced by decision makers in a business 
environment (Orasanu and Connolly, 1995), and the models fail to recognise the 
limited ability of the decision maker to cope with all the options that are 
presented. 
As a final comment on normative theories, it appears that because they are 
dependent on the 'rational actor' they have no place for the creative person who 
may find alternate processes to reach a valid conclusion. My concern lies with 
Einhorns (1974) comment that there are many instances where "oddballs did not 
agree with anyone, yet were proved to be correct by subsequent events". This is 
particularly relevant in a study of decision-making by experts. Experts are known 
to be creative problem solvers (Hammond et al., 1987; Shanteau, 1987). Irrational 
decision-making as defined by Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, (1988) considers the 
general case not the creative exceptions that may be capable of finding a better 
process to reach a decision (Einhorn, 1974). Stanovich (1999) considers 
individual differences in decision making and provides a further perspective on 
the rational versus irrational issue. 
3.4.2 Descriptive theory 
Many researchers now pursue decision-making from a perspective that asks how 
people make decisions, rather than how should decisions be made (Payne, 1982). 
Tversky and Kahneman ( 1986), Mintzberg ( 1976), and Simon ( 1955) have 
expressed concern that decision makers are often unaware of psychological effects 
associated with decision-making, or of how to resolve them when they are aware. 
This has caused researchers to develop a behavioural perspective of decision-
making, which describes what decision makers do. Tversky and Kahneman ( 1986) 
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justified this in their statement that, "The logic of choice does not provide an 
adequate foundation for a descriptive theory of decision-making" (pS252). The 
conclusion is that normative theory, or more specifically the essential axioms of 
the rational choice paradigm, cancellation, transitivity, dominance, and invariance, 
is not an appropriate axiom for descriptive theory. The reason being that problem 
framing effects can cause decision makers to violate any of the axioms. [Note: 
Framing refers to a process that allows information to be placed in context with 
existing knowledge, and is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter]. 
Descriptive theory, unlike normative theory, considers the behaviour of the 
decision maker. Consequently, descriptive theories are enriched with aspects of 
human behaviour, such as framing. This complicates the descriptive analysis of 
decision-making and also separates descriptive theory from normative theory. 
Unlike the normative decision theories discussed earlier, which provide models 
that can be seen as ideal 'methods', descriptive theories examine the decision-
making processes in which the normative methods are supposed to be utilised 
(Raiffa, 1994 ). The descriptive school apparently accepts the principles of the 
normative school, but has moved away from purely theoretical notions to include 
an acceptance of the constraints that are imposed on theoretical models by the 
'real world'. That is, a world in which decision makers make errors, are imperfect 
analysts, and have varying cognitive perceptions and ability. 
In simple terms descriptive decision-making theories describe how decisions are 
actually made in real decision-making situations. Theorists are working on an 
assumption that by understanding what decision makers are trying to do, they as 
theorists will be better equipped to help improve the quality of decision-making 
(Beach and Lipshitz, 1993). Consequently, any descriptive model of decision-
making must be based on observable decision-making patterns (Cook and Levi, 
1990). This behavioural perspective attempts to develop an appreciation of the 
environmental constraints that are imposed on decision-making and decision 
makers (Marris and Egidi, 1992). From this expanded perspective of decision-
making theorists consider work to understand how decision makers frame 
problems, and how decision makers work through the decision-making process, so 
that prescriptive solutions may be developed. 
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It is apparent that descriptive theory considers decision-making events to enable 
prescriptive solutions to be proposed based on normative principles. However, 
Raiffa (1994) suggests that prescription could form a third classification of 
decision-making theory, "which deals with giving real people, as opposed to 
super rational people, some thoughtful guidance about how they might wish to act 
in a wiser fashion in real situations" (p. 4). In the past many people have 
considered prescription to be the purpose of normative decision-making (Baron, 
1988). However, it is now commonly accepted that prescription in decision-
making takes the form of models designed to help bring the results of actual 
decisions closer to the normative model, which is assumed to be the ideal. 
[It should be noted that the behavioural perspective referred to here is not a strict 
following of the psychological doctrine of behaviourism as developed in operant 
theory by Skinner ( 1966). The behaviourism of decision-making acknowledges a 
cognitive component, which is separate from, and additional to, the relationship 
between "a stimulus, a response, and a reinforcing consequence" (p. 226) that 
Skinner recognised.] 
3.4.2.1 Irrational decision-making 
In decision-making research, rationality is a required part of the decision-making 
process, whether it is studied normatively or descriptively (Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki, 1992). Irrational decision-making has no place in the study of decision-
making, at this time. However, the garbage can model, a descriptive model 
proposed by Cohen et al. ( 1972), comes close. It pictures organisational decision-
making as the random coming together of occasions looking for a decision, 
answers looking for problems, peoples' concerns, and busy people. The garbage 
can model supplements rationality with timing and luck, and decisions become an 
erratic and random confluence of events. However, the garbage can model may be 
seen as a clever reminder of the importance of chance, although it is apparently 
not empirically robust (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). 
The garbage model is put forward as a descriptive representation of organisational 
decision-making. It is presumed that individuals within the organisation will 
attempt to continue applying rational processes to their decision-making, without 
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consciously allowing the factors identified by Cohen et al. (1972) to influence 
their deliberations. If decision makers were not rational the researcher would be 
faced with a random selection of incoherent activity. In reality, rational decision 
makers may have to contend with the difficulties identified by Cohen et al. as well 
as political systems in which the decision maker has partially conflicting 
objectives and limited cognitive capacity (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). The 
idea of bounded rationality, as mentioned in earlier [section 3.4.1.3] is an attempt 
to explain the possible outcome from conflicting objectives and limited cognitive 
capacity. Consideration of the influence of politics on decision-making takes 
place later in the chapter [3.5.5.7/8]. 
3.4.3 Naturalistic decision-making 
The study of naturalistic decision-making is a recent occurrence. Naturalistic 
decision-making dismisses established decision-making theories as inappropriate 
approximations to 'real' decision-making (Doherty, 1993). Everyday situations 
faced by decision makers do not contain discrete decisions; decisions are 
interwoven and frequently interdependent in a similar way to nested computer 
programmes (Orasanu and Connolly, 1993). This is reality, and it is what 
naturalistic decision-making attempts to study. However, it is clear that normative 
theory does not readily transfer to the 'real' world; many people have 
acknowledged this (Simon, 1979b ). Therefore, criticism of classical decision 
theory by supporters of naturalistic decision-making does not break new ground 
(Doherty, 1993). Additionally, it is not clear how naturalistic decision-making 
differs from descriptive theory. Nonetheless, the study of decision-making under 
the naturalistic banner has produced some interesting literature. Following 
Raiffa's thoughts mentioned earlier, naturalistic decision-making attempts to give 
'real people' the guidance that they need. 
Important for my research, is the methodology employed to study naturalistic 
decision-making. The two major methods are case study and self-report in an 
interview setting (Klein et al., 1993). These are the procedures used in my 
research, and they are examined in detail in the methods chapter. 
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3.5 How decisions are made 
In this section I examine how decisions are made with particular emphasis on 
intuition, heuristics, problem identification, problem framing, and politics in a 
decision-making context. 
Decision-making in a business environment can, according to Schoemaker and 
Russo ( 1994) be conveniently divided into four categories for the purpose of 
analysis; although in practice the divisions may not be distinct. Schoemaker and 
Russo refer to this as "a pyramid of decision approaches" (p. 71 ). The four 
distinct categories are intended to reflect the frequency of use, plus the accuracy, 
complexity, and cost of the methods. 
The first category identified by Schoemaker and Russo is decision-making based 
on intuitive judgement. This is the easiest and the least costly, but the least 
consistently accurate and the most frequently used. Intuitive judgement occurs 
when a decision maker relies on an instinctive belief or 'hunch' to formulate a 
decision. 
The second category is decisions based on heuristics. It is said to be more efficient 
than intuitive judgement because it is more consistently accurate, but this method 
can be slower. The heuristics used by decision makers may be personal guidelines 
established through experience, or 'rules of thumb' that have been established by 
others in the field. 
The third category is decision-making that uses weighting to establish value or 
probability. Decision makers frequently attach values or probabilities, know as 
weights, to components of the decision and these influence the decision-making 
process. When done properly the calculations can be time consuming, but the 
eventual outcome may be more in line with the desired outcome. It is considerably 
more time consuming than the first and second options, and therefore more costly, 
but because the weights form an analytical structure it is more in line with 
normative theories. 
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The fourth category is value analysis. This is the most expensive and, with the 
usual caveats, the most accurate. It is mostly used by large organisations for major 
projects. This process is similar to the third method, but it is a more complex cost 
benefit analysis of all possible scenarios leading to an outcome. 
From the four categories the first and second, intuitive judgement and heuristics, 
are most applicable to the study of expertise. The third, weighting, is probably 
used by experts both formally and informally. Weighting may be used to make 
structured decisions that follow established procedures, and it is likely to have 
become part of the expert's intuitive judgement and heuristics. The fourth, value 
analysis, is too complex to be used in everyday decision-making by an individual 
and is more appropriately considered as an organisational method. Although it 
could involve the expert, or even be expert driven, value analysis should be 
considered as a tool to be used rather than as a characteristic of the expert using it. 
Intuitive judgement (category one above) is a personal characteristic that is 
common to most people. In the previous chapter intuition was identified as an 
important defining characteristic of expertise (Shanteau, 1987). Experts' intuition 
combines with the use of heuristics and weighting (categories two and three 
above) to enable superior decision-making to take place (Hammond et al., 1987). 
Intuition is examined in more detail in the next section. 
Heuristics are particularly relevant to a study of experts. Throughout the process 
of developing expertise the expert will be exposed to existing heuristics, and will 
probably develop heuristics of their own (for a comprehensive consideration of 
this perspective see Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). Intuition and personal heuristics 
are what Simon refers to as analytical skills that have become absorbed by the 
expert to the extent that they are automatic and can be used without conscious 
effort (Simon, 1987). Although not everybody agrees with Simon's explanation 
(see Mintzberg, 1989), intuition and heuristics are accepted as important 
characteristics of individual decision-making, and particularly that of experts. 
Heuristics are examined in more detail after the next section. 
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3.5.1 Intuitive decision-making 
There is general acceptance that many decisions are intuitive; that is to say the 
decision makers rely on their own judgement without reference to established 
decision-making processes (Targett, 1996). Intuitive derived decisions can 
sometimes be brilliant, particularly when based on expertise and extensive past 
experience. It can be argued that intuitive, heuristic, and weighting processes are 
often combined to form expert intuitive judgement (Hammond et al., 1987). An 
expert, a person well trained and experienced in a particular field, does not choose 
between intuitive or analytical methods. He/she can be expected to be conversant 
with a range of decision-making skills, and to apply them appropriately. 
Furthermore expert intuitive judgement can be superior to formal analysis by the 
same person (Hammond et al, 1987; Simon, 1987). 
A difficulty that is faced when studying intuitive decisions is that the decision 
maker is typically unable to explain his/her actions, or the procedures that he/she 
followed to reach his/her conclusions. Researchers have observed decision 
makers' ability to rank criteria in order of importance, and have commented that 
the decision maker is typically unable to explain the reason for his/her ranking 
(Korhonen and Wallenius, 1996). Schoemaker and Russo (1994) provided an 
example of how this problem can be overcome. They recall a case where an expert 
insurance claims adjuster was about to retire. The claims adjuster had an 
exceptional record for detecting fraudulent claims, based on intuition, or what 
Schoemaker and Russo refer to as "automated expertise" (p54). The person was 
unable to explain how she made her decisions, although she could say what 
information she used to make her decisions. Informal decision aids that avoid 
biasing effects in heuristics are apparently common in experts (Shanteau, 1988). 
In this instance asking the claims adjuster to consider a wide selection of 
insurance claims and attach a value, or weighting, to each of the criteria that she 
considered, captured the expert judgement. With this data it was possible to 
statistically infer what the appropriate weights were, and capture valuable 
expertise before it left the company. 
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Intuitive decisions are quick and simple, but two flaws can commonly be 
identified in intuitive decision-making; they are random inconsistencies and 
systematic distortion (Schoemaker and Russo, 1994). 
3.5.1.1 Random inconsistencies 
This flaw, random inconsistencies, occurs in expert and non-expert alike. It takes 
place when the decision maker is required to use personal judgement without a 
properly defined benchmark. There are many examples cited in the medical field 
(Carroll and Johnson, 1990; Schoemaker and Russo, 1994 ), although the 
phenomenon may be evident in all decision situations. As an example, consider 
the situation when a person receives medical diagnosis, which is inconclusive, 
then later asks for a review of the diagnosis. It is not uncommon for the second 
diagnosis to be different from the first. The variation in diagnosis is usually not 
attributed to lack of knowledge, particularly in the case of experts. It may be due 
to making a relative judgement by comparing the case with other recent cases 
(Carroll and Johnson, 1990). There are other possible causes. Schoemaker and 
Russo ( 1994) refer to a test of radiologists, which demonstrated a 23% chance of a 
diagnosis being changed to support their claim that "people often apply criteria 
inconsistently" (p.4 ). They attribute this possibility to mental limitations caused 
by perception and memory, and the effects of distractions and fatigue. 
3.5.1.2 Systematic distortion 
It is common to consciously, or subconsciously, apply a weighting or bias to 
information as it is obtained. Most people accept for example, that 'first 
impressions count', and will try to make a good impression at job interviews to 
influence a prospective employer's decision. Another common example is the 
tendency to attribute good decision outcomes to the decision maker's personal 
performance, but attribute bad outcomes to external factors or even 'bad luck' 
(Schwenk, 1995; Targett, 1996). The mental limitations, identified by 
Schoemaker and Russo (1994) also apply, as Golden (1992) found when studying 
executive's recollections of their past decisions. Executives recalled decisions as 
being more rational and consistent than they actually were. Schwenk ( 1995) found 
similar results and concluded that executive's distorted memories would prevent 
them from learning from their mistakes. 
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The deficiencies of intuitive decision-making are well recognised, and can be 
reduced by adopting the normative guidance of heuristics (Kahneman, et al., 
1982). 
3.5.2 Heuristic decision-making 
Informal analysis of information requiring a decision often permits the use of 
'rules of thumb', known as heuristics, that are derived from the decision maker's 
past experience. This kind of decision-making is quick and effective when an 
approximate answer is sufficient, or is required to gauge the validity of a complex 
calculation. Two types of heuristic are recognised, heuristics that take the form of 
rules or set procedures, and heuristics that are the cognitive short cuts formed by a 
decision maker (Schoemaker and Russo, 1994; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) 
3.5.2.1 Rules 
Heuristics as rules or set procedures are commonplace; society runs on rules. 
Professional organisations have established rules for the guidance of members, 
businesses use rules to establish standards. For example a bank manager is bound 
by a set of rules, established by the bank, when considering a loan application. 
There are also less formal generic rules, the dictionary rule and the threshold rule 
for example, that are simple strategies to enable people to gain speed and accuracy 
in decision-making. The dictionary rule is a simple ranking procedure [sometimes 
known as lexical ordering] in which choices are listed according to some 
predetermined, important criteria, such as cost. Then the selection, say the first 
five, are ranked again according to the next most important criteria, and so on 
until a final selection that meets all the predetermined criteria is reached. This 
generic rule gives most importance to the first ranking, and therefore it is only 
sensible to use it when the decision criteria can be ranked in order of importance. 
The threshold rule is the one the bank manager would use when assessing an 
application for a loan; for example does the applicant meet an established set of 
criteria. It is also a useful rule for guidance. For example in screening a large 
number of tenders a set of criteria may be established to eliminate those that do 
not meet minimum requirements (Schoemaker and Russo, 1994 ). 
82 
CHAPTER 3: Decision-making 
3.5.2.2 Cognitive short-cuts 
Heuristics that take the form of cognitive short cuts can guide the decision maker 
towards rational and consistent decision-making. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
defined three specific classes of heuristic, representativeness, availability, and 
anchoring adjustment, which are used by people in their assessment of probable 
outcomes when making decisions. Although there are other kinds of heuristics, 
these three illustrate the concept and are, I think, sufficient to explain how 
heuristics operate. 
3.5.2.3 Representativeness 
Many decision-making situations require an assessment of whether an object, 
event, or person is associated with a larger group. That is, are they similar to or 
representative of others? For example is it possible that because A resembles 
members of group X that A is also a member? Judgement is made on the basis of 
how closely a person, or an object, resembles the group with which they are being 
compared. In attempting to assess a person's occupation from their appearance for 
example, a comparison with stereotypes may be made (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). 
Representativeness, or similarity, can suffer bias because it does not consider 
fundamental probability factors such as base-rate, sample size, chance, 
predictability, validity, and regression. Experts who use informal decision aids 
may be countered this bias (Shanteau, 1988). 
3.5.2.4 Availability 
The ability to relate to known examples, such as similar occurrences of the same 
experience, is a useful clue for assessing frequency or probability of events 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 ). Successful use of the availability heuristic is 
dependent on the person's ability to retrieve instances of actual occurrence, or to 
imagine the occurrence of instances not experienced. Therefore, experts, because 
of their intense knowledge and experience within their domain of expertise, 
should be able to make better use of the availability heuristic than non-experts. 
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Bias is possible when availability heuristics are used. This may occur when a 
decision maker has recently experienced a similar event to that which they 
currently face, causing them to perceive the probability of the event occurring to 
be high. Conversely if they have no prior experience of the event occurring then 
they may view the events occurrence to be unusual, and the probability of a 
reoccurrence to be low. 
3.5.2.5 Anchoring adjustment 
Achoring is most easily recognised when a prior position has been established and 
the decision maker has to move away from it. Apparently decision-making is to 
many people a process of making an estimate and then adjusting it in accordance 
with additional information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Experts are thought 
to be able to make appropriate adjustments. They are apparently aware that 
resistance to changing a decision is often not a good strategy, and therefore use 
feedback to make corrections (Shanteau, 1988). 
Anchoring bias may be present if a person has prior knowledge of a subject and 
has established a personal opinion on that topic. It will take very strong evidence 
to persuade them to alter their position. Inappropriate or inaccurate starting 
positions tend to bias the adjustment towards the initial position (anchoring) and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that "adjustments are typically insufficient" 
(p. 1128). 
In conclusion, when heuristics are used wisely they are apparently useful aids for 
decision makers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). However, the use of heuristics 
may introduce personal biases. This can cause sub-optimal information 
processing, leading to incorrect decisions being made. 
3.5.3 Problem identification 
Identification of a problem's existence happens when the decision maker's 
environment indicates that perceived goals, needs, and values are not being 
satisfied. The goals, needs, and values that influence the decision maker to 
recognise the problem are determined by psychological precepts that have been 
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established either as a physiological component of personal cognitive 
development, or through social/cultural influence and experience. Having 
identified that a problem exists, the decision maker will begin a problem solving 
process, which will call on his/her experience and knowledge in an attempt to find 
an answer to the problem. At the completion of the cycle the decision maker will 
have accumulated additional decision-making experience and probably new 
knowledge. This will influence the processes involved in determining future 
goals, needs, and values, and in tum problem identification and problem solving 
processes (Kleindorfer et al., 1993). 
There are two types of problem finding, or problem identification, reactive and 
proactive (Smith, 1988). In reactive problem identification, recognition is 
triggered by an external influence such as a person or an event. Proactive problem 
identification implies that the decision maker initiates the process through 
introspection. Either reaction takes place in response to a comparison between the 
perceived existing situation, and that which the decision maker believes to be 
desirable, or necessary. 
Some decisions are made out of necessity, because a problem requires rapid 
resolution. For example if my car is stolen I will need to replace it requiring 
decisions that were not anticipated and are reasonably urgent or time constrained. 
Some decisions are made by choice. The decision maker chooses to make a 
change in some thing, or situation, that is not in need of change. If for example I 
choose to change my car for a new one, this will require decisions that are not 
urgent unless I choose to make them so. 
3.5.4 Problem framing 
An understanding of the concept of framing (Bazerman, 1983; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981) is important in a consideration of decision-making, particularly 
a behavioural perspective on decision-making. Framing takes place through the 
establishment of a set of basic assumptions by the decision maker. When a frame 
is established it provides a reference point for the decision maker, and it justifies 
and explains to the decision maker why he/she is behaving as he/she 1s. 
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Consequently framing not only helps a decision maker to understand his/her 
immediate difficulties, it conveniently categorises information for storage and 
future retrieval. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) acknowledge that the 
psychological factors involved in framing are important, but restrict their work to 
mathematical models without offering any explanation of the psychological 
factors; this is of little value (Eppen et al., 1993). There is a need for a descriptive 
evaluation of the psychological factors drawn into action within the decision 
maker's frame. 
3.5.4.1 Blind spots 
Framing a problem can be a difficult and frustrating task. A clear example 
familiar to most people is their first encounter with a maths problem. How fast 
will a bath fill if the plug is removed and the taps are turned on, so that the water 
flows in ... , is a daunting question to be presented with when basic arithmetic has 
just been mastered. However, this type of problem is not a maths problem at all. It 
is one of problem framing requiring an evaluation, and understanding of what is 
happening, before any relevant mathematical calculation can be done. The 
situation presented is often the first encounter with formal problem framing, and 
the simple calculation of inflow minus outflow is often not conceptualised. This 
type of problem can be a perceptual blind spot that can prevent a person, no 
matter what their intellect, from formulating the correct conclusions. From this 
example it can be seen that the difficulty in answering some mathematical 
problems is often more to do with discovering the problem rather than with 
answering it. Experts, working within their domain of expertise, have 
demonstrated highly developed perceptual ability (Shanteau, 1987). [In the 
following chapter blind spots are examined in greater detail.] 
3.5.4.2 Mathematical framing models 
There are prescriptive (normative) mathematical framing models, with associated 
procedures (algorithms) to solve them (Eppen et al., 1993). However, for them to 
be useful it is necessary for the decision maker to understand how the models are 
created, and to understand the relationships between decisions and results. The 
decision maker then needs to become thoroughly conversant with the models, and 
how they are used in various situations, before the models can become an integral 
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part of the person's decision-making repertoire. Despite the lack of descriptive 
theory, mentioned above, framing is a widely recognised component of decision-
making. It is used intuitively by experts to great effect (Mintzberg, 1976; Simon, 
1987), and therefore worthy of greater evaluation. 
3.5.4.3 Framing effect 
Perhaps the most important thing to know about problem framing is that the same 
information presented in a different form can lead to different decisions being 
made. This 'framing effect' (Medin and Ross, 1990) is caused by induced 
perceptual differences. Changing the presentation of information can change the 
decision makers viewpoint or perspective of the problem, and consequently lead 
them to reach different conclusions about what is the problem, and in tum cause 
different action to be taken. 
3.5.4.4 Dunegan 's marathon model 
Since Tversky and Kahneman ( 1979) raised concern about the biasing effect of 
framing there have been many studies showing that framing is indeed an 
important influence on decision-making (Dunegan, 1996). However, most if not 
all the studies have been laboratory type examinations of decision outcomes. As 
my research is a non-laboratory, naturalistic inquiry into decision processes these 
studies are not directly relevant, but Dunegan does introduce one particularly 
interesting concept that I think is relevant to my research. He- compares the 
continuous decision-making that we all face while we are awake, with running a 
marathon. To successfully complete a marathon it is necessary to conserve energy 
by running economically and only applying enough effort to maintain the desired 
pace. 
Dunegan suggests that throughout the day we perform a similar conservation of 
mental energy by selectively applying different levels of mental processing, what 
he calls "cognitive modes" (p.188). These cognitive modes range along a 
continuum from 'virtually automatic' to 'highly controlled'. As perhaps we would 
expect, the highly controlled processing of information is according to Dunegan, 
the most demanding on mental energy and time, and also the most difficult to 
employ. Therefore, Dunegan suggests, there is a tendency to avoid the highly 
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controlled mode when possible, by moving along the continuum towards more 
automatic information processing, which is more sparing of energy. The price 
paid for this energy conservation is, according to Dunegan, a loss of recallable 
knowledge. He claims that in attending less to the information, and being less 
thorough in its analysis we provide our memories with less information to store 
for future problem recognition. The factor that apparently determines which 
cognitive mode is chosen appears to be the perceived threat of the information to 
the decision maker's objectives. Therefore, as Dunegan states, it is the perception, 
or framing, of the information that determines the response. 
3.5.4.5 Experts may be different 
The cognitive modes concept presented by Dunegan, is an example of the 
consequences of the framing effect mentioned earlier, and clearly identifies its 
importance in decision-making research. Of particular importance to my research 
is a comparison between Dunegan's cognitive modes concept and the decision-
making processes of experts. I mentioned in the previous chapter that one of the 
characteristics that separate experts from non-experts is experts' ability to process 
information automatically (Shanteau, 1987). Additionally, experts have been 
shown to have superior perceptual ability, which presumably enables them to 
more accurately frame problems. However, Dunegan argues that as a decision 
maker tends towards automatic information processing there is a reduction in 
retained information. Though logical, this argument appears to contradict the 
observed behaviour of experts. Ericsson (1997), Hammond et al. (1987), Shanteau 
( 1992), and others have indicated that during the continual decision-making 
process experts are constantly acquiring information to enable them to identify 
future problems. Maybe Dunegan's argument does not hold for experts. During 
the long apprenticeship required to develop expertise, an expert develops a 
subconscious ability to identify and retain potentially important information for 
future use. Shanteau ( 1992) and Ericsson ( 1997) have shown that experts 
perceive, identify, and select appropriate information for problem solving with 
greater skill than non-experts. Possibly this ability is so highly developed that the 
selection process persists to enable the automatic retention of relevant 
information. 
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3.5.5 Context 
The setting in which a decision takes place is often interwoven with that decision, 
to the extent that separation of the decision from its setting may cause the 
decision's raison d'etre to become obscure (March, 1994). Knowing and 
understanding why a decision needs to be made enables the decision maker to 
form an appropriate response (Kleindorfer et al., 1993). Context, as the setting is 
called, is a critical component of any decision-making situation (Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1981 ). In even the most simple laboratory study, the decision maker 
must have a goal to be able to make meaningful responses. In a naturalistic 
enquiry, such as in a managerial setting, context is the fabric or structure that 
frames the decision and the decision maker (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Context is an umbrella term that covers many situations. A search of some recent 
management journals provided numerous instances of an author qualifying his/her 
research enquiries with the statement 'in a decision-making context'. Within the 
decision-making context there are other contextual influences, such as risk or 
consequences resulting from a decision (Kleindorfer et al., 1993). Culture, 
personality, and organisational politics are additional contextual elements that 
require consideration in any naturalistic enquiry (March, 1988; Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). 
3.5.5.1 Risk or consequences 
The cognitive modes concept discussed earlier (Dunegan, 1996), is an attempt to 
explain how a decision maker reacts to information requiring a decision. In 
essence it suggests that the more threatening the information is to the decision 
maker's goals the greater the effort made by the decision maker to ensure a 
suitable resolution to the problem. Dunegan' s description of the decision-making 
process can be seen as a partial restatement of the subjectively expected utility 
theory (SEU) that was discussed earlier. When a decision maker is working at the 
highly controlled end of the cognitive modes continuum, it could be argued that 
the decision maker is in an extreme risk averse state and consciously attempting to 
make the most rational decisions possible. As the perception of risk recedes, the 
decision maker may, according to Dunegan, be willing to rely on the more or less 
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automated responses to decision-making situations that have been identified by 
other researchers (Simon, 1987; Hammond et al., 1987). The consequent changes 
in cognitive mode are contextual changes that influence the decision maker's 
perception and response to situations. 
A change in cognitive mode does not imply that the decision maker's risk 
aversion will alter, only that he/she may be willing to consider solutions that may 
be less optimal. Risk aversion has been studied for many years, and there is a 
large literature related to the topic (Kleindorfer et al., 1993). Essentially, risk 
aversion is an assessment of a person's willingness to accept a loss. The betting 
odds on which a person is willing to risk money, or the cost that he/she is willing 
to pay for insurance to offset a loss, are examples of situations in which risk 
aversion may be assessed. Risk, and the willingness to accept it, is part of the 
context in which decisions are made. 
A decision maker's personal disposition determines how he/she will respond to 
risk and other factors that make a decision-making situation (Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1981; Tversky and Kahneman, l 974/1981/1986). Personal well being 
can influence a person's disposition and consequently how he/she will respond to 
information that is presented (Weiner et al., 1977). A person who is stressed by 
circumstances not related to the immediate decision may be influenced by those 
circumstances to make decisions that are markedly different from the decisions 
that he/she would make under less stressful circumstances (Simon, 1987). 
However, personal disposition is also determined by personality and culture 
(Bamouw, 1985). 
3.5.5.2 Culture and personality 
The influence of culture and personality on the individual, are discussed in the 
following chapter [Chapter 4 Psychological Factors]. Here I discuss the role of 
culture and personality as context in which the decision maker must work. 
Ethnologists ( cultural anthropologists) and cross-cultural psychologists study 
culture (Bamouw, 1985). Ethnologists conduct field studies in which they observe 
and interview people. Cross-cultural psychologists, like most psychologists, 
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conduct controlled experiments, and conduct surveys, which provide data for 
statistical evaluation. Through these distinctly different approaches, much has 
been learnt about the importance of culture to humans. Now, as a result of 
extensive research, Shore ( 1995) is able to argue that culture is an intrinsic part of 
the human mind. 
3.5.5.3 Ethnologists 
The idea that anthropologist should consider the human mind, until recently the 
exclusive territory of psychologists, is relatively new and apparently still 
somewhat contentious (Strauss and Quinn, 1997). In the past ethnic groups and 
distinct cultures only rarely came into contact with one another, so it was 
reasonable to consider them as distinct entities. Increasingly, through ready access 
to travel and mass communication media, distinctions between the old established 
cultures based on race are slowly being eroded. Anthropologists are now reporting 
cultural meanings which are context dependent, and often they are finding that 
cognitive psychology and personality theory provide an insight that was not 
previously available to them (Barnouw, 1985; Hofstede, 1997; Strauss and Quinn, 
1997). 
3.5.5.4 Cross-cultural psychology 
A recent addition to the discipline of psychology is cross-cultural psychology 
(Segall et al., 1990). The topic was a natural outcome from a growing awareness, 
in the l 970's, that a North American - European perspective did not account for 
all the diverse cultural settings in which people live. Cross-cultural psychology 
can, according to Segall et al., be defined as the scientific study of the ways in 
which social and cultural forces shape human behaviour. This definition implies 
that sociocultural context will shape human behaviour. Therefore to understand 
human behaviour requires an understanding of the context in which that behaviour 
takes place (Pandey, 1990). 
3.5.5.5 Sociocultural contexts 
There are numerous sociocultural contexts. They can be as small as a family unit, 
or as big as a nationality or an ethnic group (Segall et al., 1990; Strauss and 
Quinn, 1997). In management one obvious sociocultural context to be considered 
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is the 'organisation'. My study 1s, as I mentioned earlier, concerned with 
individual decision-making, so I do not want to consider organisational culture, or 
its effect on decision-making, but I will briefly examine the organisation as a 
context in which individuals make decisions. 
3.5.5.6 Organisations 
Some authors distinguish between behavioural decision-making and 
organisational decision-making (Shapira, 1997). They identify behavioural 
decision-making research with laboratory studies, which they see as the work of 
psychologists. In contrast they regard organisational decision-making research as 
a naturalistic enquiry that is the domain of academics who are management 
specialists. One notable exception is Herbert Simon (March, 1987). Simon has 
written extensively on decision-making, concentrating on the actions of the 
individual no matter what the context. He does, however, acknowledge the 
importance of context, particularly in his writings on management decision-
making (Simon, 1979b/l 987). Decision-making, in any context is dependent on 
making sense of information presented (March, 1997; Strauss and Quinn, 1997). 
In an organisational setting the individual decision maker faces decisions that 
have multiple contextual influences (Langley et al., 1995). These influences will 
determine whether a decision maker identifies a potential decision-making 
situation, and how a decision maker will frame that situation for the decision-
making process to take place (Payne, 1997). Within the organisational setting 
contextual influences such as culture, personality, and personal well being, 
continues to influence decision-making, but an additional, and very powerful 
contextual influence, politics, pervades all decisions within an organisation 
(Salancik and Brindle, 1997). 
3.5.5. 7 Politics 
The study of experts is a study of individuals, and an awareness of factors that 
affect the individual is warranted, if only to be able to distinguish between 
environmental effects and normal personal performance. Therefore it is necessary 
to consider the influence of politics on decision-making. Decision-making often 
takes place in social or organisational settings that are influenced by politics, and 
this is the setting in which experts working as managers make decisions. 
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In discussing normative theory earlier in the chapter, I mentioned that politics is 
one of the factors that contribute to the confusion faced by decision makers. I 
referred to the garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972) to describe an environment 
in which decisions are made by a random blending together of the available 
ingredients. The garbage can model attempts to encapsulate organisational 
decision-making. It suggests that organisational decision-making is a meeting of 
occasions, answers, people concerns, and people. Within this model there are all 
the ingredients that form the political aspect of decision-making. Politics is the 
network of peoples relationships involving authority, power, or influence within 
an organisation and organisational politics clearly impinge on the individual. 
Consequently the decision-making situations that are faced in the 'real world' can 
be described as "an interweaving of boundedly rational and political processes" 
(p. 17) (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). 
3.5.5.8 Political perspective 
A political perspective on decision-making was developed to consider the 
influence of power on decision makers. It grew from the political science 
literature in the 1950's, and was accepted by March in 1962, and others followed 
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; March, 1994). The main assumption is that 
organisations are groups of people with conflicting and/or competing interests, 
caused by their position within the organisation, and their personal ambition and 
interests. Simply put, within organisations, decisions follow the desires of the 
most powerful people. However it is presumed that the individual decision makers 
within the organisation are rational decision makers; it is when they become party 
to organisational politics that their rationality is questionable (Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki, 1992). 
3.6 Chapter summary 
Much of the research into decision-making is based on the assumption that an 
optimal model derived from normative theory is a better representation of the 
problem, than that of the person faced with the problem (Einhorn and Hogarth, 
1981). However, it can be argued that the person's model, the model created from 
the person's perception of what is the problem, is more appropriate than the 
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optimal model (March, 1978). This is particularly so because people do not think 
or work in accordance with rational models (Isenberg, 1984 ). People with 
extensive training and experience in any discipline can be expected to know and 
to understand the principles of rational thought and optimal models, but it is 
unlikely that they think in ways that can be simplistically viewed as rational, 
although in hindsight the decisions that they have made may appear to be rational. 
People who are experts may have internalised the analytical process to the extent 
that it is automatic, and therefore be able to process large amounts of information 
intuitively (Simon, 1987). Consequently experts may focus attention on the 
process of making a decision rather than on the actual procedure to be followed; 
he/she will act intuitively to initiate the decision-making process then manage the 
process making further intuitive adjustments as required. Experts' normal 
environment involves a portfolio of simultaneous, interrelated problems 
competing for solutions. The cognitive task becomes one of problem 
management, requiring the identification and definition of problems, then 
decisions about which problem to deal with (Isenberg, 1984 ). 
In this chapter decisions of certainty, uncertainty, risk, and conflict have been 
identified as the potential types of decision that an expert could face (Schoemaker 
and Russo, 1994). However, in 'real' decision-making situations a clear 
distinction between types is not to be expected. Most decision-making situations 






The literature examined in Chapter 2 indicates that experts working within their 
domain of expertise are better decision makers than non-experts. From that 
chapter the overall impression is that experts either have, or develop, different 
decision-making abilities form those of non-experts. Additionally, in Chapter 3 
there is an indication that an individuals' decision-making ability is influenced by 
psychological factors. This chapter builds on those earlier reviews by considering 
the influence that differences in mental processing have on the way decisions are 
made, and the psychological factors which may determine how experts process 
and respond to information during the decision-making process. A discussion of 
relevant psychological factors is essential, but they have vast literatures and are 
specialised areas of study and therefore cannot be covered in detail, consequently 
what is covered in this work is no more than an acknowledgement of their 
importance. 
This chapter is in four parts. It begins with a brief discussion about cognitive 
ability, and then the second section considers the psychological characteristics 
that are said to be representative of experts. The third section of the chapter 
examines the psychological factors that are an essential part of the behavioural 
perspective on decision-making that was discussed in the previous chapter. In 
particular personality, culture, and cognitive style are considered. The final 
section of the chapter examines the influence of psychological factors on 
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previously identified decision-making variables such as heuristics and problem 
framing. 
Although most of what is discussed is now interdisciplinary, - because it is 
accepted knowledge in psychology, philosophy, management science, and 
economics, - it is however, grounded in psychology and the testing and evaluation 
methods are still largely psychometric tools. 
****************** 
4.1 Cognitive ability 
Cognition refers to the mental processes that allow an awareness and 
understanding of our personal environment. Humans acquire this awareness 
through perception, intuition, evaluation, and reasoning (Weiner et al., 1977). The 
effects of cognition are readily seen in the application of existing knowledge to 
new circumstances, problem solving, and creative thought. 
It is well accepted that cognitive ability is a distinctive feature that identifies and 
separates individual performance (Medin & Ross, 1992). There are numerous tests 
that have been developed in an attempt to assess an individuals' cognitive ability. 
Most people are familiar with IQ tests of the type developed by Cattell, Binet, and 
Spearman which attempt to rank personal intellectual ability, and many are 
sceptical of their value (Carroll & Maxwell, 1979). There are other tests however, 
that identify individual differences without any attempt to value one over the 
other. The tests are used to identify individual differences enabling a better 
understanding of how people respond to situations and what the different 
responses imply. For example, the embedded figures test (EFT) developed by 
Witkin et al. (1971 ), has been used by many researchers (Loo, 1978; Noble & 
Sanders, 1980; Goodenough, 1976) to identify differences in drivers' road traffic 
hazard recognition ability. 
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The important issue here is that experts are not expected to have different 
cognitive abilities from those of non-experts, but they are expected to have 
developed particular, possibly specific, cognitive functions which enable them to 
demonstrate the greater proficiency associated with expertise (Shanteau, 1987; 
Ericsson, 1997). 
4.1.1 Information processing 
Early studies of the cognitive effects that were thought to determine decision-
making processes took an information processing approach which laid the ground 
for much of the empirical work on decision-making (Medin & Ross, 1992). 
Information processing research split into two distinct streams, computer based 
artificial intelligence (Al) and linguistics based psychology. Newell and Simon 
( 1972) were among the first to use computers to try to imitate and learn about 
cognition. They modelled the heuristics that individuals use to make choices. 
Subsequently Simon has made important contributions to both cognitive science 
(Simon, 1979) and decision-making theory (Simon, 1987). 
4.1.2 Linguistics 
In contrast to AI, linguistics grounded psychology was not based on new 
technology but on a logical progression of memory psychology. The study of 
memory had used simple words and often nonsense collections of syllables to 
evaluate cognition (Neisser, 1967). However, Chomsky's transformational 
grammar provided new insights that gave the impetus for psychologists to 
evaluate the memory of sentences and paragraphs, and even whole stories (Medin 
and Ross, 1992). Memory, and language are essential parts of information 
processmg for decision making and must be considered in any psychological 
evaluation of expertise. 
The study of information processing, both as AI and linguistics, forms part of the 
interdisciplinary topic known as cognitive science. A consideration of cognitive 
functions is an integral part of cognitive science research. Most importantly, the 
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study of experts and investigation into decision-making are important lines of 
inquiry within cognitive science (Shanteau, I 992). 
4.2 Psychological characteristics. 
The dilemma faced by decision makers is how to remain sufficiently logical and 
objective when faced with situations for which they have not only involvement 
and responsibility, but also strong intuition and passion. Objectivity and logic do 
not associate comfortably with intuition and passion, they tend to act as a 
contradiction. Such conflict of interest may produce 'good' or inspired decisions, 
or it may lead to errors in problem definition, and poorly conceived solutions 
(Leader, I 997). From the study of experts, discussed in Chapter 2, researchers 
know that expert's decision-making processes are constrained by domain 
specificity, environmental cues, and external influences (Ericsson, 1997). 
However, there are other more personal factors that determine how a person will 
respond to situations that they may face within their domain of expertise. Expert's 
prior knowledge and experience, plus their mental disposition towards a problem 
will certainly influence how they proceed (Simon, 1979). 
Shanteau ( 1987) identified several highly developed psychological characteristics 




Experts have a highly developed ability to recognize 
and attend to information. Experts can extract 
information that is embedded in extraneous material 
and evaluate it. 
Experts have a highly developed ability to 
concentrate on relevant information, while ignoring 
the irrelevant. 
Experts are adept at recognising exceptional events. 
• Interpretation. 
• Personality 
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Experts select appropriate problems to resolve. 
Experts adapt well to change. 
Experts synthesise information proficiently to make 
it sensible. 
Experts think creatively. 
Experts have a strong sense of responsibility. 
Experts have great confidence in their ability. 
Experts have high stress tolerance. 
Experts have effective communication skills. 
The cognitive functions identified by Shanteau are of course no different from 
those of non-experts. The important difference is that experts have developed the 
ability to apply them to greater effect. Shanteau did not intend his list of 
psychological characteristics to be exhaustive and it is not, but it is sufficient to 
demonstrate the cognitive superiority of experts. Many of the characteristics that 
Shanteau identified are discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, because they relate to 
expert's decision-making processes. The discussion in Chapter 2 considers the 
influence that these psychological characteristics have on what experts do. 
Additionally, in Chapter 3 intuition, bounded rationality, and heuristics are 
identified as psychological factors that may help to shape the course of the 
decision-making processes of decision makers (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; 
Teversky & Kahneman, 1974). In chapters 2 and 3, psychological factors were 
considered either because they differentiated between experts and others, or 
because they affected decision-making performance. In this chapter they are 
examined as the behavioural factors that determine the experts actions. Several 
psychological variables are considered because they help to differentiate and 
categorise individuals, and they may help to explain why decision-making 
processes differ between individual experts. 
*************** 
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4.3 Behaviour in decision-making 
Decision theory has well-established models that provide a guide to how decisions 
ought to be made [normative theory], and how they are made [descriptive theory]. 
There are of course deficiencies, and inadequacies in decision-making research for 
which solutions are being sought. One area of research that has been identified to 
be in need of further study by several prominent researchers is, what has become 
known as, the behavioural aspect of decision-making (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 
1992; Langley et al., 1995; Schwenk, 1995). The behavioural perspective 
considers the personal variables that the decision maker brings to the decision-
making process, such as personality, culture, and cognition [cognition includes 
perception, memory, attention, knowledge representation, etc.]. Each variable 
contributes to the complexity of the decision maker, and an awareness of their 
influence is valuable knowledge when studying expert's decision processes 
(Ericsson, 1997). 
The behaviour of decision makers has been studied in laboratory experiments for 
many years (Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Simon, 1966). There has also been 
considerable discussion and theorising of how decision makers behave in 
organisations (Mintzberg 1979; 1989). However, but there is little information 
available about individual decision makers in their normal decision-making 
environment (Lipshitz, 1994). Consequently, several authors have called for 
further research on the behavioural aspects of decision-making because it is, they 
say, one of the largest challenges in the future of decision-making theory 
(Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Korhonen & Wallenius, 1996; Langley et al., 
1995; Schwenk, 1995). Researchers who adopt methodologies from other 
disciplines for their own research purposes are meeting this challenge. 
An example of this approach is the recent work by Huff ( 1990), a strategic 
management analyst, using cognitive mapping techniques developed from Kelly's 
(1955) work in psychology. Cognitive mapping in various forms is now 
frequently used in management research. Ginsberg (1994) evaluated the value of 
cognitive maps as a tool for strategic decision-making, and Swan (1995) 
considered the utility of cognitive mapping techniques for anticipating the 
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problems that may anse from management cognition. However, Eden et al. 
( 1992), are critical of some current use of cognitive maps, including the work of 
Huff, which they see as simplistic and superficial, and not requiring, or using, the 
power of cognitive mapping. Cognitive mapping was adopted, used and further 
developed by Eden et al. (1979) within the discipline of Operations Research 
where they extended its use to the evaluation of management teams. 
Innovative researchers are combining other aspects of psychology theory to aid 
them in their search for a better understanding of decision makers. A Cognitive 
Style Index, developed by Allinson and Hayes (1996), a Personal Style Inventory, 
developed by Taggartt ( 1993), and a Cognitive Style Analysis, developed by 
Riding ( 1991 ), are some examples of recent management research based on 
established psychology theory. 
Earlier in the chapter it was mentioned that awareness of our personal 
environment is mediated by cognitive abilities, such as perception and reasoning. 
This awareness is strongly moulded by our personality and cognitive style, and by 
the culture to which we belong. Personality and culture are distinct topics in 
several academic disciplines; each with its own literature, and a thorough review 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently only a synopsis of these topics 
will be presented in this chapter. Cognitive style is more specifically a psychology 
topic. It is less well understood outside psychology and therefore warrants greater 
explanation in this chapter. 
4.3.1 Personality 
All people are to some extent personality psychologists. We assess the people we 
interact with, even people we have not met, such as TV stars, and formulate our 
own ideas of what they are like as a person. Most people have their own theories 
about 'types of people' such as fat people, or short people, about being submissive 
or assertive, etc. Personality psychologists assess people on the basis of these 
dispositions (Weiner et al., 1977), and formulate theories to explain them. 
Psychologists identify a person's inclination toward specific dispositions, called 
traits, and then by selecting interrelated traits the psychologist is able to indicate a 
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personality type representative of the person (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). 
Personality, according to Eysenck and Eysenck is, "a more or less stable and 
enduring organisation of a person's character, temperament, intellect, and 
physique, which determines his unique adjustment to the environment." (p9) 
Personality is recognised as a large taxonomy of traits, and types. Eysenck and 
Wilson (1975) claim that there are in excess of 4000 traits, and Jung defined 32 
types (Myers, & Mccaulley, 1986). 
Weiner et al. (1977) define personality as an organisation of traits, or personality 
dispositions, that are characteristic of a person. The traits are complex composites 
of irrational tendencies, reflexive actions, rational capacities, and meaningful 
experiences that form the image people project to others, and colour our 
interpretation of the image projected by them. Personality is considered by most 
psychologists to be moderate I y stable and consistent (Eysenck, 1994 ). Unlike 
moods and emotions, which may change dramatically within a short time period, 
personality tends to endure. 
The literature on personality can be traced to the Greek philosophers 
Theophrastus and Hippocrates (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). Theophrastus 
preferred the literary descriptive method to record his observations of personality 
and individual difference. Today researchers know this as the ideographic method 
which says that each person is a unique combination of characteristics and so can 
not be ranked or ordered. Hippocrates established a classification, which can be 
compared to modem scientific method. Hippocrates' highly successful typology 
was based on careful observation and provided a model for scientific investigation 
that has lasted over 2000 years, known as the nomothetic method. 
Freud, Jung, Maslow, Kelly, and others have developed theories to explain the 
observable differences in human response to the environment (Medin & Ross, 
1990; Weiner et al., 1977). Freud's assumption that the ego determined human 
response to the environment was rejected quite early by other psychologists who 
thought that the stimulus response model failed to account for motives, abilities, 
interests, and temperament (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978). Maslow' s humanistic 
theories have been used extensively in management research. No doubt all 
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students of management will have been introduced to Maslow's Hierarchy of 
Needs. Kelly ( 1955) pursued the nomothetic method established by Hippocrates, 
to study personality. Nomothetic method believes that human differences have 
dimensions that can be measured, and is the justification for the host of measures 
that now exist to measure personality traits, including Kelly's Repertory Grid 
Technique. Jung suggested that apparent random variation in human behaviour, 
may in fact be a quite orderly and consistent behaviour that is due to basic 
differences in the way individuals prefer to use their perception and judgement 
(Myers & Mccaulley, 1985). Jung's theory of psychological type was adopted 
and modified to form the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a widely accepted 
method for indicating personal preference in information processing (Allinson & 
Hayes, 1996). 
The theories of Jung and Kelly are, as noted above, the foundations of two tests, 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Repertory Grid Technique. Both measures have 
been widely used in decision research, justifying some further discussion on their 
design and function. The two tests are discussed below. 
4.3.1.1 Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
The MBTI, based on Jung's theory of personality types, is according to Allinson 
and Hayes ( 1996), the most widely used psychological evaluation tool in the 
business environment. The MBTI identifies 16 personality types that represent 
combinations of preferences. The preferences are thought to influence what 
people perceive and how they make judgements from their perceptions. It is 
essential to realise that the MBTI identifies a person's preferred way of 
responding to a situation, not their only way. The MBTI is intended to identify 
habitual choice between competing alternatives. Although it is assumed that an 
individual may use all the preferences, the MBTI is based on the premise that he 
/she will respond first or most often with the preferred functions or attitudes 
(Myers & Mccaulley, 1985). The MBTI, unlike the Repertory Grid Technique, is 
relatively straightforward to administer, although it requires approximately one 
hour to complete. The MBTI is user friendly; it asks respondents to choose from a 
selection of answers to questions that are posed on the form, and stresses that 
there are no right or wrong answers. Evaluation of the test results is not a simple 
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matter, and should only be done by a qualified person, usually a psychologist 
(Myers & McCaully, l 985). 
The test manual explains how the MBTI can be used in counselling, career 
assessment, and for the assessment of learning and teaching ability. The MBTI 
has been widely used in business, particularly for personnel assessment. 
Coscarelli et al. ( 1995), reviewed the assessment of decision-making styles 
available to human resource development, and found the MBTI to be the most 
widely used assessment tool. However, the MBTI does not appear to have been 
widely used in decision-making research. Fitting' s (1991) study was possibly the 
first study to evaluate the influence of personality type on decision-making in a 
real work environment, often referred to as a naturalistic setting. Fitting 
'shadowed' two managers (separately) for five working days to observe what she 
considered to be the 'decision-making process in action'. The focus of the study 
was the managers' overt actions, interactions, and behaviour, all of which were 
compared with their personality type as determined by the MBTI. Fitting observed 
that personality type had an apparent effect on the decision-making process, in 
particular it was seen to influence information gathering and information 
utilisation. 
4.3.1.2 Repertory Grid Technique 
Kelly ( 1955) developed a theory of personal constructs based on the premise that 
a person's psychological processes are guided by the ways in which he or she 
anticipates events. Unlike Jung, Kelly developed his own procedure for evaluating 
personal constructs. The test, which he called the Role Construct Repertory Test 
(Rep Test) to elicit associations, or constructs in Kelly's terms, which were 
intended to allow hypotheses to be formed about the subject's personal-social 
behaviour. 
Kelly used the data to form a 'tabular analysis of the raw protocol' in a grid form, 
and suggested that the information should be thoroughly evaluated to see 
something of what the respondent is telling the enquirer, before subjecting the 
data to statistical analysis (Fransella & Bannister, 1977). When the evaluation of 
the written material is complete a statistical analysed may be carried out. In 1955 
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statistical analysis of the grids, which could be 19 by 22 or larger, was an 
extremely difficult procedure. Grid analysis is now usually carried out through the 
application of a dedicated computer program. 
The Repertory Grid Technique is complex, as indicated above. It relies heavily on 
the researchers ability to extract complex information from the respondent, and 
from the written records. Rep Grid also uses mathematical analysis techniques 
that require processing by dedicated computer programmes (Fransella & Banister, 
1977). Nonetheless, the Repertory Grid Technique has enjoyed considerable 
success, possibly due to the status of its creator, Kelly ( 1955) and his theory of 
personal constructs. The Rep Grid has been widely adopted and has many forms 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Fransella & Bannister, 1977). Many people have 
adapted the Repertory Grid Technique to form simplified procedures, which avoid 
the mathematical complexity but retain the original logic (Stewart et al., 1981 ). 
There were, in the late l 990's, several sophisticated computer programmes 
available to process the data but they were relatively expensive (NZ$ l 500). 
However, a simple to use and highly sophisticated alternative is available on the 
Internet. The FOCUS algorithm developed largely by Professor Shaw, Industrial 
Research Chair in Software Engineering at the University of Calgary (Shaw & 
Gaines 2001), appears to be a sophisticated program, which is readily available, 
free for use on the Internet. The site also provides valuable analysis of the data 
and a wealth of background information relating to the development of Kelly's 
Repertory Grid and is the home of the web based Personal Construct Psychology 
(PCP) site with links to many countries including the PCP sites at Wollongong, 
Australia, and the university of London, UK. Given its development history this 
software seems to be more appropriate for Repertory Grid analysis than SPSS or 
SAS, which are more generic statistical packages. 
In research relating to experts and decision-making, the recognition of differences 
between individuals has often not been acknowledged. Many researchers studying 
expert decision-making have treated 'individual' as a generic term, implying 'the 
group of individual people', rather than as a single person who may act differently 
from other individuals (Langley et al., 1995). This is acceptable when 
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generalisations are sought, but when the results are applied prescriptively, the 
expected outcome may not eventuate in an single application. Newell and Simon 
(1972), acknowledged individual differences, "Each man differs - both in 
systematic ways and simply by virtue of his unique genetic endowment and 
historical fate - from all other men" (p. 3), but consciously excluded motivational 
and personality variables, which they identified as being separate from the 
"cognitive system" (p .8). However, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
motivational and personality variables and the cognitive system are inseparable 
for most research purposes. More recently some authors have called for greater 
awareness of personality differences and the affect of different personalities on 
decision-making. (Langley et al., 1995). 
4.3.2 Culture 
To a non-specialist, the influence of culture on human activity is accepted and 
taken for granted. For a cultural theorist, things are far from definite. However, 
for the purpose of my research a simple dictionary definition (as follows) 
adequately explains the constraints imposed on expert decision makers by their 
culture. "A representation of inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, that 
collectively form the basis of social interaction" (Collins English Dictionary, 
1992). 
The French Marxist Louis Althusser, believed that ideology actually forms the 
individual's consciousness and creates the person's subjective understanding of 
experience (Littlejohn, 1992). He thought that the dominant ideology of a culture 
would subvert other ideologies through social institutions, such as schools, 
church, and the media. Althusser presented his ideas many years before the advent 
of mass media. Now that we are exposed to news broadcasts, documentaries, and 
many other formats that display cultural bias openly, anyone who has an interest 
in the phenomena can readily observe cultural influence. However, the real 
circumstances within which we live are not readily understood by us as 
individuals. 
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4.3.2.1 Culture's consequences 
Due to the immense scale and complexity of the world with which we interact, 
our position inside our culture and our relation ship to the environment is beyond 
normal comprehension (Littlejohn, 1992). Consequently we have developed 
coping strategies to facilitate our relationship with society and the environment. 
The coping strategies are based on our personal interpretation of the ideological 
framework that exists during our formative years. This influence affects the whole 
cultural community to some degree, but each person will be influenced in a 
different way. Hofstede (1984) presented a most comprehensive study of 
'Culture's Consequences'. Through observation of cultural differences in forty 
countries Hofstede identified four main dimensions, which he named as power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Hofstede claims 
that these four dimensions give order to dominant value systems within cultures, 
and influence the thinking of individuals and organisations within those cultures. 
In his most recent work Hofstede (1997), now extended to cover fifty countries, 
he uses a powerful analogy to show that culture determines, perhaps more than 
anything else, how humans behave. Under the title Software of the Mind, he 
compares the human mind to computer software to show that although people are 
'programmed' in distinctive ways, it is possible for different programs to have 
common objectives. As he clearly states, it is common practices not common 
cultures that solve problems. He suggests that there is a need to understand the 
differences in values between cultures, and that the differences in practices 
between cultures must be resolved. Hofstede refers to a wider topic than decision-
making by experts, but the logic is as applicable. 
4.3.2.2 An irresistible force 
Cultural training and experience may cause individuals to follow different paths to 
satisfy their needs and desires, but humanistic psychologists such as May, 
Maslow, and Rogers, believe that individuals in different cultures are basically 
similar and the needs and desires for personal expression are universal (Weiner et 
al., 1977). Culture is identified as being a strong, perhaps irresistible force that 
influences individuals' perception of the world that surrounds them. Recognition 
of this influence supports the widely held view that people react to problems 
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according to their preconceived cultural notions of what 1s taking place 
(Eckensberger, 1995; Hofstede, 1984/1997). 
4.3.2.3 Cross cultural considerations 
Experts working in another culture face an additional demand. Their original 
culture will colour their perception of problems faced outside their normal 
environment, but they may have need to consider influences from other cultures 
for their decisions to be appropriate (Berger, 1988; Eckensberger, 1995). Experts 
are frequently exposed to different cultures, particularly now that international 
travel is readily available. Even within their own country they meet people with 
different cultural beliefs and experiences (Brislin, 1990). 
4.3.2.4 Culture and communication 
So far the discussion on culture has followed the accepted knowledge that culture 
is an internal, mental perception. Another view being considered is the importance 
of interpersonal communication and material things (Littlejohn, 1992; Toomela, 
1996). Littlejohn' s monograph (1992), Theories of Human Communication, 
discusses the association between communication and culture at length. He 
explores various diverse theories and shows that for many communication 
theories culture is the framework in which language exists. This additional 
perspective on culture is of particular interest to the study of experts. In most 
instances experts have to interpret information and act on it, circumstances that 
require communication and at least the recognition of material things such as 
symbols and other artefacts. 
4.3.3 Cognitive style 
Education, motivation, and application do not necessarily lead to success. 
Raudsepp, ( 1996) stated that there is strong evidence to indicate that successful 
people work on tasks that are appropriate for their cognitive style, and this may be 
a determinant of expertise. This statement was not supported by empirical 
evidence, but it is apparently a widely held belief, particularly in human resource 
management (Coscarelli et al., 1995). Cognitive style refers to the distinctive 
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ways in which individuals conceptually organise the environment, and respond to 
it (Goldstein and Blackman, 1978). 
4.3.3.1 Hemispheric laterality 
The study of cognitive style began m the early 1940's, and was somewhat 
fragmented; Goldstein and Blackman (1978) identified five approaches. Now 
cognitive style enjoys a more definite position in research; perhaps because recent 
developments in cognitive psychology, have provided a greater understanding of 
the innate complexity of the human brain (Medin & Ross, 1992). In particular 
scientists have known for some time that differing information is processed at 
different locations within the brain, even in separate hemispheres. For most 
people verbal and analytical processing appears to happen in the left hemisphere, 
while spatial and intuitive thinking occur in the right (Taggart & Robey, 1981 ). 
This rather simplistic explanation of the laterality of information processing 
within the human brain suffices to introduce the idea that information processing 
within the brain is fragmented (Eysenck, 1995). Research has shown that once the 
information is fragmented a preferential processing treatment may be adopted. 
During thinking and decision-making different people apparently process the 
same information in different ways, using different areas of the brain. This may, 
for example, predispose individuals to tasks that perhaps require analytical in 
preference to creative thought, or creative in preference to analytical thought. 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). 
Hemispheric laterality has been clearly demonstrated through biological and 
neurophysiological methods, where action of the body has been observed in 
response to stimulation of the brain (Eysenck, 1995). Less direct methods for 
assessing laterality, based on what has been discovered through biological and 
neurophysiological, have been pursued to establish associations between apparent 
lateral brain functions and observed physical activity. The research has pointed to 
several possible associations between brain functions and observable human 
performance. Some of the associations are tenuous and still require empirical 
support, but many of the associations that have been made are supported if not 
conclusively. Among the more accepted associations is handedness; hand 
superiority is associated with the opposite brain hemisphere i.e. a preference for 
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using the right hand is related left-brain dominance because of neural crossover. 
Hearing and eyesight have similar associations to handedness (Goldstein & 
Blackman, 1978). 
4.3.3.2 Visual field dominance and insight 
A detailed study of hemispheric laterality is clearly outside the scope of my thesis, 
but one recent study is particularly interesting. Bowden and Beeman ( 1998) 
reported on an association between visual field dominance and insight. They 
presented evidence suggesting that right hemisphere dominance assists in the 
recognition of solutions. Apparently, in response to input words, the right 
hemisphere "weakly activates large semantic fields of related information, 
including information only distantly related to the input word'' (p. 435) allowing 
insightful associations to be made. The left hemisphere has smaller semantic 
fields, which consequently do not provide such a strong opportunity for insight to 
take place. 
As visual perception is normally the dominant sense in humans, it is not surprising 
that information received by the brain via the visual senses is used to define and 
interpret the environment to which we are relating (Goldstein, 1989). What is 
interesting is the possibility that a preferential processing system may be in 
operation that is unique to the individual. It is accepted knowledge that visual 
information received by each eye is routed to different locations in the brain 
according to where the stimulus strikes the retina (Frisby, 1979; Hubel, 1988). 
The idea that visual information is attended to according to brain hemisphere 
preference determined presumably subconsciously by the individual has 
implications for the study of cognitive style. 
4.3.3.3 The MBTI and cognitive style 
The MBTI was discussed under the heading of personality. It is a personality 
inventory, which as yet, has not been directly related to cognitive action. 
However, there have been several attempts to relate hemispherical laterality to the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) (Power and Lundsten, 1997). Evidence to 
support a relationship between type theory (the foundation of the MBTI) and left-
brain/right-brain cognitive theory (hemispheric laterality) could indicate that type 
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preferences are to some extent innate. If type preferences are shown to be innate 
' 
then the use of the MBTI as an assessment of cognitive style could be justified, 
but so far the evidence is not conclusive. 
4.3.3.4 MBTI and hemispheric laterality 
Shiflett ( 1989) produced evidence to suggest a correlation between intuitiveness 
and brain dominance, but the evidence indicates an inverse relationship; 
intuitiveness should correlate to right dominance not left as Shiflett's results 
demonstrate. A repeat of Shiflett' s study by Taggart, Kroeck and Escoffier ( 1991) 
produced the appropriate correlation to support the relationship. However 
Eysenck (1995) suggests that the results are suspect because Taggart et al. based 
their research on a set of scales founded on data obtained through questionnaires 
not psychophysiological examination. Eysenck and others have made similar 
criticism of the MBTI, which is also based on a questionnaire format. The clear 
difference is that users of the MBTI can refer to a large history of use that 
supports its validity, whereas the Human Information Processing Survey used by 
Taggart et al. ( 1991) is not so well supported. 
Nonetheless Eysenck indicates that an association between two of the MBTI 
measures, sensing-intuitive and thinking-feeling, is reasonably established. Left-
brain dominance indicates the sensing and thinking types, whereas right brain 
dominance suggests the intuitive and feeling types as indicated by the MBTI. As 
mentioned earlier both measures are based on data obtained through 
questionnaires, so it is important to recognise that the correlation may be between 
sets of behaviours and experiences, not behaviour and experience with brain 
activity or location (Eysenck, 1995). 
4.3.4 Grouping cognitive styles 
Research suggests that individuals can be categorised into groups of thinking, 
according to their preferential ways of attending to information presented, 
otherwise known as cognitive styles (Tennant, 1988). Riding et al. ( 1993) classify 
cognitive styles into families. A Wholist-Analytic cognitive style family and a 
Verbal-Imager cognitive style family. Each family contains many sub-sets of 
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constructs that have been developed over the 59 years from the development of 
Bartlett's Sensory Modality Preferences in 1932, through Witkin 's (1962) Field 
Dependence-Independence to the recent work of Riding (1991). Each cognitive 
style is independent of the other (there is no significant correlation), but 
interaction between the two styles has been shown to affect a wide range of 
behaviours, ranging from learning performance and training preference, to 
occupational stress (Rayner & Riding, 1997; Riding, 1997). 
Cognitive style is a way of thinking that is used to filter and process stimulating 
information so that the environment takes on psychological meaning (Goldstein & 
Blackman, 1978). The resultant psychological meaning forms cognitive 
representations, which the individual uses to respond to, and interact with the 
environment. Without cognitive representation the stimulus would be irrelevant to 
the individual, and without the apparent differences in cognitive representation, all 
human response would be the same. In effect we would behave as automatons. 
4.3.4.1 Models of reality 
If humans were automatons then perhaps normative decision-making theory as 
described in Chapter 3 would suffice to explain all decisions (Beach and Lipshitz, 
1993). Of course people are not automatons and we produce a variety of responses 
to any given situation requiring a decision. Even experts working on the same 
problem may display different approaches to that problem (Willemain, 1995). 
Furthermore, many decision processes, expert or not, are clearly complex and not 
readily observable (Langley et al.. 1995). A decision can be thought of as a 
cognitive process that builds a model of reality, evaluates the model, applies 
available knowledge to derive an acceptable solution, then uses the model to 
organise appropriate action (Hunt et al., 1989). The reality that is modelled is built 
from the cognitive perception of the environment that has been created through 
cultural influences, personality traits, and mentally preferred ways of processing 
information (O'Keefe, 1989). Preferred ways of mentally processing information 
is a component of cognitive style. 
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4.3.4.2 Confusion between personality and cognitive style 
Early research produced theories of cognitive style that were based on personality 
variables (see Goldstein & Blackman, 1978). In trying to understand the 
complexity of human decision-making, many researchers have adopted cognitive 
style evaluation as a research tool. However, most research that claims to evaluate 
cognitive style is actually an evaluation of personality variables. Although the 
researchers discuss cognitive style, they use personality tests such as MBTI or 
Repertory Grid Technique to evaluate their data. For example, Hunt et al. (1989) 
used the MBTI to evaluate the cognitive style of undergraduate students in a 
decision-making situation (see also Kleindorfer et al., 1993; Allinson & Hayes, 
1996; Hayes & Allinson, 1994; O'Keefe, 1989; Robey & Taggart, 1981). 
Personality and cognitive style is not the same thing. 
4.3.4.3 Cognitive style and personality 
In the earlier section that considered personality, it was stated that personality is 
"more or less stable and enduring" (p. 9) (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). However, 
we are usually to some degree aware of our personality, and on occasion may 
modify it to suit prevailing circumstances. Additionally the stability of personality 
variables may be upset, and even altered by unusual or traumatic circumstances. 
Cognitive style is a more permanent physiological feature. A simple analogy is to 
compare it with being left or right handed. Most people find that it is extremely 
difficult to function with their non-preferred hand. Use of the preferred hand has 
been developed since birth, the nervous system and the associated muscles have 
developed to support this preference. Cognitive style represents the individuals' 
preferred use of the 'nerves and muscles' of the brain. 
Cognitive style is a distinct way of thinking that is used to filter and process 
stimulus information so that the environment takes on psychological meaning 
(Goldstein & Blackman, 1978). Cognitive style perhaps describes the processor 
that provides the information for the personality to act on. It is possible that some 
personality traits may be coexist with particular cognitive style combinations 
(Riding, 1997), but apparently there is no suggestion that personality and 
cognitive style are in any way directly related. They are independent, but they 
may interact. Having a particular personality type, does not predispose a person to 
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a particular cognitive style, neither is the reverse necessarily true. However, the 
individual differences that are identified through cognitive style analysis may 
underlie, and perhaps help to explain more readily observable human differences 
(Lewis, 1976; Rayner & Riding, 1997). 
There are numerous measures that have been used (not always appropriately as 
noted above) to assess cognitive style, Allinson and Hayes, (1996) identified at 
least 28, but three in particular stand out as due to the frequency of their use 
and/or appropriateness for the purpose. They are the Repertory Grid Technique, 
the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), and the Cognitive Style Analysis 
(CSA). The Repertory Grid Technique, and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI) have been discussed under the heading of personality; the Cognitive Style 
Analysis (CSA) is discussed shortly. 
4.3.4.4 Field-dependence theory 
Personality, as mentioned earlier, is recognised as a large taxonomy of traits, and 
types. Cognitive style is different; it is not based on traits or types, but on 
information processing dimensions. Witkin et al. ( 1971) recognised one 
dimension, field dependency. Field dependency is a term that Witkin et al. used to 
define differences in personal ability to separate embedded images in the 
embedded figures test (EFT), which they had developed. In simple terms this is 
similar to being required to identify a particular sign in an environment that is 
cluttered with signs, such as a busy shopping area. 
Witkin and his associates, with their field-dependence theory, were the first to 
look towards alternative explanations from personality theories, to account for 
cognitive perception (Witkin & Goodenough, 1981 ). Field-dependence theory 
assumes that differences in cognitive perception account for variations in human 
response to the environment. Field-dependence testing, using the embedded 
figures test (EFT) developed by Witkin et al. ( 1971) has been used extensively in 
research where the focus is on evaluation of visual perception (Loo, 1978; 
Mykytyn, 1989). 
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4.3.4.5 Cognitive Style Analysis 
The first apparent advance on Witkin's work is the Cognitive Style Analysis 
(CSA) developed by Riding ( 1991 ), which identifies two dimensions to cognitive 
style, wholist-analytic, and verbal-imagery. Wholist-analytic defines a continuum 
ranging from identifying the total picture, but not the detail, to identifying specific 
localised information with out recognition of the total picture. Verbal-imagery 
defines a continuum that separates people by their preference to attend to 
information in either verbal or image form. The CSA is described in greater detail 
below. 
The CSA is a modem and technically sophisticated test developed by Richard 
Riding (1991) at the University of Birmingham, UK. The CSA stands out from 
other tests that claim to measure cognitive style, because it measures actual 
performance on visual tasks presented, measured by a computer. The CSA can be 
described as a simple, user-friendly test from the respondent's perspective. It is a 
computer presented, interactive assessment of cognitive style which attempts to 
'positively assess' both dimensions of cognitive style, that is the Wholist-
Analytic, and Verbal-Imagery dimensions described above (Riding, 1991). 
The CSA is in effect a measure of human information processing that permits 
difference in cognitive performance to be identified. Some features of the CSA are 
in common with Witkin et al. 's EFf. The EFT evaluates people by measuring 
how they actually perform, and requires respondents to identify concealed images 
embedded within other images. In the EFf the images are displayed on cards, and 
the test respondent is not permitted to view the image and the figure in which it is 
embedded at the same time, therefore the EFf becomes a memory test as well as a 
perceptual one. As the EFf was developed before computers were in common 
use, the total procedure is carried out manually, including timing the test 
respondent with a stopwatch. Consequently it is necessary to deny the test 
respondent visual access to both images simultaneously, because it is possible that 
the response times would be so quick that they would be more of a reflection of 
the tester's reaction time than response to the test. In this respect the CSA is a 
reflection of technological advance (Digman, 1996). The computer records 
response times as the respondent interacts with the program so there is no need to 
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conceal information from the respondent, and the requirement for the respondent 
to memorise the images is eliminated. Additionally, being computer based enables 
the CSA to perform a quick and accurate evaluation that is much more detailed 
than the EFf. 
The CSA incorporates two sets of figure identification tasks that are similar to the 
EFf's one set, and the CSA contains an additional evaluation of judgements made 
from written information. The respondent is presented with a series of short tests, 
which require him/her to make associations and assessments; based first on 
written information, then on images. The CSA is self-administering, it takes 
approximately ten minutes to complete and, because it is self-evaluating, the 
respondent's report is presented on the computer screen on completion of the 
evaluation. The report requires interpretation and explanation by the administrator 
with reference to the manual provided (Riding, 1997). 
In developing the CSA, Riding (1991) moved away from the self-report style of 
evaluation, such as the MBTI, that is the standard research tool for most studies 
(see Fitting, 1991; Hunt et al., 1989; O'Keefe, 1989; Robey and Taggart, 1981 ). A 
major disadvantage associated with self-report systems is that people are often not 
aware of how they perform in a given situation. This lack of personal awareness 
leads the person to think, and consequently report, that they are carrying out a 
particular action when they are actually doing something different (Bromley, 
1977). Therefore self report measures record information on how people think 
they would perform in a given situation when what is required is data that informs 
about how they do perform. Additional problems with self-report measures arise 
from social pressure to 'say the right thing', and there is often a lack of motivation 
to make the necessary effort to respond accurately (Riding, 1995). 
4.3.5 Section summary 
This section considers the personal variables that the decision maker brings to the 
decision-making process. Specifically, personality, culture, and cognitive style are 
examined. The following section builds on this evaluation of personal variables by 
considering their influence on individuals' decision-making. 
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4.4 The influence of psychological factors on decision-
making 
The earlier part of this chapter has examined the psychological factors that 
influence the decision maker. This final part of the chapter discusses some 
important psychological factors that influence the decision-making processes. 
4.4.1 Intuition 
Intuition is used in all phases of the problem solving process (Isenberg, 1984 ). It 
is not 'folk psychology' but an empirically testable feature of the unconscious 
mind (Eysenck, 1995) that may be evident in personality or cognitive style. 
Of all the characteristics that distinguish an expert perhaps the most distinct is the 
expert's ability to produce an intuitive response. Intuition, an unconscious 
response to stimuli, has received a large amount of attention, particularly from 
personality psychologists, but also in decision research (Eysenck, 1995). 
Mintz berg ( 1989) is certain that intuition plays an important role in expert 
decision-making, but Simon ( 1987) disagrees. From his extensive research in the 
field of information processing Simon concludes that intuition is "simply analyses 
frozen in to habit and into the capacity for rapid response through recognition" 
(p. 63). However, what Simon identifies is not intuition as it is recognised by 
those that have studied the topic in more detail (Wescott, 1968; Simonton, 1980; 
Eysenck, 1995). 
Wescott ( 1968) established the foundations for the empirical study of intuition. He 
is credited with 'rescuing' intuition from the mystical status of being beyond the 
senses (Bruner, 1968), although some people continue to dismiss intuition as 'folk 
psychology' (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995). As Wescott states "intuition means 
many things to many people" (p. 98). For Wescott intuition is "when an individual 
reaches a conclusion on the basis of less explicit information than is ordinarily 
required to reach that conclusion" (p. 63). This is not Simon's (1987) 'analyses 
frozen into habit' , because that would require all the information to be available. 
Eysenk (1995) clarifies this point with his definition that "intuition is a mode of 
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cognitive functioning that is located at the opposite end of a continuum from 
logical thinking" (p. l 87). It is distinguished by instantaneous reaction with a few 
facts considered, what Eysenck calls the "aha! Experience". In Eysenck's work on 
Genius, he produces examples of great achievers who he believes combined 'the 
gifts' of intuition and analytical ability, and quotes from Mark Kac the Polish 
mathematician to separate 'ordinary genius' from the 'magician'. Kac (1985) 
suggested that an ordinary genius is someone that 'you or I' would be as good as 
if only we could perform at a rate many times better than we do. There is no 
mystery to the way they work, and when we see what they have done we feel that 
we could have done it. Magicians are different. How their minds work is to 
ordinary people effectively incomprehensible. Even when we understand what 
they have done, how it was done remains a mystery. 
4.4.2 Cognitive dissonance 
When there is a lack of agreement or consistency within ones thoughts, a 
condition known as cognitive dissonance exists, and may cause an 'honest error' 
(Leader, 1997). An expert is particularly prone to making honest errors because of 
their domain specific knowledge. Honest error is most prevalent when a person is 
attempting to make decisions within his/her domain of knowledge, experience, or 
influence when there is an emotional content. Cognitive dissonance theory 
suggests that a person will seek information that agrees with hi/her own beliefs 
and tend to avoid contradictory information (Festinger, 1957). Additionally, 
information received that is perceived to agree with the decision maker will be 
considered to be more valid than information that conflicts. Information that 
disagrees or conflicts with the decision makers preconceived ideas is likely to be 
critically evaluated, and perhaps rejected even though it may be both valid and 
applicable. 
4.4.3 Problem framing 
The requirement to define a problem in a way that fits with personally held mental 
references was discussed in Chapter 3. It was mentioned that the decision maker 
establishes a set of basic assumptions to frame the problem. In this chapter, 
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because problem framing is a psychological process, I briefly discuss the some 
psychological implications. 
The problem frame justifies and explains to the decision maker why he/she is 
behaving as he/she is. How problems are framed is determined by a person's 
cognitive ability. Throughout life people develop memories related to their 
experiences, and recall those memories to make sense of new experiences (Medin 
& Ross, 1990). When the first experience takes place, the information presented 
to the person experiencing it is filtered by their perceptive processes. How that 
information is interpreted is dependent on individual differences. No two people 
will have exactly the same perception of events (Goldstein, 1989). Consequently 
the retained memories will also differ. The memory will determine how the 
person perceives the problem initially; it will either help or hinder the process of 
identification. General knowledge structures, known as schema, will come into 
play as the person tries to make sense of the situation. If the information presented 
closely resembles earlier experiences the person may be able to call on accurate 
mental models to cope with the new situation. Training may improve their ability 
to recognise the relationship, between the immediate problem and passed 
experience, and lead them to a solution. 
However some people never overcome their inability to reconcile the manner in 
which a problem is presented with the context of the problem. Jung (1963) 
recalled his difficulties with maths while at school; 
" ... and I was unable even to formulate the question. To my horror I found 
that no one understood my difficulty. . .. My intellectual morality fought 
against these whimsical inconsistencies, which have forever debarred me 
from understanding mathematics . .. .All my life it remained a puzzle to me 
why it was that I never managed to get my bearings in mathematics when 
there was no doubt that I could calculate properly" (p. 41). 
4.4.4 Heuristics 
Rules and cognitive short cuts that form heuristics were examined in chapter 3. It 
was concluded that heuristics are beneficial aids in decision-making provided that 
there is an awareness of the possible existence of bias. Heuristics that are 
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cognitive short cuts are particularly interesting because they are associated closely 
with expert's decision-making processes (Shanteau, 1987). Experts develop 
expertise through many years of persistent training (Ericsson, 1997). They train 
highly specific cognitive functions, which undoubtedly facilitates the 
simultaneous development of heuristic ability (Medin & Ross, 1990). Decision-
making is rarely an isolated event. Typically decision-making is an intertwined 
series of events that can often allow modifications and adjustments to be made to 
initial decisions on the basis of feedback (Hogarth, 1981 ). Therefore, because it is 
quicker, the expert may be content to use heuristically derived decisions to initiate 
a process, and then make critical adjustments as the process achieves momentum 
(Medin & Ross, 1990). 
4.4.5 Personal commitment 
The decision options that managers will consider may be constrained by their own 
psychological beliefs, which are sufficiently powerful to cause business 
opportunities to be missed (Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983). There preliminary 
research indicated that managers were under pressure to maximise shareholder 
wealth, that their strategic decisions would be subject to the discipline of the 
capital markets, and that managers would concern themselves solely with investor 
reaction and expectation. However, they actually found that the prime managerial 
goal was to ensure the survival of the organisation in which they had invested so 
much of themselves psychologically and professionally. In essence Donaldson 
and Lorsch found that people, in this instance managers, have strong personal 
commitment to protect their own interests. 
There is no research that I am aware of that extends the work of Donaldson and 
Lorsch to consider experts. However, experts take many years to develop their 
expertise and may become highly committed to their vocation. They are known to 
have a strong sense of responsibility (Shanteau, 1987), but it appears unlikely that 
they will be any less committed to protecting their personal interests. 
Consequently, expert's decision-making may, on occasion demonstrate personal 
bias. 
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4.4.6 Blind spots 
The subject of blind spots was discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to decision 
making, in this chapter it is examined from the psychological perspective. 
Although a person may be aware of events taking place before them, they may not 
recognise the significance of the event, or they may incorrectly interpret what is 
happening (Porter, 1980). There are many possible causes, but that which Porter 
identified is bias introduced by cognitive blind spots. The need to consider the 
effect of competitor's contingent actions is demonstrated by chess players (Chase 
& Simon, 1973), and is important in many competitive environments. It is 
expected that proficient competitors are conversant with this important component 
of decision-making strategy. However, it has been recognised that highly trained 
people can be aware of a situation but not recognise important information 
embedded in the data being observed. 
Expert radiographers, who are highly trained in the recognition of pathological 
information on x-ray film, may not see relevant data (Carmody, Nodine & 
Kundel, 1981 ). This inability to perceive important information present in the 
field being observed is not unusual. Studies of car accidents frequently determine 
that a driver did not see the object with which they have collided (Mihal, & 
Barrett, 1976). Aberrations of the type described are not fully understood, but are 
well-recognised psychological phenomena that have been studied for many years. 
Driving can be seen as analogous to decision-making in two important ways. First 
there is a mass of confused information competing for the drivers/decision 
maker's attention. This requires the ability to extract weak signals from a noisy 
background (Einhorn, 1974). Second, the driver/decision maker makes decisions 
that have contingent affects on future events. 
It is important to my research on experts' decision-making to note that most of the 
literature has focused on being aware of competitors blind spots, not personal 
blind spots (Zajac & Bazerman, 1991 ). Decision makers need to be aware of their 
own blind spots to maximise the benefit of decision theorists' prescriptive advice. 
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4.4. 7 Section summary 
This section has extended the earlier work of this chapter by considering six 
psychological factors that influence decision-making processes. They illustrate the 
importance of understanding that decision-making is more than the application of 
decision-making rules, as may be concluded from decision-making theory. 
Decision-making is a highly personal activity that is determined by the decision 
maker's psychological interpretation of, and reaction to, situations that require a 
decision. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
Several authors have called for further research on the behavioural aspects of 
decision-making because it is, they say, one of the largest challenges in the future 
of decision-making theory (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Korhonen & Wallenius, 
1996; Langley et al., 1995; Schwenk, 1995). The behavioural perspective 
considers the personal variables that the decision maker brings to the decision-
making process, such as personality, culture, cognition. Each variable contributes 
to the complexity of the decision maker, and an awareness of their influence is 
valuable knowledge when studying experts' decision processes (Ericsson, 1997). 
Experts, according to the literature, are seen to have highly developed, 
psychological characteristics such as perception, discrimination, interpretation, 
and personality, to an extent that distinguishes them from non-experts (Shanteau, 
1987). This justifies a greater consideration of what the psychological 
characteristics are and how they may influence the decision-making of an expert. 
This chapter began with a brief consideration of cognitive ability and the 
psychological characteristics that were identified by Shanteau, before considering 
some psychological aspects of behavioural decision research; personality, culture, 
and cognitive style. The final section of the chapter considers aspects of decision-





A confluence of the preceding chapters, and the underlying motivation for my research path. 
The preceding chapters [Chapters 2, 3, 4] examine the literature relating to 
experts, decision-making, and human behaviour. In Chapter 2 the literature 
relating to experts is reviewed in detail. Elements of decision-making theory are 
reviewed in Chapter 3 that inform on the decision-making processes of experts, 
and in Chapter 4 human behaviour that mediates experts' decision-making is 
reviewed. 
The first section of this chapter is a synopsis of the preceding three literature 
review chapters, followed by a brief synthesis of the key elements of those 
chapters to outline my field of research. In the third section of the chapter I 
identify and describe several lacunas in the literature. The final section of the 
chapter is devoted to the development of my research question. The section begins 
by positioning my research perspective to vindicate my choice of a managerial 
setting as a suitable context in which to examine the previously identified lacunas. 
Next, there is a brief discussion of the role of experts as managers. The section 
concludes with the development of my overall research question, and the five 
subordinate questions, which determine my research path. 
******************** 
CHAPTER 5: Lacuna and research question. 
5.1 Synopsis of the literature review 
Chapter 2: Experts 
In this chapter I posed the obvious question - What is an expert? - as a basis for 
developing an understanding of the topic, and examined the literature that relates 
to experts to derive the following answers to that question. 
• Experts are people who have committed many years to extensive training and 
persistent practice in a particular discipline. The development of expertise 
may take ten years and frequently more. This period forms an important bench 
mark for the recognition of expertise (Ericsson, 1997, Shanteau, 1995). 
• Expertise is generally restricted to the domain in which it develops (Ebbesen 
& Konecni, 1975). Through their extensive training and experience experts 
develop particular abilities, which may be domain specific. Away from their 
domain of expertise experts may not be any more proficient than non-experts. 
Their skills may be appropriate in a different environment, but due to lack of 
familiarity with that environment, experts may not be able to locate the critical 
information cues that enable their expertise. 
• As their expertise develops and they acquire better decision-making processes 
experts become different from non-experts. (Baron, 1988). Experts become 
mechanistic in their approach to decision-making, acquire an ability to 
identify the appropriate path to a solution, and they process available 
information in a non-goal specific manner while working towards their goal. 
• Experts have an acute understanding of their domain of expertise. They can 
perceive information that to a non-expert may be invisible or at least 
incomprehensible (Shanteau, 1992b ). This enables experts to identify and 
understand information cues that would possibly be missed by a people who 
are not familiar with the domain. 
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Experts are acutely aware of events within their domain of expertise, 
consequently they can see relationships between cues. Experts can recognise 
and interpret complex patterns of information and critically discriminate 
between relevant and redundant information (Shanteau, 1987). 
• Experts, because they have a mechanistic approach to decision-making, can 
select their preferred procedures. Experts are able to manage and manipulate 
the decision process to accommodate their particular expertise (Klein, 1998). 
• Experts, because they are acutely aware of events that take place within their 
domain of expertise, can form intuitive conclusions about probable outcomes, 
and therefore possible solutions. Experts rely on intuitive judgement to guide 
them towards and often provide a solution to a problem (Hammond et al., 
1978). 
• Experts, because of their familiarity with their domain of expertise, can use 
intuitive judgement to assess the accuracy of formally derived solutions. 
Experts are able to assess the accuracy of the decisions that they make as they 
make them (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther & Schoemaker, 1993). 
******************** 
Chapter 3: Decision-making 
Aspects of decision-making theory that may be characteristic of experts' decision-
making processes are examined in Chapter 3. Consideration is given only to 
individual decision-making, as may be encountered in a management role. No 
attempt is made to explain group decision-making. Furthermore, it became 
apparent in the previous chapter that expertise is, to a large extent, determined by 
subjective characteristics, consequently this chapter has a particular emphasis on 
aspects of decision-making that may be susceptible to behavioural variables. 
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The conclusions drawn from the literature review presented in this chapter is 
summarised as follows: 
• The study of decision-making has been traced back to the time of Aristotle 
and Euclid (Suppes, 1984 ). 
• Decision-making is a process, which attempts to find a path from an initial 
state of problem recognition, to a desired state of problem resolved. 
• Decisions may take place under conditions of certainty, uncertainty, risk, and 
conflict (Schoemaker & Russo, 1994 ). 
• Decision-making theory is divergent (Tversky & Kahneman, 1990). There is 
normative theory, which prescribes rational actions to resolve problems, and 
descriptive theory which attempts to explain how decisions are made 
(Kleindorfer et al., 1993; Raiffa, 1994). A recent addition to decision-making 
theory is naturalistic theory, which, although it claims to study 'reality', is 
similar to descriptive decision theory (Doherty, 1993). 
• Decision-making can be intuitive or analytical, it can be dependent on 
heuristics, and it can involve weighting to establish values and/or probabilities 
(Schoemaker & Russo, I 994 ). 
• Human cognition will apparently have a major influence on the perception of 
a problem by the decision maker, and on how the decision maker responds to 
that problem, these are recognised as problem framing issues Bazerrnan, 1983: 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981 ). This is particularly important when considering 
experts. Experts, unlike non-experts, are expected to have ability to process 
relevant information automatically, thereby conserving mental energy while 
maintaining a high standard of decision-making (Ericsson, 1997; Hammond et 
al., 1987; Shanteau, 1992). 
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• The context in which decisions are made is important information when 
attempting to understand why the expert makes particular decisions. Risk and 
consequences, culture, personality, and organisational politics are specific 
contextual influences (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981; Kleindorfer et al., 1993). 
******************** 
Chapter 4: Psychological factors 
Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that expertise m decision-making is significantly 
determined by the development and appropriate application of cognitive ability. 
Consequently in this chapter I examine psychological factors that influence the 
development and application of cognitive abilities that mediate decision-making. 
The conclusions drawn from the literature reviewed, that makes up this chapter, is 
summarised as follows: 
• Cognitive ability distinguishes individual performance from that of others 
(Medin and Ross, 1992). Experts may be expected to have highly developed 
cognitive abilities appropriate to their domain of expertise (Shanteau, 1987; 
Ericsson, 1997). 
• Perception, discrimination, interpretation, and personality are important 
psychological characteristics that appear to be specifically, and well developed 
in experts (Shanteau, 1987). These characteristics are known to be particularly 
important for the achievement of superior decision-making and an 
understanding of how these factors differentiate individuals may be beneficial 
in developing an understanding of why the decision-making processes of 
individual experts vary. 
• There is an identified need to study the behavioural aspects of decision-
making, which include personality, culture, and cognitive style (Eisenhardt 
and Zbaracki, 1992; Langley et al., 1995; Schwenk, 1995). 
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• The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, and The Repertory Grid Technique are 
commonly used tools to evaluate aspects of personality in managerial research 
(Allinson and Hayes, 1996; Fransella and Banister, 1975; Stewart, Stewart and 
Fonda, 1981). 
• The influence of culture on decision makers is apparently significant and 
requires consideration in an evaluation of decision-making processes 
(Eckensberger, 1995; Hofstede, 1984/1997). 
• Cognitive style is a term used to define the characteristic way in which 
individuals process information to make sense of their environment (Goldstein 
and Blackman, 1978). Cognitive style appears to be a critical issue in the 
understanding of human decision-making processes (Riding, 1991 ). 
• It is apparent from the literature reviewed that psychological factors strongly 
determine how decisions are made. Intuition, heuristics, problem framing, and 
personal commitment are all largely determined by psychological factors 
(Eysenck, 1995; Goldstein, 1989; Shanteau, 1987). 
******************** 
5.2 Synthesis 
Experts have been studied in a large variety of situations to gain knowledge about 
the nature of their expertise. Provided that the experts are bona fide experts 
working within their domain of expertise, they have demonstrated definite 
superiority of performance over non-experts (Ericsson, 1997). They have also 
shown that their superiority is due to at least ten years specific training and 
experience within their domain of expertise, which have developed a different and 
apparently better information processing ability. Overall, the conclusion must be 
that experts are able to make better decisions than non-experts because the expert 
uses superior decision-making processes. 
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Decision-making processes are the research domains of decision theorists. 
Decision-making research is developing strongly towards a behavioural 
perspective that considers how the decision maker interacts with the decision-
making environment (Orasanu and Connolly, 1993). It is recognised that most 
often decision-making takes place in a busy and confusing environment in which 
the decision maker has limited information and restricted ability to use that 
information (Simon, 1979b ), plus the pressures of partially conflicting objectives 
brought about by political pressures (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). To have a 
proper understanding of the behavioural aspects of decision-making it is necessary 
to consider process not performance (Lipshitz, 1989). Process, particularly 
superior process is dependent on the application of appropriate cognitive skills to 
available knowledge. 
Many of the cognitive skills that are associated with decision-making process are 
known to be better developed in experts than in non-experts (Shanteau, 1987). 
However, although many of them are observable they are difficult to assess in a 
way that provides meaningful information about individual decision-making 
processes. Recent developments in the assessment of cognitive style (Riding, 
1991) may help to overcome this difficulty. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that decision-making is dependent on particular 
cognitive functions that have been identified as highly developed in experts. This 
seems to indicate that experts are better equipped, to be proficient decision 
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5.3 The lacuna 
5.3.1 Process determines expertise 
Despite strong evidence indicating that it is process, not performance, that 
determines expertise (Lipshitz, 1989), the overarching theme in research that 
studies experts is performance (Camerer & Johnson, 1991). A preoccupation with 
outcomes is perhaps understandable. Superior outcomes were expected in the 
early research, and when they were not evident, expert's performance was 
denounced as no better than chance (Shanteau & Stewart, 1992). However, 
subsequent evaluation indicated that particular criteria must exist to permit the 
display of superior performance by experts. It is now accepted that bona fide 
experts have particular credentials that can be assessed before their performance is 
considered, and that they are expert only within their domain of expertise 
(Ericsson, 1997). Therefore, under the right circumstances experts are capable of 
better performance than chance (Carroll & Johnson, 1990). 
Experts are now accepted to be supenor performers, so the continued 
preoccupation with their performance is overshadowing a need to understand how 
they process information to achieve superior performance. Some knowledge about 
process has been obtained. For example it is known that experts process 
information differently than non-experts; that they are mechanistic rather than 
goal seeking (Baron, 1988). It is also known, from the study of chess players, that 
experts call on well established mental models to evaluate problems (Chase & 
Simon, 1973). However, this knowledge informs on how experts process 
information, not on why they process it as they do, although it can be assumed 
that one essential reason is because it leads them to the desired outcome. 
The processing of information by a decision maker, trained or not, will most 
likely follow some personal path. However, trained people, such as experts, can 
be expected to have some understanding of appropriate decision-making 
processes. Consequently, understanding why experts follow their personal paths 
takes on some importance when attempting to gain an overall understanding of 
their decision-making processes. Three factors that may determine that path; 
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subjective variables (Einhorn, 1974 ), subjective characteristics (Shanteau, 1987), 
and cognitive style (Rayner & Riding, 1997) are discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
5.3.2 Subjective variables 
When experts are studied the research usually considers how the experts perform 
in some specific task. This may be done through observation or by requiring the 
experts to account for their actions via verbal protocols or retrospective reporting 
(Ericsson, 1997). There are numerous studies that have looked at how experts 
acquire knowledge and at how experts use that knowledge (see Ericsson, 1997, 
and Klein et al., 1988, for examples). These studies have considered the 
performance of individual experts as a sample of the total expert population. The 
research has most often been a mathematical evaluation that focused entirely on 
supposedly objective data for statistical comparison, and largely ignored 
individual perception. For example Einhorn 's (1974) seminal work on expert 
judgement used an in depth mathematical analysis of the work of three 
pathologists to assess 'intrajudge' reliability, construct validity, and judgmental 
bias. However, although he made no allowance for their existence, he 
acknowledged that several subjective variables might be present. 
Einhorn (1974) identified several subjective variables and their possible effect on 
outcome. He recognised the possibility of experts being able to describe 
previously unthought-of methods to carry out activities. He also suggested that a 
'real expert' might be capable of locating and associating cues that have not been 
identified previously. Einhorn chose not to pursue these ideas further. He was 
satisfied to acknowledge them as parts of a "creative process that we know little 
about" (p. 570). Einhorn also examined the idea that the "process of information 
search will greatly structure the task" (p. 570). He was considering the effect that 
the individual expert's problem definition and solution finding processes could 
have on the decision-making process. Again, although Einhorn acknowledged the 
potential for individual differences to influence outcomes he chose not to pursue it 
further. Einhorn thought that for his experiment the task was sufficiently 
structured to eliminate any need to consider individual differences in problem 
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structuring. However, he did conclude "in non-experimental settings, this 
structuring will undoubtedly he of great importance" (p. 570). Einhorn 's final 
concern was with the need for agreement between experts, particularly in how 
they evaluate information. His contention was that experts should agree on what 
information was present and how it should be valued. However, he recognised 
that if experts reached appropriate conclusions without agreement on the process 
then an additional variable must exist to enable them to arrive at appropriate 
conclusions. Einhorn concluded that "there may be many routes to the same goal, 
and there may be more than one way to perform the cognitive tasks involved in 
judgement" (p. 571 ). 
Einhorn (1974) acknowledged that individual differences in experts' perception of 
information and the subsequent conceptualisation of its meaning is "undoubtedly 
of great importance" (p. 570), nevertheless I have been unable to find evidence 
that experts' subjective variables have been studied. Apparently no prior research 
has evaluated differences in the perception or conception of information leading to 
decision-making. Indeed individual differences have been overshadowed by 
individual similarities, because apparently 'expert' research has focused on 
discovering knowledge that informed on the expert population as a whole. 
To summanse, Einhorn acknowledged that an expert's perception of the 
information presented, and his/her subsequent conceptualisation could influence 
expert's decision-making processes. Before they are able to form an 
understanding of the information, the decision maker must make assumptions 
about the information presented to them by referring and comparing it to their 
prior knowledge (Medin &d Ross, 1990). This is often referred to as framing 
effects. The assumptions and subsequent understanding are completely 
determined by the individual's unique prior knowledge. Additionally, the 
presentation of the information influences what assumptions will be made. A 
subtle change in how the information is presented, such as a change in the order of 
presentation, may cause different assumptions to be made. Consequently a 
different interpretation and understanding of the information may be formed. 
Einhorn's 'subjective variables' can be seen as direct contributors to individuals' 
assumptions and to their subsequent understanding when 'framing' occurs. 
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The subjective variables that Einhorn identified are essential knowledge for the 
development of my research question. For this reason they are set out below. 
The subjective variables are: 
( 1) Variations in ability to locate and associate cues that have not been identified 
previously. 
(2) Variations in information searching to define a problem and select a solution. 
(3) Variations in performing the cognitive tasks involved in decision-making. 
The differences between the variables are perhaps subtle, but it is important to 
recognise that they exist and that each one is influenced by the behavioural factors 
examined in Chapter 4. 
5.3.3 Subjective characteristics 
Shanteau ( 1987) examined, in general terms, the psychological characteristics of 
expert decision-making. He identified the need to analyse "subjective 
characteristics" (p. 297) of experts because he considered that if the objective is 
to understand experts then all the processes involved need to be studied. Rather 
than follow the mathematical methodologies of objective analysis, which permit 
inductive hypotheses relating to experts as a whole to be formed, a subjective 
evaluation of expert characteristics should focus on individual performance. The 
critical issue here is that, as Einhorn (197 4) mentioned, there may be more than 
one way to perform the cognitive tasks associated with expertise. This builds on 
the earlier discussion of subjective variables, which shows that the assumptions 
made about information presented, can determine its subsequent interpretation and 
understanding. When there are alternative ways to perform cognitive tasks, the 
one chosen may be determined by subjective variables. In simple terms, the way 
the task is framed by the decision maker may indicate to them the appropriate 
cognitive route to a resolution. 
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However, despite Shanteau's suggestion that to understand experts more attention 
should be applied to understanding all the processes that permit expertise, his lead 
appears not to have been followed. Apparently no prior research examines the 
idiosyncrasies of experts to determine how or why they perform as they do. 
5.3.4 Cognitive ability 
Cognitive style research has indicated that successful performance in any 
discipline may come more easily if the appropriate cognitive aptitude is applied 
(Rayner & Riding, 1997). This is the basis of aptitude testing, and career 
counselling. 
Decision-making is known to be predominantly a cognitive activity, and experts 
are accepted as superior decision makers (Shanteau, 1987). Ericsson and Charness 
( 1994) and others have attributed expertise to lengthy practice, and obviously the 
long period of training that develops expertise must be a significant factor in 
expert ability (Ericsson, 1997). However as Ericsson acknowledges, practice does 
not always lead to expertise. Failure to acquire expertise may be attributed to 
improper practice, but it is clear that all people who train in a specific activity, no 
matter how much they try, do not become experts. 
So what does enable expertise to develop? Einhorn (1974) identified subjective 
variables, which are interesting but they alone do not seem to suggest an answer. 
It is generally accepted that people are different, and that as a consequence they 
respond differently to similar stimuli (Weiner et al., 1977). Shanteau (1987) 
suggested that the subjective characteristics of experts should be studied. Again, 
this is interesting but alone does not appear to answer the question of why some 
people become experts and others do not. Possession of subjective characteristics 
identifies experts, and helps to explain an expert's actions, but does not inform on 
why the person is an expert. 
There is apparently some additional variable that interacts with the extensive 
training, subjective variables, and subjective characteristics to facilitate expert 
performance. Research, which has considered the influence of cognitive style, 
indicates that in any discipline the application of appropriate cognitive aptitude 
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can more easily lead to successful performance (Rayner & Riding, 1997). Perhaps 
this is the missing link. By combining the thoughts of Einhorn (1974) and 
Shanteau ( 1987), with recent developments in cognitive style theory it may be 
possible to show that there is a relationship between experts' overt actions and 
their cognitive style. Subjective variables and subjective characteristics may alter 
in accordance with the expert's preferred cognitive style. 
Cognitive style is a strong, and stable influence on how a person perceives 
information and subsequently acts upon it. Consequently, an expert's decision-
making processes should demonstrate a strong influence that implicates (or is 
representative of) that expert's cognitive style. 
Furthermore, as I mentioned in Chapter Four, although many researchers have 
inappropriately used the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) as a tool to assess 
cognitive style (see Hunt et al., 1989; Hayes & Allinson, 1994; O'Keefe, 1989; 
Robey & Taggart, 1981) there have been several attempts to relate hemispherical 
laterality to the MBTI (Power & Lundsten, 1997). Evidence to support a 
relationship between type theory (the foundation of the MBTI) and left-
brain/right-brain cognitive theory (hemispheric laterality) could indicate that type 
preferences are to some extent innate. This suggests that a consideration of type 
preferences when studying individual experts may be valuable. 
Little significance has been attached to the variations between experts' problem 
solving strategies, perhaps this is because the differences are accepted as part of 
the mystique of expertise. However the fact that experts do reach similar 
conclusions although they follow different paths appears to suggests that experts 
may chose the path best suited to their cognitive style. In some situations there 
may be several clearly identifiable paths to a solution, in which case perhaps there 
is little significance in the choice. However, when the path to a solution is not 
obvious the expert's characteristic way of thinking, their cognitive style can be 
expected to dominate the selection process (Hunt et al., 1989). This assumption is 
based on cognitive style theory (Chapter 4), which indicates that people do have 
an idiosyncratic way of processing information, and that they may find difficulty 
in alternative processing methods. 
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The idea is similar to that of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Chapter 4). The 
MBTI suggests that people follow their preferred information processing 
strategies, but may on occasion chose to act in an alternative way (Myers & 
Myers, 1986). Cognitive style however is not a preference that can be modified at 
will; it is a more or less fixed characteristic of the individual (Riding, 1997). 
Cognitive style could be an important variable in the makeup of expertise. 
Research suggests that during the brain's continuous process of storing 
information, representing interactions with the environment, the brain 
simultaneously forms preferred ways to access and use that information. This is 
the foundation of cognitive style (Messick, 1976). Studying the cognitive style of 
experts may lead toward an understanding of why experts apparently follow 
different paths from one another when determining a problems' solution even 
though they have identical initial information and reach similar final conclusions. 
There is no evidence, in the literature, that this line of enquiry has been followed. 
5.3.6 The lacuna: a summary 
Einhorn, ( 1974, p. 570) clearly stated that when studying experts decision-making 
processes in an uncontrolled environment, (such as the 'real world') consideration 
of how information is structured by an expert will 'undoubtedly be of great 
importance'. He identified three particular variations in the ability of individuals 
to processes information, which he called 'subjective variables'. Einhorn's 
statement appears to support the earlier concern expressed by Simon ( 1945/1957) 
that a single isolated individual may not be able to select the optimum solution, 
and may therefore chose a path that differs from the norm. Although the 
importance of information structuring has been identified for some time little 
knowledge of it exists in the literature. In particular the literature does not address 
the question of how the perception and conception of information by experts in 
their natural working environment may influence their decision-making processes. 
Shanteau (1987) identified the need to consider all the processes involved in 
human decision-making, to gain a better understanding of experts' decision-
making. In particular he identified a need to answer the question of how the 
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'subjective characteristics', or idiosyncrasies of experts, influence their decision-
making. This topic appears not to have been addressed in the literature. Answers 
may elaborate Einhorn' s statement that "... there may be more than one way to 
pe,jorm the cognitive tasks involved in judgement" (p. 571 ). 
There is evidence to suggest that success in any endeavour is easier when the 
appropriate cognitive style is applied (Raynor & Riding, 1997). Perhaps experts 
are people who maximise the application of their cognitive style to their 
environment. As we have seen cognitive style is a more or less fixed characteristic 
of the individual. Therefore, an individuals' success in any endeavour is 
dependent using his/her cognitive style to frame problems in a way that enables 
him/her to reach the most appropriate conclusions, and experts appear to be 
people who are particularly capable of achieving success in this way. 
Studying the cognitive style of experts may lead toward an understanding of why 
experts apparently follow different paths from one another when determining the 
solution to a problem, even though they have identical initial information and 
reach similar final conclusions. However, I have not found any evidence in the 
literature that the influence of cognitive style on expert's decision-making has 
been studied. This third omission in the literature suggests that questions 
concerning possible relationships between an expert's information structuring, an 
expert's personal characteristics, and an expert's cognitive style nave not been 
addressed. 
I have identified three lacunas within the literature. The question, raised by 
Einhorn (1974), of how the perception and conception of information by experts 
in their natural working environment may influence their decision-making 
processes, has been identified as important for some time. Similarly, the question 
concerning how the 'subjective characteristics', or idiosyncrasies of experts, 
influence their decision-making (Shanteau, 1985) remains. No study, that I have 
found, has attempted to answer these questions. Furthermore, no study that I am 
aware of has examined in cognitive terms, an expert's personal approach to 
decision-making. 
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5.4 The research question 
5.4.1 Research motivation, perspective, and focus 
In the preceding section I have identified a lacuna in the literature, which appears 
to be worthy of study. There are many ways that the three interesting topics, 
subjective variables, subjective characteristics, and cognitive style, can be studied. 
How they are studied will more than likely be determined by the researchers 
motivation, research perspective, and his/her particular focus. In Chapter 1, I 
discussed all three of these issues to justify the path that I have taken in this study. 
Here I must restate my position to vindicate my research question. 
The motivation that lead to this study taking place derived from my involvement 
in Human Resource Management, and from my academic training in psychology. 
For many years my occupation, in HRM, exposed me to the diverse nature of 
human behaviour that is a feature of people in general. My occupation also 
brought me into frequent contact with 'experts'. Consequently my research 
perspective is heavily biased towards considering experts in a setting that I know 
and understand. As a management psychologist I feel bound by my personal 
domain of expertise, and therefore inclined to focus on experts who work in that 
environment. This research focus leads me to conduct my research in an 
contextual setting that coincidentally appears to have been neglected. Managers 
who possess expertise do not appear to be uncommon, yet there is apparently very 
little evidence of research that considers experts working in management. [Note. I 
draw a distinction between experts working in management and expert managers. 
The former are experts in domains other than management, and they are my focus 
in this research. The later do not appear to have been studied, and possibly do not 
exist in terms of the definition of experts.] 
The study of experts has apparently taken place in many different settings 
(Ericsson and Smith, 1991 ). This, I believe is mainly a contextual issue which 
narrows the focus while retaining a consideration of the important issues relating 
to experts. Consequently I believe that a research setting in which the unit of 
analysis is an expert working in a managerial role forms a rich contextual 
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environment in which to study the interrelated actions of subjective variables, 
subjective characteristics, and cognitive style. Therefore, it is my view that a 
study that considers experts in managerial positions, as a contextual setting, is 
appropriate given my background, and is further justified by the evident lack of 
prior research in the area. 
5.4.2 Management research perspective 
As a student of decision-making working within a management discipline, one 
strong reason for studying expert's decision-making is to obtain knowledge that 
can be used prescriptively to improve the decision-making of non-experts. That is, 
to be able to inform non-experts about experts' decision-making processes, so that 
they, the non-experts, can learn how to make better-processed decisions in 
situations that they may face. Non-experts are most likely to gain maximum 
benefit from prescriptive information if they perceive it to be relevant, therefore 
my research must of necessity be management related. 
In addition an understanding of both how and why experts act as they do seems to 
be more beneficial than only knowing how they act. This can be compared with 
the earlier discussion of heuristics, otherwise known as rules and mental short 
cuts. Knowing how to act in a given situation is comparable to having rules to 
follow, which works well if the situation is covered by the rules available. Mental 
short cuts differ from rules; they require an understanding of what is to be 
achieved. They enable the application of prior knowledge, experience and 
understanding to existing situations, and to new and often very different 
situations. 
Mental short-cuts effectively allow associations to be made between old situations 
and new ones. This suggests that non-experts, equipped with knowledge of how 
and why experts act as they do, may be better able to apply their knowledge 
appropriately, not only in prescribed situations but also in novel situations not 
previously encountered. Again, to be prescriptively beneficial, the knowledge 
gained must be relevant to a management environment and, I believe, justifies my 
research being contextually focused on decision-making in a managerial role. 
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5.4.3 Experts as managers 
In Chapter 1, ( 1.2 Motivation) I stated that the original motivating factor for my 
research was a consideration of why consultants, people who often have sufficient 
experience and training to be classified as expert, frequently use different 
processes to achieve similar goals. The consultants that I had worked with were 
usually technical experts in a domain such as computing or accounting systems 
who were employed to manage installations or upgrades in existing installations 
i.e. the consultants were employed in a managerial role. Over time I frequently 
observed different experts completing similar tasks in very different ways, but 
they still achieved the same goal. I formed the opinion that the differences were 
brought about by the personal characteristics of the expert, because the task was 
similar to that carried out by other consultants and the environment (domain) did 
not change. At that stage it was not clear to me what actually distinguished 
experts from non-experts, although it was clear that the consultants were 
employed to do work that staff were not able to. 
In pursuing this line of thought I carried out a preliminary literature review, which 
introduced me to work by Einhorn (1974) and Shanteau (1987). Questions raised 
by Einhorn and Shanteau lead me to pose the following question, - could it be that 
behavioural characteristics, not training or the setting, determine the path that 
experts take to resolve a problem? 
To be able to consider the behavioural characteristics of experts it was necessary 
to examine the literature that considers experts. Through the literature review I 
developed an understanding of domain specific expertise. However, I did not find 
any studies of experts outside of their domains of expertise. 
It seems reasonable to think that aspects of expertise that are determined by 
cognitive style and personality (see Chapter 4 section 4.3.1 and 4.3.3) are 
sufficiently stable to be transferable to other domains. If this is right then perhaps 
an expert has an idiosyncratic set of skills that he/she will apply to any situation 
in, or external to, the domain of expertise. 
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Expert ability is usually developed in a specific domain. Within that domain 
experts spend ten years or more acquiring domain related knowledge. However, 
along with that knowledge they develop many skills to enable them to apply their 
knowledge. Some of those skills will be domain specific, for example the ability 
to recognise cues, an ability to compare current events with past events, or simply 
being able to recognise subtle change within the domain. Other skills may not be 
domain specific and could have application in other domains. Examples of non-
domain specific skills could be knowledge of languages, mathematical 
knowledge, computer skills, and decision-making. 
Edwards' (1983) argues that non-domain specific skills are part of what he sees as 
'a taxonomy of intellectual tasks'. These intellectual tasks are part of the expert, 
that is they are part of the expert's cognitive development. They do not require 
domain specific information such as cues to enable the expert to use them. A 
language specialist, who developed his/her expertise in a teaching domain, could 
be expected to perform well in another domain requiring language skills such as 
an interpreter. Similarly an expert who has developed exceptional mathematical 
skills through specialisation in engineering could be expected adapt easily to other 
domains requiring mathematical skills such as lecturing in maths at a University. 
Decision-making skill should also be applicable outside of the domain in which it 
was developed, providing that contextual information on which to base the 
decision is available to the expert (see Chapter 3, section 3.5.5). 
When experts are studied within their domain of expertise they will exhibit all 
their domain specific skills. Therefore, a study of process away from domain of 
expertise is appealing because it can consider specific skills (Edwards, 1992) in 
isolation, to examine and perhaps help in the development of a taxonomy of 
expert skills that can be generalised across domains. Superior decision-making 
skill is a characteristic that is frequently used to distinguish experts from non-
experts (Simon & Chase, 1987), and as I have mentioned earlier (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.1.5) this ability to make sound decisions is highly desirable in 
managerial positions (Bennett & Felton, 1974; Gilmour & Comer, 1998; Lipshitz, 
1994; Mintzberg, 1984; Simon, 1987). Therefore, managerial role provides an 
environment in which the individual difference that determine the expert's 
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decision-making process can be studied without having to have a detailed 
understanding of his/ her domain of expertise. 
The term managerial role was not intended to do more than define an 
environment. I did not want to consider specific management tasks for several 
reasons: 
1. By definition the experts are not expert managers. 
2. I only wanted to consider situations in which the experts applied aspects of 
their expertise. 
3. I was only interested m expert's decision-making processes, which I 
believe are not determined by a particular managerial role. 
As I have stated earlier, my interest was to consider experts working in a 
management role and I had identified some indication that personal characteristics 
determined how the consultant carried out his/her managerial role. As the task to 
be achieved and the environment were relatively constant, it was apparent that the 
process used to complete the task, not the task its self, should be the focus of my 
research. 
In summary, I set out to study experts' decision-making independent of task. In a 
study of experts domain and or task is important but that is not what I wanted to 
study. My intention was to study decision-making in terms of personal 
characteristics and individual differences. I chose to study the experts out of their 
domains of expertise to avoid any suggestions about domain specificity. 
Nevertheless the experts had to be doing something that would require the use of 
their expertise, would provide context for their decisions, and allow their expertise 
to be studied. I chose 'managerial role' because it is an environment that many 
experts move into, not as experts but frequently because of that expertise. I saw 
managerial role as something like a controlled environment in which each 
respondent would be exposed to similar managerial problems. 
It is not uncommon for experts to become managers. They often, without 
additional training, apply their expertise to difficult management tasks and are 
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seen to be successful, yet apparently no-one has examined domain specific experts 
working as managers. Auditors (Abdolmohammadi and Shanteau, 1992; 
Shanteau, 1995), engineers (Hammond et al., 1987), various medical specialists 
(Patel and Groen, 1991) many other domain specific experts have been studied, 
but apparently no consideration of experts' managerial decision-making has been 
reported. Mintzberg ( 1989), Simon ( 1978), and many others have examined 
management decision-making, but not specifically the managerial decision-
making of experts. 
Could it be that in developing expertise the expert also develops skills that are 
appropriate for management, or perhaps experts that succeed in management have 
suitable cognitive or subjective characteristics to be successful in both domains 
without additional training? It may be that in developing expertise the expert also 
develops an understanding of decision theory. 
Decision-making can be learnt, and is accepted as an important part of both 
expertise and management (Shanteau, 1988; Simon, 1987). The important 
constraint is the information about which decisions are made, this could be said to 
be domain specific. Perhaps some experts are sufficiently versatile to be able to 
adapt (Patel and Groen, 1991). Furthermore, the 'expert' who is a manager is, in 
Maccoby's (1987a,b,c) view, a very capable decision maker when logic alone can 
determine outcomes. 
Decision-making is a contextural, or interwoven, aspect of management, as is the 
management of people to achieve goals. Management of people can be thought of 
as a personal skill that is acquired concurrently with development of expertise in a 
particular domain due to a constant interaction with people, but it is probably best 
thought of as a behavioural ability that is characteristic of the person (Myers and 
Myers, 1986). There is little evidence in the literature of any consideration of 
experts as managers, however, a management style defined as 'expert' by 
Maccoby (l 987a,b,c) recognises that expert managers frequently do not have 
good interpersonal skills. As a large employer of experts in managerial positions, 
the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) in The United States 
of America can provide some interesting insights to the managerial skills of 
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experts. At NASA it has been found that experts often view problems as technical 
issues that can be resolved through the application of logic, and consequently are 
likely to be insensitive and ineffective when involved in the management of social 
issues (Maccoby, 1987 a,b,c ). 
In many domains, such as psychology, chemistry, or teaching, it is normal for 
training to include tertiary education followed by the development of practical 
skills. However, during the period of expertise acquisition management training is 
not normally included. Nonetheless, experts do frequently and successfully move 
outside their domain of expertise to take up management positions, but there is 
little evidence that this occurrence has been studied. 
5.4.4 Developing the research question 
The literatures relating to experts, decision-making, psychology, and management 




Ex pert theory 
Figure 5.1. Overlapping theories with the lacuna in black. 
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Within the overlap are located the lacunas discussed in the previous section: 
subjective variables, subjective characteristics, and cognitive style. I stated earlier, 
my belief, that the setting in which I examine the lacunas is important, and I have 
represented the contextual setting, management theory, in the diagram to illustrate 
that all the identified lacunas can be examined within a managerial context. These 
issues have apparently received minimal attention in the literature, and I therefore 
conclude that my research has no precedent. 
5.4.5 Research question 
In order to improve the understanding of experts my research will seek an answer 
to the following research question: What shapes the managerial decision-making 
processes of an expert? My research question is intended to discover new 
knowledge about the perception and conception of information by experts in their 
natural working environment, and how it may influence their decision-making 
processes. 
There appear to be three particularly important influences that have the potential 
to shape an expert's managerial decision-making processes: 
1. The expert's personal psychological makeup. Psychological factors can be 
seen as internal influences that are potentially strong enough to determine 
experts' actions. 
2. The expert's prior training and experience. During the extensive development 
period of ten years, or more, that it takes to become an expert, a strong 
reliance on acquired skills develops which may influence expert's managerial 
decision-making. 
3. The management role and associated influences and constraints. This can be 
seen as external to the expert. Experts may resist the influence of their 
managerial role, or they may be consumed by it. [Note. Managerial role in this 
work means the functions carried out by the respondents in their jobs as 
mangers.] 
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Number one, above, is the primary focus of my research; a consideration of the 
influence of subjective variables, subjective characteristics, and cognitive style on 
experts' managerial decision-making. 
Within the broad scope of my research question, answers to the following 
questions will be sought. The questions can be seen as taking specific, defined 
positions from which to consider the shaping influences that are at work. The 
questions are not, by design, linear; they are searching. The intent here is to 
examine all reasonable possibilities, so that the important shaping influences are 
identified. 
Question 1. How does the expert make decisions? 
To answer my research question it is first necessary to determine what shape the 
expert's decision-making processes take. Shape, here means the organised and/or 
defined form or pattern that the expert's decision-making process appear to follow 
and, is synonymous with the expert's preferred way of processing decisions, and 
with the expert's preferred decision-making style. The shape of the expert's 
decision-making processes is, for the purpose of this research, thought to be a 
manifestation of the interaction between the individual's subjective 
characteristics, his/her expertise, and his/her managerial role. Therefore, this first 
question attempts to identify any examples of pattern formation associated with 
decision-making processes that are displayed by the respondents who feature in 
the case studies. 
Question 2. How does the expert's preferred decision-making 
style fit with his/her subjective characteristics? 
An answer to this question may establish that there is, or is not, an association 
between the observed shape of experts' decision-making processes and their 
subjective characteristics. The subjective characteristics considered here are those 
recorded in interviews and observation, plus the indications derived from 
psychological evaluations. If an association is apparent, then this may support the 
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idea that subjective characteristics do determine the decision-making processes of 
experts. 
Question 3. How do the expert's decision-making processes 
influence his/her managerial role? 
Having determined, in answer to question one, what shape the respondents' 
decision-making processes take, this question attempts to explain what happens 
when that shape, in the form of the decision-making processes of expertise are 
applied to a managerial role. Experts bring to a managerial role personal 
dispositions that have probably influenced the development of their expertise. 
Additionally experts, by definition, have had many years to develop a particular 
pattern of behaviour, which has been recognised as expertise. Therefore, it seems 
probable that the combination of personal disposition and entrenched expertise 
will have a strong influence on the experts' decision-making processes in their 
managerial role. [Note. Managerial role in this work means the functions carried 
out by the respondents in their jobs as mangers.] 
Question 4. How does the managerial role influence the expert's 
decision-making processes? 
This question takes an alternative perspective from that of question three. It 
examines the possibility that the shape of experts' decision-making processes may 
be affected by the managerial role. There are many strong influences in 
management that could perhaps, apply sufficient pressure on an expert to cause a 
change in their decision-making processes. [Note. Managerial role in this work 
means the functions carried out by the respondents in their jobs as mangers.] 
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Question 5. How does the expert's management role fit with 
his/her subjective characteristics? 
This question attempts to explain how experts' general dispositions, which are 
displayed in their subjective characteristics, allow them to satisfy the requirements 
of their managerial role. 
***************** 
5.5 Chapter summary 
The preceding chapters have examined the existing literature relating to experts, 
decision-making (where it is relevant to the study of experts), and psychological 
factors that may help to explain the cognitive processes of experts in a decision-
making situation. In this chapter I have presented a synopsis of the material 
presented earlier, then drawn from those earlier chapters to establish a link 
between the topics to show the clear relationship that exists between them. I then 
identified a lacuna worthy of investigation, and developed a research question to 
examine that lacuna. 
In the following chapter I discuss the background to my constructivist approach to 




My research, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, examines the managerial 
decision-making processes of experts. For this research I use a qualitative case 
study procedure to obtain knowledge relating to the manager's decision-making 
processes. I set out in this chapter how I went about my research. However, before 
explaining how I conducted my research, it is appropriate that I state what 
determines my research perspective, and why I elected to use qualitative 
procedures. Therefore I begin this chapter by examining how social science 
research has developed to its current status, and show where my research fits 
within social theory. Next I state my chosen research procedures, justify my 
choice, and explain the procedures. Then I explain how I went about satisfying 
qualitative research criteria for trustworthiness. Finally I make a statement about 
the delimitations, limitations, and ethical issues that relate to my study. 
This chapter is in four parts, section one is a consideration of the philosophy of 
social science, section two is my justification for the research procedures that I 
adopted, section three is a report on my research procedures, and section four sets 
out the research limitations. 
CHAPTER 6: Research procedures. 
6.1 The philosophy of social science research 
Until recently most research could be described as positivistic; based on a 
philosophy that experimental investigation and observation are the only sources of 
substantial knowledge. Social science is a relatively new discipline, that has 
adopted some of the procedures developed by the positivistcally inclined 'natural' 
or physical sciences. Of obvious significance is 'scientific' method, which 
originated in metaphysical debate. Metaphysics is the philosophical study of 
reality. It considers the principles of being and knowing, and theorises on the 
nature of things (Burtt, 1932). Aristotle wrote on metaphysics, as did Descartes. 
The development of 'scientific' method is associated with people such as Locke 
and Hume. The seventeenth century philosopher Locke argued that all knowledge 
comes from experience not pure thinking. Hume, a Scottish philosopher, began in 
the eighteenth century, the rational evaluation of cause and effect (Preece, 1994). 
Metaphysics is not an empirical science, in fact many of the statements made are 
not capable of being empirically tested and may be considered to be nonsense by a 
positivist. Nonetheless, metaphysics has made an important contribution, known 
as rational thinking, to modem research method (Preece, 1994). In the past 
unexplained events were often credited to the influence of mystical forces. Now 
rational thinking can usually equate unexplained events to logical possibilities. 
However, the philosopher, Karl Popper, in his book 'The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery' (1934/1960) put forward his view that knowledge cannot be absolutely 
confirmed. He suggested that science progresses by disproving current theory, 
which is then replaced with equally provisional new theory that incorporates more 
of the known data. The hypothetico-deductive concept on which Popperian theory 
is based, was widely accepted as the way science progressed until Thomas Kuhn 
( 1962), also a philosopher, published his book 'The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions' which caused strong divisions in the philosophical ranks. Kuhn's 
ideas have overtaken Popperian theory, in particular Kuhn's conceptualisation of 
a paradigm (Masterman, 1970). Although Kuhn did not see a place for paradigms 
in the social sciences (Lather, 1990), the paradigm concept has become the 
foundation material for explanations, and justifications of the many research 
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perspectives that exist m the social sciences (Deetz, 1996, Guba, 1990). 
Consequently the next section, of this chapter, looks at the origins of the term 
'paradigm' in social science, and examines what paradigms mean to the social 
sciences. 
6.1.1 Paradigms 
Thomas Kuhn developed the philosophical concept of paradigm for the physical 
sciences. Kuhn ( 1962, 1970) apparently used the term 'paradigm' in at least 21 
different ways, which at the least fails to clearly define its meaning (Masterman, 
1970). However, Masterman' s explanation of Kuhn's work defined three types of 
paradigm; metaphysical, sociological, and construct. The metaphysical paradigm 
equates to a set of beliefs, standards, or simply a new way of seeing. The 
sociological paradigm represents institutionalised achievement, and the construct 
paradigm encompasses artefacts such as texts and tools. 
In an hypothetico-deductive approach to research, induction provides hypotheses 
which are tested and subsequently confirmed or rejected through the application 
of deductive reasoning (Preece, 1994 ). Kuhn's work is seen to be an advance from 
an hypothetico-deductive view, which then becomes a problem solving artefact in 
Kuhn's terminology, and therefore becomes only one of the possible paradigms 
(Masterman, 1970). Kuhn's paradigms can exist before the theory is formed, they 
are a 'way of seeing'. Paradigms are a conceptualisation of something, what 
Masterman calls "a concrete picture of something" (p. 77), which can be used 
analogically to describe something else. This concept has formed the foundation 
on which others have built (Guba, 1990). 
There exists, according to Masterman ( 1970) three situations, non-paradigm 
science, dual-paradigm science, and multiple-paradigm science. Non-paradigm 
science is the inductive or philosophic stage at the beginning of the thinking 
process before a paradigm exists. Dual-paradigm science exists when an existing 
paradigm is falling from favour and another is contending as a replacement. 
Multiple-paradigm exist when there is a discordant development between theory, 
practice, and technology. Masterman recognised that, in the late sixty's, the social 
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sciences were in a discordant situation. Now, thirty years later this discordant 
situation in social science is perhaps more intensified. The triad appears to have 
become more divergent. In particular technological development is apparently 
outstripping development in the other areas. I say apparently in caution because 
people, particularly researchers, are always unable to move outside the ideas of 
their time to develop a truly balanced perspective of current events (Burtt, 
1932/1964 ). However, it appears that multiple-paradigm science is still the 
prevailing situation in the social sciences. 
The discordant development between theory, practice, and technology creates an 
environment in which there is constant revision and development of paradigms, 
and often assimilation or combination. The state of flux requires new paradigms 
to be created which form sub fields. As these sub fields proliferate, the separation 
between them becomes more trivial until eventually someone conceives of a new 
paradigm that encompasses many of the established fields, and gives a more 
central insight to the nature of the field (Masterman, 1970). It may happen 
through the collapse of rival, perhaps weaker paradigms, or by assimilating other 
closely associated paradigms, so that one paradigm prevails and more advanced 
research can develop. This final stage of paradigm development, where an 
established paradigm (or paradigms) is replaced is known as a paradigm shift, and 
is evident in the physical sciences. The social sciences however, are thought to be 
at an earlier stage of development in which there is no dominant paradigm, 
consequently paradigm shifts are not experienced (Skrtic, 1990). 
From her comprehensive assessment of Kuhn's original work on paradigms, 
Masterman (1970) provided a clear picture of what is, in her view, a 'paradigm'. 
Put simply, a paradigm is 'a concrete picture' that is used analogically to perceive 
a solution to a problem. It, a paradigm, is "an artefact which can he used as a 
puzzle-solving device; not a metaphysical world view" (p. 76). The analogy that a 
paradigm is a concrete picture is apt, because the boundaries of a paradigm tend to 
be finite, as is concrete. When paradigms approach their elastic limit they tend to 
suffer from the 'law' of diminishing returns, but more importantly they can fail. If 
stretched too far a paradigm can, according to Masterman, produce "conceptual 
inconsistencies, absurdity, misexpectation, disorder, complexity and confusion in 
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exactly the same way as a crude analogy does" (p. 82), without any possible 
explanation of what has gone wrong. 
Following Kuhn (1962) and the subsequent 'interpretation' of his work by 
Masterman ( 1970), the term 'paradigm' became so widely misused that Mintzberg 
( 1978) suggested, somewhat tongue in cheek I think, that any paper submitted for 
publication that contained the word 'paradigm' be rejected "out-of-hand'' (p. 636). 
Morgan (1979), in response to Mintzberg's comment, set about realigning the 
term 'paradigm' with Kuhn's work. He adopted Kuhn's concept of paradigms; in 
particular he adopted the idea of metaphysical, sociological, and construct 
paradigms. He claims that social scientists operate within a metaphysical 
paradigm. That is, they operate within a set of beliefs, standards, or a way of 
seeing, while rarely questioning or examining the context. Instead, social 
scientists concern themselves with what Kuhn ( 1962) considered to be less 
important debates and associated puzzle-solving activities, which Kuhn defined as 
'normal science'. Normal science takes place within the sociological paradigm, 
which represents institutionalised achievement, and the construct paradigm which 
encompasses artefacts such as texts and tools. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) develop Morgan's comments to propose that all 
perspectives should be grouped within a framework of four metaphysical 
paradigms. They suggest that two pairs of dimensions, subjective-objective and 
sociology of regulation-sociology of radical change, form the four sides of a 
frame [Figure 6. 2]. Within that frame they identified, 'Radical Humanist', 
'Radical Structuralist', 'Interpretive', and 'Functionalist' paradigms. 
Although there are many alternate views to those expressed by Burrell and 
Morgan (See Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Van Maanen, 
1983 for examples), they appear to be the first to have attempted to draw together 
all the ingredients of social science research in an attempt to form a coherent body 
of understanding. Therefore I propose follow the four-paradigm model produced 
by Burrell and Morgan [figure 6.2] to describe in outline the key assumptions 
made by social scientists. 
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Sociology of radical change 
Radical Radical 
humanist structuralist 
I Subjectivity I I Objectivity I I 
I Interpretive I I 
Functionalist I 
Sociology of regulation 
Figure 6.2. The four paradigms for the analysis of social theory proposed by 
Burrell and Morgan ( 1979). 
The first dimension, subjective-objective, forms the horizontal axis of the Burrell 
and Morgan model and establishes four kinds of assumptions that are made by 
social scientists. 
1. Ontological assumptions about reality. Such as whether reality is external to 
the individual or the product of the individuals mind. 
2. Epistemological assumptions about what can be known, what 1s the 
relationship between the inquirer and the known or knowable. 
3. Assumptions about human nature such as are people conditioned by their 
environment, or do they have free will to control their environment. 
4. Methodological assumptions about how the inquirer should go about finding 
knowledge. 
Each of the above assumptions has application across the subjective-objective 
dimension as set out below. 
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Ontology ranges from objective realism where a real world of tangible objects 
exists to a subjective nominalism where nothing but names exist outside the 
person. 
• Epistemology ranges from objective positivism based on the traditional 
scientific approach associated with the natural sciences to subjective anti-
positivism which holds that is relativistic and can only be understood from the 
perspective of the individuals involved. 
• Human nature ranges from objective determinism where human activity is 
seen to be a response to environmental influences to subjective voluntarism 
where humans are autonomous and free-willed. 
• Methodological assumptions range from objective nomothetic protocols and 
techniques to subjective ideographic consideration of the individual. 
The extreme positions of the four assumptions, according to Burrell and Morgan, 
represent 'social positivism' and 'German idealism', two major intellectual 
positions that have dominated social science for more than two centuries. In 
recent times, particularly the last twenty years, intermediate positions have arisen 
and there is now a range of positions between the two extremes. 
The second dimension identified by Burrell and Morgan is at one extreme the 
sociology of radical change, and at the other the sociology of regulation. 
• Sociology of radical change is concerned with deep-seated structural 
conflict, conflict, and domination that some see as characteristic of modem 
society. 
• Sociology of regulation is concerned with social cohesion and solidarity 
and the reasons why society remains as an entity. 
Burrell and Morgan maintain that the two perspectives are necessarily separate 
and distinct from each other, so that there is essentially no middle ground. They 
claim that these are alternative models that require a researcher to commit to one 
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side more than the other. Some of the dimensions identified by Burrell and 
Morgan are status quo or radical change, social order or conflict, and solidarity or 
emancipation; for each pair there is no middle ground, a choice for one effectively 
eliminates the alternative from consideration. 
Having separated the model along a horizontal axis based on assumptions about 
the nature of science, the subjective-objective dimension, and a vertical axis based 
on assumptions about the nature of society in terms of regulation or radical 
change, there are now four quadrants. These quadrants, according Burrell and 
Morgan, represent four paradigms that sanction the meta-theoretical assumptions 
that drive the social theorists that operate within them. The upper pair are named 
'radical humanist' and 'radical structralist', and the lower pair are 'interpretive' 
and 'functionalist'. Before explaining these paradigms it is useful to consider what 
these paradigms represent. 
The paradigms delimit radically divergent perspectives for the analysis of social 
phenomena. They are analogous to Kuhn's metaphysical paradigms, and 
accommodate Kuhn's sociological and construct paradigms (Kuhn, 1962; 
1970bc ). Each of Burrell and Morgan's paradigms identifies a totally separate 
social-scientific reality, and Burrell and Morgan claim that the meta-theoretical 
assumptions of all social theorists will place them within the context of these 
paradigms. Inside each paradigm 'normal science' as defined by Kuhn (1962) 
takes place, and there may be considerable debate between theorists, but seems to 
be extremely rare for inter-paradigm activity to occur. Burrell and Morgan suggest 
that a theorist changing from one of their paradigms to another is "in Keeping with 
Kuhn's (1970) notion of revolutionary science" (p. 24). However, I believe that 
Kuhn was referring to conceptualising new paradigms through an amalgamation 
of new and existing ideas (Kuhn, 1962; Masterman, 1970); the new paradigm then 
replaces the old, as with the Copernican system, or Einstein's theory of relativity. 
Nonetheless, Burrell and Morgan's paradigms do appear to bring together many 
divergent ideas into a coherent whole. 
As with the sociology of regulation and sociology of radical change mentioned 
earlier, Burrell and Morgan's four paradigms are very different ways of seeing 
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things, which in their pure form are based on opposing meta-theoretical 
assumptions. An acceptance of one set of assumptions defies acceptance of the 
others as can be seen in the paradigm descriptions that follow. 
Radical humanist takes a subjectivist perspective of the sociology of radical 
change. This paradigm is concerned with analysis of the status quo with a view to 
changing it. Its origins lie in the German idealist tradition of Kant, Hegel, as 
interpreted in the early works of Marx who sought to change the world through 
changes in societal awareness and thinking. 
Radical structralist takes an objectivist perspective of the sociology of radical 
change. This paradigm is concerned with social forces, internal contradictions, 
and power relationships. Its main origin is the later work of Marx who had 
become interested in theories of evolution and in political economy. 
Interpretive takes a subjective perspective of the sociology of regulation. This 
paradigm sees the world as an emergent social process created by individuals. It is 
concerned with understanding the basic nature of the usual world, the status quo 
with a view to understanding and explaining it. Its approach to social science is 
anti-positivist and ideographic such that social reality rests with the consciousness 
of the individual, and anything else is merely assumption and subjectively shared 
meaning. This paradigm is the direct product of the German idealist tradition of 
social thought established by Kant. 
Functionalist takes an objectivist perspective of the sociology of regulation. This 
paradigm concentrates on understanding order, equilibrium, and stability in 
society and how they can be maintained. It is the 'positivist' paradigm, which 
attempts to apply the ideas and methods of the natural sciences to the study of 
peoples' affairs. This, according to Burrell and Morgan, is the paradigm, which 
forms the meta-theoretical base for most organisational theorists, psychologists, 
industrial sociologists, and industrial relations theorists. 
There is now a well-established movement away from the strictly positivist 
perspective which Burrell and Morgan identified as the norm, towards what they 
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called a phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology was identified, in the 
Burrell and Morgan model, as a dominant research form in the interpretivist 
paradigm, but the paradigm had not at that time provided much organisation 
theory. The term phenomenology is now widely used as an umbrella term for all 
kinds of qualitative research (Easterby-Smith, 1991 ), although it is also the 
description of conscious experience founded by the German philosopher Husserl. 
6.1.2 Subjective-objective problem 
The Burrell and Morgan model is distinctly divided between subjective and 
objective assumptions. This, as Deetz (1996) has stated, is no longer acceptable. 
Contemporary researchers recognise at least three problems with the dichotomy. 
First, the meaning of subjective-objective does not have generally accepted 
meaning. Different cultures, different societies within those cultures, and 
researchers who assume different research perspectives within those societies all 
attach different meaning to the terms 'subjective' and 'objective'. Second, the 
subjective-objective label forms an artificial division between researchers that 
provides identity and status for some, and causes others to be obscured. 
Nonetheless, a growing acceptance that the difference between objective and 
subjective is rhetorical not substantive has lead to the establishment of new 
research perspectives. Deetz claims that many feminists, postmodemists, 
poststructuralists, critical theorists, and labour process theorists have been 
inspired by the writings of the European philosophers Husserl, Heidegger, and 
Wittgenstein. These writers suggest that language not consciousness determines 
our understanding. Therefore, the new research positions cannot, and should not 
be classified as either subjective or objective; they are a new dimension. Thirdly, 
the subjective-objective has become, to some researchers, synonymous with 
qualitative-quantitative. The subjective-qualitative association is seen by some to 
reduce this type of research to "impressionistic musing" (p 194) (Deetz, 1996). 
Others see it as an alternate form of data collection to the one they see as an 
objective-quantitative method, and use both for what they think to be an aid to 
triangulation. 
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Deetz ( 1996) replaces the axis of the Burrell and Morgan ( 1979) model with what 
he considers to be "a more contemporary look at alternative research programs" 
(p 195). He defines two contrasting dimensions, 'local/emergent-elite/a priory', to 
replace Burrell and Morgan's 'subjective-objective' dimension, and 'consensus-
dissensus' to replace Burrell and Morgan's 'social regulation-social change'. 
The first dimension accounts for the overall research process by identifying the 
origins of concepts and problems statements. As the title suggest, local/emergent 
represents concepts and problem statements developed with the research and 
elite/a priori represents those brought to the research. Three benefits are gained 
from this new dichotomy. First, it recognises social constructions and identifies 
the conceptual origins of objects and problems. Second, this focus helps to 
separate elite/a priori, theoretical 'book' knowledge or knowing about, from 
local/emergent, 'practical' knowledge or know how. Thirdly, it helps to identify 
bias. 
The second dimension, 'consensus-dissensus', represents at one extreme unity or 
continuation of existing discourse, 'consensus', and at the other extreme 
difference or disruption of existing discourse, 'dis sens us'. Deetz considered that 
Burrell and Morgan's model assumed an existence of coherent and cohesive 
groups that changed through class conflict. The Deetz view sees that conflict 
exists inside the groups which are not necessarily cohesive or coherent. Problems 
are, according to Deetz, caused by suppression of human needs, and destructive 
control processes. 
Moving on from Burrell and Morgan's model, and the refinements that Deetz has 
proposed, there are many alternate views, or paradigms, which are used to explain 
research perspectives (Berg, 1995; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Van Maanen et 
al, 1982. 1983;). Lincoln and Guba (1985) defined the 'naturalistic' or 
constructivist, paradigm as the logical successor to positivism. The constructivist 
paradigm is in effect used by Lincoln and Guba as an umbrella term for many 
post-positive points of view, in a similar way to the Burrell and Morgan's use of 
phenomenology mentioned earlier. 
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The 'constructivist paradigm' seems to be another way of conceptualising Burrell 
and Morgan' subjective, sociology of regulation paradigm; the interpretive view. 
Lincoln and Guba name postpositivistic, phenomenology, ethnographic, 
subjective, case study, qualitative, hermeneutic, and humanistic as examples of 
alternate titles that are frequently applied to the constructivist paradigm. In 
addition, Guba (1990) identifies postpositivism, critical theory, and 
constructivism as three major paradigms that reject positivism. Also Deetz ( 1996), 
as mentioned earlier, identified the new research perspectives of feminists, 
postmodernists, poststructuralists, critical theorists, and labour process theorists. 
Postpositivism is what Burrell and Morgan called the functionalist paradigm. 
Critical theory developed from the metaphysical basis of the radical humanist 
paradigm, and constructivism is an alternate title for the interpretivist paradigm 
(Skrtic, 1990). Feminist theory and labour process theory draw their metaphysical 
inspiration from what Burrell and Morgan called the 'German idealism'. Feminist 
theories fit the radical humanist paradigm. Labour process theory could be either 
radical humanist or radical structuralism, depending on whether it follows the 
early, humanist, Marxist theory or the later, structralist, Marxist theory. 
The critical issue here is that there has evidently been a persuasive move away 
from sociological positivism, what Burrell and Morgan call the objective, radical 
structuralist and functionalist paradigms. Phillips ( 1990) claims that positivism 
was in its death throes by 1956, this suggests that the move away had gained 
considerable momentum by that time. Developments in social science theory have 
mainly built on German idealism, in what Burrell and Morgan called the 
subjective, radical humanist and interpretivist paradigms. Burrell and Morgan 
acknowledged that there were important changes in research focus through the 
60's and 70's. In particular they saw a declining interest in the regulation-radical 
change dimension, and increased interest in the subjective-objective dimension. 
As I have mentioned earlier, Deetz (1996) criticised the excessive interest in the 
subjective-objective dimension. His view is that the subjective-objective is no 
longer appropriate, and has become an obstacle to further progress in social 
science theory, consequently he proposed two new paradigm dimensions, which 
may permit a better understanding of the relationship that exists between existing 
and emergent theories. 
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6.1.3 Qualitative-quantitative 
There are now so many perspectives within the postpositivistic paradigms that the 
perhaps less emotive, but more descriptive, term 'qualitative' has been adopted as 
a recent umbrella title for the paradigms (Creswell, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 
1998; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Leedy, 1993). 
Many authors now accept a qualitative-quantitative dimension as the only major 
distinction between paradigms in social science. The quantitative paradigm builds 
on the traditional, realist, positivist, experimental, empiricist theories. The 
qualitative paradigm attempts to accommodate all the theories that are 
ideologically removed from positivism, and it can be argued that the modem 
scientific paradigm is postpositivistic (Firestone, 1990). Schwandt ( 1990) suggests 
that no matter how many paradigms, theories, research perspectives, or ontologies 
there may be, there are only three paths to enquiry within the social sciences: 
scientific methodologies, constructivist methodologies, and critical science 
methodologies. Scientific methodologies are those of the quantitative paradigm 
mentioned earlier. Constructivism and critical science are the methodologies of 
the qualitative paradigm. Constructivist methodologies derive from hermeneutic 
enquiry; the study and interpretation of human behaviour and social institutions, 
and is concerned with "capturing the lived experience of participants" (Schwandt, 
1990, p. 268). Critical science brings together scientific and constructivist 
methodologies to examine the empirical and interpretive explanations from its 
own critical dialectical perspective. This is the methodology used by feminism 
and critical theory, among others. It systematically investigates " the manner in 
which that lived experience may he distorted by false consciousness and ideology" 
(p. 268) (Schwandt, 1990). Simply put, constructivist methodologies search for 
the meaning of human experience; critical science methodologies attempt to 
overcome the illusions in human experience. 
6.1.4 Postmodernism 
Although many authors include postmodemism as part of the qualitative 
paradigm, others do not (Skrtic, 1990). Postmodemism to Skrtic, and others, is a 
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movement beyond the four-paradigm model of social science to a position which 
is disbelieving of all social science paradigms. However, as I do not wish to enter 
the postmodernist debate, I confine myself to the contents of the qualitative 
umbrella as stated above, and now present an overview of the ideology of what 
has become known as qualitative research. 
6.1.5 Qualitative and quantitative assumptions 
Postpositivism is seen as a reaction to the perceived failings of a positivistic 
approach. Most of the features of postpositivism have come from the 'hard 
sciences', physics and chemistry, although the arguments put forward in the hard 
sciences are even more persuasive when applied to the study of people (Hanson, 
1958; Phillips, 1990). Qualitative research is founded on postpositivism. 
Postpositivism in its many forms, as mentioned earlier, is the resultant reaction to 
dissatisfaction with positivistic ideologies, and is generically known as the 
qualitative paradigm. Positivism was the path of the natural sciences, but it has 
not escaped the postpositivistic developments, which it spawned. Positivism in its 
contemporary form accepts some of the postpositivistic ideas that can be applied 
to quantitative procedures, and in its contemporary form is known as the 
quantitative paradigm. 
The quantitative paradigm is based on at least five assumptions. The qualitative 
paradigm makes five very different assumptions (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Both sets of assumptions are set out below. 
1. Ontological assumptions 
Quantitative. An ontological assumption that there is a single, tangible 
reality able to be studied by evaluating its components independently since the 
whole is merely the sum of its parts. 
Qualitative. An ontological assumption that there are multiple constructed 
realities that can only be studied holistically, and that enquiry into these realities 
will inevitably diverge so that prediction and control are unlikely, but some level 
of understanding may be achieved. 
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2. Epistemological assumptions 
Quantitative. An epistemological assumption that allows separation of the 
observer from the observed. 
Qualitative. An epistemological assumption that the observer and the 
observed interact to influence each other, such that the knower and the known are 
inseparable. 
3. Time and context assumptions 
Quantitative. An assumption that time and context are independent of 
observation such that what is true for a sample at one time and place may also be 
true for a similar sample at another time and place. With an intent to form 
generalisations that hold anywhere at any time. A nomothetic perception. 
Qualitative. An assumption that an enquiry will develop a specific 
knowledge that describes an individual case. An idiographic perception. 
4. Cause and effect assumptions 
Quantitative. An assumption that cause and effect are inseparable. 
Qualitative. An assumption that all things are in a state of mutual 
simultaneous shaping such that it is not possible to differentiate between causes 
and effects. 
5. Value ladenness assumption 
Quantitative. An assumption that the enquiry is value free. The objective 
methodology ensures that the results of an enquiry are fundamentally free from 
bias introduced by external values. 
Qualitative. An assumption that all enquiry is value laden. Research is 
influenced by: 
(I) The enquirers values, choice of problem and framing of the problem. 
(2) The enquirers choice of paradigm that guides the enquiry. 
(3) The enquiry is influenced by the essential theory used to guide the 
collection, and interpretation of information. 
(4) The enquiry is influenced by contextual values. 
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(5) There must be value-resonance (congruence) between problem, 
paradigm, theory, and context for the enquiry to produce meaningful 
results. 
From the qualitative assumptions mentioned above comes a set of interrelated 
implications for qualitative research (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). 
• The ontological assumption requires the study to be in a natural setting; 
otherwise known as in context. 
• The adaptability necessary to cope with the variety of realities requires 
that the primary data-gathering instrument must be a person. All 
instruments interact with respondents, but the human instrument is 
capable, to some extent, of grasping and evaluating meaning associated 
with the interaction. 
• Intuitive as well as formal knowledge is required. Much of the interaction 
between the enquirer and the respondent of enquiry occur at an intuitive 
level, which reflects most honestly, and accurately the values of the 
enqmrer. 
• Procedures (methods in positivist rhetoric) will necessarily be descriptive 
(qualitative procedures) rather than empirical probability (quantitative 
methods). Quantitative methods have a place in qualitative procedures, a 
supporting role, but the many mutually shaping influences and value 
patterns that may be encountered are more sensitive and adaptable to 
qualitative procedures. 
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• Sampling is purposive; it seeks out particular instances thereby exposing a 
greater range of data. It may expose several possibly realities. In this way 
the enquirer can attempt to account for contextual items such as local 
conditions, local influences, and local values. By contrast, the random 
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sampling of quantitative methods tends towards the norm, and may 
suppress- deviant cases. 
• Inductive analysis is most appropriate. It allows values to be an explicit 
part of the analytic structure and, more than deductive analysis, it allows 
the enquire-respondent interaction to be explicit, and the interaction of the 
mutually shaping influences are more likely to be identified. 
• Theory that existed before the investigation (a priori) is based on prior 
generalisations which may not fit the particular situation being examined. 
Therefore, it is preferred that the theory should emerge from the data 
(grounded theory) because no previously existing theory could possibly 
include the multiple realities that are likely to be encountered. 
• Research tends to follow a path of emergent design as the enquiry 
proceeds, because what emerges from the enquirer-respondent interaction 
is largely unpredictable before the event. Additionally, the enquirer cannot 
know the form of mutual shaping that may occur, nor how the value 
systems, including the enquirers, will interact. 
• The enquiry depends on the nature and quality of the interaction between 
the enquirer and the respondent. It is the respondent's constructions of 
reality that the enquirer seeks to represent, and the respondent is the best 
person to authenticate the enquirer's conceptualisation of events. 
Therefore, outcomes are negotiated. 
• Reporting should take the case study form which is most suited to the 
description of multiple realities; it is adaptable, able to demonstrate the 
variety of mutually shaping influences. It can also best represent the value 
positions of the enquirer, existing theory, procedures, and particular 
contextual values. The case study report allows the reader to build on his 
or her own intuitive knowledge and understanding, and also enables 
personal generalisations to be made. 
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• ldiographic representation is the norm because the validity of 
interpretations relies heavily on the enquirer-respondent interaction, 
contextual factors, local mutually shaping influences, and values including 
those of the enquirer. 
• Generalisations, if made, are provisional, hesitant, and cautious because 
the findings are bound up in the particular interaction between the enquirer 
and the respondent. Also, the findings are context and value dependent, 
and the mutually shaping influences may be very different in another 
setting. 
• Enquiry boundaries emerge as the problem comes into focus. Without 
prior knowledge, which is not available to the enquirer, contextual and 
mutually shaping influences boundaries cannot be set. 
• Decisions about the trustworthiness of qualitative procedures cannot be 
based on existing quantitative criteria. Quantitative research relies on 
internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity to establish the 
trustworthiness. Internal validity establishes that what is intended to be 
measured is measured. External validity is established when the results are 
found to be generalisable to a larger population, a different group, or a 
different setting. Reliability establishes that when the measure-, test, or 
experiment is repeated a similar result will be obtained. Special criteria for 
trustworthiness adopted for qualitative research are examined after the 
following brief explanation of why the quantitative criteria fail in 
qualitative research. 
• Internal validity fails because it depends on a one to one correspondence 
(isomorphism), which is not possible with multiple realities. External 
validity fails because it is incompatible with the inability to generalise 
with certainty. Reliability fails because emergent design denies 
unconditional replicability. Objectivity is in direct contravention of the 
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enquirer-respondent interaction, and the recognition of the importance of 
values and context. 
• Alternate special criteria for trustworthiness, known as credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability, need to be used [see also 
Cassell and Symon, 1994; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Miles and 
Huberman, 1984]. 
6.1.6 Postpositivist trustworthiness criteria 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) devote forty-one pages to 'Establishing 
Trustworthiness', in their treatment of credibility, transferability, dependability, 
and confirmability. As they state, it is on the issue of trustworthiness that 
qualitative research is most frequently questioned, and it is therefore essential that 
acceptable criteria be put forward and defended. This thesis can only briefly cover 
the topic. However, in the remainder of this sub section I examin the essential 
meaning of the terms as they relate to research within limits of the qualitative 
paradigm set out earlier. 
Credibility 
Five techniques are proposed to ensure credibility. 
1. There are three specific activities, which increase the possibility of credible 
findings being produced. (a) Prolonged engagement. The investment of sufficient 
time to learn the 'culture', test for misinformation introduced by distortion, and 
build trust, but not so much time that the researcher becomes part of what is being 
researched. When the researcher looses an association with his or her origins and 
'goes native' there is a tendency to lose the research perspective by changing from 
being an observer, to become a contributor to the research with a 'performance 
understanding'. (b) Persistent observation. During a prolonged engagement 
persistent observation attempts to identify characteristics relevant to the research 
problem and to focus on them in detail. To satisfy the trustworthiness criteria the 
enquirer must be able to describe in detail how identification and exploration was 
carried out. Persistent observation requires that the enquirer retain a degree of 
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scepticism, to avoid focusing too soon, before an appropriate recognition of 
context, values, and mutually shaping influences is achieved. (c) Triangulation. At 
least four modes of triangulation exist. They require the use of either multiple and 
different sources, methods, investigators, or theories, or any combination of them. 
Triangulation is a well-established technique for locating, measuring, or observing 
a point of interest by taking several, at least two, different perspectives which 
allow corroboration or contradiction of data. [See Denzin (1978), and Fielding 
and Fielding ( 1986) for detailed coverage of the topic] 
2. Peer debriefing. This requires the enquirer to explain his/her work to a person 
who understands the research paradigm but is not involved in the specific 
research. The peer effectively follows the devil's advocate line of enquiry to 
attack the enquirer's work, if possible to destruction. If the enquirer is able to 
defend the work it then has some credibility. 
3. Negative case analysis. This process, originally proposed by Kidder (1981 ), is 
claimed to be analogous to statistical tests for quantitative data. Negative case 
analysis is said to be a process of revising assumptions with hindsight to achieve a 
hypothesis that, without exception, accounts for all known cases. 
4. Referential adequacy. Data, however recorded may be kept in its original form 
for later comparison and evaluation. Sceptics are then able to use these materials 
to satisfy themselves that the findings and interpretations are meaningful by 
testing them against the raw data. Being able to support the findings in this way is 
extremely compelling (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This simple process appears to 
the best possible defence a qualitative researcher can provide, assuming items 1, 
2,3, and 5 have been properly observed such that the research has credibility to 
defend. 
5. Member checks. For the enquirer to be able to report that his/her findings are 
representative of the respondent(s), the respondent(s) must be able to react and 
provide feedback. A summary of an interview could be discussed with the person 
interviewed, or other people may be asked to express their opinions on 
information obtained. This is an integral part of the research process and is 
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somewhat similar to triangulation. In both processes the enquirer seeks alternate 
perspectives to either confirm or contradict the enquirer's perception of 
respondent. This is a guiding principle in qualitative research. 
Transferability 
In qualitative enquiry, transferability refers to findings being appropriate in more 
than one enquiry. Qualitative enquiry is intended to provide, as much as is 
possible, a complete and detailed description of the enquiry to enable other 
subsequent enquirers to make decisions about possible transferability. It is the 
enquirer's responsibility to provide a database on which transferability decisions 
can be made. The enquirer is not expected to demonstrate transferability. In 
practice achieving transferability is a complex occurrence because qualitative 
hypotheses are relevant for the particular time and context that existed during the 
enqmry. The hypotheses may not hold at some other time or in some other 
context. 
Dependability and Conflrmability 
These two measures of trustworthiness are possibly the easiest but by far the most 
time consuming to achieve. The most appropriate method, according to Lincoln 
and Guba ( 1985), is to perform an enquiry audit. The auditor must examine the 
process of the enquiry to establish that it is internally coherent and that 
appropriate data exists to support the enquiry. There are established procedures 
for auditing qualitative research. However, because of the auditor will necessarily 
be familiar with the type of enquiry, it is probable that the audit will be in effect a 
peer review. In practice it appears unlikely that a disinterested person is likely to 
be available to perform an audit, therefore demonstrated dependability and 
confirmability must rest with the enquirer(s). 
6.1.7 Researcher effects 
Two types of researcher effect need to be considered (Miles and Huberman, 
1984): First the influence of the enquirer on the respondent(s), and second the 
influence of the respondent(s) on the enquirer. In quantitative studies, the first 
effect, that on the researcher on laboratory experiments, is well recognised. In 
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qualitative research the first kind of researcher effect is reduced to a large extent 
by the need for the enquirer to be in contact with the respondent(s) for a lengthy 
period of time to collect sufficient data. This prolonged engagement (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985) allows the enquirer and the respondent(s) to become reasonably at 
ease with one another, so that the respondent(s) will tend to act 'normally'. The 
second researcher effect can exist when the enquirer becomes part of what is 
being researched. If the researcher develops sympathy for or identification with 
the respondent(s), then the researcher may lose the 'enquirer' perspective (Berg, 
1995). Both kinds of researcher bias are part of normal human interaction and the 
researcher must be aware of them and consider their effects at all stages of the 
research. The trustworthiness criteria for qualitative research, mentioned earlier, 
are an important safeguard against researcher effects. 
6.1.8 Qualitative emphasis 
The emphasis of the literature review presented above has been on the 
postpositivist, or qualitative approach to social science enquiry. The reason for 
this is that although there appears to be a strong movement toward qualitative 
research, the procedures used for qualitative research are less well understood 
than those of quantitative research (Daehler, 1997). However, it should also be 
noted that qualitative research requires better identification of objectives during 
the research design phase, takes much longer to complete and cannot be evaluated 
by a computer program. It is therefore considered by some researchers to be a 
more difficult form of enquiry than quantitative research (Berg, 1995). Naturally, 
a quantitative approach is still possible, as is a combination of quantitative 
methods and qualitative procedures (Cassel and Symon, 1994; Creswell, 1994; 
Firestone, 1990). 
6.1.9 Scientific method 
Earlier in this chapter I stated that scientific method and rational thinking have 
their origins in metaphysical thought. However, although modem scientific 
method is based on rational thought, researchers rarely go through a metaphysical 
evaluation of the nature of being before beginning their study. They do, however, 
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make paradigmatic assumptions, which determine what they think rationally 
about. For example, a positivist assumes that the world is real, and that by 
appropriate rational thinking he/she can discover more real things. These 
assumptions mean that theories cannot be proved right; they are dependent on 
earlier presuppositions external to the theory itself. For this reason, an essential 
principle of positivistic scientific research is that all assumptions must be 
recognised and acknowledged (Eysenck, 1995). 
In contrast a constructivist views consideration of a real world as pointless, and 
therefore concentrates on learning about individual's interpretations of what 
happens in specific settings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Constructivists accept 
assumptions as part of a natural bias present in any research. Their existence must 
be acknowledged, but it may not be possible to recognise them. 
Social science, as explained through Burrell and Morgan's (1979) model, and by 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), has the appearance of a set of mutually exclusive 
research perspectives that determine and constrain research strategy. In practice 
this is not the case (Firestone, 1990). Although a researcher may have a 
predisposition for a particular research perspective, most, if not all researchers are 
obliged on occasion to use alternate research strategies, if only for the purpose of 
triangulation. Consequently, there is now such an intermixing of research 
strategies that the only remaining demarcation is between quantitative and 
qualitative paradigms and associated methods (Creswell, 1994 ). 
6.1.10 Section summary 
To this point, I have examined Kuhn's (1962) conceptualisation of paradigms and, 
using Burrell and Morgan's (1979) model, I explored the idea of paradigms 
further, before considering Lincoln and Guba's ( 1985) explanation of 
postpositivism, which included a comparison of the positivist-postpositivist 
assumptions. While considering paradigms and postpositivism, I also examined 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions and their impact on 
sociological enquiry, including the requirement for special criteria for establishing 
trustworthiness, and researcher effects. 
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This concludes Section One. In the next section, as a justification for the research 
procedures that I have followed in my research, I state where my ontological and 
epistemological background place me within the social sciences. 
****************** 
6.2 Justification for the research procedure 
The focus of this study is my research question - 'What shapes the managerial 
decision-making processes of experts'. 
As I explain in more detail later in this chapter, I consider that to examine my 
research question the most suitable research procedure is a case study. One case, 
while it may be interesting, will probably not prove to be a sufficient examination 
of my research question; therefore I intend to undertake several independent 
studies, which together will form a multiple-case study. This procedure allows, 
what Yin (1994) calls a "literal replication" (p.109). The first case will attempt to 
identify and describe how expertise, managerial role, and personal psychological 
makeup coexist. The subsequent cases will, through replication of the first study, 
seek additional information, and attempt to identify persistent patterns and/or 
hierarchies. 
6.2.1 Research perspective 
The enquiry that I undertake to answer my research question is directed by my 
research perspective, which is shaped by business management doctrines and 
psychology principles. Therefore, the genesis of my study is rooted in the social 
sciences. As with most researchers (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991 ), my formative 
years included a predominantly quantitative education. It was dominantly 
concerned with the measurement, quantification, and unquestioning acceptance of 
'facts'. Again, like many researchers I have come to question many of those facts 
and now hold a strong belief that enquiry into the activity of people is not a simple 
numbers game to be evaluated statistically, but requires that any enquiry accounts 
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for the enquirer's perspective, and the context of the enquiry. Unlike the 
traditional psychologist's approach, which tries to isolate events, often in a 
laboratory setting (Ericsson and Smith, 1991 ), I believe that a true understanding 
of peoples' actions can only be found in a natural setting (Klein et al., 1993; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985). There is ample evidence to suggest that the synergy, 
which appears to take place in the context of a natural setting, cannot be 
duplicated in isolation (Ebbesen and Konecni, 1975). Therefore, looking back at 
Burrell and Morgan's model, which I discussed earlier in this chapter, I see my 
self as dominantly a subjectivist, although due to my education I clearly can relate 
to the objectivist position. Therefore I see myself as slightly left of centre on the 
subjective-objective continuum. On the other axis my research position is dictated 
by my interest in what is happening and why, the status quo, which places my 
enquiry in sociology of regulation. Consequently my research perspective, within 
the Burrell and Morgan model, is best described by the 'interpretive' paradigm. 
Within the interpretive paradigm there are many kinds of enquiry. From them, 
case studies appear to be best suited to my research. I will examine the nature of 
case studies later, but first I explain why I chose a case study procedure. 
Ebbesen and Konecni ( 1975), and many others have clearly demonstrated a 
requirement to study experts operating within their domain of expertise. In 
Ebbesen and Konecni's study, court judges were found to be dependent on 
environmental cues when assessing bail. Away from their usual courtroom setting 
judges reached different conclusions from those reached in court, despite having 
identical information presented to them. Therefore, Ebbesen and Konecni 
concluded, the judge's decision-making was dependent on the environmental 
setting. The court judges attached value to information presented to them, by 
assessing the people who presented the information and how they presented the 
information. This is a clear indication that it is necessary to consider personal 
values and context when attempting to understand the actions of experts. 
Subsequent to the work by Ebbesen and Konecni, researchers have developed a 
strong awareness that, in most instances, a true representation of the nature of 
expertise requires that experts be observed in a natural setting (Klein et al., 1993; 
Olsen and Biolsi, 1991 ). 
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Ericsson ( 1997) contends that experts can be examined under controlled 
conditions in a laboratory, and for some experts this may be possible. Ericsson has 
a particular interest in the performance of musicians. It is feasible that some 
experts, such as musicians, pathologists, and chess players could display their 
expertise in controlled laboratory conditions. It is argued that this particular kind 
of expertise may not be as domain specific as other forms of expertise and 
therefore not as dependent on a particular environmental setting. Against this, as a 
qualitative researcher, I argue that all performance is contextual and has value to 
the performer. An expert pianist may 'rise to the occasion' for a concert 
performance, and surely even a chess grand master builds up some nervous 
tension for a major tournament. Despite Ericsson's claims, experts who as part of 
their function manage people and things in a particular environment can be 
expected to be dependent on environmental cues, in a similar manner to that of the 
court judges mentioned earlier. 
Qualitative research procedures permit observation of experts working in their 
domain of expertise (Daehler, 1997). There are numerous approaches possible 
based on different ontological and epistemological assumptions (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980). Phenomenology, ethnography, action research and case study are 
commonly used (Creswell, 1994). Phenomenology is the method founded by the 
philosopher Husserl. It concentrates on the detailed description of conscious 
experience, without appeal to explanation. Ethnography is a branch of 
anthropology that deals with the description of individual human societies. My 
background in management and psychology has not prepared me for 
phenomenological or ethnographic studies. 
Action research is used in management research, particularly organisation 
development (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991 ). The action research approach to the 
study of management is, according to Easterby-Smith et al., (1991) based on the 
premise that an understanding of something can be obtained by attempting to 
change it. They state that action researchers' believe that change is part of the 
research process and should be incorporated in the research process. With action 
research, the researcher is at risk of forming a perspective that is similar to an 
ethnographer 'going native'. He/she is not just an observer, he/she develops a 
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'performance understanding' and becomes a contributor to the research and may 
therefore lose the original 'enquirer' perspective (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
Action research appears to be aligned with what Burrell and Morgan (1979) called 
the sociology of change, not the sociology of regulation that I am concerned with. 
An action research approach requires me to interact with, and therefore cause 
changes within the setting. I do not want to cause changes. I am interested in how 
the combination of managerial decision-making and expertise are displayed in a 
natural setting, when devoid of abnormal influences, such as researchers. 
Therefore, action research is not an appropriate procedure for my research. 
Case study procedures are widely used in the social sciences (Berg, 1995; 
Creswell, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; McKenzie et 
al., 1997; Yin, 1994). This includes extensive use in management research 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Mintzberg, 1983), and in psychology (Bromley, 
1977; Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1997). As I explain below, I believe case 
study procedures are the most appropriate for my research. 
6.2.2 Case study 
There are many ways to conduct research; experiments, surveys; field studies, 
action research, and case studies for example. The chosen method is largely 
determined by the research question(s). These are the who, what, where, how, and 
why questions. For my research I am interested in the explanatory how and why 
questions. How does the expert process the information that is available for 
decision-making, and why do they processes it as they do. Answers to these 
questions can be sort through experiment, histories, case studies (Yin, 1994), but 
histories are not appropriate for my contemporary research. 
To answer my research question - what shapes the managerial decision-making 
processes of experts - there are three important conditions that need to be 
satisfied, and as I explain below a case study is the only method that satisfies 
these conditions. 
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1. The respondent must be in a naturalistic setting (see Chapter 3, section 
3.5.5) so that they can identify cues (see Chapter 2, 2.4.8). A case study 
could do this, but an experiment cannot. 
2. There must be clearly identified context to give meaning to the expert's 
decision-making (see Chapter 3, 3.5.5). An experiment or a case study 
could do this. 
3. The respondents must not be controlled or unduly influenced by my 
presence. A case study can do this, but an experiment cannot. 
As Yin ( 1994) states, perhaps the most important reason for using a cases study is 
the ability to deal with a large variety of evidence, such as interviews, 
observations, and documentation. So in addition to satisfying the conditions set 
out above, the flexibility of a case method will allow me to use several different 
lines of enquiry to develop rich information through a triangulation approach to 
understanding the respondents individual characteristics, and no other 
methodology will do this. I need to develop the best possible understanding of the 
respondent's mental approach to decision-making through interviews, observation 
and psychometric testing. Also, I want to be able to carry out analytic 
generalization to be able relate to existing theory and attempt to build new theory, 
once again only a case study will enable me do this. 
Much of the literature that considers experts comes from case studies, and is 
considered to be the most appropriate and rewarding methodology for developing 
detailed knowledge of experts (Shanteau, 2001, personal communication). Only 
case studies can explain, describe, and / or explore the real life causal links in 
events that I intend to study. I want to describe events and the real life context in 
which they happen, I also want to explore events with no clear outcome, such as 
decision processes, and a case study approach is the only way to do this (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 1998; Yin, 1994 ). 
As I have stated above, case studies can use multiple sources of evidence to 
enable the collection of rich information, so a case study method is the most 
appropriate for my research. However, it is possible to have a single case study or 
multiple case studies. A single case study is most appropriate for considering 
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unique or critical events, which by definition cannot be repeated, my research 
does not consid6r either of these. Multiple case studies provide an opportunity for 
replication. Replication allows the research to repeat a defined line of enquiry in 
several discrete situations, which is what my research will do. There are two 
forms of replication, theoretical and literal. Theoretical replication occurs when 
cases produce different outcomes for predicted reasons. Literal replication occurs 
when cases are carefully selected to predict similar results. I am seeking literal 
replication as the desired outcome for my research where the intention is to 
consider possible links between expert's individual characteristics and expert's 
decision-making processes. 
Possible flaws associated with case studies. 
Case studies have been criticised for several reasons. Some case studies have not 
been well presented, and have demonstrated researcher bias, which has influenced 
what has been presented as findings and conclusions; I have tried to avoid these 
flaws in my research. Another criticism is that case studies do not permit 
generalisablity to a lager population, and I have acknowledged this restriction in 
my thesis. The time required to carryout a case study has also drawn criticism 
however, a multiple case studies methodology is the only method that will satisfy 
the needs of my research and the time that it takes must be accepted as the cost of 
good research. 
In my selection of procedures I was constantly aware that it is not the methods 
themselves that are most important. It is the link between the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of the researcher and the overall research effort that 
establishes knowledge (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Therefore to maximise the 
return from my research effort, and allow my ontological and epistemological 
assumptions free reign, I elected to use a case study procedure as a research 
'instrument' (Stake, 1998). Through my research I mean to develop a better 
understanding of how and why experts act as they do in a particular context, and I 
believe that, for the reasons set out below, case study procedures are the most 
suited to my purpose. 
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First, I have experience with case study procedures, and I am confident that I can 
carry out research using these procedures. This confidence allows me to 
concentrate my attention on issues and events that occur, rather than the 
procedures that need to be adhered to. 
Second, an important reason for using case study procedures is that they are 
always contextual (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Strake, 1985). As I have 
mentioned earlier, my research question demands answers, which inform about 
experts working in their natural setting. A case study always takes place in a 
specified bounded context or setting, in which events, processes, and outcomes 
can be studied. Case studies attempt to describe contextual effects on behaviour, 
not control or eliminate their influence as a laboratory study would (Strake, 1985). 
A case study permits an expert to be observed within his/her domain of expertise. 
Thirdly, an important reason for selecting a case study procedure that is not 
mentioned by Miles and Huberman ( 1984 ), is that case study procedures can also 
provide a contextural understanding (Guba and Lincoln,, 1989). It is not just the 
conditions and circumstances [context] relevant to events that are of interest, the 
weaving together of the processes and the interwoven structure [ contexture] 
(Fitting, 1991) are of particular interest in my study. 
Fourthly, to successfully obtain the data for my enquiry, I need to get close to 
respondents to observe them and communicate with them in a natural setting. The 
experts, who become the respondents for my research, are busy people who, 
although they agree to participate in my research, can make very little time 
available. Therefore it is necessary to obtain as much information about their 
activities as quickly as possible. I believe that no other qualitative procedure could 
achieve this goal. 
Finally, my selection of case studies follows Guba and Lincoln's, (1989), 
guidance for 'constructivist' enquiry, discussed earlier in the chapter, and their 
recommendation that a case study report is the most appropriate way to present 
qualitative findings. 
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As I stated earlier, I elected to use case study procedures to examine particular 
experts in a specified context. My choice allows me to select cases on the basis 
that they appear to provide an opportunity to learn about my research topic, rather 
than to find 'typical' examples (Stake, 1998). Opportunity to learn appears to 
equate with the time that can be made available by a suitable respondent, not with 
their typicality. In selecting cases to study there is a need to recognise that 
potential for learning is different and at times a preferred criteria to 
representativeness. It is, according to Stake, often better "to learn a lot from an 
atypical case than a little from a magnificently typical case" (p. 101 ). This gives 
strong motivation for selecting a suitable case that is potentially easy to access for 
a sustained period. 
6.2.3 Multiple case study 
One case study may be expected to provide interesting insights about what shapes 
an expert's managerial decision-making processes, but multiple-case studies have 
the potential to show that patterns and hierarchies are repeated. Yin ( 1994) 
stresses that multiple-case studies should not be confused with sampling; he 
considers that multiple-case studies are analogous to repeated experiments. In 
multiple-case studies, as in repeated experiments, the research design and data 
analysis is interconnected so that cross case conclusions may be possible. It is 
therefore seen that the cases of a multiple-case study are not random samples; 
they are repeated attempts to demonstrate the existence of particular events within 
a specified framework. A multiple-case study requires careful selection of cases 
so that each will either produce similar results, 'literal replication', or for 
predictable reasons, produce contrasting results 'theoretical replication'. If literal 
and/or theoretical replication proves to be possible then the initial propositions are 
seen to be supported, if replication is not possible then the propositions may be 
false. 
Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this thesis have developed the rich, theoretical 
framework required to support this type of enquiry (Yin, 1994 ). Evidence has 
been presented which indicates that there are powerful influences at work within 
the setting being examined. 
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6.2.4 Selecting an appropriate case study procedure 
Case study research, ·according to Avison ( 1997), examines a phenomenon in its 
natural setting with the researcher as independent outsider. This simple statement 
encapsulates the idea of a case study, however, it does not inform about what the 
study sets out to achieve, or what happens within the study. 
A case study can be written for different purposes, such as teaching, recording, or 
describing. Case studies can also take different analytical approaches. A factual 
approach attempts to represent the actual occurrence observed as accurately as 
possible, as in a historical record. An interpretative approach attempts to find 
inner meaning to explain what motivates the occurrence. An evaluative approach 
attempts to assess the importance or benefit of the occurrence. The case study 
developed in accordance with any combination of the above, will require different 
actions from the researcher. A simple record may suffice for a factual account of 
events, but a detailed examination of events may be required for interpretive or 
evaluative case studies (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). 
6.2.5 Data collection 
Having declared myself as an interpretivist, it seems clear from the above that a 
detailed record and description of events is required to answer my research 
question. This approach should be sound provided that sufficient information is 
elicited to form a detailed account of how the expert behaved in decision-making 
situations. However, it will not be sufficient to simply record what the expert 
does. A critical issue is why the expert behaves as he/she does. As an observer 
recording a factual account of the expert's behaviour, I cannot presume to know 
why they behave as they do. Therefore, a triangulated approach to data collection 
will be adopted. Appropriate questions will be asked of the experts in semi-
structured interviews. The expert's work associates will be interviewed to obtain 
additional information, and the experts will be evaluated with psychological tests 
(see section 2.7). 
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The nature of my study dictates and limits how data can be collected within the 
case study methodology. Yin (1994) identified "six sources of evidence" (p. 79), 
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation, and physical artefacts. Of these only interviews and direct 
observation are appropriate for my study. Documentation, archival records, and 
physical artefacts are clearly of little consequence. Participant observation is a 
form of action research. It is often based on gaining knowledge through change, 
and requires that the researcher participate in the activity being observed. Neither 
occurrence was desirable for my research. First, I required an understanding of the 
status quo, so I definitely did not want to change the setting; I wanted to influence 
the respondents as little as possible. Second, I am not at all expert in the settings 
in which my enquiries took place, so it was unlikely that I could have made a 
meaningful contribution to events within the study. 
6.2.6 Verbal protocols 
I chose not to use verbal protocols for reasons that are explained in the following 
examination of the procedure. Yin does not mention as a source of evidence the 
think aloud commentary known as verbal protocols. This means of obtaining data 
has been used by many researchers (Ericsson and Simon, 1985; Ericsson, 1997). 
However, the validity of data obtained through verbal protocols has been 
questioned (Doherty, 1993; Mintzberg, 1989). I share Mintzberg's concern about 
an expert's ability to concentrate on a complex task and to simultaneously provide 
a commentary. It is possible though, that the information that the expert is able to 
provide may help the observer to form a clearer understanding of the actions 
being observed. The behaviour of experts in managerial decision-making 
situations appears, to me, to be readily accessible through direct interview, 
observation, and third party interviews. I did not use a formal verbal protocol 
procedure, but I did ask for simple verbal explanations when I thought that they 
could help my understanding of the events before me. 
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6.2.7 Psychological evaluations 
My research question asks what shapes the managerial decision-making processes 
of an expert. Clearly, an important factor to be considered is the personality and 
cognitive style of the person. This topic has been considered in Chapter 4. 
To be able to consider the influence of cognitive style and personality as shaping 
factors I will assess the expert's with the Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA), the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and the Repertory Grid Technique (Rep 
Grid). I selected the CSA because it is a simple computerised and interactive tool 
that appears to have validity (although it has not been validated for New Zealand), 
which provided an additional opportunity for me to observe the respondents in a 
decision making situation. As the data analysis shows some interesting 
information was obtained. The MBTI was used because it is widely used in 
management assessment, which gave it credibility with the respondents. I am 
registered to use what may be seen as more sophisticated psychological 
assessments, but I considered the MBTI to be adequate for this research The 
Repertory Grid Technique, discussed in more detail later, was primarily selected 
because it also created an additional opportunity to observe the respondents in a 
decision making situation. 
I considered that a comparison of the data gained via the psychological 
assessments and the data obtained through interviews and observation could be 
interesting, and perhaps revealing. Additionally, the psychological assessments 
form part of the triangulation process being used to assure the overall 
trustworthiness of the data. 
The evaluations, as I have mentioned, provide additional opportunity for informal 
conversation with the expert's about their decision-making, and for observation of 
the experts making decisions. It is difficult to obtain time with experts, and there 
is a need to justify to them the time required. By using alternative procedures that 
are acceptable to the respondents additional data collection time is created. The 
extra time permits a different data gathering process, which ensures that the 
experts are considered from alternative perspectives. Considering three sets of 
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data, interviews, observations, and psychological evaluations, is a triangulation 
process that can provide a richer and deeper understanding of the respondents than 
would otherwise be available (Corner, 1991; Denzin, 1978; Fielding and Fielding, 
1986). 
6.2.8 Defining and locating suitable respondents 
My research seeks answers about what shapes the managerial decision-making 
processes of experts. Therefore the unit of analysis for my research question is an 
'expert'. Therefore to carry out my study, first I have to define suitable 
respondents and then locate people who meet the criteria that were willing to 
participate in my study. 
As there is no formal procedure for identifying an 'expert', I used a definition of 
an expert which falls well inside the range of definitions used by other researchers 
in the field, as discussed in Chapter 2 (see Einhorn, 1974; Ericsson and Smith, 
1991; Ericsson and Chamess, 1994; Shanteau, 1992). 
6.2.9 Definition of an expert for my research 
The respondents (subjects) are people who meet the following criteria, and 
therefore have a demonstrated qualification as an expert. 
• They are formally trained and qualified for their occupation. 
• They have at least ten years experience in their domain of expertise. 
• They are recognised by their peers as competent practitioners within their field 
of expertise. 
6.2.10 Managerial qualification 
As my research examines the managerial decision-making processes of experts, 
there is a requirement for these experts to be employed as managers for large part 
of their working time. 
The experts that are the respondents for my case studies make many managerial 
decisions that are not within their domain of expertise. However, some managerial 
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decisions are similar to decisions that the experts would have made before 
becoming managers, and the respondents continue utilise their training to make 
decisions that are related to their field of expertise. 
6.2.11 Locating experts for my research 
The people who were the respondents in the case studies on which my research 
findings are based were located through my personal network of associates. They 
are domain experts, and they manage people and business functions associated 
with their domain of expertise. 
This concludes section two. In the next section I report on the research procedures 
that occurred during my study. 
******************* 
6.3 Research Procedures 
In this section I present the research procedures that were used for my study. I 
examine each procedure on the basis of its prior use and suitability for my 
research, and then I explain how I used the procedure. 
After I had received approval to proceed, from the University of Waikato 
Management School's Research Ethics Committee, I arrange to meet the people 
that I hoped would agree to participate in my research. At the initial meeting I 
explained the purpose of my research to each prospective respondent and asked if 
they would be willing to participate. Each person approached agreed to be a 
respondent, and signed a consent form. I then asked each respondent to provide 
information about their education and training, and their managerial role. I used 
this information to satisfy myself that the person is, by my definition (stated 
earlier in this chapter) an expert, and that they are working in a defined 
managerial role. As I had selected the people on the basis of my prior knowledge 
of them and on advice from associates, the information was used to confirm my 
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assumption that the person could be accepted as an expert working as a manager. 
The information was also used, where appropriate, to aid in the development of 
the case study protocols, and to form specific questions in the subsequent 
interviews. This occurred either when I did not understand something contained in 
the information, or where the respondent had mentioned something which if 
elaborated had the potential to provide interesting data. The case study protocols, 
and a synopsis of pertinent information from each respondent are discussed in the 
relevant case study report. The forms containing the written questions are in the 
appendix. 
6.3.1 Interviews 
Interviewing using free form discussion has the potential to provide rich 
information (Berg, 1995; Creswell. 1994; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991 ). However 
there are several potential problems with interviews. The interviewer must know 
what information is sought, and must be able to pursue it without distraction. The 
interviewer must not introduce bias by inappropriately leading the interview; the 
interviewee must offer their own answers, not those alluded to by the interviewer. 
This is perhaps unlikely with experts. Although an expert can be expected to be 
sufficiently confident of his/her knowledge and understanding within his/her field 
of expertise, it is possible that the respondent may be subject to 'demand effects' 
causing him/her to offer answers that he/she thinks the interviewer wants. There is 
also the possibility that limitations due to retrospective reporting, and biased self-
awareness can be present. Structured interviews give some control over the 
interviewer and ensure that essential questions are asked. 
However, the rigidity of the structured interview can be clumsy and not conducive 
to free flowing information from the person being interviewed. Informal 
interviews allow a more free ranging conversation, but depend heavily on the 
interviewer's skill to steer the conversation. I thought that an open ended 
structured approach was more appropriate. It delimits, to some extent, the topic of 
conversation but does not stop the interviewer pursuing interesting responses to 
gain more information. It is also more aligned with this researcher's informal 
interviewing approach, which has developed over many years practice in human 
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resource management. Also remembering that the interviewer, by the nature of the 
process, interacts with the respondent inevitably introducing bias (Easterby-Smith, 
1991 ), and that the interviewer is also the observer, I thought that a procedure 
with which I am comfortable was the most appropriate. First, if I, as the 
researcher, was at ease while conducting the interview, then the possibility that 
respondent would also be at ease was enhanced. Second, if I were at ease then my 
ability to make accurate observations without distraction would be improved. 
The formal, written questions were constructed to present some resemblance of a 
formal interview structure to the respondent, but the questions were used as 
'openers' for extended conversation where either the respondent or I wanted to 
continue beyond the initial question. The formal questions also ensured that, at the 
least, there would be some linking points between the case studies. So that some 
direct comparisons between cases would be possible. 
Interviewing was the major source of data in my research, but it was supported 
with other information obtained from verbal comment and personal observation 
(Olsen and Biolsi, 1991 ), and through psychological testing. As it is considered to 
be an important way of gaining information by many researchers (Ericsson, 1997; 
Doherty, 1993), I discuss verbal comment as a separate issue in the next section. 
6.3.2 Verbal comment 
Comment by the expert during a decision-making process is a well tried 
methodology that has enabled the capture of data, and perhaps knowledge, 
concerning many activities that require intense mental activity with little or no 
obvious activity to suggest what the outcome will be or how it will be achieved 
(Ericsson, 1997). The initial enthusiasm for verbal reporting was met with 
considerable criticism as flaws in the methodology were identified (Doherty, 
1993; Mintzberg, 1976). The problems of personal bias, limited recall ability and 
the reliability of the recalled material called into question the overall validity of 
the method. 
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However, the development of human-information processing theory by Newell 
and Simon (1972) lead to recognition of verbal reporting during an activity, rather 
than retrospectively, as a source of reliable and valid information (Ericsson and 
Simon, 1985). For this procedure, known as task analysis (Ericsson, 1997) to be 
valid, it is essential that the information obtained is spontaneous commentary, of 
thoughts induced by the task, and therefore valid verbal comment on the activity 
taking place. It is not a running commentary. Otherwise, the respondent may state 
what he/she thought that he/she was doing, which may not be the same as what 
actually occurred (Doherty, 1993). Bias is easily introduced if the person is asked 
to report retrospectively e.g. why did you do that?, or if the person is asked to 
elaborate on an activity as it proceeds (Ericsson, 1997). However, where an 
account of how or why a person acted is required, retrospective reporting is the 
only way that the actor can account for his/her actions. This kind of verbal 
reporting, often called protocol analysis is now considered to be an important 
process in many fields of research. 
Interviews and verbal reports are, as Olsen and Biolsi (1991) state, the only direct 
methods available to identify expert's concepts and strategies, therefore it is 
necessary to use them, but cautiously. My research relies heavily on the 
respondent's verbal comments in response to my enquiries. Verbal responses 
formed the major part of my data. As I have mentioned earlier, the respondents 
had very limited time available for my research. Therefore I required a procedure 
that allowed me to extract as much information as possible from the respondents 
in the time available. A verbal response is far quicker than a written one, and has 
the added advantage, from the researcher's perspective, that the person responding 
often gives several answers to ensure that he/she has conveyed to the researcher 
the best answer. This creates a richer picture of the respondent's thoughts. 
6.3.3 Observations 
Olsen and Biolsi ( 1991) suggest that the possible bias of verbal reporting can be 
avoided by merely observing performance. This simple solution is of little value if 
most of the expert's performance is cognitive, however. They suggest that the 
expert could be observed with a video recorder, and that the expert could add 
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commentary while he/she watched a rerun of his/her performance (Shephard and 
Kirkwood, 1991 ). This appealing solution would probably be easier for the expert, 
because they could concentrate on their performance while the activity is recorded 
without interruption of their mental activity. But it could lead to the problems that 
have been identified with verbal reports. [see S3.2 above] 
An alternative observational method is to ask the person to repeat the process, 
then interrupt him or her at any time when what they are doing is not clear from 
previously recorded data obtained through interview and verbal reporting. This 
method would require a very composed and patient expert. It would also be very 
time consuming. The benefit assumed with this method is that the expert will have 
immediate memory available to support comment, but an interruption from the 
enquirer may dislodge that memory and it may also cause difficulty for the expert 
to restart the process. 
Information obtained through the observation of general activities may enhance 
the quality of the data recorded, provided that it is correctly interpreted (Easterby-
Smith, 1991 ). Activities such as interaction with other people, use of information 
gathering tools, use of decision-making aids, as well as the decision-making 
process as it is evident during the observations, have the potential to provide 
valuable information. The researcher's observations can be recorded as they 
happen by recording verbal commentary. This has the advantage of being 
immediate. 
Observation was an essential and continuous part of each case study. I noted the 
respondent's reaction to me as the researcher, and to the questions and tests that I 
used to elicit information. 
6.3.4 Data recording 
The participant provided initial biographical data, either verbally or in written 
form. Subsequent data was a mix of verbal, written and observed information. A 
tape recorder was an essential tool for data collection to capture accurately, and in 
detail, the person's verbal expression of his or her thought processes. Throughout 
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each case study, and after each contact with the respondent I made hand written 
notes of my observations. I tried, as much as possible, not to interrupt the flow of 
proceedings, consequently some written notes were made some time after the 
observations that prompted them. 
6.3.5 Administration of psychological evaluations 
As part of the triangulation process being used to answer my research question I 
sought a psychological evaluation of the respondents to provide information about 
their personality and cognitive style. As has been shown in Chapter 4, there are 
highly developed psychological characteristics that should be taken into account 
when considering experts. 
The following evaluations took place: 
Repertory Grid Technique 
Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA) 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
For the CSA and MBTI evaluations, established administration procedures were 
followed. In the case of the Repertory Grid Technique (Rep Grid), some 
procedures need to be modified to suit the particular study in which the Rep Grid 
is to be used. I found it necessary to modify some aspects of the data collection 
procedure, and these changes are explained shortly [6.3.6]. 
The evaluations were used to provide a psychological profile of the respondent 
that, I thought, would provide useful triangulation. The CSA, MBTI, and 
Repertory Grid Technique were examined in Chapter 4. The tests were 
administered as the final part of each case study. Furthermore, in an attempt to 
reduce researcher bias, the tests were not marked until after the personal 
observations were written up. However, the verbal commentary obtained during 
test administration could not be avoided and was therefore included in the 
interview and observation data. 
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6.3.6 Repertory Grid Technique 
The background to this evaluation technique was briefly examined in Chapter 4, 
4.3.1.2. Here I provide an outline description of the variation in the data collection 
phase of Repertory Grid Technique (Rep Grid) that took place in my research. 
Other than this variation, which is consistent with contemporary use of the Rep 
Grid, the overall Rep Grid procedure followed in my research is similar to that 
used by other researchers. A detailed explanation of the workings of the Repertory 
Grid Technique is presented in A Manual for Repertory Grid Technique 
(Fransella and Bannister, 1977), and extensive information is also available at the 
following University of Calgary websites: http://tiger.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/. and 
http://ksi.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/PCP/PCP.html. 
After reading several reports on the use of the Rep Grid Technique I realised that 
the real value, to a qualitative researcher, is the dialogue associated with the data 
collection. It is my belief that, for the purpose of my research, the reasons given 
by respondents for their selections are potentially more interesting than the 
outcomes from statistical evaluations. This follows what Kelly ( 1955) indicated to 
be an essential first procedure in the evaluation of the collected data, and leads me 
to believe that the evaluation can meaningfully start earlier than the grid 
formation. 
The Repertory Grid Technique data collection procedure requires respondents to 
verbalise their consideration of words associated with the process being evaluated, 
to consider word associations and attempt to explain them, and finally to make 
judgements about their personal valuation of words representing decision-making 
processes. 
My use of the Repertory Grid uses Kelly's (1955) original concept of eliciting 
relationships, but unlike Kelly I am interested in how the respondent relates to 
decision processes, not people. As mentioned earlier, my use of the Rep Grid is 
similar to that of Stewart, et al. ( 1981) in business applications, who in one 
situation used the Rep Grid to elicit information about quality control inspection. 
The respondents were first asked to select words that they associated with the 
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quality control process, and then asked to explain why they made those particular 
associations. 
There is no formal procedure for selecting words to be used in the Rep. Grid, 
although interactive computer evaluations do suggest possibilities to respondents 
once they have made an initial choice. The enquirer selects what he/she considers 
to be important for his/her research (Fransella and Bannister, 1977). I carried out a 
pilot test to determine how many words were appropriate for my study, and 
concluded that seventeen words in total provided an adequate pool from which the 
respondent could select associations. Consequently, respondents were asked to 
select nine words, from the list of seventeen presented, which in their view were 
representative of the decision-making situations that they faced as managers. Nine 
words were selected for two reasons. First, in trials I found that seven to ten words 
were about the comfortable limit for most people. The first seven to ten selections 
tend to be immediate or spontaneous, and therefore appear to be what the 
respondent closely associates with his/her decision-making. Once past 
spontaneous choice the respondent starts to deliberate and be hesitant, perhaps 
choosing additional words with little importance just to satisfy the enquirer. As I 
was interested in dialogue, I considered that the early spontaneous responses were 
likely to produce the most interesting comment. 
The second justification for requiring nine words to be selected was the 
procedures that define the Repertory Grid Technique. As I was not interested in 
statistical evaluation, I did not need to form a large data matrix, as Kelly had 
done. The only constraint, in my application of the Rep Grid, was the requirement 
for the respondents to be able to form a triadic word selection. 
To elicit associations, and the consequent explanatory dialogue, respondents are 
required to select two words, which they associate with one another, and to 
explain why the words are related. Next they are asked to select a word that is, in 
their opinion, contrary or negatively associated with the first two words selected, 
not just an opposite. Again the respondents are asked to comment on the selection 
and its association with the other two selections. Nine words satisfied the 
requirement to be able to work in threes. I subsequently realised that, because 
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there was no constraint on how many times the respondent could use particular 
words in the triadic associations, the number nine was not significant. However, I 
chose to stay with nine selections. 
Once the interviews and the data were recorded, standard Repertory Grid 
Techniques were followed. The data was evaluated, via the Internet, by the 
WebGrid II facility at the university of Calgary. WebGrid II is a dedicated facility 
that I consider to be better suited to the analysis of Repertory Grid data than the 
more generic statistical packages such as SPSS and SAS. Calgary University is 
the home site for Personal Construct Psychology (PCP), Repertory Grid 
Technique (Rep Grid), Personal construct Theory (PCT), with links to sites 
around the world including the UK and Australia. The site has extensive, up to 
date information relating to Rep Grid and PCP. WebGrid II was developed by 
Shaw and Gaines, mathematicians and software engineers at Calgary University 
(Professor Shaw is the Director and Chair) and is an extension of Shaw's work at 
the University of London at the time when Kelly was working on computational 
methods for his Repertory Grid Technique. After Kelly's death Shaw continued 
her work on computational models of personal constructs with Slater, resulting in 
the INGRID computational model now based in New Zealand (see:-
http://homepages.ihug.co.nz/-income/jimekus.html). Shaw then constructed her 
own computational model known as the FOCUS algorithm, which is in tum 
appears to be an extension of Slater's work with Kelly. Shaw's cluster analysis, 
known as the FOCUS algorithm, and the Principle Components analyses, which is 
part of Slater's INGID analysis, were applied to the data obtained in this research, 
however, only the cluster analysis is presented as it gives the most pertinent 
information. 
6.3. 7 Case reports 
In a previous section of this chapter [S6.2.2] I stated why, in my view, a case 
study procedure is the most suitable for this research, and I explained what the use 
of case study procedures is intended to accomplish. I need now, to state what 
particular case study procedures I followed. As I mentioned earlier, case studies 
are widely used in the social sciences, and as a consequence there appear to be a 
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number of different approaches to the case study procedure. As I have relied 
heavily on the constructivist paradigm (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985) to guide my research procedures to this 
point, it seems prudent to continue on this path and adopt the case reporting 
procedures that are an integral part of constructivist inquiry. 
Constructivist inquiry case reporting procedure is founded on the following: First 
there are substantive considerations and methodological considerations. The 
substantive component forms the actual case report, which is usually separated 
from the methodological component. This separation takes place because the case 
report is intended for the 'consumer', while the report on the methodology is more 
often aimed at the inquirer's 'peers and/or critics' who may not be consumers. In 
this thesis the methodological component is addressed in this chapter, and the case 
reports make up Chapters 7 and 8. 
Second, constructivist case reports begin with an explanation of what the study set 
out to achieve, followed by a thorough description of both the setting in which the 
enquiry took place, and of the processes relevant to the problem that were 
observed in the setting. This part of the constructivist case report is the 'thick 
description' that is intended to form a base of information that will allow anyone 
who is interested to consider the possibility of transferability. The thick 
description is followed by a discussion of the important issues that arise from the 
setting and a discussion of the outcomes of the enquiry. From these discussions 
explanations in the form of working hypotheses may be developed. In this thesis 
Chapter 7 contains the justification for the study, and the thick description, and 
Chapter 8 contains the discussions on important issues and outcomes, in the form 
of case analyses. 
6.3.8 Case analysis 
Chapter 8, as mentioned above, presents my analysis of the individual case reports 
in response to my research question - What shapes the managerial decision-
making processes of an expert? In that chapter I examine the four case reports 
seeking answers to the five subordinate questions derived from my research 
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question. [see Chapter 5, S4.2] Answers to these questions have, I believe, the 
potential to produce interesting and possibly important new knowledge. 
6.3.9 Cross case analysis 
A further evaluation of the case reports applying a cross case analysis helps to 
satisfy the requirement for credibility. This approach also provides an additional 
opportunity to identify important issues, which may support, or confound, the 
issues identified in the individual analysis. Furthermore, the cross case analysis 
provides an opportunity to identified patterns and explanations of a more general 
nature. However, any cross case generalisations can only provide working 
hypotheses, not generalisations (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). 
This process can be compared with the procedure for analysing case study 
evidence suggested by Yin (1994), but my interpretivist approach does not 
compare empirical evidence with predicted patterns as Yin suggests should 
happen. Instead I explore the thick description of the setting and processes it 
contains to look for patterns and events that may provide explanations. I follow 
the well-established procedure of looking for important issues, and general 
dispositions (Bromley, 1977; Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). I 
then compare my findings with existing theory. However, if in my view existing 
theory does not provide an adequate explanation for observed events, then I will 
look for alternative rationale. 
In summary, I am looking for the respondent's general disposition towards 
recognisable decision-making processes, and any associated issues that appear to 
be important. In particular, I want to identify any natural inclination or tendency 
for the respondent to follow identifiable paths to solutions. I then compare these 
general dispositions with existing theory in an attempt to explain the findings. 
First I look at the individual cases, then I compare across cases in an attempt to 
find explanations that are, for these four cases, mutually satisfying. 
**************** 
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6.4 Research constraints 
6.4.1 Researcher effects 
I was aware of possible bias due to researcher effects, and I attempted to 
acknowledge them where I was conscious of them. 
Additionally, I attempted to follow the trustworthiness criteria mentioned earlier 
in the chapter (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
6.4.2 Trustworthiness 
The issue of credibility (see section 1.6) was dealt with by: -
• Prolonged engagement. Each case varied in terms of engagement, but all of 
the respondents made themselves available for sufficient time to enable my 
research plan to be completed. However, I was not 'adopted' by any of the 
respondents, and I think I retained the 'enquirer' perspective (Berg, 1995; 
Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Mintzberg, 1983). 
• Persistent observation. During the engagement with the respondents I tried to 
ensure that as much relevant data as possible was collected (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989; Ericsson, 1997). 
• Triangulation. I interviewed and observed the respondent, then I interviewed 
two people who work closely with the respondent to gain their perspective on 
the respondent. I also used five distinctly separate tests to gain a third 
perspective of the respondent (Fielding and Fielding, 1986; Jick, 1983). 
• Referential adequacy. All data is available in its original form and may be 
scrutinised, subject to privacy laws (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991 Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989). 
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• Member checks. The findings of each case study have been referred back to 
the relevant respondent to obtain his or her opinion (Guba and Lincoln,, 
1989). 
The issue of transferability is satisfied by the account of the case studies that 
follows, and information provided in the appendices (Creswell, 1995; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989). 
The issues of dependability and confirmability (Easterby-Smith, 1991; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989) rest with me. I have attempted to ensure that the enquiry is 
internally coherent and that all the findings are supported by data. 
6.4.3 Delimitation 
This study is confined to interviewing, observing, and testing domain experts in 
managerial positions to examine their decision-making processes. 
6.4.4 Limitations 
• This is an exploratory study, which exammes some potentially interesting 
behavioural aspects of four distinctly different domain experts. A study of this 
nature does not permit any firm conclusions to be made about the actions of 
other experts. At best some aspects of this study may justify further research. 
Therefore, the study does not claim any general application across areas of 
expertise, management, or decision-making. 
• Given the nature and assumptions of qualitative research the findings of my 
research could be subjected to other interpretations. 
• The psychometric tests used m this research are not intended to be 
comprehensive; they are used as additional data to aide in assessing the 
validity of data gained through other sources, i.e. as a triangulation aide. 
Consequently no detailed psychological reports are presented. 
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6.4.5 Ethical considerations 
Permission to undertake the study was obtained from the Waikato Management 
School's Research Ethics Committee. All respondents were advised verbally and 
in writing of the purpose of my research, and advised that they could withdraw at 
any time if the chose to do so. The letter of approval and blank copies of the forms 
presented to the respondents are included in the appendix. 
*************** 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
Qualitative research is not a new form of enquiry, but the procedures still create 
some controversy (Berg, 1995). Therefore, I have presented a review of the 
central concepts of qualitative research, with particular attention paid to 
paradigms, ontology, epistemology, and the issue of trustworthiness associated 
with qualitative studies (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; 
Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
For any enquiry to take place under the umbrella of 'qualitative' research it is 
necessary for the researcher to understand where he/she 'stands' within qualitative 
research, and to recognise the constraints and the freedom that define that stance 
(Creswell, 1994; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991 ). In this chapter I stated my 
justification for the research procedures that I adopted. I examined several 
alternatives within the appropriate research paradigm, and stated why I think a 
multiple-case study procedure is appropriate for my research. 
I then discussed ways of collecting data within a multiple-case study procedure. I 
stated that I chose to use interviews as the main data collection procedure, and 
that I would use researcher observation and psychological evaluations to 
triangulate the research perspective (Fielding and Fielding, 1986; Jick, 1983). I 
also discussed how the data was recorded, and the administration of the 
psychological evaluations. 
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The chapter concluded with a statement on the research constraints that I, as the 
researcher, have recognised. I addressed researcher effects, trustworthiness, 
delimitations, limitations, and ethical considerations. 
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Case study reports 
In this chapter I present a 'thick description' (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985) of the setting and respondents that form the database for four 
case studies. This qualitative approach is, as explained in Chapter 6: Procedures, 
based on constructivist inquiry procedures (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
The chapter begins with a preliminary discussion of some important parameters 
that constrain the case studies that makeup the remainder of the chapter. 
***************** 
7 .1 The case reports 
The 'thick descriptions' of the respondents, and the settings in which they work, 
presented in this chapter provide an information base for the case analyses that 
follow in Chapter 8. Additionally, the thick descriptions should enable anyone 
who wishes to assess the transferability of my findings to do so (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The case reports that make up the thick 
description are the result of my attempt to gain meaningful information which I 
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could synthesise to develop an answer to my overarching research question, which 
is - What shapes the managerial decision-making processes of an expert? 
Although, the case reports are representative of the information obtained through 
interviews, observations, and psychological evaluation, they do not contain all the 
information that is available. I am of course aware of the need to provide a solid 
information base for this thick description, but I must also accept the constraints 
imposed upon the size of a thesis. Consequently I have attempted to include an 
example of all the various types of information, and therefore most of the 
information that is not presented can be considered to be supporting data, which 
repeats and confirms that which is contained in the case reports. 
Each case report begins with a short explanation of the circumstances that 
prevailed during the study, and of how the study was carried out. Once the 
background to the research situation is established a vignette of the respondent is 
presented, and then the data obtained through interviews, observation, and 
evaluations is presented. 
******************* 
7 .2 The four cases 
The four cases are similar m that they study experts who have moved into 
management positions. However, each case is different in that the respondent is 
performing different tasks in a different contextual environment. 
***************** 
7 .3 Respondents 
To be sure that the correct person is identified and to separate them from other 
people who are mentioned in the case reports, and to protect their identity, the 
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person who features in each case is referred to as the 'respondent'. The term 
respondent is used throughout constructivist inquiry to identify the person who is 
the focus of the study (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
**************** 
7.4 Data collection 
Constraints imposed by each expert's occupation defined the nature of the data 
collection process. As a consequence, data was obtained at a time dictated by the 
expert's business schedule. In one instance, Case Report Number One, I was able 
to observe the person at work from mid afternoon until late in the evening on one 
day, through eight in the morning until late in the evening on the following day, 
and for approximately two hours the third day. The people who feature in the 
other three cases were only available for periods of one to two hours at a time, by 
appointment, so I met with each of them at least five times. I also had several brief 
phone conversations, with each of them, to gain supplementary or clarifying 
information. In addition all of the respondents provided personal background 
information in writing, completed a questionnaire asking for specific information 
related to their training and experience within their domain of expertise. The 
respondents also completed the CSA, Repertory Grid, and the MBTI 
psychometric tests. 
In addition to interviewing the respondent, I interviewed several other people in 
each case to gain additional information. For the first case I was able to interview 
one additional person who has known the respondent for more than ten years, and 
to speak with seven of the respondents clients. In the other studies I was able to 
interview two or three additional people who have known the particular 
respondent and worked with him/her for at least 18 months. The interviews lasted 
between 30 and 40 minutes, and some provided additional material by e-mail 
subsequent to our discussion. For each person, that is the four respondents and the 
people providing additional material, I transcribed the tape-recorded information, 
along with all other information and entered it all into a database. 
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7 .5 Definition of an expert for my research 
The respondents two male and two female, are people who meet the following 
criteria, based on definitions established by Ericsson ( 1997), Carroll and Johnson 
(1990), and Shanteau (1987; 1995): 
• The respondents are formally trained and qualified for their 
occupation. 
• The respondents have at least ten years experience in their domain of 
expertise. 
• The respondents are recognised by their peers as competent 
practitioners within their field of expertise. 
***************** 
7.6 A Vignette 
Each report begins with a vignette of the person who was the respondent in the 
study. The vignette provides background information about the person to enable 
readers to create their own understanding of the person who features in the study. 
While I have attempted to construct a good picture of each respondent, I have also 
remained aware of the need to protect the respondent's privacy, consequently I 
have been careful to avoid providing any information that would identify the 
respondents. 
******************* 
7.7 Interview transcripts 
Following the vignette of the respondent is a report of the interviews that took 
place. First I report on the conversations between the respondent and me, the 
interviewer. Next I report on the conversations that took place between working 
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associates of the respondent and me. Finally I present a summary of the 
respondent's psychological evaluation. 
Although I have retained all the interview transcripts, I present only a synopsis of 
the conversations. I recognise that the actual words spoken, and the structure of 
the sentences, often convey meaning beyond the words and that contextual 
information may be lost in a synopsis. However a full presentation of the 
interview transcripts, which exceed one hundred pages, is not reasonable. 
****************** 
7 .8 Observations 
My record, of how the person appeared to me, follows the interview reports. What 
I observed, how the respondent seemed to approach decision-making situations, 
and what I thought the person was doing. This part of the report is based on my 
continuous observation of the respondent, which includes the non-verbal 
responses during interviews, informal conversations that were not recorded, and 
privileged moments when I was present during the respondent's attendance to 
managerial decision-making. 
***************** 
7 .9 Psychological evaluations 
A summary of the findings from three psychological evaluations is reported. 
Although the administration of the psychological evaluations and subsequent 
assessment of the evaluations follow standard procedures, the reports contain only 
sufficient information to enable triangulation with the data obtained through 
interview and observation; they are not detailed psychological reports. 
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The Repertory Grid Technique (Rep Grid) is first presented as a transcript of the 
respondent's conversation during the evaluation. The transcript from a Rep Grid 
evaluation provides, I believe, a good insight to the respondent's decision-making 
process. The transcript is followed by an assessment of the constructs and 
elements developed by the respondent as part of the Rep Grid evaluation. This 
assessment is presented in figures with a written assessment of their content. 
The Cognitive Style Analysis (CSA) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI) reports are abstractions from the appropriate manuals, based on a careful 
analysis of the information provided by each respondent. 
******************** 
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Case report number one 
This was the most difficult case study. If it had been possible, this study would 
have been conducted later, after the cases that follow, but the respondent was near 
to the end of his season in New Zealand and was preparing to travel overseas. 
Therefore, this was the only time available. The study was made difficult by the 
very limited time he could make available to me, during which he was constantly 
working. This meant that I had to carry out the study over a period of two and a 
half days, with no time to return to any part of the study for clarification. 
Nonetheless, the respondent was interested in my research, and made a special 
effort to ensure that I got the information that I asked for. 
In addition to this two-day data gathering session, I had spent four and a half days 
with the respondent several months earlier, as a client of his business. On both 
occasions, I was able to talk with the respondent, and his clients. Being with the 
respondent and his clients allowed me far more opportunity to observe, and to 
make notes about the respondents actions while he worked, than I had in the later 
case studies. 
Unfortunately, the formal aspect of my research for this case study was rushed 
due to the limited one-to-one time available, and could have benefited from 
lessons learnt in the later case studies. However I did fax some additional 
questions to the respondent, and his answers have help to fill some gaps. 
***************** 
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A vignette 
The respondent in this case study is a British male, from Yorkshire, England, age 
49. He is the manager/chief instructor/owner of a highly respected outdoor 
pursuits centre in New Zealand. He has a Bachelor of Education Degree with a 
major in geography, and a Teaching Certificate, both obtained in the UK. He has 
completed, over a period of five months, a business and computing course at a 
polytechnic in New Zealand. He holds the New Zealand Outdoor Instructors 
Association (NZOIA) highest-level qualification in Kayaking, Caving, 
Mountaineering, Rock climbing, and Rescue. He is the most highly qualified 
instructor in NZ, and. He also holds American Canoe Association (ACA) 
qualifications. 
Before settling in New Zealand, he was a schoolteacher, "7 years as teacher at an 
English Catholic Grammar School, a boys school", and he represented the UK, in 
slalom kayak competition, for ten years. He left teaching when his involvement in 
expeditions reached a point where it required more commitment than was possible 
while teaching. After teaching he was "doing almost anything - lecturing, relief 
teaching, cruising round the world between the UK US and NZ, jobbing 
instructing, doing what ever I could." 
The respondent was one of a group of instructors who, in 1987, initiated the 
establishment of a qualifications and certification system for outdoor pursuit 
instructors in New Zealand, the New Zealand Outdoor Instructors Association 
(NZOIA). "It seemed as though the whole world was pushing for paper, so a 
bunch of us pre-empted the issue. We did not want to be in a situation where we 
were forced to get qualified by local authorities, or by insurance companies, or by 
DOC [Department Of Conservation] people who know nothing about what we 
were doing. So we started are own professional association, and by consensus set 
our own standards, and I think that's grasping the nettle." 
Within the narrow field of outdoor pursuits this man is a legend. He has lead or 
taken part in kayaking and caving expeditions that have been first ascents, first 
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descents, first trip down river etc. in many countries around the world. Although 
he continues to be involved in exploration, he spends at least half of the year as 
"manager/chief instructor/owner of a small business aiming at providing high 
quality instruction for small groups of people." He added that he is in fact only 
part owner. His wife, an accountant, is also part owner and according to the 
respondent she does all the organising, while he teaches. During the season, which 
is from September through to the end of May, there are several additional 
instructors employed, plus an office manager who attends to bookings, and other 
clerical duties. 
Other than the five month polytechnic course, his management training has been 
what he calls "in situ /experiential". He managed, or "ran", an outdoor centre in 
Christchurch NZ, for five years with 3 or 4 staff. Prior to that he ran courses for 
business managers, at the NZ Outdoor Pursuit Centre. The courses were basic 
team building exercises combined with management development courses, and 
involved an educational psychologists who evaluated the clients. Despite his 
extensive, and impressive record in out door activities, he claims that he has had 
"heaps and heaps of situations where despite my experience in the outdoors my 
salary has been determined by my tertiary qualifications. Having a degree and a 
teaching certificate has helped a lot ... because that's how society works, you still 
get paid for the bits of paper regardless of how good you are." 
*********************** 
Interview transcripts 
First transcript: A synopsis of an interview with the respondent 
The respondent is clearly a very capable person in many outdoor pursuits. 
However, he sees his teaching ability as his most valuable skill. "/' m good at 
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teaching. I've got enough experience now to reasonably well pick out where 
people are at, to try and pitch the lessons and rivers at their ability level." 
He does not see any overlap between his field of expertise and management 
requirements for running a business, but he does consider the polytechnic course 
in business and computer skills to have been beneficial. He stated, "The level we 
run at is mostly common sense. The business programmes I've been on provide 
you with the tools of the trade. In other words the literacy skills and the 
organisational skills but I think running a business like this is seat of the pants 
intuition, about what gear to buy and how much money to spend on what. We are 
a dinky little business with all the usual problems of being under capitalised and 
over mortgaged and all the rest of it." 
The respondent considers the business,, to be a retirement plan. He states that after 
five years he hopes to be able to employ sufficient instructors to allow him "to 
just go out and potter". However, he admits that he is not sure that he would be 
content not to be involved in teaching, and he is aware that "you need a 
reasonable pyramid of people to pay for a manager and that's a contradiction of 
the aims of what we are trying to do. I do make an effort to get to know every body 
who comes on the property which I think is an indication of the size of your 
business I mean if you stop trying to do that then it's to big for what we are trying 
to do." 
The respondent's view is that the decision-making style that enabled him to 
become an expert in his field is one of "impulsive recklessness bred on hard won, 
painful experience, and luck." He attributes his reputation as an outstanding 
instructor to an "ability to see clients in a time !skill continuum, and to deal with 
them at their level with a view to advancing their individual skills." He considers 
that his strengths and distinguishing features are "longevity - the joy of 
paddling!!" and "e.Aperience !enthusiasm, still." As a manager he sees that his 
strengths are "enthusiasm and single mindedness", and his weaknesses are "lack 
of communication skill with other staff Lack of financial skill" 
****************** 
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Second transcript: Comments from a fellow instructor 
The comments here are from another top ranking kayaking instructor, who has 
known the respondent for more than ten years. He stated that the respondent "has 
a typical Yorkshire man's reluctance to show enthusiasm, and he is a very focused 
person, almost dogmatic." The respondent, in this person's opinion, is a man of 
his word, who is highly respected through the outdoor pursuits industry. 
In his view the respondent is a "totally charismatic character" who is remarkable 
because he is still has a deep love of kayaking after 30 years. He states, "The 
respondent demonstrates more personal interest than many much younger 
instructors with a lot less experience." 
******************** 
Third transcript: Comments from clients 
"He is a friendly, social, and enthusiastic person, although he appears to be very 
independent." 
"He is perceptive, accepting, diplomatic, and accommodating." "He enjoys his 
job, and it obviously keeps him very fit." 
"He is concerned about the environment, and works hard to promote an 
awareness of the need to look after the environment in the general public." 
"He demonstrates a strong appreciates the freedom of the outdoors." 
"He is an effective teacher." "He is well organised in connection with his main 
role, and conscious of his responsibilities on the job." 
"He is not too concerned with financial rewards, and does not like administration 
tasks." 
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Observations 
Although the respondent stated that his partner, and the office manager attend to 
organisational matters, during my visits I noted that he often carried out these 
functions. Consequently I have, I think, a good understanding of the respondent's 
decision-making processes. 
As a teacher he has an ability to relate to his clients in a way that appears to reflect 
the person that he is instructing. He can be the 'hard man' type with young male 
clients who want to 'push the envelope', by controlling them while pushing them 
so that they become skilled and safe in their outdoor activities. Yet he can be very 
understanding, and caring with other clients who are beginners yet to come to 
terms with the activity. Even with in a group of four, which is the maximum for 
one instructor, he makes a point of adapting his teaching methods to the 
individuals. 
As his record in exploration demonstrates, he is obviously mentally strong, and 
determined, and this shows in his teaching. In outdoor pursuits, an inappropriate 
decision can result in someone being killed or injured. The respondent is well 
aware of the dangers involved in outdoor pursuits, consequently he is always 
attentive and never out of reach of his clients. He works hard to ensure that his 
clients do acquire new skills, and are aware of safe practices. 
His decision-making processes appear to be automatic, although there was 
evidence of some analytic, or considered decision-making in managerial matters 
outside his domain of expertise. His interaction with the other instructors can be 
described as democratic. The instructors were told when their clients would 
arrive, and what kind of instruction the clients expected, and then they were left to 
organise themselves and teach the clients. During my observation the respondent 
told people what needed to be done, not what they should do. In my view the 
respondent takes his work very seriously, and uses his teaching skills to ensure 
that clients enjoy what they are doing while they are learning. He stated that he 
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leaves the organisational and clerical work to others, but he appears to be aware of 
what is happening. 
****************** 
Psychological evaluations 
Repertory Grid Technique 
Note. This application of the Rep Grid was rushed due to the limited time the 
respondent had available. He made very little comment during the word selection, 
and may not have truly applied himself to the task. At the time, a written record 
appeared to be sufficient, although in hindsight it was not. I discovered, in the 
next case, that a richer record of the participants' verbalisation of their thoughts is 
provided if the conversation is recorded on tape. Consequently, subsequent studies 
were tape-recorded. Unfortunately, by the time I had made this discovery this 
respondent had gone overseas so I was unable to obtain additional information 
from him. Therefore this Rep Grid evaluation is very weak when compared to the 
later studies. 
The nine words chosen by the respondent to represent the decisions he faces are: 
Practical 2. Financial 3. Experience 4. Involves people 5. Democratic 6. Quick 7. 
Easy 8. Considered 9. Time dependent. These words are the elements in the Rep 
Grid analysis. 
In the following statements the respondent differentiates between the nine 
elements to form four constructs; denoted by the bold lettering. After establishing 
the constructs the respondent weighted the elements in relation to the constructs 
using a one to five scale on which a score of one represents alignment with the 
initial pairing and a score of five represents an alignment with the alternate. 
[ 1] 1. Practical & 2. Experienced, 3. versus: Financial. 
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"The first two are common sense, the third is uncertain" 
[2] I. Democratic & 2. Involves people, 3. versus Financial. 
"The first two are clearly tied together, the third is a grey area" 
[3] 1. Quick & 2. Easy, 3. versus: Considered. 
"The first two are day to day activities, the third is something that I tend to defer" 
[4] 1. Time dependent & 2. Involves people, 3. versus: Financial. 
"The first two are interdependent, the third is independent" 
The respondent was having difficulty thinking up additional pairs so we stopped 
at four iterations. 
The chart below (figure 7. I) shows the nine words that the respondent selected 
which form the elements of the Rep Grid process, and are displayed as the vertical 
columns. The value response that the respondent attached to each word forms a 
construct in the Rep Grid, (scored on a continuum of I to 5 from left to right) and 
are the horizontal rows, with the values for each element in terms of the construct 
represented in vertical columns. 
For example the element 'practical' is rated 'one' in terms of the construct 
'common sense/uncertainty', where the value 'one' rates an element as totally 
'common sense' and the value 'five' rates the element totally as an 'uncertainty'. 
In the construct 'independent/interdependent' where the value 'one' rates the 
element as totally 'independent' and five rates the element as totally 
'interdependent', the respondent has selected a value of 'two' to represent a less 
than total inclination towards the independent end of the continuum. 
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Figure 7 .1 A chart representation of the elements and constructs selected by the 
respondent in case one. From the University of Calgary, WebGrid II. 
Analysis of Rep Grid data requires a re-sorting of the data to find correlations that 
place similar constructs, and similar elements, together. The FOCUS computer 
program performed this evaluation process, known as cluster analysis. The result 
of the FOCUS evaluation is shown in figure 7 .2. The scales to the right of the 
figure represent the percentage of correlation between constructs (at the top), and 
elements (below). [Note: To facilitate the graphical display the FOCUS program 
has transposed the original material.] 
The FOCUS evaluation indicates that the elements 'quick', 'experienced', and 
'easy' are 100% correlated, and this grouping correlates at 95% with 'involves 
people', which in tum correlates with 'democratic', 'time dependent', and 
'practical' at just less than 90%. Finally, the elements 'financial' and 'considered' 
have a correlation of 75% with each other, and with the other elements overall. 
The cluster analysis strongly indicates that, to the respondent, decisions based on 
experience are frequently quick and easy when there is nothing else to consider. 
When the decisions involve other people, the respondent continues to be highly 
confident that he can make quick and easy decisions based on his experience. 
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However, when other issues are introduced that are perhaps not as readily 
controlled, the respondent becomes more considered in his decision-making. This 
need for deliberation is particularly evident when financial decisions are faced. 
Overall, there appears to be two groupings or 'families' of elements; those that are 
closely associated with the respondent expertise, and those that are not. 
FOCUS Case 1 , Domain : Decision making 
Context : Manageria 1 decision making, 9 Decision types, 4 Decision determinants 
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Figure 7 .2 A FOCUS based cluster analysis of the respondents Repertory Grid 
responses. From the University of Calgary, WebGrid II. 
The constructs clear/grey area, day-to-day/defer, and independent/interdependent 
have a correlation with each other of slightly more than 85%, and they correlate 
with common sense/uncertainty at slightly more than 70%. 
When written in typical Grid evaluation form as follows, 
Clear - grey area 
Day-today - defer 
Independent - interdependent 
Common sense - uncertainty 
it appears that the respondent has differentiated between his decision-making 
situations on essentially one dichotomy, easy/difficult, and that the first three 
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constructs are to the respondent, closely related. The result associated with the 
construct 'construct common sense/uncertainty' is perhaps an indication by the 
respondent that to him all the decisions that he is faced with are what he believes 
to be common sense. Overall the respondent appears to have indicated a strong 
preference for straightforward uncomplicated decision-making. However, as noted 
earlier the respondent was under considerable pressure from his work while he 
completed this test, which may have constrained his ability to develop further 
constructs. 
******************** 
Cognitive Style Analysis (CSA) 
The respondent evaluated as a Wholist - lmager: WA 0.71 :VI 1.08, meaning that 
the respondent is left of centre on the Wholist-Analytic dimension, and right of 
centre on the Verbal-Imager dimension, as shown by the X in figure 7.3. 
The CSA manual describes the decision-making style of Wholist-Imager as 
follows: This person should be able to see the whole scene and have an overall 
balanced perspective, particularly where success requires that several aspects need 
to be developed together. He is realistic, flexible and ready to adjust to the 
circumstances. 
He is able to appreciate another person's point of view and rarely show extremes 
of opinion. He is flexible and will often be happy to fit into the plans of others. He 
is willing to be directed and lead by others. 
He is open to persuasion and is likely to change his mind fairly readily. 
He has the limitation of not being very discerning and of being swayed to and fro 
by passing fashions. He is insufficiently critical of ideas and plans. 
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Figure 7 .3 The respondents position on a global representation of all the possible 
cognitive styles evaluated by the CSA. 
***************** 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
This person provided an Extravert, Sensing, Feeling, Perception (ESFP) response 
to the MBTI. The following is an interpretation of the respondents ESFP response 
obtained from the MBTI Manual. 
Extravert sensing makes the adaptable realists who good-naturedly accept and use 
the facts around them, whatever these are. They know what the facts are, since 
they notice and remember more than any other type. They know what goes on, 
who wants what and who doesn't. And they do not fight those facts. There is a 
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sort of effortless economy in the way that they deal with situations, never taking 
the hard way when an easier one will work. 
ESFP's like to make decisions with their feelings (F) rather than their thinking. 
Feeling gives them tact, sympathy, interest in people, ease in handling human 




CHAPTER 7: Case study reports. 
Case report number two. 
The respondent was asked to participate in this research because of her recognised 
expertise within her profession. When asked she showed a keen interested in my 
research and volunteered to be a respondent. Data collection for this case took 
place in the teaching facility of a large hospital. The respondent was available for 
up to one hour, only on Wednesday afternoons by appointment. However, she did 
on several occasions phone to offer additional information which she had thought 
about between interviews. The respondent gave instructions to her staff that we 
were not to be disturbed during the interviews and evaluations. As a consequence 




The respondent in this study is a New Zealand European female, age 50. This 
person is a qualified teacher, specialising in the education of children with special 
needs. She has been a teacher for thirty years, and has acquired additional 
university qualifications in the education of children with special needs. 
The respondent is a warm friendly person who is well liked and respected within 
the teaching profession. She likes to be well organised, she is dedicated to her 
work, and she has a clear picture of what she wants to achieve. 
When this study was carried out, the respondent was the senior teacher in charge 
of a major hospital's education facility. The facility is both an Early Childhood 
Centre catering for pre-school children and a school for pupils up to the age of 
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fifteen years of age. Her responsibilities included the administration and 
management of staff, resources, finances, and the daily running of the unit. She 
answered to the management committee. 
********************** 
Interview transcripts 
First transcript: A synopsis of several interviews with the 
respondent for this case study 
The respondent's main job function, in her words, "is to ensure that all children 
receive the support of a teacher while they are in hospital. That's my overall 
umbrella. It's the kids that count. Then in terms of what I do, have to make sure 
that each staff member is properly supported to do their job, that their are 
equitable loadings in terms of case load for the day, and I would see that I have a 
responsibility to support the staff to do their job." To carry out her job she is 
continually liasing with other groups within the hospital system, and co-ordinating 
activities. 
The respondent considers that decision-making is an important part of her work. 
In her role she must ensure that the school meets the children's needs, which 
means that, she doesn't "have a lot of time to muck around with making a 
decision". However, "there are some things that can take time and so I like to 
take a consultative role in some respects hut quite often I don't have the privilege 
of consultation." 
The respondent's decision-making is a mix of decisions relating to people, "I'm 
making decisions about what would he a good thing for them to happen for that 
day and how can I use my knowledge of educational understanding in terms of 
resources and curriculum to make that happen", decisions relating to finance, 
"what resources I use, what sort of programme I run", decisions relating to time 
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management, "probably one of the really important things I do in terms of 
decision-making is about time management. I've got these things to do today in 
terms of children who always come first with me and then I will have other things 
that I have got to do to keep every body else smiling about this service within the 
hospital. So I actually have to give that some thought each day and I do that first 
off in the day about prioritising my day what time I'm going to give." 
Educating children in a hospital environment is often an emotional experience, "in 
this job you often have to take into account a lot of what I call emotional and 
psychological factors in making to decisions. They could he things associated with 
why a students in here in the first place, is there some issue concerning pain thats 
going to influence what I'm going to give them to do, or what I'm going to expect 
from them, or when I might be able to do it with them because of who else is going 
to he seeing that child. So I have to actually consult with a team of people before I 
can implement my belief of what should he done." "Another thing is just the 
emotional well being of that child, because some times a kid can cope with things 
and other times they can't, and how a child is emotionally may very well 
determine what I do with them anyway, so they may be things relating to the 
distance from home how, long they have been in hospital how long they are likely 
to he in here, what are the procedures a head of them. Another thing with children 
is that my decisions might he totally focused on death and dying, because the 
child is not going to live very long, so what I do and when I do it and what's 
important is tied. I've got quiet a big caseload of those children at the moment. 
That brings me to the comment that with some of the decisions that I make I have 
to continue to return to myself and say, 'am I looking after me in what/' m doing' 
so that all the other decisions keep perspective and priority." 
The most common decisions that she has to make are related to "a child's 
education programme; what is the programme meant to he doing." Closely 
followed by time management decisions. "What I do during the day." 
It is her view that "a hospital teacher needs to he a person with a very solid 
knowledge of child development and they also have to have a very astute 
knowledge of curriculum," so that the information required for decision-making is 
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largely personal knowledge. "/ would carry a lot of that knowledge in my own 
memory of what a child does at what age in what subject so I would draw on 
that." 
For decisions that fall outside her knowledge and experience, she will seek 
information from the child's parents and/or the school that has taught the child 
prior to hospitalisation. "There are some children that you meet and you sense 
that this is not the normal pattern so you can't use your expertise. Very often a 
parent is available, so I might ask a question about there local school and if there 
is any special support given to this child. With the parents permission, I will 
contact the school and ask there for the individuals educational plan be made 
available". In the mean time, she relies on her "smorgasbord of expertise and 
experience." 
In this teaching environment, where many different races can be encountered, 
cultural etiquette is must important. It is particularly important here due to the 
stressed emotional state of patients and parents. "One of the things that I have 
done in previous years in terms of my own professional development is to actually 
identify the different groups that we get here and to actually make sure that I am 
aware of some things like greetings and definite no no' s with in that culture so 
that I don't offend them." 
The respondent states that most of her decisions, "whether it is educational, 
financial, or whatever," are based on her "expertise, which is my historical kind of 
perspective of the matter, and the current situation." If time permits she will often 
discus decisions with her staff, "particularly if it has a complexity about it or a 
risk to it and it can wait, I would wait until I talk with my colleagues. That just 
ensures a good outcome really, it is not very often that I will change what I have 
already decided to do by consulting with others, but some times I do and I'm very 
willing to take advise." 
The respondent is comfortable making quick decisions where her expertise 
provides suitable solutions, for example, "if it's about a child's teaching 
programme then I would have no problem making that decision I would use my 
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expertise, my case load of the day, and I would make the decision. That would be 
how I would prefer to do it and that's how I would do." However, "it if it was for 
something that was going to have a long term consequence then my preferred way 
of making it would be that /, perhaps had more time to make the decision and 
more opportunity to consult. So that the consequence of that decision was going to 
be most supportive to the child initially, possibly the family, and at times my safety 
and when I say that I would see those as the hooks. I'm thinking were there are 
times when /' m actually asked to make decision by a paediatrician, or asked my 
opinion about something and I would usually ask when are you wanting that 
decision. And if he says I want it today then I might have to negotiate that. If he 
says I don't need it for a week, then /' II say /' II keep looking at it and make a 
recommendation, or /' II gather some observation notes and write a report. But 
things can often involve CYPS [Children and Young Person Service] here, and if 
it involves a legal kind of consequence then I think its important to consult. I also 
find that in making decisions for families, or being involved in decisions for 
children that are dying, that requires a different process and I would have some 
preferences about that." 
The respondent's reference to her own safety shows concern to avoid 
recriminations and to avoid "feelings on my own part that I haven't actually given 
the kids the best for a situation. I don't easily cope with compromise. Quality is 
very important to me, and I am not a person who chews over a thing for a long 
time to make a decision as a rule, but I believe that there are some times when you 
do need to." 
This person's expertise is the base on which most of her decisions are made, but 
she strongly believes that her personal makeup determines how she works. "How I 
work are things about me, but what I do with children is definitely based on my 
curriculum expertise, what I make most use of would be my post grad training. 
That was much more about teams, interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary 
Junctions, and once again that's a content knowledge that I bring rather than a 
process. Overall I would say the way I do things is about me, rather than what 
anybody has put in me, what any formal education has put in me. In terms of 
courses I mean, I haven't gone to course on decision-making techniques, or that 
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sort of thing. I think my fat her would have been a very powerful influence on who 
I am and how I do things." For many years her father was Mayor of her 
hometown. 
When asked if her managerial role had necessitated any modifications in her 
decision-making style, she replied that she is not aware of having a particular 
style. "/ think I approach things in different ways according to what the 
circumstances are, but I suppose if you were to put that out into a flow chart it 
would have its own little cycles to it any way." However, when asked if she would 
treat management decisions in the same way she deals with educational decisions 
she replied, "No I don't think I do, I mean I don't have a great deal of knowledge 
about management systems, so I suppose in a sense it depends how you argue it. 
What a child learns is a systematic approach to the building of knowledge, and I 
guess what I do in terms of managing and administering this unit is to assist it 
through." 
********************* 
Second transcript: An interview with a work associate 
This person is a teacher at the hospital, who answers to the respondent who 
features in this case study. She would seek help from the respondent in situations 
where she needs "advice, advice on anything that I didn't feel I had the knowledge 
of during the day or to do with the children who I see." 
In the view of this teacher, she and the respondent often confer when making 
decisions. "We make decisions quite often to do with the unit and our management 
of things together, in our staff meetings week by week we do make decisions about 
the unit, and we make decisions about follow up for children who are admitted to 
the hospital, so that's the type of decision-making we would be involved in." 
When asked to describe the respondent's decision-making style, she stated, "She 
is a person who gives great thought to any decisions that she makes. I think that 
223 
CHAPTER 7: Case study reports. 
when you have a problem you can see her thinking before she gives you an 
answer, but she will give you an answer fairly promptly, but it never really 
finishes there. She knows that if its a problem you have, that she can come back 
with more options, or if that first option is one that doesn't really suit you she's 
always very prepared to follow up. I think that her decision-making in this 
situation really is as a result of having known people and taught in various 
situations including this situation for a great deal of time. So its one of pretty huge 
experience really." 
She considers that the respondent's decision-making strength lies in an ability to 
"find a lot of solutions. She doesn't just find one and stick to that she thinks quite 
divergently about all other options to do with the situation. And if isn't perhaps as 
she's perceived it she can come back with more options. So I guess it's a 
divergent decision maker she doesn't stick to one idea unless it's the one that's 
working." 
When asked if there is any type of decision that the respondent has difficulty with, 
she replied that "/ don't think she rushes to make decisions, although she could 
give you an answer very quickly, I think it stays with her for a long time. But I 
don't actually think that's giving her a difficulty; except that she gives it an awful 
lot of consideration. She's quick with an answer, but she doesn't always leave that 
decision alone it stays with her and she wonders herself, if she has given you the 
right decision. I think she particularly finds decision-making difficult if it s going 
to hurt or upset a person or child, then its difficult for her if she has to make a 
decision against those feelings. She is a very humanitarian type of decision maker, 
she likes to be comfortable with her decisions, but that doesn't stop her from 
making a decision against her feelings if she sees fit." 
In managerial decision-making, this person considers the respondent to be "very 
strong, which as I say affects people, I think she is very organised and has a very 
advance and futuristic view of what she wants to achieve in the way of 
management of a place or of a building or of a unit for example and I think she 
has almost a drive for what she wants and she goes for that very quickly." 
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In her view there is a difference between the respondents managerial and 
educational decision-making, when people are not involved. "If she's managing 
people perhaps not but I think her decision-making style when its not a human, 
like when it's a management of buildings, or of resources, or things that aren't 
human is, yes, probably done much more definitely than ones that she has to make 
about people." 
A strong characteristic of the respondent's decision-making, in this person's view, 
is determination. "One thing you can see in her when she has made a decision that 
its something that she wants to stick to, she's pretty firm and strong in the 
decisions she makes, I think." 
As this person's supervisor, she sees the respondent as "extremely efficient but I 
would also say she is very human and very caring person." 
At the conclusion of the interview this person stated that she would have liked a 
bit of time to think about some of the questions before she answered them. She 
added, "When your speaking about management, and (the respondent) as a 
manager, I see her very specifically in two different roles. One is that she 
manages the people in a place that she comes across, not only the people she is 
responsible for, but also the people she has around her and the children, and I 
think that style of management is quite different to her management of, I think as I 
said, money or resources or the unit. So in that I think I was trying to say that I 
see it as two quite distinct styles, or perhaps she still has that feeling for what she 
wants from people but she just approaches it in a different way. So in all your 
questions when you talked about her approach to management decisions I felt a 
bit of a split, because if its to do with management or to do with people she is in a 
different a place. OK." 
Third transcript: A work associate of the respondent 
This person is a ward receptionist on the children's ward. She has frequent 
interaction with the respondent "to let her know where there are any social 
problems with the child, also to inform her about any complications going on in 
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the children's lives that she may has not been able to pick up in the short time she 
stays with them, compared with the longer time that we get." In her view the 
respondent is able to offer "so much more with a better understanding of the 
children." 
This person states that the respondent makes quick and appropriate decisions, and 
is able to adjust her actions to suit changes in the situation. "She is always able to 
assess the child very quickly and then decide which is the best way to go with the 
child's education whether to back off a little bit or to go ahead." 
When asked if there are decisions that the respondent is particularly good at or has 
difficulty with she replied that the respondent "is a good all rounder, she is so 
skilled. She's a very logical person and its what ever is best for the child, that is 
what she pushes for." In this person's view there is no difference between the 
educational decisions and the managerial decisions made by the respondent. 
"Again she is very skilled at achieving the best with the child, or with the whole 
service, the bottom line in her case is the child. Every thing is best for the child. 
She stated that the respondents decision-making style is that of, "A kind loving 
person very caring person." 
********************* 
Fourth transcript: Interview with a colleague 
This person has known the respondent for more than twenty years. Early in the 
respondent's career this person was, for six years, the respondent's supervisor. 
Since then they have been closely associated as teaching colleagues. The 
respondent is in this person's view "determined, political, friendly, independent, 
dedicated to the job, willing to give of herself to achieve her goals. She is 
organised in all aspects of her life, likes to be tidy and in control. Also, she can be 
a strong advocate if she feels the need, takes advantage of a situation if she sees it 
could be beneficial for either herself or the goals which she has set in the job. She 
has a strong set of priorities, is ambitious, easy to talk to, enjoys recognition, a 
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leader, sees goals clearly, and likes to encourage people to use their potential and 
have faith in themselves." 
Observations 
The respondent gave an impression of a person who is driven by her desire to 
achieve self-imposed goals. She is a very friendly, warm person who is easy to 
talk with and she was very willing to talk about her background and her 
aspirations. Her strong personality is immediately evident and clearly shapes her 
management processes. 
Her decision-making appears to be mostly intuitive, based on personal evaluation 
of the problems she faces. She communicates openly with her own staff and with 
other people outside her managerial control, and readily uses feedback to monitor 
situations. 




Repertory Grid Technique 
Note. I collected the initial data by writing answers on paper, as I had done with 
the first case study, but the respondent was talking far to fast for me to make a 
meaningful written record. I was not satisfied with this outcome. I was aware that 
I had missed a large part of the information provided by the respondent, so I 
returned and asked her to talk through the same selection while I recorded her 
conversation on tape. In her comments she repeated the same comments that I had 
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managed to write down, but the recording provided far more information. I used a 
taped record for subsequent data collecting in this case and the two that follow. 
The 9 from 17 decision types selected by the respondent were: 
1. Considered. 2. Based on practicality. 3. Based on experience. 4. Analytical. 5. 
Intuitive. 6. Based on knowledge. 7. Involving people. 8. Financial. 9. Time 
dependent. 
The groupings made by the respondent were: 
[ 1] 1. Based on knowledge 2. Based on experience, versus 3. Intuitive. 
"Similarity about based on knowledge and based on experience is that you do 
have some prior learning. Something has preceded that for you in terms of your 
having had some experience a prior learning really which you bring to a 
situation. And intuitive, to my way of thinking is more of a feeling response that is 
more sort of gut level. So one has got a sort of fact, actuality base and the other 
one is more sort of going on your feelings, which it could be argued has prior 
learning anyway but for the purpose of the grouping I chose to do it that way." 
[2] 1. Involving people 2. Considered, versus 3. Time dependent. 
"Well the time dependent side of it for me intimates an aspect of measurement or 
a finiteness that it is something that has a start and finish and that could be quite 
different to something needing consideration because if there are people involved 
it usually is something that requires a gathering of certain information 
understanding historical background which can very often blow about this finite 
aspect of time so one is almost in contention with the other." Q. What do you see 
as the similarity between considered and involving people? "That consideration 
for me involves reflection and time in a way that has to give a proper decision it 
involves not having a finite time to it, it needs reflection and pondering thinking 
and taking into account which is different to the aspect of finiteness or time 
dependent, this is open-ended where as that is very much closed the time 
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dependent is closed where as a considered is an open time." Q. And because it's 
involving people you think it should be a considered decision? "Yes." 
[3] 1. Analytical 2. Based on practicality, versus 3. Financial. 
"I would see the analytical and based on practicality as going together in so far 
as that what ever it was that you were being asked to decide upon you are actually 
thinking through all of the aspects taking into account the practical elements and 
that should be able to stand alone, oh no its not that it should be able to, but it 
would be a privileged to think that a decision could be made analysing the facts 
and it's practical applications independent of any financial reasoning and I guess 
I'm bringing my prior learning of restraint financially because usually it is that in 
my experience of decision-making that finance is very much a finite (factor?). And 
I would like to think that there is the opportunity to make practical decisions that 
were workable without financial restraint of finance." 
[4] 1. Time dependent 2. Financial, versus 3. Involving people. 
"Once again time dependent and financial are something that have usually got a 
measurement to them which has amount side limit top it in making decisions in 
terms of there are only so many hours in the day or there is only a certain amount 
of time to come up with a decision and that, that decision I also couched in the 
finical implications of that decision where as what people actually require might 
fall quite outside of that in terms of assessing the situation or delivering what is 
required or the ongoing re-sourcing of what ever that decision might involve. So 
once again one is seen as a restraint and that other one has got open to do it well 
should be able to stand alone of the restraint of time and money" Q. So you need 
a wider scope. "Yes." 
[5] 1. Analytical 2. Based on experience, versus 3. Financial. 
"Well in making a decision I believe that I would always bring my prior learning 
to that situation and I would always encompass aspects off other things I've come 
across in experience of making a decision and that I would analyse the factors out 
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of those experiences so that they would be working together in making the 
decision and that would stand alone the things that I'm doing in terms of ding that 
would stand quite alone in a very general sense from a money question in so far 
as once again I would see that the financial aspect might offer restraint to 
information I had analysed out of my other experience." 
[6] 1. Based on practicality 2. Considered, versus 3. Time dependent. 
"I think one of the things I am heavily biased to is the practicality of the decision 
because that's the way I am and so therefore in making a decision based on 
practicality I would be thinking about it's workability and I would think that the 
fact that it had been thought to be workable and practical was independent of the 
fact that time something because I don't think time should in actual fact dictate 
whether or not something should go ahead if it's been considered and felt to be 
practical I mean if it takes a bit longer to get there it may in fact have a much 
better long term outcome for the person or the situation." 
The chart below (figure 7.4) shows the nine words that the respondent selected, 
and these form the elements of the Rep Grid process, which are displayed as the 
vertical columns. The value response that the respondent attached to each word 
forms a construct in the Rep Grid, and they are the horizontal columns. 
Analysis of Rep Grid data requires a re-sorting of the data to find correlations that 
place similar constructs, and similar elements, together. The FOCUS computer 
program performed this evaluation process, known as cluster analysis. The result 
of the FOCUS evaluation is shown in figure 7.5. 
The Focus evaluation indicates that the elements 'based on knowledge' and 
'based on experience' correlate at 100%, and in tum correlate with based on 
'practicality' and 'involving people' at 95%. The elements 'considered' and 
'intuitive' correlate at 90% and there is an overall correlation between all 
elements including 'financial' at slightly higher than 80%. 
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Display Case 2, Domain: Decision making 
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Figure 7.4 A chart representation of the elements and constructs selected by the 
respondent in case one. From the University of Calgary, WebGrid II. 
The cluster analysis indicates that the respondent considers her experience and 
knowledge to be essentially the same thing in the context of decision-making. The 
respondent also indicates a close alignment between decisions that are based on 
practicality and those decisions that involve people, and these decisions elements 
are closely associated with her knowledge and experience. The respondent 
apparently regards intuitive decisions to be similar to considered decisions. 
The construct analysis shows a correlation of slightly less than 100% between 
'uncertainty/common sense' and 'grey area/clear', and between those constructs 
and the construct 'defer/day to day' there is a correlation of slightly more tan 
90%. The construct interdependent/independent is less closely associated with the 
other constructs at a correlation of less than 85%. 
The constructs used in this respondent's Rep Grid are those defined by the 
respondent in Case One, therefore I am unable to analyse her choice of constructs, 
only her weighting of the elements that she selected, within those constructs. 
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FOCUS Case 2, Domain: Decision making 
Context : Management, 9 Decision t\l pes, 4 Decision determinants 
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Figure 7 .5 FOCUS evaluation of the respondents Repertory Grid response. From 
the University of Calgary, WebGrid II. 
******************** 
Cognitive Style Analysis (CSA) 
The respondent evaluated as an Analytic-Verbaliser: WA 1.31 VI 0.99. This 
evaluation places the respondent right of centre on the Wholist-Analytic 
dimension, and left of centre on the Verbal-lmager dimension as shown by the X 
in figure 7 .6. 
The CSA manual describes the decision-making style of an Analytic-lmager as 
follows: 
This person should be good at analysing situations and obtaining a clear view of 
the important issues when considering problems or plans and the best way of 
doing things. 
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Because this person can often appreciate a range of options and have a desire to 
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Figure 7 .6 The respondents position on a global representation of all the possible 
cognitive styles evaluated by the CSA. 
This person is likely to be consistent, but the negative side of this will be a slight 
inclination to rigidity and stubbornness. She is likely to be idealistic and inclined 
to follow a set of principles. However, she will usually be socially realistic in 
terms of what others are likely to accept. 
In planning situations where new ideas have to be found she is likely to make the 
greatest contribution in the area of how plans might be implemented rather than in 
their generation. 
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Myers-Briggs type Indicator (MBTI) 
This person provided an Introverted, Sensing, Thinking, Judging (ISTJ) response 
to the MBTI. The following is an interpretation of the respondents ISTJ response 
obtained from the MBTI Manual: 
Introverted sensing types are made particularly dependable by their combination 
of preferences. They use their favourite process sensing, in their inner life, and 
base their ideas on a deep, solid accumulation of stored impressions, which gives 
them some pretty unshakeable ideas. Then they use their preferred kind of 
judgement, thinking or feeling, to run their outer life. Thus they have complete, 
realistic, practical respect both for the facts and for whatever these facts create. 
Sensing provides the facts. And after the introvert's characteristic pause for 
reflection, their judgement accepts the responsibilities. 
With feeling as an auxiliary they mildly resemble the extraverted feeling types. 
Feeling stresses loyalty, consideration and the common welfare. They are 
sympathetic, tactful, kind and genuinely concerned, which traits make them very 
supportive to persons in need of support. They are often attracted to fields where 
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Case report number three 
I arranged to meet with the respondent to discuss my research and to ask if he 
would be willing to participate. The respondent showed an interest in my research 
and agreed to take part. All subsequent meetings were arrange through the 
respondents personal assistant, and took place in the respondent's office. 
********************** 
A vignette 
The respondent in this study is a New Zealand European male, age 40. 
The following biographical details are drawn from the responses to a short 
questionnaire, which the respondent completed prior to the interviews. 
He is biologist with a PhD in soil science and microbiology. He has research 
experience in New Zealand and the United States of America, where he did post-
doctorate research, and later lectured as a visiting professor. His publications 
include approximately 85 scientific publications and refereed journals, and 45 
consultancy reports. He has 13 years experience as a research scientist and is 
considered to be an expert in his field. 
The respondent has been working in a managerial capacity for more than three 
years. He is a regional manager for a research institute that has a total staff 
compliment in excess of 120 people. Since becoming a manager he has 
undertaken specialised management training aimed at his particular needs in the 
current management position. The courses taken include accounting for non-
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accountants, managing and leading technical people, and a technology 
management programme at the University of Waikato. 
When first appointed to the management position he continued to be personally 
involved in scientific research, but soon found that the managerial role did not 
allow sufficient time, so he is no longer directly associated with scientific 
research. However, his management role is heavily dependent on his 
understanding of scientific research and what it is to be a scientist. 
Before starting my PhD research, I worked at the research institute as a research 
assistant for approximately 12 months. During that time the respondent became 
the regional manager of the institute. Prior to his promotion he was the research 
Project Leader for the section of the institute in which I worked. Consequently I 
met him frequently and formed my impressions of him well before this case study 
took place. The respondent also helped me to complete an earlier case study 
evaluation of the research institute in which he is the regional manager. 
To me he is a quiet, but not a shy person, who works hard to pursue his interests, 
and displays strong personal confidence. He admits to being consumed by his 
research to the extent that he had little interest in other people. However, he chose 
to move into management because it offered new challenges, and as he mentions 
in the interview transcripts that follow, he has had to change to achieve the goals 
of his new management role. He enjoys a joke and is an interesting, and easy 
person to talk with. During the interviews he was relaxed and offered valuable 
insights to his managerial role, and to his efforts to come to terms with the 
position. He has always shown an interest in my research, and he has been a very 
co-operative respondent for this case study. 
The respondent gives the impression that he is an easygoing friendly person. He 
appears to be a quiet thinker who decided to pursue a management position 
because the opportunity was presented. He also appears to be content with his 
present position. During our meetings he was relaxed and confident. The 
respondent expressed an interest in my research, and was willing to explore my 
questions in some depth. He often supplied analogies to clarify what he was 
236 
CHAPTER 7: Case study reports. 
saying. There did not appear to be any difficulty understanding one another, and 
the formal questions were only necessary as guides for the conversation. 
******************** 
Interview transcripts 
First transcript: A synopsis of several interviews with the 
respondent 
The respondent continues to be involved in research in an advisory capacity. He 
no longer acts as a project leader, nor does he have his own research program. 
Decision-making, in his managerial capacity, is a major function. He faces 
decisions related to financial matters associated with budgets, existing and new 
projects, and securing research funding. He also has to make decisions as part of 
his management of the staff that report directly to him; the Business Development 
Manager, the Regional Accountant, the IT Manager, and eight Project Directors. 
Decisions are related to recruitment of scientists and senior staff, salaries and 
performance evaluations, and directing the progresses of work. He also makes 
decisions about what kind of research is appropriate for the organisation. 
His managerial decisions are constrained by the Research Foundation's research 
strategies. The direction that the organisation is obliged to follow is largely 
dictated by availability of funds. No matter how valuable the scientists may 
consider a project to be, it will not proceed without funding. He is forced to make 
the decisions in this area because the scientists tend not to accept the constraints, 
requiring the respondent to make decisions on their behalf. 
The respondent states that decision-making is an important part of his job, and as 
stated earlier, it is a major part of the job. The most common decisions are 
financial, but the respondent considers that the most important decisions are those 
related to people. "The reason being that in this business we sell peoples' time. 
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That's how we make our money, from the expertise of those people. We have got 
to have them motivated and with good morale. They need to know where they are 
going and feel secure. So if we haven't got that, then none of the financial things 
work." 
It is unlikely that any single decision will lead to adverse consequences. The 
respondent considers that it would require a series of inappropriate decisions to 
cause major problems. The possible consequences associated with inappropriate 
decisions are high staff turnover, financial blow blowouts, and disasters. "/ think 
you balance the way you make decisions based upon the consequences, the 
significance. And the consequence whether you make that decision solely, or a 
consultative approach, or truly consultative. I don't know if that's the right word, 
but truly joint with others, or if you do it on the basis of listening to others and 
feeding that into you and tossing it around and coming out with the answer. So 
there is all sorts of levels." 
Decisions that require consideration of the organisations needs and conflicting 
needs of staff are stressful for the respondent. "There have been a few situations 
like that and it does churn me up. But at the end of the day the organisation is 
paying the bills for me and for the other person. And if those decisions are going 
to impact negatively on the other person, I really have gone through it and tried to 
think of other ways of doing it. Then at the end of the day it's the organisation that 
comes first." Acknowledging that many of his staff have huge personal 
investments in very narrow fields, the respondent stated that he gets some 
compensation - "if you like can make me feel better about those things' - from 
knowing that those people usually have not got a good fit with the organisation 
and they are causing of stress and problems for a lot of other people. "So you are 
sort of making some peoples lives easier if you deal with it". 
The respondent claims that he usually seeks input from the people who are closest 
to a situation to get their perspective on a situation "then I make the decision". 
However, he states that his decision-making style varies. "When the decisions are 
minor/' m autocratic because I've got to get on and do the job. So, 'bang', that's 
OK. Go for it." He added that, "Also, you know there is another tier of decision-
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making where, when you really look at it might not matter what decision is 
arrived at, as to how successful the decision is going to be, but how the it is 
arrived at." As an example, he referred to a situation where he may require a 
change in the organisations structure. Although he requires a change, he is not 
really interested in the structure so long as it delivers the desired result. "/ think 
it's more likely to deliver what I want if the people who are going to be affected 
come up with their own organisation structure". In that kind of situation he does 
not see a need to be a decision maker. He considers that he just endorses the 
decisions made by the group. As he states it, "is not to sort of impose, or be 
autocratic, or even democratic about, it's where people make their mind up. So 
that's another sort of type". This appears to be more a guiding and facilitating 
role. 
By inclination the respondent is an autocratic decision maker. He stated that "you 
could call that genetic inherited, I would be autocratic, and I think that comes 
with a lot of people who end up in management roles. The reason that they end up 
in management roles is that when they are not in management roles they have 
been confident people. Confident in their own ability, and have therefore made 
their own decisions and taken on responsibilities for their own decisions, and 
that's why they have come to the management situation. They have displayed 
characteristics. And so I would have to say in those times I would he autocratic so 
I would sit down and say ok I reckon that to research this issue we have to do this 
and we'd do it so I'd say that would he my natural way autocratic. So I do 
constantly do a check on myself, just in my head, what things have I done in the 
last week how have I come to those decisions am I slipping hack to my natural 
autocratic way, but I think that autocracy if you like can be sort of beaten out of 
you, not beaten out of you, but it sort of you see that it's not appropriate. I guess 
that's just experience I suppose hut you see that it's not an appropriate way to do 
things." 
Since becoming a manager the respondent has had to modify his approach to 
decision-making. He is now aware that his dependent on the actions of others to 
achieve his objectives. As he states, "Yes, you have to rely on others, you do have 
to rely on others and that's something that I'm very convinced of I don't want to 
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become an accountant; I just want the accountant to give me something and to 
recommend something to me. You know, I don't want to become an expert in IT, I 
just rely on the IT guy to tell me what he thinks is the best course and why he 
thinks that". 
As a manager he must rely on others to provide information necessary for 
decision-making processes, unlike when, as an expert in his field he had all the 
information at hand. "There is a fair amount of that I mean there was some time I 
guess back in the scientist days. There you know its like there may be an issue that 
comes up and there might be three or four different people who could claim 
expertise in that area. And I guess I would say they don't know what they are 
talking about you know scientific arguments between scientists. You know what 
you are talking about. This is the way to go. You are going to waste a lot of time 
and not come up with the right kind of answers doing it your way. That sort of 
thing." Now as a manager, he intentionally does not "do" some of the "business 
things". He stated that when he meets people they often ask how he, as a scientist, 
can run a business, "/ you haven't got any sort of management or accounting 
background''. His reply is that "/ say well our business is science and I rely on 
others. I rely on the recruitment process to get me good people." After a brief 
discussion about the high proportion of accountants in New Zealand businesses 
compared with the United States, he referred to the criteria being put forward by 
the Foresight Project (a funding agency). They are saying that "if we want to be a 
knowledge based society we have got to get some of the technocrats, some of the 
technical expertise into positions of influence." 
Although the respondent recognises that his expertise helps with the technical 
aspects of his managerial decision-making, such as what he is making decisions 
on, he does not see that his expertise provides any benefit in the actual process of 
decision-making. However, he does admit that there is "to some degree there is a 
common thread running through, in that the scientist has by training an analytical 
mind, tries to be quantitative, objective about things. Where as somebody coming 
from, another discipline may be less analytical more subjective. So I think there is 
that analytical training that comes through from science that may be runs through 
in your decision-making. Ok, when I make a decision on some think, if there are 
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any numbers, or figures, or quantifiable things, I'll get them before I make a 
decision, because I feel comfortable with quantifiable things." 
The respondent agrees that in becoming a scientist he apparently chose a career 
that suited his inclination towards being analytical. He also recognises that in 
assuming a new role as a manager he has had to modify his decision-making style, 
and that the new style is not his natural way of making decisions. 
Second transcript: An interview with a work associate 
This person has known the respondent for many years. He is a research scientist, 
and Project Leader within the organisation managed by the respondent. He and 
the respondent worked in the same research field before the respondent became 
the Regional Manger. 
He stated that the respondent has an open door policy, which permits either person 
to contact the other as necessary. He identified two different decision-making 
processes the he and the respondent can be involved in. First, if the issue is 
straight forward "In these any one who is involved in the situation will come along 
to express there concerns in a group situation and then a consensus will be 
reached. Alternatively in the event that the issue is more complex than that, either 
party will go away and give some thought to the various options, put them in 
writing so that they can be circulated to the other people involved in the decision-
making. So that they can have time to think about it and the options and then to 
discuss it and reach a consensus." 
When asked to describe the respondent's decision-making style, he made the 
following comments. "It ranges from quite definitive. Quite autocratic, in a way 
where the issue is clear, cut and dried, it's not really open to debate. There is no 
real belief that it is necessary to debate because the issue is black and white and 
this will or will not be the way to do it. Through to the other extreme where there 
is absolutely no clear thought as to what the final outcome might be, therefore 
there is no precise decision-making taking place at that time. Its just really a case 
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of how do you think, what are your thoughts, or we have to come back and discuss 
it further, what are the issues." He agreed that the respondent has cope with quite 
a wide range of decision-making situations, and added that he has "seen both 
styles both extremes operating". 
To this person, the respondent is "particularly good at going away and thinking 
about the issues and in his own way in his own quiet time to find what the issues 
and options are and to put forward a recommendation base for the decision." 
He was unable to identify specific situations in which the respondent may have 
difficulty with the decision-making process. As he stated, it is hard to judge 
"whether he has difficulties with it or whether it is simply a difficult decision-
making situation frequently there are conflicting views in many cases and there 
isn't a clear distinction or advantage from one or the other." 
When asked if, in his view, the respondent appeared to be more at ease with 
decisions involving people, things or processes, he stated, "probably dealing with 
things and processes. I think when you get involved in things that involve 
personalities it does create a more sensitive situation because he is a sensitive 
kind of decision-making person, it increases the degree of difficulty in the 
decision-making." 
He was asked to consider the two elements that makeup the respondent's 
managerial decision-making background, a scientist and as a manager, and to 
comment on there affect on the respondent's approach to management decisions. 
He stated that "/ feel that initially when he first ended up in that job he is/was 
bordering on embarrassment because he came from a background of familiarity 
with colleagues and I think he found it a bit difficult to be seen and accepted as 
some one who had to make the kind of decisions that affected his colleagues. I 
think he is more comfortable about that now." He considered that he no longer 
works closely enough to the respondent to comment on the any difference 
between the respondents decision-making style in his area of expertise and his 
decision-making style as a manager, "except to say that I believe his style is very 
much dependent on his personality irrespectively." 
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In this persons view the respondent is not of the old style of managers who "were 
seen as stern loud speaking table thumping decision makers. Where it was seen 
almost appropriate or necessary to be sort of quite bolshie in the way you 
managed people and issues. To be seen, as a leader, to be unafraid, to be 
unpopular, unafraid to stand up and say what you thought. Where strength of 
personality was a manger feature". He is, in this person's opinion, a modem type 
of manager. "The flavour of the time is for one of moderation, much more sort of 
personable, much more sort of responsive to issues and sensitivities of the role." 
Although the person interviewed agreed to our meeting, he was not at all at ease 
while the tape recorder was recording our conversation. Perhaps in recognition of 
this he sent an e-mail, two hours after the interview. The e-mail contains what he 
called "Just an after-thought that may be of some use". It is in fact valuable 
additional comment, which provides an important insight to the respondents 
personality and decision-making processes. 
"In my opinion 'respondent' does not always come across as an articulate, quick 
thinking.fast talking manager. There can be long awkward moments as the right 
words or response may be sought. This is most apparent when dealing with new 
topics/issues etc. His body language projects a level discomfort, while at the same 
time clearly expressing intelligence and an astuteness that wheels are spinning in 
many directions, but they are not yet synchronised into a uniform consistent or 
appropriate response. Once any issue has been reflected upon, both the written 
and spoken response tends be very perceptive, clear and confident. One further 
comment, I feel he has mastered the art of listening to good effect and knows how 
to utilise silence, and an almost quizzical appearance of participation without 
really saying anything at all, in order to keep people talking even potentially 
beyond their comfort zone." 
******************** 
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Third transcript: An interview with a work associate 
This person had, at the time of the interview, known the respondent as a work 
associate for two years. She is a chartered accountant employed as the Regional 
Accountant for the organisation. Her position as Regional Accountant answers 
directly to the Regional Manager, the respondent, consequently she works closely 
with him. They not only have numerous meetings due to the relationship between 
their positions within the organisation but, as senior people within the 
organisation they frequently attend other meetings together, both internal and 
external to the organisation. Also, as she stated, "/ drop in his office when ever I 
want to ask him something, sort of thing." 
As could be expected, the respondent and the Regional Accountant are involved 
in decisions involving expenditure, particularly capital expenditure. The Regional 
Accountant also has responsibility for health and safety issues, and the 
organisation's property. These additional responsibilities create additional 
decision-making situations in which both the respondent and the Regional 
Accountant may be involved. 
This person sees the respondent's decision-making style as considered and 
deliberate. She states that he is "quite slow off the mark, you know like he thinks a 
lot before he opens his mouth, or asks about clarification or that sort of thing. He 
tries to compare it to something else often, you know like what else would this 
relate to, like what else do we do that this can sort of sits along side that we can 
base our decision on." However, the respondent prefers not to work to guide lines, 
"he hates guide lines. He hates the idea of guide lines because things always fall 
outside them see, so you can't write every option down because things are always 
going to he on either side." Nonetheless, he always looks for precedents. Either a 
precedent that indicates, "what have we done to date", or "what sort of precedent 
is this going to create". 
From this person's perspective the respondent is able to make quick, firm 'no' 
decisions, which she finds very helpful in her position. As she states, "/ can go in 
there and say this is what I think. What do you think? And he' II say nah". She 
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indicates that she "would sort of ponder on it for a bit longer, or waver a bit" so 
the respondent's ability to make negative decisions helps to take the emotion out 
of the situation, at least for her, and gives her strong feedback about what should 
be done. 
In this person's view the respondent's science background is often very helpful in 
decision-making situations. As she states, "he is quite handy in terms of science 
things, because he knows. You know, he knows what the background is to the 
question ... where as I wouldn't." However, she was unable to say what decisions 
he finds difficult. She commented that the respondent's approach to managerial 
decision-making is "considered, Sort of structured in terms of looking at all the 
options, em. And consultative where sort of necessary". 
This person, because she has only known the respondent as a manger, was unable 
to say whether the respondent's decision-making style as a manager differed from 
that when he was a research scientist. She commented that his decision-making 
style, in her view, is characterised by his straightforward attitude, what she called 
"straight up, sort of shooting from the hip". Additionally she stated, "There is 
quite a lot of sense of humour involved in his work. So there is a sort of easy style 
about what he does and how he goes about it. I think that characterises him and 
also the science, you know, having the science background, you know, having all 
that information and that sort of thing". 
In the view of this person the respondent is analytical, he tends to think things 
through and work out possible solutions for a decision, rather than make intuitive 
decisions. However he is also a people person. She finds him to be "sociable, easy 
going, goes down to the tea room, keeps his connections with scientists, em, and 
those things are quite valued." 
******************** 
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Observations 
In my view the respondent prefers decisions that are, to him intuitive. He likes to 
be able to draw on previous experience and make quick decisions that do not 
involve other people. However, he accepts that as a manager he faces many 
situations that cannot be resolved by intuitive decisions. He is well aware of the 
need to consult with people who may be better informed about the decision topic. 
He also considers the people involved in decisions. The respondent is very 
sensitive of the need to consult with staff and to ensure that, where appropriate, 
the members of staff are allowed to own the decision. 
My overall impression is that the respondent is using his analytical ability to 
assess the needs of his new position and where his assessment indicates a need; he 
is working strongly to develop his decision-making processes to fit. Although he 
is no longer working as a research scientist, his analytical expertise is being 




Repertory Grid Technique 
The following are the nine words selected, as most representative of the decisions 
faced, by the respondent. 
1. Involving people. 2. Democratic. 3. Instant. 4. Based on experience. 5. Based 
on practicality. 6. Based on knowledge. 7. Financial. 8. Analytical. 9. Autocratic. 
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The following are the respondent's verbal responses to the structured interview 
process that forms the data collection part of the Rep. Grid. 
[ 1] 1. Based on knowledge & 2. Based on experience, versus 3. Instant. 
"Because ones knowledge whether it's your own knowledge or others is based on 
experience there is a strong link between the two, knowledge base is what you are 
starting from." "Definitely linked." 
"Instant is sort of opposite but its not, there are instances when you do have to 
make instant gut feeling reaction to what somebody is saying to you across the 
table or whatever and so your not going through the process of building on your 
knowledge or your experience yet at the same time, if you think about it long 
enough, that instant response is probably driven - the way that you respond 
instantly is probably driven by your knowledge and experience in reality so may 
be that's not a good one." 
[2] 1. Involving people & 2. Democratic, versus 3. Autocratic. 
"I guess the definition of democratic is that you involve people in the process of 
making the decision and I guess autocratic is the opposite where you have made 
your decision by your self." 
[3] 1. Financial & 2. Based on practicality, versus 3. Involving people. 
"Now frequently, well not frequently but occasionally I find that the financial 
imperatives, the practical imperatives of running a business are - certain things 
have to be done - there is not a hell of a lot of point in involving people in those 
decisions they just have to be done." 
[4] 1. Analytical & 2. Based on knowledge, versus 3. Instant. 
"Analytical, the definition of that is you have accumulated all of this knowledge 
and you have analysed it so that you can come to a knowledge based decision, 
and as opposed to instant where you are reacting or making an instant decision, 
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where you haven't gone through the analytical process. And that can be perfectly 
valid if the decision does not require a lot of knowledge to make." 
[5] I. Financial & 2. Analytical, versus 3. Involving people. 
"I guess financial and analytical go together quite nicely, because its financial, 
analysis its numbers, its dollars-- dollars in dollars out, and some times those 
things are -- they are a sort of simple analytical process involving bringing the 
people dimension into the decision-making - sometimes we make decisions that 
are not - that are a balance between the people side of it and the financial side if 
your running for short term financial gain this sort of process will win out but at 
the expense of long term issues long term organisational goals involving people." 
[6] 1. Based on practicality & 2. Autocratic, versus 3. Democratic. 
"Again it's sort of I guess there are just practical imperatives that exist in the 
business that we are in and its almost preordained that you are going to have to 
make that decision and the involvement of other people - you could put involving 
people there as well as democratic - a democratic process is not going to change 
the process that imperative." 
The chart that follows (figure 7.7) shows the nme words that the respondent 
selected, these form the elements of the Rep Grid process, and are displayed as the 
vertical columns. The value response that the respondent attached to each word 
forms a construct in the Rep Grid, and they are the horizontal columns. 
Analysis of Rep Grid data requires a re-sorting of the data to find correlations that 
place similar constructs, and similar elements, together. The FOCUS computer 
program performed this evaluation process, known as cluster analysis. The result 
of the FOCUS evaluation is shown in figure 7 .8. 
The FOCUS analysis indicates a correlation between the elements 'based on 
experience' and 'involves people' at 90% and between these two elements and the 
element 'financial' at approximately 85%. The elements 'based on practicality' 
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and 'instant' correlate at approximately 85%, and the elements 'based on 
knowledge' and 'democratic' correlate at approximately 75%, as do 'autocratic' 
and analytical'. There is an apparent correlation overall at 70%. 
Display Case 3, Domain: Decision making 
Context: Management, 9 Decision types, 4 Decision determinants 












1 1 3 
3 3 4 
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Based on knowledge 
Based on practicality 
B.ased on experience 
Instant 
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lnvo lving peop l<l' 
Figure 7. 7 A chart representation of the elements and constructs selected by the 
respondent in case one. From the University of Calgary, WebGrid II. 
The cluster analysis indicates that the respondent has four close associations in his 
decision-making processes. There is no clear indication that any particular 
decision-making elements dominate. The indication is that there are discrete 
decision-making processes that the respondent resorts to possibly based on his 
perception of the criteria being assessed. The respondent's declared inclination to 
be autocratic and analytical are clearly correlated but far less so than the 90% 
correlation between the elements 'involving people' and 'based on experience', 
which are factors that the respondent has declared that he is trying to develop. 
The construct evaluation shows an 80% correlation between 'day-today/defer', 
'clear/grey area', and 'common sense/uncertainty'. These three constructs 
correlate with the construct 'interdependent/independent' at 70%. However, there 
is a wide spread of values associated with each construct, which possibly indicates 
that the respondent has no strong bias. 
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The constructs used are those created by the respondent in Case One, and were 
used in an attempt to provide comparable data throughout the cases. Consequently 
only the weighting of the elements within the constructs is important here. 
FOCUS Case 3, Domain: Decision making 
Context: Management, 9 Decision types, 4 Decision determinants 
Common sense 2 1 1 
Clear 1 2 2 
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Figure 7 .8 FOCUS evaluation of the respondents Repertory Grid responses. From 
University of Calgary, WebGrid II. 
***************** 
Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA) 
The respondent evaluated as an Analytic- Imager: WA 1.6 :VI 1.13, meaning that 
the respondent is right of centre on both the Wholist-Analytic dimension, and the 
Verbal-Imager dimension, as shown by the X in figure 7.9. 
The CSA manual describes the decision-making style of an Analytic-Imager as 
follows: 
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This person should be good at analysing situations and obtaining a clear view of 
the important issues when considering problems or plans and the best way of 
doing things. 








X[WA 1.6:VI 1.13] 
Analytic 
Figure 7.9 The respondents position on a global representation of all the possible 
cognitive styles evaluated by the CSA. 
Because he can often appreciate a range of options and has a desire to examine 
them and weigh up the pros and cons he is sometimes hesitant in making 
decisions. This can lead to him being indecisive. 
The positive side of his way of thinking is that he is consistent, but the negative 
will be an inclination to rigidity and stubbornness. He is idealistic and inclined to 
follow a set of principles. He can be socially unrealistic in terms of what others 
are likely to accept although he is often logically correct. 
***************** 
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Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
This person provided an Introverted, Intuition, Thinking, Perception (INTP) 
response to the MBTI. The following is an interpretation of the respondents INTP 
response obtained from the MBTI Manual. 
Introverted thinkers use their thinking to analyse the world, not to run it. They 
organise ideas and facts, not situations or people unless they must. Relying on 
thinking makes them logical, impersonal, objectively critical, not likely to be 
convinced by anything but reasoning. Being introverts, they focus their thinking 
on the principles underlying things rather than on the things themselves. Since it is 
hard to switch their thinking from ideas to details of daily living, they lead their 
outer lives mainly with their preferred perspective process, in this case intuition. 
They are quiet, reserved, detachedly curious and quite adaptable - till one of their 
ruling principles is violated, at which point they stop adapting. 
INTP's see possibilities. They value facts mainly in relation to theory. They are 
good at pure science, research, maths and the more complicate engineering 
problems. They are apt to have insight, ingenuity, quick understanding, 
intellectual curiosity, and fertility of ideas about problems. They are more 
interested in reaching solutions than in putting them into practice, which others 
can do as well. 
******************* 
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Case report number four 
The respondent in this case is a work associate of the respondent in Case Three. 
During the data collection for Case Three, I became aware that the respondent was 




The respondent in this case study is female, age 30, born in New Zealand. Ethnic 
origin English /Yugoslav 
This person is the Regional Accountant for a Research Institute, a position that 
she has held for two years. She is a chartered accountant with more than ten years 
training and experience in accounting. Her experience, prior to this position, 
includes working for four different accounting and taxation companies. During 
that time she studied part time to become a chartered accountant. 
In her current position as Regional Accountant, she reports to the Regional 
Manager who featured in the third case study, and to the General Manager for 
Finance at the corporate office. She is responsible for all accounting procedures 
for the region, for management of five staff, and management of the site including 
health and safety, maintenance, and security. 
Her expertise is in accounting. She has two years experience in this management 
position, and two years prior experience in a similar position. 
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Her interests outside work indicate that she may not be a 'typical' accountant. As 
she states, "I'm very involved in action methods as a training thing." She 
explained this as a personal development program derived from psychodrama, 
that she is undertaking outside work as a personal development project. She is 
also involved in counselling work, which she sees as useful in her management of 
people. 
Throughout the interviews and psychological evaluations she continually 
questioned my questions - "why is it an important part of my job, what do you 
mean by that?" - and the questions in the psychological evaluations, and often 
found alternative meanings. 
**************** 
Interview transcripts 
First transcript: The respondent 
The respondent states that decision-making is an important part of her job, "yes it 
is, I seem to he constantly called on to make decisions. Because it's my 
responsibility to ensure that we meet budgets, I need to make those sort of 
decisions. I try to get other people to make decisions where possible, and I make 
decisions as an overview, sort of an overview person, I guess like having an 
overview of the whole thing." 
She makes decisions about purchasing capital items, and other major expenditure. 
"Like a scientist coming to ask can I have this or I need such and such or 
something has broken down. Or insurance, which is another part of my job. Can 
we pay this money to this person? There are tax questions as well. Decisions on 
things around the site, like can we make the water pressure in E block better 
because I can't wash my boats." Clearly she is involved in more than accounting, 
but she states that most decisions are financial. 
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If she makes a decision that somebody is not happy with she states "they would 
escalate it to the Regional Manager. In some cases I would already of discussed it 
with him, or found out what the policy is, or what process we need to go through, 
like there are a lot of things around here that have happened over a long period of 
time so some times I need some history." She does consider her decisions in terms 
of how they will "affect their general working day whether they are happy or if it 
affects peoples day to day functioning really and its not going to - it doesn't make 
a huge impact on their science." 
She considers that it is highly unlikely that, if she made an error when making a 
financial decision that it would not be detected before it had an adverse effect. "If 
it was a big decision I probably would have checked it out with corporate office 
anyway. One of my staff might pick it up or it could get picked up at corporate 
office, I suppose it might never get picked up. Well you know some times things 
slip through, I mean if it was big it would get picked up." 
When asked how she prefers to make decisions she replied, "the way that I 
usually make decisions is to find out the full story. If it's a small thing I would 
usually just make a decision on the spot, I would get some background on why 
somebody needed it, or why this had to happen right now, or whether it could wait 
till next financial year. I might find out some history find out what other people 
think if it was something about boats, or motor vehicles, or something I would 
contact somebody on the boat committee, or I would discuss it with the workshop 
technician. So I seek experts as well as just you know - so I go round it a bit find 
out some history from the Regional Manager may be, or policy, or that sort of 
thing." This suggests that she seeks out information, assimilates it, and then 
makes what she sees to be an appropriate decision. "Yea. That's how I prefer to 
make decisions go right round then come back and right that's what we are going 
to do." 
From her comments it is clear that she prefers not to make hurried decisions. "I 
prefer not to make decisions in a hurry where I'm under pressure to say yes or no, 
without having done any research or discussed it with anyone." 
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The respondent states that she is "not sure if her training in accounting has helped 
with decision-making I don't know if my training in accounting has helped with 
my decision-making I guess a lot of the decisions I'm called on to make are 
financial ones. But no I don't know the answer to that one." However, when asked 
to consider whether her accounting background had formalised her decision-
making, or if her decision-making is just her natural way, she replied "/ think 
there is a bit of both I do it in my own way. I also, I mean I have learnt 
something' s from the Regional Manager since I have been here, and having to 
make decisions a lot is one way of leaning to make decisions I guess, and being an 
accountant is quite structured so I am quite structure in my approach." 
The respondent considered that her managerial role has necessitated a change in 
her decision-making style. "/ guess sometimes I have to make decisions quickly, 
so to some extent it has modified my decision-making style, and also knowing 
some history or policy or what ever means that decision-making is easier to some 
extent yea." 
The respondent considers her decision-making to be easier in this management 
role because "there is a standard to say that because that falls within this criteria 
that actually should go against your project, rather than against overheads. Yes, 
so I guess making decisions more quickly and having some background does help, 
yea." 
******************** 
Second transcript: The assistant accountant 
This person answers directly to the Regional Accountant, and has held the 
position for 18 months. Before joining this organisation she was self-employed for 
17 years, running a business jointly with her husband. Although she has no formal 
qualifications, the years spent in business have apparently developed sufficient 
expertise in accounting for this position, and she is now studying for a business 
diploma at a polytechnic. 
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As the assistant accountant she spends "quite a lot" of time working with the 
Regional Accountant. Her work is dependent on the Regional Accountant, as she 
states, "basically a lot of my job depends on (the respondent) like she' [[ have 
something for me to do and she'll bring me out something and say can you sort 
this out, can you look into this, can you ring these people and find out what is 
going on that sort of thing." 
When asked if she is involved in decision-making situations with the respondent 
she replied that there are many situations where they work together to reach 
decisions, ''just about everything involves decisions", although as expected, the 
respondent makes the final decision. 
This person considers the respondent's decision-making style to be, "very 
informed. She likes to get all the facts first. She asks the other people concerned a 
lot, like we are asked for our input before the decision is made rather than make 
the decision and every one has got to live with it." 
The respondent, in this person's experience, is particularly good at involving staff 
in decisions that effect them "she is excellent, we are always consulted about it 
and you get the feeling that what you have to say is influencing the decision not 
just saying it and having it totally ignored. So that it is actually going in, and 
being taken on board of course the decision may not always be the one you want 
but you can at least see why it has happened." She could not think of any 
decision-making situation that the respondent has difficulty with, although she did 
state that dealing with staff issues could be difficult. This is more a difficult 
situation rather than having difficulty with the situation. "If it is negative 
consequences, yes I get the feeling that she doesn't like doing that but nobody 
does-we always do things together so it's a really major thing." 
This person's view of the respondent's decision-making is that she has no clear 
preference for simple clear-cut things or the more complex things. "/ think she 
takes it pretty much in her stride she certainly doesn't get flustered or seem to get 
worked up about things - on the out side anyway." 
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She states that the respondent's approach to management decisions involves 
getting "the facts first, she likes to know all the ins and outs of what is happening 
and all the background to it before she makes a decision sort of quite thorough." 
In her experience the respondent can on occasion take some time to deliberate 
over a decision, particularly if people are involved. 
This person sees that the respondent's background in accounting may influenced 
her when she makes some decisions. "/ think possibly it does tend towards the 
accounting I think perhaps a times the money has the final say, but that's just my 
assumption from things she has said, I think if it came down to two choices and 
one was cheaper I think that the bottom line would be the way to go." Q. What 
happens when she is dealing with people? "/ think in that instance it would 
probably be different. It would be more the person concerned. The situation 
rather than the money. Although in any background the money is never far away, 
it really does keep creeping in." Q. Are you saying that as the regional accountant, 
even though she considers people she would still have to remember that 'as 
Regional Accountant I am here to control the finances'? "Yes I think that is 
exactly it." 
The respondent's decision-making style is, according to this person, characterised 
by her willingness to consult. "She asks for your opinion and listens to you 
opinion and if she disagrees with your opinion it is explained why she disagrees 
with you, and then it also gives you the chance to disagree with her again as well 
And as I say, what you say to her you get the impression is being thought on and 
being listened to churned around and is being used to make the decision which is 
excellent." In this person's opinion the respondent is consultative and more 
democratic than autocratic. "Yes definitely." 
********************** 
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Third transcript: The Regional Manager 
The Regional manager, featured in the previous case study, is the Regional 
Accountant's immediate supervisor. As, discussed earlier, the Regional Manager 
is a research scientist who has moved into a management position. He states that 
the respondent answers directly to him, and provides him with all the financial 
information that he needs to manage the business. She also provides information 
on "scheduling of peoples time and so on within our system, I also ask her to 
manage the budgets for the overheads we have got for the site, and to produce 
running reports on that and other site related issues like health and safety." 
The respondent works with this person to establish the budget for the region, and 
to justify that budget to the chief executive. "Through the year we have got 
mutual decision-making on spending that budget, but also on the overall financial 
position and on how that is reported. And the analysis of that, because some of the 
financial reporting relies upon estimates of how complete a job is. And there is a 
bit of scientific knowledge required in that, so that's another sort of regular 
decision-making process that we go through. Other things are in terms of 
arrangement or staff issues relating to the accounting staff and reception staff and 
how it should be arranged. It's more, I guess it's sort of a joint decision but I rely 
more on some sort of recommendation." 
When asked to describe the respondent's decision-making style he replied that 
"unbelievable as it may seem I believe that she's more analytical than me. Well I 
guess there is two sorts of style, I believe she is more analytical than me on a lot 
of things, in that she would like to have a lot more written policies and set guide 
lines to follow so that we could follow through those, and follow through that 
procedure, and this is the decision out of it. Where as I'm a little bit sort of, well 
lets just think about it and just come up with the answer for the particular 
circumstance. So in that sense I think she prefers to be more sort of analytical on 
a lot of things, but then on other things she gets an idea and is enthusiastic about 
it wants to go with it." 
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He considers that the respondent is "black and white about a lot of things, I like 
people who are black and white in some ways because when I get a 
recommendation it's black or white its not some shade of grey and so to me that's 
easy I can say you have gone wrong here or yea that seems like a good idea so I 
get something definite and I get a definite opinion and whether I take it on board 
or not is another matter but at least its definite." 
In this person's view the respondent is "particularly good at decisions on people. 
/' m not sure that she thinks she is or not. /' m not sure about that, but I think she 
is, and decisions on organisation of people and what their work should be. Those 
sorts of things. So getting everybody organised, giving somebody set procedures 
to follow. I believe as you go into this sort of thing, the accounting clerks sort of 
area, you don't want somebody like me who doesn't set things out, you want 
somebody like (the respondent), who does have set guide lines to follow. So I think 
she's particularly good at reading people and making decisions on that sort of 
thing. I trust her judgement on making decision on about hiring the right people." 
In response to a comment about the respondent being interested in people, he 
replied that when he recruited for the position of Regional Accountant, the 
respondents position, his main objective was to find a person who could create "a 
user friendly administration" and he considers that the respondent achieves that. 
"She's very good with picking the team and very good at getting that message 
through to her team, that that's what they should be doing. And she is very good 
with the scientists as people. And, yes I think you are right accountants are not 
usually like that." 
He considers that, like most people the respondent is uncomfortable with 
decisions that require reprimanding people. "/ think she is uncomfortable, we all 
are I suppose, with hard decisions on people when they are not performing or up 
to scratch, and not going to get a salary increase. Those kind of things. On the 
financial accounting side I think she finds it difficult to make sort of decisions -
what these accountants seem to do is to categorise expenditure into all these 
boxes and I think she may find it quite difficult to do that. Because we have the 
corporate accountants which are checking on that, and she is finding it difficult to 
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make a decision because if its wrong they might think she is incompetent. I think 
that kind of thing is running through her head. I don't see it as a problem, the 
accountants have been complaining about those kind of things for ages. I think 
where the issue comes is personal interactions between her and the people that 
are doing the final allocating to the boxes. She probably feels that they are not 
recognising her professionalism, some clerk up there deciding the box she is 
putting it in is the wrong box.fair enough comment I would say." 
In this person's view the respondent's management decision-making style is 
"analytical, definite. This is, on the whole, one thing I am not sure about yet. I 
should he I guess, but I'm not. Where on the spectrum between democratic and 
autocratic she falls. Whether she is autocratic and then gets her team on board 
because of her personality, or whether she is democratic because of the definite 
views, definite sort of black and white thing she has. I just don't know how the 
interaction occurs between her and the team she is managing, so /' m not sure 
where she falls on the autocratic democratic line. I suspect that she may well be 
tending towards autocratic." 
The respondent's is still learning in the management area but, in this person's 
opinion her accounting background and her personal approach to decision-making 
appear to shape her decision-making. "/ think I guess she's still comparatively 
young and she has her chartered accountants sot of side of it. She knows what she 
is doing. But on some of the other things she doesn't know, when she starts out on 
something, how its going to turn out. But I think that when it gets down to the 
nifty-gritty of making a decision, whether that he what recommendation she gives 
to me on health and safety or what ever, she makes it in the same way." 
His opinion 1s that she her decision-making approach is dominated by her 
personality rather than her accounting background. "/ think that really shows on 
the basis of the fact that her personality overwhelms the stereo type of an 
accountant. People say 'you've got really good one we have never had 
accountants like her' so that overwhelms the training she's had, because she has 
got other interests she may have talked to you about, in terms of what's it called. 
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Psychodrama and things like that so she is a people person and understands 
people so it is surprising that she chose to become an accountant, but!" 
When asked what, in his view characterised the respondent's decision-making, he 
relied "well we have sort of said it already really. Definite, and black and white 
about things. I would say clear as well, which comes out black and white I guess. 
One thing I can't stand, well I live with it, that is asking people to go away and 
come back with a recommendation on something, and for them to come back with 
sort of four recommendations, none of which they favour, or are willing to put a 
priority on. She doesn't do that, she tells me what she thinks is best." 
********************* 
Observations 
The first impression of the respondent is of a rather loud friendly person who is 
busy getting things done. She speaks quickly and briefly. Where, in earlier cases, 
other respondents had offered additional information to amplify their response to 
questions, this respondent was brief to the point that she required prompting, to 
acquire sufficient information. However, she was very keen to be involved in the 
study, and particularly interested in the outcome of her psychological evaluations. 
The respondent appears to be a strong-minded person who has to be sure that she 
understands questions before she will commit herself to an answer. On several 
occasions she asked, "What are you getting at" in response to questions that had 
not caused problems in earlier cases. This same problem was evident in the CSA 
test, which is discussed later. The CSA provides answers from which the 
respondent is expected to pick the best to answer the question asked. This 
respondent, on several occasions stated that she did not agree with any of the 
answers offered. 
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The respondent's decision-making appears to be guided by her continuous search 
for answers to questions, which seems to be a personal trait rather than something 
that her accountancy training has developed. The impression is that accountancy 
has given her the knowledge and method for enquiry, but that she has always been 
a questioning person. However, despite he analytical approach to decision-making 
there is an impression that she may have formed an answer at the outset and that 
the analysis is used to confirm that decision. 
****************** 
Psychological evaluations 
Repertory Grid Technique 
The following are the nine words selected, as most representative of the decisions 
faced, by the respondent. 
1. Based on experience 2. Intuitive 3. Instant 4. Involving people 5. Based on 
practicality 6. Financial 7. Considered 8. Easy 9. Based on knowledge. 
"Financial has to he there doesn't it and I like to make easy decisions." 
The following are the respondent's verbal responses to the structured interview 
process that forms the data collection part of the Rep. Grid. 
[ 1] 1. Involving people 2. based on practicality, versus 3. Instant. 
"The two that I see as related are involving people and based on practicality I use 
them in conjunction with on another. What was your question? Why do I see them 
as similar? To have enough knowledge to make a decision based on practicality 
you need to involve the other people that are relevant or involved in the practice 
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of what ever and making an instant decision doesn't always work in that way, so 
that's the third one." 
[2] 1. Intuitive 2. Based on experience, versus 3. Financial. 
"Intuitive and based on experience. I see those as quite similar often my intuitive 
response would come out of experiences in the past I reckon and that may or may 
not go with the financial side of things so it might be conflicting with a financial 
decision even though my experience is financial". Q. In what way do you think it 
might conflict. "If there was inadequate budget or, like, financial constraints on 
the decision that I wanted to make based on experience or intuition." 
[3] 1. Instant 2. Easy, versus 3. Considered. 
"Those two go together quite nicely instant and easy. I quite like those two and 
they would be opposed by a sort of considered decision." 
[4] 1. Based on knowledge 2. Financial, versus 3. Practicality. 
"Based on knowledge and. financial because my knowledge is financial those two 
sort of fit together and I guess that conflicts with the practicality of something and 
it may conflict with involving other people." 
[5] 1. Based on knowledge 2. Financial, versus 3. Involving people. 
"This is the same as the one before". [See above for an explanation] 
[6] 1. Involving people 2. considered, versus 3. Intuition. 
"Involving people and making a considered decision as opposed to Intuition." Q. 
Why do you consider those to be related? "Because involving people takes a bit of 
time and so does consideration so by the very fact of involving people you end up 
being considered in your approach I think because you have to look at more 
angles than one." Q. Why do you think that conflicts with intuitive? "Because 
intuitive is often the one thing "we' II do that" bang rather than taking a slow 
leisured approach." 
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The chart that follows (figure 7.10) shows the nine words that the respondent 
selected, these form the elements of the Rep Grid process, and are displayed as the 
vertical columns. The value response that the respondent attached to each word 
forms a construct in the Rep Grid, and they are the horizontal columns. 
Display Case 4, Domain: Decision making 
Context: Management, 9 Decision type, 4 Decision determinants 
Common sense 















4 2 2 Ufleff'tain&/ 
4 2 2 Defer 
4 3 3 G!'ey ot'ea 
4 4 5 lnw--dependent 
Based on E'Xp'i'rience 








Figure 7 .10 A chart representation of the elements and constructs selected by the 
respondent in case one. From the University of Calgary, WebGrid II. 
Analysis of Rep Grid data requires a re-sorting of the data to find correlations that 
place similar constructs, and similar elements, together. The FOCUS computer 
program performed this evaluation process, known as cluster analysis. The result 
of the FOCUS evaluation is shown in figure 7 .2. 
There are three distinct groups or ·families' of elements evident in this cluster 
analysis. The one group, correlated at approximately 95%, is formed by the 
elements 'considered', involves people', and 'intuitive'. Another group, also 
correlated at approximately 95%, is formed by the elements 'based on 
practicality', instant', and ·easy'. A third group, correlated at slightly less than 
90%, if formed by the elements 'based on experience', based on knowledge', and 
'financial'. The first two groups have a correlation between groups at 
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approximately 75%, and the three groups have an overall correlation at 
approximately 70% .. 
FOCUS Case 4, Domain : Decision making 
Context : Management, 9 Decision type, 4 Decision determinants 
Doy today 2 
Common sense 
Clear 1 1 
Independent 1 2 2 
100 90 80 
~=~~-~~:::::::::::"~! I 
Grey area-············· 
ln~dependent- ... · ... 
100 90 80 70 60 
: ... Considered.. . ... -~ 
· . . . . lnvo lves peop lo? ............ ;} '··· .• , .. _ 
............ Intuitive. . . .. 
. . . . . . . . . . Bas>?d on experience .. ) 1,\ 
......... Based on kr,owledge .. ., \ / \ 
.......... Finacial ............... _.,..,,-;:, ~ 
.......... Based on pr actica lit,J. ~ /' 
.......... Instant ............... .. ,·y/· 
. . . . ... ..E~y . 
Figure 7 .11 FOCUS evaluation of the respondents Repertory Grid response. 
From University of Calgary, WebGrid II. 
The evaluation indicates that the respondent tends to separate her decision-making 
into two distinct modes. There are decisions that are based on her expertise, they 
use her knowledge and intuition, and tend to be perceived as easy by the 
respondent. He other decisions are based on practicality and experience which 
presumable has taught the respondent that an alternative decision-making 
approach is sometimes required. This second decision-making approach is closely 
associated with decisions that involve people and financial considerations. The 
respondent appears not to favour decisions that are either instant or analytical. 
The Focus analysis of the constructs indicates slightly more than a 90% 
correlation between the constructs 'day-today/defer', 'common sense/uncertainty', 
and 'clear/grey area'. In tum the three constructs correlate with 
'independent/interdependent' at approximately 80%. No particular bias is evident 
in the values attached to elements within the constructs. 
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The constructs used are those created by the respondent in Case One, and were 
used in an attempt to provide comparable data throughout the cases. Consequently 
only the weighting of the elements within the constructs is important here. 
******************* 
Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA) 
The respondent evaluated as an Analytic- Intermediate: WA 0.97 :VI 1.03, 
meaning that the respondent is left of centre on the Wholist-Analytic dimension, 
and slightly right of centre on the Verbal-Imager dimension. An Intermediate is 






X [WA 0.97:VI 1.03] 
Imager 
Analytic 
Figure 7 .12 The respondents position on a global representation of all the 
possible cognitive styles evaluated by the CSA. 
[Note: The respondent had difficulty with the verbal part of the CSA. As has been 
noted in the interviews that precede this report, the respondent tends to be 'very 
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black and white' when faced with alternatives, and in this test she found some 
difficulty in accepting the alternatives offered. Therefore, the number of correct 
responses on the verbal section is considerably lower than her response on the 
images section. This may mean that the final analysis of her cognitive style is not 
an accurate representation of her.] 
The CSA manual describes the decision-making style of a Wholist-Bimodal as 
follows: 
Able to see the whole situation and to have an overall perspective. Good at 
summing up situations. Realistic and ready to adjust to the circumstances. 
Able to appreciate another person's point of view and rarely show extremes of 
opinion. Flexible and will often be happy to fit into the plans of others. Willing to 
be directed and lead by others. 
Open to persuas10n and likely to change her mind fairly rapidly. Decisive 
occasionally to the point of being impulsive. 
In planning situations where new ideas or methods have to be found she is likely 
to have knowledge that will be useful in generating plans. 
Is insufficiently critical of ideas and plans. 
******************* 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
This person provided an Extroverted, Intuition, Thinking, Perception (ENTP) 
response to the MBTI. The following is an interpretation of the respondents ENTP 
response obtained from the MBTI Manual. 
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The extroverted intuitives are the enthusiastic innovators. They are always seeing 
new possibilities - new ways of doing things, or quite new and fascinating things 
that might be done - and they go all out in pursuit of these. They have a lot of 
imagination and initiative for originating projects, and a lot of impulsive energy 
for carrying them out. They are wholly confident of the worth of their 
inspirations, tireless with the problems involved, and ingenious with the 
difficulties. They get so interested in the current project that they think of little 
else. 
With Feeling as an auxiliary. They tend to be more enthusiastic, more concerned 
with people and skilful in handling them. Much drawn to counselling where each 
new person represents a fresh problem to be solved and fresh possibilities to be 
communicated. ENTP's may be inspired at almost anything that interests them. 
******************** 
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Analysis and discussion 
8.1 An overview of the case reports 
The previous chapter presented a 'thick description' (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of 
four case studies. There are two major links between the cases, first the 
managerial contextual setting, and second the consideration of a domain expert as 
the unit of analysis. In each case the respondent is a domain expert who has, by 
choice, become a manager of business closely aligned to his/her expertise. 
However, each respondent is an expert in a domain that differs from that of the 
other respondents and he/she works in an environment unlike that in the other 
cases. However, as no claim to generality of findings will be made the 
dissimilarity is not an issue. 
A summary of the case reports is presented in figure 8.1; it shows that the case 
study respondents display strong personal characteristics that appear to determine 
their overall approach to their occupation, particularly how they make decisions. 
Each respondent has developed his/her own preferred approach to decision-
making situations with clearly observable patterns and procedures. 
The respondents also demonstrate preferences for types of decision that they 
attend to, or try to avoid. All of the respondents appear to be continuing in their 
personal development as decision makers, and in each case they have been able to 
identify strengths and weaknesses. They are all able to recognize the 
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Case One Case Two Case Three Case Four 
Domain of Teaching 
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processes. 
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perspective. situation Clear view of Resolute 
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Adaptable Dependable Intuitive analyst Tireless 
realist. Always realist. Practical, with some problem 
CHAPTER 8: Analysis and discussion 
finds the reflective and ability to adapt. solver. 
easiest responsible. 
solution. 
I Figure 8.1 A summary of the case reports. 
limitations of their expertise and have developed personal strategies for coping 
with situations that are outside their area of expertise. 
********************* 
8.2 Supporting information from triangulation 
The data collected via interview and observation has in each case been supported 
by the additional material collected from the people who know and have worked 
with the particular respondent; see Figure 8.1. 
Additionally, the psychological evaluations provide interesting descriptive 
information (see Figure 8.1 ), which in three of the four cases appears to provide 
support for the two perspectives provided by interview and observation of the 
respondent, and by the interviews of people who know the respondents. In the 
fourth case the psychological evaluation does not align well with the other data, 
and this creates some concern. 
However, overall the strong support between the data sources used in 
triangulation, suggests that the information obtained is trustworthy in terms of 
credibility (Cassell and Symon, 1994; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Miles and Huberman, 1984 ). 
****************** 
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8.3 Addressing the research questions 
The research question that is the focus of this study 1s - What shapes the 
managerial decision-making processes of experts? The research question arose as 
a consequence of my interest in the influence of subjective variables (Einhorn, 
1973), subjective characteristics (Shanteau, 1987), and cognitive style, on the 
decision-making processes of experts. I developed a case study research procedure 
(see Chapter 6: Research Procedures) to guide my research, and I subsequently 
carried out four case studies (see Chapter 7: Case Study Reports), which provided 
data to enable me to develop an answer to my research question. In the remainder 
of this chapter the case study reports are analysed. 
The scope of my research question is potentially extensive, however my particular 
interest, and the focus of this thesis, is in the subjective variables that possibly 
shape an experts decision-making processes. Therefore I posed five specific but 
subordinate questions to aid in the analysis of the case data. The questions also 
have the potential to produce new and interesting knowledge about the function of 
experts' subjective variables in decision-making. The questions are: 
Question 1. How does an expert make decisions in a managerial role? 
Question 2. How do an expert's decision-making processes influence his/her 
managerial role? 
Question 3. How does the managerial role influence the expert's decision-making 
processes? 
Question 4. How does the expert's preferred decision-making style fit with 
his/her behavioural characteristics? 
Question 5. How does the expert's management role fit with his/her behavioural 
characteristics? 
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*********************** 
8.4 How does an expert make decisions in a managerial role? 
Answer: In a managerial role, the experts studied appear to make decisions in 
accordance with a personal hierarchy of influences, which is determined by, in 
order of strength strongest first, subjective characteristics, experience/knowledge, 
managerial goals and responsibilities, consideration for staff, and expedience. 
The answer, presented above, is derived from the following evaluation of the 
material presented, as a thick description, in Chapter 7. 
Case 1. 
Summary of pertinent data 
In the first case report, the respondent considers that in his business decision-
making is largely intuitive, and that his expertise, in teaching and in outdoor 
pursuits, is not pertinent to his managerial role. Comments about the respondent 
indicate that he is amongst other things, focused, perceptive, independent, 
conscious of his responsibilities, and well organised. My observations were of a 
strong, determined person who makes apparently intuitive decisions within his 
domain of expertise, and deliberated analytical decisions in areas where he lacks 
expertise. His apparently intuitive decisions are on closer inspection an automatic 
response based on the knowledge gained through years of experience within his 
domain of expertise. It is also apparent that he has a strong preference for 
decision-making that involves people in a teaching situation. 
There are two distinctly different managerial roles faced by the respondent. In the 
first he is an instructor, or teacher, who has responsibility for managing the safety 
and instruction of his clients. In the second he is jointly responsible for the 
management of a business that employs up to five staff to provide outdoor 
pursuits instruction. In the first role the respondent relies on his expertise when 
making decisions. In the second role there are factors that are outside his domain 
of expertise to be considered, such as financial matters and people management. 
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His expertise is important in this role, because the main business focus centres on 
his expertise, but he must consider additional information that is specifically 
business management and outside of his domain of expertise. The respondent 
admits to being uncomfortable in his managerial role because he is in his view 
lacking in some of the required skills, although he states that running a small 
business like his "is seat of the pants intuition". 
The evaluation of the respondent, using the Repertory Grid Technique, confirms 
his apparent inclination towards quick and easy decisions that call on his 
expertise, and his obvious separation of the more deliberated and analytical 
decisions called for by financial matters. 
The CSA response describes the respondent's decision-making style as able to see 
the whole picture with a balanced perspective, realistic, flexible and ready to 
adjust to circumstances. 
The MBTI response, ESFP, indicates that the respondent is an adaptable realist, 
who is aware of what is going on, and finds the easiest path to a solution. It adds 
that this person prefers to make decisions using feeling rather than thinking, 
which is no help in situations requiring analytical processes. 
In summary, the triangulation of data from interviews, observation, and 
psychological evaluation seems to be in agreement. 
Data analysis 
The data suggests that this person is likely to make most managerial decisions 
quickly, thereby giving an impression that his decisions are intuitive. In fact his 
decision-making processes are characteristic of an expert who has become 
sufficiently familiar with his domain of expertise. He is apparently able to 
automatically, and perhaps subconsciously, analyse a situation to form an 
appropriate and almost instant response (Ericsson, 1997; Hammond, et al., 1987; 
Lipshitz, 1993; Simon, 1987). 
In situations that are, in the respondent's, assessment outside his domain of 
expertise, he becomes analytical, looking for information that will enable him to 
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make an appropriate response. However, contrary to some predictions (Carroll 
and Johnson, 1990) this expert seems to be clearly aware of his limitations outside 
his domain of expertise. When making these decisions the respondent is inclined 
to change from his preferred decision-making process, which relies heavily on his 
prior knowledge and experience, to one that is more consultative and dependent 
on the knowledge of others. 
In his managerial role this expert makes decisions that appear to be firmly guided 
by his subjective psychological characteristics. He has definite decision-making 
preferences, which align with his psychological makeup, and with his expertise. 
However, when he is occasionally faced with decisions that do not align well with 
his psychological makeup, or his expertise, he consciously chooses to modify his 
decision-making processes to what he perceives to be a better suited procedure. 
Case 2. 
Summary of pertinent data 
In the second case report the respondent is seen to be highly focused on her clients 
needs, and she indicates that her decisions are largely based on her expertise and 
experience. She also emphasises that practicality is an important consideration for 
her, "because that's the way I am". The respondent makes most decisions quickly, 
based on the knowledge and experience, which forms her expertise, although she 
admits that on occasion she prefers a consultative approach. This is supported by 
comments from work associates. 
Interestingly one work associate indicated that the respondent has two different 
decision-making styles. One when the decisions involve people, and the other 
when material things are being considered. There appears to be a reliance on 
intuitive decision-making when decisions are clearly within her domain of 
expertise, although she does appear to weigh her decisions. As one person 
commented, "you can see her thinking before she gives you an answer". However, 
this respondent appears to have an unwavering faith in her ability to cope with any 
decision-making situation that may arise in her managerial role. This may 
demonstrate that for this respondent the managerial role is merely an extension of 
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the role she plays as an expert in her field, and that it does not require her to move 
outside her domain of expertise. 
The respondent's Repertory Grid response identifies two distinct, separate, and 
highly correlated groupings amongst her decision-making associations. The first 
distinct grouping, 100% correlated, is the association between decisions based on 
her experience and those based on her knowledge, which to the respondent appear 
to be synonymous. The second grouping, 95% correlated, includes the first group 
along with decisions based on practicality and those that involve people. The 
respondent mentioned many times how she relies on her knowledge and 
experience to guide her through her decision-making processes. She also indicated 
a strong concern for issues that concern people and the need to develop practical 
solution. Therefore this response fits well with the earlier data. However, the 
respondent's stated belief that she analyses and considers information before 
making decisions is not so strongly correlated at 80%. 
The CSA response indicates a person whose decision-making is analytical, likes 
to weigh the 'pros and cons', is inclined to follow a set of principles, and is 
usually realistic. Also she will prefer verbal interaction to resolve issues. Overall 
the CSA response aligns well with data obtained through interview and 
observation, and with the indications gained from the Repertory Grid. 
The MBTI response, ISTJ, also supports the earlier data, and is a very strong 
representation of the person in this case report. In particular the MBTI suggests 
that this person will have complete, realistic and practical approach to decision-
making situations, with a characteristic pause for reflection before accepting what 
needs to be done. 
In summary, the triangulation provided by the interviews, observations, and 
psychological evaluations, seems to agree on the makeup of this person. 
Data analysis 
The respondent's managerial decision-making does not appear to differ from her 
usual decision-making processes, which are representative of the expert decision-
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making processes described in the literature. However, despite comments and 
observations, which suggest that this respondent makes quick and apparently 
intuitive decisions, she indicates that her decision-making is considered and 
analytical. This supports the idea that intuition is really analytical processing that 
has become internalised to the extent that it is automatic and can be used without 
conscious effort (Simon, 1987). This may appear to an observer, to be an intuitive 
response. All the indications are that she has internalised appropriate analytical 
processes to such a high degree that her decisions appear to be intuitive. 
Within her decision-making processes there is an identified difference between 
the respondent's approach to decisions involving people and her approach to other 
decisions. The respondent's psychological evaluation suggests that she is inclined 
to be very concerned for the welfare of others. The MBTI indicates a person of 
this type, ISTJ, is inclined towards fields where systematic attention to detail is 
combined with care for people. Therefore the respondent's particular concern for 
decisions that involve people may be a personality trait. 
Case 3. 
Summary of pertinent data 
In the third case report the respondent's managerial role relies on his expertise for 
background knowledge, but much of his decision-making relates to issues that fall 
outside his domain of expertise. Within his domain of expertise the respondent 
was, according to his comments and those of a work associate, inclined to make 
quick decisions based on his personal knowledge and understanding of a situation. 
Now, in his managerial role, his decision-making process has been modified to 
accommodate the need to consult with others and also to accept the guidance of 
people who are expert in areas where he is not. Also, the respondent uses his 
strong analytical training where possible, and he likes to think carefully before 
making a decision. 
The respondent is more at ease with decisions concerning material things rather 
than people. His natural inclination is to be friendly and considerate towards 
people, and he feels a need to be democratic in his decision-making. In his 
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managerial role this can lead to personal conflict, which he recognises, and deals 
with by recognising that his responsibility is to make decisions that are best for 
the organisation, and ultimately the people employed by the organisation. 
The Repertory Grid response clearly identifies the respondent's autocratic 
analytical inclination, although it is not particularly highly correlated at 75%. 
However, the respondent's autocratic/analytical inclination is clearly separated 
from other groupings that are displayed. It is perhaps surprising that the grouping 
of decisions based on practicality and instant decisions, correlated at 85%, does 
not form a close grouping with autocratic/analytical; the correlation between these 
two groups is only 70%. Surprising because the respondent indicated that his 
autocratic nature enabled him to achieve quick, practical results. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting that the respondent identifies, during the Rep Grid data collection, that 
instant, apparently intuitive decisions are "driven by your knowledge and 
experience in reality". 
The CSA response clearly identified this man's analytical inclination. This 
suggests that he is able to make competent assessments of situations to obtain a 
clear view of important issues for his decision-making. The CSA also identifies 
the concern that he may not be as competent when making decisions that involve 
people. 
The respondent's MBTI response, INTP, clearly identifies this person. He is, 
according to the MBTI, a person who prefers to organise facts and ideas, not 
situations or people. Additionally, he is identified a quiet, reserved, and adaptable 
person. The MBTI states that this type of person makes a good pure scientist. 
In summary, the triangulation of interviews, observations, and psychological 
evaluation appears to agree on the makeup of this person. 
Data analysis 
The respondent's managerial decision-making processes, outside his domain of 
expertise, seem to rely heavily on his strongly developed analytical ability. The 
psychological evaluations indicate that his analytical approach is a strong trait, 
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part of his personal makeup, which may have lead him to become an expert 
scientist. 
The respondent has three defined decision-making responses in his managerial 
role. First, where his expertise is perceived to be relevant, he chooses to process 
decisions based on his knowledge and experience. In this situation he tends to be 
autocratic, and sure of his ground, making decisions that appear to be intuitive 
but, as he acknowledges, they are based on past knowledge and experience. 
Second, his decision-making processes outside of his domain of expertise are 
clearly different. He recognises the need to consult with people who possess 
greater knowledge than he does on defined topics, such as accounting and 
information technology, but he still feels that he can often follow his natural 
inclination to be analytical and autocratic. 
The respondent's third decision-making process requires consultation with staff 
members who are immediately affected by his decisions. This consultative 
decision-making process is apparently a conscious attempt, by the respondent, to 
counter his natural inclination to be autocratic. He is aware that, in his managerial 
role, a democratic approach to decision-making can provide a more harmonious 
and therefore easier to manage and more productive organisation. This third 
decision-making process differs from the respondent's natural inclination, and has 
required a conscious effort on his behalf. Although colleagues have identified him 
as a considerate, sensitive person, he has admitted that he is not naturally inclined 
to be democratic, and this is what the psychological evaluations suggest. In 
conflict situations his natural inclination towards an autocratic analysis of things 
and facts may limit the respondent's ability to adapt to the decision-making 
processes required in his new role. 
Case 4. 
Summary of pertinent data 
The fourth respondent managerial role can be seen as an extension of her 
expertise, in most situations. The respondent is inclined to follow the well-
established techniques and rules that have been part of her training and experience 
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while she became a domain expert. She likes to have all the information for 
consideration, and to be aware of any precedents, before making a decision based 
on her expertise. In her managerial role she has had to accept that often decisions 
need to be processed quickly without access to all the desirable information. 
There is a clear indication that although the respondent is an enquiring, analytical 
person, who likes to make well-informed decisions, she can adopt a different 
approach when faced with decisions that involve people. There have been several 
comments that suggest that with financial matters she is quite analytic, autocratic, 
and mechanistic, but with situations involving people she is different. The 
respondent is seen as a democratic, considerate person who listens to other people 
before making decisions. 
The respondent's Repertory Grid response identifies associations, at a 95% 
correlation, between considered, 'involves people' and 'intuitive' decision-
making situations. There is also a 95% correlation between 'based on 
practicality', 'instant', and 'easy' decision-making situations, and also between 
'based on experience', and 'based on knowledge' decision-making situations 
As noted in Chapter: 7, the respondent's evaluation on the CSA is not optimal 
because she was unhappy with the solutions offered in some questions and 
therefore did not provide the best possible response. However, that situation 
emphasised her inclination to question everything before making a decision. The 
CSA response obtained indicated that the respondent is capable of making a good 
assessment of situations presented to her; she is realistic and able to adjust to 
circumstances. It also indicates that she is able to relate to other peoples views and 
willing to work with others. 
The MBTI response, ENTP, indicates a very versatile, confident, and enthusiastic 
person, who will tirelessly pursue solutions to problems. This type of person is, 
according to the MBTI concerned with people because they gain satisfaction from 
resolving people's problems. 
282 
CHAPTER 8: Analysis and discussion 
In summary, the triangulation formed by the interviews, observations, and 
psychological evaluations appears to clearly identify, and represent this person. 
Data analysis 
The respondent's expertise clearly shows in her management role, where she 
demonstrates the expert's inclination to rely on knowledge and experience when 
processing decisions. However, this respondent shows a strong inclination to 
search for all the information possible before processing the decision. This 
suggests that in most situations her decisions are deliberated and analytical rather 
than the quick and analytical decisions that frequently cause observers to conclude 
that experts' decision-making is intuitive (Simon, 1987). 
The respondent appears to be highly analytical, however, 'analytical' was not one 
of the decision-making elements that she selected, and consequently it is not 
possible to assess how she would associate the other elements with the element 
'analytical'. Her omission of the word analytical highlights the role of language, 
and the need to allow for differences in meaning and interpretation. Nonetheless, 
the fragmentation that is evident in the respondent's Repertory Grid response 
indicates that she separates the key components of her expertise, experience, 
knowledge, and financial matters, into a discrete decision-making group. 
Furthermore, the respondent forms two additional, strongly correlated groupings, 
'considered, involves people', 'intuitive' form one and 'based on practicality', 
'instant', 'easy' form the other. It is interesting that the three strongly correlated 
groupings are relatively weakly correlated with one another at approximately 
70%. Perhaps the respondent's apparent analytical approach to decision-making 
arises from a need to identify which of her three decision-making associates is 
appropriate for the problem she is facing. 
The case study, in which the respondent features, provides convincing evidence 
that the respondent is a domain expert, but there is also an indication that she has 
strong subjective characteristics that are not necessary within her domain of 
expertise, but are now being used in her managerial role. 
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Cross case analysis. 
Summary of pertinent data 
The move into a managerial role has had little influence on the first respondent. 
He continues to use his dominant decision-making processes in all the situations 
for which his expertise has prepared him. He is aware that he lacks expertise in 
financial and administrative matters and, although he takes a managers interest in 
theses topics, he readily accepts advice and guidance from those who he trusts to 
make appropriate decisions. 
In the second case, although the respondent has become a manager there appears 
to be no noticeable requirement for her to work outside her recognised domain of 
expertise. Consequently her decision-making processes have not had to change, 
and are typical of what is expected from an expert. 
In the third case the move into managerial roles has caused the respondent to 
adapt to his new decision-making environments, and to develop coping strategies. 
This has necessitated the acceptance of a decision-making approach that is 
contrary to the respondent's natural inclination and in opposition to what his 
psychological evaluation indicates as his preference. The data suggests that he is 
able to achieve this contradiction through conscious effort, but it seems that when 
under pressure he could revert to his natural disposition. 
In the fourth case, the respondent apparently has no need to change her decision-
making processes, only to develop them further. She clearly prefers an analytical 
approach to decision-making, but has not had reason to develop the quickness that 
is so often characteristic of experts. As an accountant, before becoming a 
manager, the goal of her decision-making was to ensure that all available 
information was considered, this is apparently standard practice in her domain of 
expertise. Now, however, she accepts that in a managerial role timeliness is often 
critical, and decisions frequently must be made with adequate rather than 
complete information. Consequently, as a manager, her decision-making 
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processes are continuing to develop towards those apparently intuitive decision-
making processes that typically characterise an expert. 
There was in each case an indication that decisions that directly involve people 
may be processed differently from other decisions. This phenomenon is not 
identified in the literature. Each respondent indicated that their decision-making 
process would necessarily include a consideration of the interests and welfare of 
those people for whom they are responsible, if those people could be affected by 
the decision under consideration. This occurs more easily when it is the 
respondent's natural inclination but, as the third case study demonstrates, it can 
also occur against the respondent's natural inclination, when the respondent 
makes a conscious choice to act in a different manner. 
In cases 1, 2, and 4, the respondent's have shown a natural inclination towards 
dealing with people. This was evident in the interviews, observations, and the 
psychological evaluations of these respondents. In case 3, although the respondent 
demonstrates a concern for other people, which is supported by comments from 
work associates, he admits that this, as his psychological evaluation indicates, is 
not a natural inclination when processing decisions. In this case the respondent 
has come to accept that, in his managerial role, making appropriate decisions 
where people are involved is possibly the most important aspect of his role from 
the organisations perspective. Two comments from the respondent indicate his 
concern; "/ do constantly do a check on myself, just in my head, .. . am I slipping 
back to my natural autocratic way" and "We sell peoples time, that's how we 
make our money. We have got to have them motivated and with good morale. 
They need to know where they are going and feel secure. So ifwe haven't got that, 
then none of the financial things work." 
Summary. 
The psychological disposition of the experts studied appears to strongly determine 
their overall approach to decision-making. This psychological disposition was 
evident in the interviews and observations, and is supported by the psychological 
observations. Furthermore, there appear to be two additional psychological 
associations that have a bearing on the respondents' actions. First, there is an 
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indication that the experts have achieved expertise in a particular domain due to 
their possession of an appropriate psychological makeup. Second, there is an 
indication that psychological disposition can determine how the experts use the 
knowledge that they have acquired. 
Beyond consideration of the psychological constraints the managerial decision-
making processes of the expert are predictably similar to those of expert's in 
general, when working within their domain of expertise. That is, they rely heavily 
on the prior knowledge and expertise that qualify them as experts (Ericsson, 1997; 
Shanteau, 1992). However, the respondents did apparently demonstrate a greater 
concern for their staff responsibilities than has been reported in the literature. This 
concern for staff responsibilities can apparently cause experts to select alternate 
decision-making processes from that which would otherwise be chosen if staff 
were not affected. 
Outside their expertise, they seem to recognise their limitations but, although they 
often do not acknowledge it themselves, they appear to call on some important 
aspects of their expertise to resolve issues. They search for information, which 
they can process with their highly developed analytical skills, and constantly 
search for cues that may indicate an appropriate solution. Therefore, it appears 
that experts who operate outside of their defined domain of expertise can and do 
use domain specific expertise that is appropriate in many situations outside of 
their specific domain of expertise. This may not ensure that they are 'good' 
decision makers outside their domain of expertise, nor that outcomes from their 
decisions will be appropriate, or not be equivalent to those of experts within that 
domain. However, it does suggest that decisions made by experts acting outside of 
their domain of expertise will be as well processed as those of experts within that 
domain. Also, it may be possible for them to acquire expert decision-making 
status in less time than it would take for a novices to acquire expert ability 
(Ericsson and Charness, 1994) and to quickly achieve recognition by associates as 
experts (Shanteau, 1988). 
******************** 
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8.5 How does the expert's preferred decision-making 
style fit with his/her subjective characteristics? 
Answer: The respondents' subjective characteristics appear to determine and 
define their decision-making styles. Evaluations obtained through cognitive style 
and personality traits assessment provide, in three of four cases, an accurate 
prediction of the respondents' decision-making style. This is not unexpected, 
because the CSA and the MBTI do claim to indicate decision-making style. 
However, the data obtained in my research suggests that there is a particularly 
strong alignment between the predicted and the observed decision-making 
processes, which in tum suggests that these psychological evaluations may have 
particular value in the study of experts. 
The answer, presented above, is derived from the following evaluation of the 
material presented, as a thick description, in Chapter 7. 
Case 1. 
The respondent, in case one, has demonstrated that his dominant decision-making 
processes appear to be automatic, to the extent that they may be c~nsidered to be 
intuitive in the sense that Ericsson ( 1997), Simon ( 1987) and others have 
described. He is apparently able to automatically, and perhaps subconsciously 
analyse a situation to form an appropriate and almost instant response. He relies 
on his own judgement, which is based on more than twenty years experience as an 
instructor. Before beginning instruction he talks with his clients about their prior 
experiences and their aspirations, then asks them to perform specific tasks so that 
he can assess the clients current competence. The respondent is then able to adjust 
his instruction to the client's ability. Therefore the respondent is seen to have a 
considered approach to his decision-making. 
However, once he has established the level at which he needs to instruct, his 
decision-making processes appear to be automatic. He gives an impression of 
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always being in control, and of being able to respond immediately in any 
situation. This probably comes from his focused, perceptive, and conscientious 
approach to his task that was identified in interviews, and his "ability to see 
clients in a time/skill continuum, and to deal with them at their level with a view 
to advancing their individual skills." 
Overall, his ability to call on "experience/enthusiasm" after more than twenty 
years in this occupation is, as many people have said, so characteristic of him. 
This continued dedication to his occupation has given the respondent a reputation 
as an outstanding instructor who shows great personal interest in his clients, it 
must also support his own claim that his managerial strength is "enthusiasm and 
single mindedness". Consequently, the respondent's dominant subjective 
characteristics that associate with his decision-making processes can be summed 
up as considered, perceptive, focused, independent, and flexible. 
The psychological evaluations appear to give an accurate account of this person, 
as he is represented in the interviews and observations. The Cognitive Style 
Analysis (CSA) indicates that, as a Wholist-Imager, the respondent should have a 
good grasp of the overall situations that he faces, and be able to form a balanced 
perspective, particularly where success requires that several aspects need to be 
developed together. It indicates that he is realistic, flexible and ready to adjust to 
circumstances. 
The CSA response is complemented by the MBTI's which indicates that, as an 
ESFP, he is inclined to be highly aware of the facts around him, which this type 
notice and remember more than any other. It also indicates that he will have an 
effortless economy in the way that he deals with situations, never taking the hard 
way if an easier one will work. The MBTI indicates that he has an inclination to 
make decisions based on his feelings, which I interpret to mean intuitively. This 
appears to account for his apparent automatic response to situations. Additionally, 
his reliance on his feelings provides him with the appropriate personal skills to 
sustain his interest in people. 
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The psychological evaluations indicate that the respondent's dominant decision-
making processes appear to be well aligned with his cognitive style and his 
personality. There is also an apparent agreement between the psychological 
evaluations and the data obtained through interviews and observation. As success 
in a particular field is known to come more easily to those that are psychological 
suited (Ridding, 1991 ), this clear alignment between the respondent's subjective 
preferences, both expressed and as indicated by psychological evaluation may 
account for the respondent's outstanding success in his chosen occupation. 
Case 2. 
The respondent in case two 1s seen to prefer a considered, organised, and 
analytical decision-making processes. The data indicates that the respondent's 
occupation, as the manager of a hospital school, requires her to make decisions 
that are well within her domain of expertise, and that she is particularly 
comfortable with this situation. 
Although the respondent has to make many managerial decisions that do not 
involve people, it is clear from the interviews and observations that she attends to 
these decisions in a different way to those that involve people. This separation is 
clearly identified by a work associate who stated"/ see two quite distinct styles, or 
perhaps she still has that (same) feeling for what she wants from people but she 
just approaches it in a different way. " 
In overview the respondent's dominant decision-making processes appear to be 
considered, and analytical, with a typical experts reliance on knowledge and 
experience. The respondent is clearly a 'people person', but she is apparently also 
motivated by her own desire to achieve her objectives. 
The psychological evaluations are consistent with and appear to support the 
interviews and the observations. The respondent's comments during the Repertory 
Grid evaluation emphasise the respondent's awareness of her reliance on her 
experience, and her differentiation between decisions on things and decisions that 
involve people. The CSA indicates that the respondent is a competent analyst, 
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with a clear view of important issues. Also, because she is able to see a range of 
possibilities she is inclined to weigh the pros and cons. The MBTI response, ISTJ, 
identifies the respondent's tendency to reflect on her decisions, and her readiness 
to accept responsibility. The respondent's inclination to rely her knowledge and 
experience to form strong ideas is also identified. 
In summary, the respondent's subjective characteristics that associate with her 
decision-making processes, as identified through interviews and observation, are a 
great dependence on the knowledge and experience that form her expertise, a clear 
inclination to analyse and deliberate over issues, and a strong determination to 
follow her own ideas. By indicating that the respondent's natural disposition is to 
behave as she was observed to in her managerial role, the psychological 
evaluations support these findings. 
Case 3. 
The dominant decision-making processes of the respondent, in this case, are 
readily identified as an independent reliance on his expertise, which is based on a 
highly developed analytical ability. The respondent has demonstrated that he 
prefers to make autocratic decisions based on his own assessment of a situation. 
However, in his managerial role his natural inclinations are not, in his view 
always appropriate. 
Although he has been described, by a work associate, as "a sensitive kind of 
decision-making person", his natural inclination is to be autocratic in his decision-
making. However, in his managerial role the respondent considers that decision-
making based on a more democratic process is more likely to produce the desired 
results. The respondent's position as a manger requires an interaction with and a 
consideration of people. He needs to consult with people to obtain relevant 
information for his decision-making. To achieve the organisations objectives he 
must ensure that employees are provided with an environment that encourages 
and motivates them to undertake appropriate research. 
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The managerial role that the respondent has assumed is clearly different from his 
role as a research scientist, but in his managerial role the respondent's expertise is 
important. It clearly shapes his approach to his position, and his coping strategies. 
His natural inclination to analyse situations and issues, and to form his own 
decisions has enabled him to conclude that, in his managerial role, there is a need 
for different decision-making processes to be used dependent on the objectives 
being pursued. In particular he has identified a perceived personal deficiency in 
decision-making situations that require an interaction with people. He consciously 
attempts to modify his natural inclination toward autocratic decision-making to 
achieve what he considers to be a more appropriate, democratic decision-making 
processes. 
The psychological evaluations appear to support the interview and observation 
data' which indicates that the respondent has a strong preference for analytical 
decision processes, and has an inclination to rely on his own assessment of 
situations and issues. The respondent's Repertory Grid commentary identifies his 
clear separation of analytical and autocratic from other elements. The CSA finds 
that he should be a competent analyst with a clear view of important issues, but he 
is also idealistic and can be inclined to follow a set of principles. The MBTI 
response, INTP, clearly identifies the respondent's inclination to analyse the 
world. It also indicates that he likes to organise ideas and facts, not situations and 
people. His reliance on thinking indicates a logical, impersonal and objectively 
critical person. However, he is also seen to be an adaptable person when it suits 
him. 
However, there are some indications in the psychological evaluations that were 
not apparent in the interviews and observations, and are perhaps contrdictory. The 
CSA indicates that this type of person may weigh up the pros and cons to the 
extent of becoming hesitant in making decisions, leading to him being indecisive. 
In his managerial role, the respondent was observed to consider information 
before reaching a decision, and a work associate commented that the respondent is 
"particularly good at going away and thinking about issues .. . to find out what the 
issues and options are." However, his ability to reach a decision was not in doubt, 
and he appears to be a very decisive person. 
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Although the overall -representation of the respondent by the MBTI corresponds 
well with the information obtained about the respondent through interview and 
observation, there are also some indications about this person's type that are not 
supported by the interviews and observations. The MBTI indicates that this type 
of person will not use his analytical inclination to organise situations or people 
unless he must. Yet he is, by choice, in a managerial role that does require him to 
do both. Also there is an indication that this type will be more interested in 
reaching solutions than in implementing them. Once again, the implementation of 
solutions is an important part of this manager's role. 
In summary, this respondent's dominant decision-making processes are generally 
aligned with his subjective characteristics, as they are indicated by the 
psychological evaluations. Nevertheless, there are some characteristics that the 
respondent displays in his managerial role that are apparently in contradiction to 
both his cognitive style and his personality, such as his awareness of 'people 
issues'. However, the explanation for this apparent anomaly may be provided by 
his natural inclination to be both analytical and adaptable. Being analytical 
enables this type to see situations that must be resolved, and being adaptable 
allows him to modify his approach so that he can resolve situations. 
Case 4. 
The dominant decision-making processes of the respondent in this case are seen to 
be analytical, and very considered. As an accountant she has developed a reliance 
on structured processes and continues to look for these in her managerial role. 
Also the respondent likes to have all the information that she considers to be 
necessary, which she then deliberates on in detail before making a decision. 
However, in her managerial role she has had to modify her approach to decision-
making. As a manager she often has to make decisions without complete 
information and more quickly than previously. 
The respondent's expertise as an accountant is clearly suited to her managerial 
role as Regional Accountant. However, the managerial role requires additional 
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functions to be undertaken that were not essentially part of her expertise. The 
respondent has several members of staff answering directly to her, and she also 
has a regular involvement with other staff members within the organisation. The 
interviews and observations indicate that the respondent is well suited to this 
additional function. She appears to relate well to people and demonstrates a keen 
interest in their welfare. Work associates have indicted that she is, perhaps 
unusual as an accountant, due to her general disposition towards dealings with 
people. 
Overall, the respondent appears to be constantly questioning things and events 
that occur around her, this appears to be a personal trait, not something that has 
developed as part of her expertise in accounting. In fact it appears that her training 
in accountancy has given some structure to her natural inclination to question. 
This also shows in her interests, in counselling and psychodrama, that she is 
pursuing outside her managerial role. 
The psychological evaluations are not totally in agreement with each other, but do 
give some indication of the respondent's dominant decision-making processes, 
although they are not as clearly aligned with the interviews and observations as 
may have been expected. The Repertory Grid commentary identifies the 
respondent's inclination to separate decisions involving people from those that are 
simply based on her expertise. Also her willingness to apply more time to 
decisions involving people is noted. 
It was noted earlier that the respondent's CSA response might not be an accurate 
representation of the person due to her difficulty answering an unusually high 
proportion of the questions. Therefore, as the CSA' s indications do not 
correspond with the data obtained through interviews and observation it is 
probable that this confirms the inadequacy of the result. 
The MBTI however produced an interesting result. The respondent's dominant 
interest in decision-making processes that involve people was clearly identified. 
The MBTI states that people of this type are more concerned with people (than 
other people) and skilful in handling them, and are drawn to counselling where 
each new person represents a fresh problem to be solved and fresh possibilities to 
communicate. However, the strong tendency to question and analyse all situations 
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and issues that were clearly evident in the interviews and observations were not 
predicted by the MBTI. The respondent's natural exuberance is indicated by the 
MBTI, but the further indication that the respondent is an innovator, always 
seeing new possibilities that she pursues relentlessly was not obvious in the data. 
In summary the triangulation used in this case does not work well. The 
respondent's dominant subjective characteristics, as noted during interviews and 
observations do not align well with the psychological evaluations, although some 
personal characteristics are clearly identified. Perhaps the most interesting 
outcome in this case is the recognition of the respondent's strong interest in 
people, which could not have been predicted from her expert status, and is 
particularly surprising in view of her chosen career as an accountant; a career, 
which does not appear to be attractive to people with the respondent's traits 
(Bathurst, 1996). 
Cross case analysis. 
The dominant decision-making processes of the respondent's in the first three 
cases were representative of the subjective characteristics that were indicated by 
the psychological evaluations. In the fourth case the Repertory Grid analysis 
produced a good correspondence with the interview and observation data. 
However, although there is an apparent correspondence between the interview and 
observation data and some aspects of the MBTI, overall the alignment was poor, 
and an unreliable CSA response failed to add useful data to the case. 
Of particular interest in all cases is the dominance of the respondent's cognitive 
style and personality traits over the task characteristics of their managerial roles. 
This appears to be a clear demonstration of the influence of subjective variables 
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8.6 How do an expert's decision-making processes 
influence his/her managerial role? 
Answer: It this study it is apparent that the experts' decision making processes 
determine their actions within their managerial roles. The managerial role 
determines the goals and objectives, but the expert determines how to achieve 
them. In answer to the previous question I concluded that the experts decision-
making processes were representative of their subjective characteristics, therefore, 
my conclusion here is that an expert's decision-making processes influence 
his/her managerial role through a direct application of the experts subjective 
characteristics. The case data indicates that experts have a strong preference for 
particular activities, which enable them to use their subjective characteristics to 
their advantage, as a consequence experts are inclined to shape their managerial 
role accordingly. 
The answer, presented above, is derived from the following evaluation of the 
material presented, as a thick description, in Chapter 7. 
Case 1. 
The respondent in case one has expertise in a domain that has little in common 
with what may be called a stereotypical managerial role. His expertise in outdoor 
pursuits does include management of complex situations, but not the 
administration of finance and people in a way that is usually associated with 
business management (Mintzberg, 1989). As a consequence it could easily be 
concluded, as the respondent does, that his expertise is of no value in his 
managerial role. 
However, many skills are developed during the lengthy process of becoming an 
expert (Ericsson and Chamess, 1994), and expertise has been shown to be 
dependent on domain knowledge, psychological disposition, cognitive skills, 
decision strategies, and task characteristics (Shanteau, 1993). The respondent has 
been described as focused, perceptive, well organised, and conscious of his 
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responsibilities. All of these are likely to be an asset in any managerial role, and 
additionally the respondent also brings to his managerial role an experts decision-
making skills. 
Considering the five factors mention above, which form the basis of expertise, it 
seems clear that the respondent's domain knowledge is important in a business 
that specialises in instructing people in outdoor pursuits, as are his decision 
strategies and cognitive skills that have developed within his domain of expertise. 
An evaluation of his psychological disposition indicates that he should easily see 
the overall situation facing him in a managerial role and be able to develop a 
balanced perspective. He is also seen to be a realist who copes easily with 
decision-making situations. Several times the respondent has been identified as a 
person who relates well to other people, and his psychological evaluation 
reinforces this. However, the task characteristics of his expertise relate to only a 
proportion of his managerial role, and in particular exclude financial management. 
This is not a major problem for the respondent because his partner in the business 
is trained in financial accounting. 
In summary, the respondent appears not to recognise the value of his expertise in 
his managerial role, yet his decision-making skill as an expert appears to be well 
suited to his role as manager, in this particular business situation. The financial 
decisions faced by this small business could possibly cause the respondent some 
anguish, but his partner attends to the financial decisions, so the difficulty is 
avoided. If decisions are required that clearly fall within the respondent's domain 
of expertise, then he will make them as a matter of course, once again 
demonstrating experts' internalisation of analytic decision-making skills. For 
decisions that the respondent considers to be outside of his domain of expertise he 
will defer and consult, and willingly accept advice and guidance. Overall, the 
respondent's decision-making processes appear to determine his role as a 
manager. 
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Case 2. 
In this case the respondent's managerial role appears to be well within her domain 
of expertise. The respondent, a teacher, is a highly organised person who has, 
throughout her career, developed management skills as part of her way of doing 
things. She is recognised as a person who analyses and considers information and 
situations before acting, and her decisions are respected. Additionally, it is noted 
that she is ambitious, likes to be in control, and enjoys recognition as a leader, but 
consults readily before acting on what she believes to the best solution. 
The respondent's domain knowledge is clearly relevant in her managerial role, as 
are the task characteristics, and her cognitive skills. The psychological evaluation 
indicates that she is very capable of analysing situations to gain a clear 
understanding of critical issues, and prefers to weigh the information carefully 
before deciding. She is, according to her psychological evaluation disposed 
toward an occupation that includes a systematic attention to detail combined with 
care for people, which is an accurate description of her managerial role. Therefore 
I conclude that in this case the respondent's decision-making skills are totally 
appropriate for her managerial role. Furthermore, they apparently determine how 
she fulfils her managerial role. 
Case 3. 
In this case the respondent has an expertise, as a scientist, that is clearly relevant 
for the organisation that he manages; a research institute. The majority of the 
organisations staff is consists of scientists and laboratory technicians, so the 
respondent's expertise in scientific research is clearly an asset in his managerial 
role. However, in this case there is evidence of some conflict between the way in 
which the respondent is generally disposed to make decisions, and the 
requirements of his managerial role. 
The respondent's natural disposition appears to be that of a self-reliant person 
who prefers to deal with facts and things, rather than people and situations. 
Nonetheless, the respondent has excellent domain knowledge, cognitive skills, 
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decision strategies, and task characteristics for the scientific decision-making 
processes that may be faced in his managerial position. However, his 
psychological evaluation, although it clearly indicates that he is suited to scientific 
research, suggests that he is inclined to be impersonal and unrealistic in his 
expectations of others, and more interested in finding solutions than in 
implementing them. This does not appear to indicate a psychological disposition 
that is suited to a managerial role. 
The managerial role occupied by the respondent is perhaps unusual. As a research 
institute the organisation's output is an intangible called 'knowledge' produced by 
people. It cannot be measured in terms of production or product, only in how well 
the scientific research produced satisfies the organisations clients. Therefore, a 
major proportion of the respondent's managerial role is to achieve the 
organisation's goals through the management of people. 
However, the respondent, as his psychological evaluation indicates, is quite 
adaptable. He quickly became aware that to succeed in this managerial position he 
would need to alter his decision-making processes. For example, he realised that 
often he can best achieve organisational goals by providing a guiding hand while 
allowing others to make the decisions that they must follow through. Additionally, 
although he may still follow his natural inclination to make autocratic decisions 
based on his own judgement, he constantly reminds himself that to achieve his 
overall objectives he needs to be democratic and consultative wherever possible. 
In summary the respondent's managerial decision-making processes are strongly 
influenced by his natural inclination to be an autocratic, analytic decision maker, 
more comfortable with his own mental images than with verbal representations 
with other people. He does, however, demonstrate a strong desire to overcome his 
natural inclinations so that he can meet the requirements of his managerial role. 
Case 4. 
In this case the respondent's managerial role is largely covered by her expertise as 
an accountant. However, as a manager she has additional responsibilities that may 
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require her to make decisions outside of her domain of expertise. The domain 
knowledge, cognitive skills, decision strategies, and task characteristics that she 
has as an expert appear to be well suited to most of these additional 
responsibilities. 
There are however two areas where she has had to adapt to her new position. 
First, the respondent has a strong inclination to be analytical almost to the extent 
of being pedantic, and has found that in management she often has to make 
decisions more quickly than she would prefer, and often on incomplete 
information. Second, it is unlikely that the respondent's expertise has prepared her 
for the management of people that is part of her managerial role, but the 
respondent seems to be very able to cope with this additional role. 
There is indication from my observations and from the comments of her work 
associates that the respondent has very good interpersonal skills. Her 
psychological evaluation indicates she is a person who does not fit a stereotypical 
description of an accountant. Although it may by assumed that accountants are 
tireless problem solvers, the other indications, that she is good at summing up 
situations, realistic, and flexible, with a readiness to appreciate the views of 
others, seem to be more suited to a position with a higher interaction with people. 
The additional psychological indicator, that she is inclined to be an enthusiastic 
innovator, who is concerned with people, and drawn to counselling, is apparently 
an accurate representation of the respondent, and also suggests that her natural 
inclination is to work with people. 
In summary the respondent's expertise is well suited to her managerial role, and 
her expert decision-making processes are apparently appropriate. Therefore, her 
managerial role should not be expected to influence her expertise, although her 
expertise can be expected to develop further due to the additional stimulus 
provided by the managerial role. The respondents demonstrated interest in 
interacting with people seems to add an important additional dimension to her 
managerial role, that is not explained by her expertise The major interest here is 
that the respondents psychological disposition, a characteristic of expertise 
299 
CHAPTER 8: Analysis and discussion 
(Shanteau, 1993), does not appear to be in complete alignment with the 
respondents domain of expertise. 
Cross case analysis. 
An expert's decision-making skill is apparently beneficial in a managerial role, 
and that role is influenced by the expert's general disposition. In the first case the 
expert does not recognise his expertise to be either influential or beneficial in his 
managerial role. However, his expertise is central to his role as chief instructor 
and manager of the organisation. His inability to recognise this perhaps 
demonstrates that as an expert he accepts his abilities as the norm, and therefore 
can only recognise his lack of ability in particular functions, such as financial 
management. Therefore, in the first case the managerial role is influenced by the 
respondent's general disposition towards the main function of the management 
role, and his perceived in adequacies are disproportional to the actual demands of 
the role. 
In the second case the expert's management role is within her domain of 
expertise. Consequently, unlike the first case, she has all the expertise necessary 
to cope with her managerial role. The respondent naturally follows a systematic 
approach to her role; she has strong leadership inclinations, and is naturally 
disposed to be concerned about the welfare of people. Consequently, her 
managerial role is influenced to the extent of being dominated by her expertise 
and personal traits. 
The third respondent, unlike the first two, is in a managerial role that does not 
require his expertise in an operational way, but does rely heavily on it for 
decision-making. His knowledge and experience guide him in most of his 
managerial role. Although his natural inclination is apparently not to be a manager 
of people, he has chosen to adapt to this role as a means to progress his career. 
Clearly the managerial role is influenced by his expertise in scientific research, 
and his natural inclination towards an analytical solution appears to guide him in 
areas where he is not an expert. Therefore this expert's general disposition 
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combined with his expertise has completely shaped the managerial role that he 
occupies. 
The fourth respondent, somewhat like the second respondent, occupies a 
managerial role that is largely an extension of her role as an expert. Her expertise 
as an accountant is essential to her managerial role, and central to the function. 
However, this respondent has found that in her managerial role she can exercise 
facets of her natural disposition that have not featured in her role as an expert. 
There is evidence that the respondent is apparently inclined toward working with 
people, and derives satisfaction from resolving people's problems. This seems to 
be a personal disposition not associated with her expertise, but it is very 
influential in her managerial role. 
In summary the managerial roles occupied by all four respondents are influenced 
and shaped by the subjective characteristics that determine the decision-making 
processes associated with their expertise. However, the natural disposition of each 
respondent appears to play an important part in how each expert responds to the 
demands of their managerial role. The second respondent's managerial role is 
completely aligned with her natural disposition and, perhaps as a consequence of 
this, her expertise completely dominates and shapes her managerial role. In the 
other three cases the respondent's expertise also dominates their managerial roles, 
but their natural dispositions are not so closely aligned with their roles. 
In the first and third cases the respondents recognise the boundaries of their 
expertise and use their highly developed analytical processes to seek solutions. In 
the first case, the respondent's partner is able to process the financial decisions 
that are outside the respondent's domain of expertise, so that the respondent can 
concentrate on his area of expertise, which aligns with his natural disposition. In 
the third case the respondent's natural disposition, to be analytical, enables him to 
determine what should be done, and his ability to adapt allows him to develop 
coping strategies that build on his expertise. The respondent in the fourth case has 
demonstrated that her natural disposition to be analytical, which apparently suites 
her expertise as an accountant, combines well with another of her traits, an 
interest in peoples problems. These two natural dispositions appear to enable this 
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respondent to influence and shape her managerial role beyond what may possibly 
be expected from her expertise. 
********************* 
8.7 How does the managerial role influence the expert's 
decision-making processes? 
Answer: The managerial role provides the experts studied with a variety of 
problems that may not be directly related to their domain of expertise, and as a 
consequence the experts have a need to consider issues that they may not 
otherwise face. Therefore, although the influence of the managerial role does not 
appear to be sufficiently strong to modify the experts decision-making processes, 
there is some evidence that the experts in cases one, three, and four have applied 
some lateral thinking to their decision-making where decisions are different from 
those usually faced within their domain of expertise. 
In each case the influence of the respondent's managerial role on the expert's 
decision-making processes appears to be minimal. This is, perhaps to be expected. 
After at least ten years developing the ability to process decisions as experts, it 
seems unlikely that the respondent's subjective characteristics, on which the 
decision-making processes are based, will have altered as a consequence of a brief 
period in a management role. What appears to happen is that the experts 
demonstrate, contrary to some suggestions (Camerer and Johnson, 1991 ), that 
they are aware of their limitations, and can apply their expertise in decision 
processing to seek appropriate solutions outside their domain of expertise. 
The answer, presented above, is derived from the following evaluation of the 
material presented, as a thick description, in Chapter 7. 
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Case 1. 
Case one presents an expert who is clearly aware that there are situations outside 
his domain of expertise. Although he does consider that much of what he has to 
contend with in his management role is common sense "seat of the pants 
intuition", his expert decision-making processes seem to make him aware that 
appropriate decisions require the skilled attention of someone who has the 
appropriate expertise. In this case there is little indication that the managerial role 
is influencing the respondent, other than to make him aware of this limitations. 
Case 2. 
In case two the respondent appears to have total mastery of her managerial role 
and there is apparently no indication that the role is influencing her decision-
making processes. 
Case 3. 
Case three is perhaps the most influenced by the managerial role. In this case the 
respondent has chosen to adapt to the requirements of the managerial role. 
However, because the adaptation appears to be taking place largely outside the 
respondent's domain of expertise, it is wrong to say that the managerial role is 
influencing the expert's decision-making processes. The influence has apparently 
stimulated a natural inclination, within the respondent to adapt to situations when 
he perceives it to be to his benefit. 
Case 4. 
The respondent m case four is noticeably influenced by her managerial role. 
Before assuming a managerial role the respondent was apparently able to analyse 
and deliberate over information until she was satisfied that the appropriate 
decision could be made. In her managerial role the respondent has come under 
pressure to make timely decisions, which can often necessitate quicker and less 
considered decision processing. Therefore, in this instance the respondent is 
changing her expert decision-making processes, but the change is slight and will 
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apparently bring her expertise more in line with the accepted ability of experts to 
make fast analytical decisions (Hammond et al, 1992; Simon, 1987). There is no 
evidence to suggest that the change will impact on her subjective characteristics, 
and thereby alter her decision-making processes. 
Cross case analysis. 
The overall indication is that expertise can resist the influence of the demands of a 
managerial role, at least in the short term. This resistance may also be associated 
with the general disposition of the respondents. The respondents have clearly 
demonstrated that they are experts in domains to which they are suited and, as it 
appears that their move to managerial positions has been done by choice, it is 
perhaps unlikely that they would feel any pressure to change. 
This outcome is largely to be expected if it is accepted that subjective 
characteristics determine the decision-making processes of an expert. Subjective 
characteristics are usually robust psychological features that are stable unless 
subject to extreme trauma. 
********************** 
8.8 How does the expert's management role fit with his/her 
subjective characteristics? 
Answer: In each instance the respondent's managerial role is apparently well 
suited to his/her subjective characteristics. 
The answer, presented above, is derived from the following evaluation of the 
material presented, as a thick description, in Chapter 7. 
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Case 1. 
In the first case the respondent's role is that of manager, chief instructor and chief 
guide for a highly respected kayaking school based in New Zealand. The business 
has two functions. One function is to provide white water kayaking instruction for 
clients ranging from beginners through to experts, to provide safety and rescue 
training, and to train and assess outdoor pursuits instructors. The other function is 
to provide guided tours and expeditions to remote parts of New Zealand and other 
locations throughout the world. 
The school provides accommodation for clients, rental equipment and has a retail 
outlet for various items of outdoor pursuits equipment including kayaks. It also 
arranges tour packages for groups who want to participate in outdoor pursuits. 
This business is highly regarded throughout the industry because of the 
particularly high standards it maintains. These high standards create a managerial 
role that is mentally and physically very demanding. However, the respondent 
lives at the centre, and is involved in business activities through out the day, yet 
always appears to be at ease. His client's comments indicate a person who is 
friendly, sociable, accommodating, and accepting, while also organised and 
conscious of his responsibilities. It seems clear that the respondent's enthusiasm 
and focused attention, to what obviously is his occupation of choice, drives this 
business. 
The respondent is identified, in the interviews and through observation, as a, 
single minded and focused person, who continues to demonstrate enthusiasm and 
personal interest in his occupation. The Cognitive Style Analysis aligns well with 
the data obtained through interviews and observation. It indicates that this person 
will see the whole situation that he faces and be able to form a balanced 
perspective, particularly where success depends on the development of several 
aspects of the situation being developed together. There is also an indication of 
the respondent's perceptive, and accepting attitude towards people. 
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The type of person indicated by the MBTI evaluation, ESFP, appears to be a 
accurate description of the respondent. This type is described as an adaptable 
realist, who notices and remembers more than any other type. He is consequently 
aware of what goes on, and of who needs what and who does not, and good-
naturedly accepts and uses the facts around him. These characteristics were noted 
in the interviews and the observations. Additionally the MBTI indicates that this 
person will be have an interest in people and will be at ease in interactions with 
people, which he will handle with tact and sympathy. Once again, these 
characteristics were evident in both the interviews and the observations. 
In summary, there appears to be an almost ideal match between the respondent's 
managerial role and his dominant subjective characteristics. The indications 
suggest that the respondent has followed his general dispositions through out his 
life to develop his expertise in outdoor pursuits, and subsequently to develop his 
occupational interests, which mesh so well with his overall interest in the outdoors 
and people. The respondent appears not to allow his managerial role to conflict 
with his subjective characteristics. His partner can successfully carry out any task 
that falls outside his domain of expertise. Therefore, in this case, the respondent's 
subjective characteristics, which are shaped by his cognitive style and his 
personality and account for his general disposition, appear to be completely 
responsible for his particular expertise, and the way in which he has shaped his 
managerial role. 
Case 2. 
In this case the managerial position takes responsibility for the provision of 
education for hospitalised children. Children of all ages, preschool onwards are 
provided for. The requirements are obviously somewhat different from those of a 
normal school situation. The teachers have to accomplish their teaching in an 
environment that is far from ideal, due to the condition of the children, the 
constant presence of medical staff, and frequent unscheduled interruptions to their 
teaching programs. 
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The manager is responsible for the staff, and for the overall administration of the 
school and its teaching programs. Her prior experience and training have made her 
into a person who appears to be well suited to this position, and this comes across 
clearly in both the interviews and the observations. She appears to be a 
committed, perhaps driven person who has in her mind where she wants to be and 
how she is going to get there. She is highly valued by her staff and colleagues, and 
well respected as a teacher and administrator. It is clear from discussions with the 
respondent, and from the comments of her associates that she lives for the job. 
As a manager, the respondent appears to make considered analytical decisions 
largely based on her expertise, although she is seen to consult with others 
particularly when her decisions impact on others. Her inclination to consider and 
weigh information before acting is clearly identified in both the interviews and the 
observations. 
The Cognitive Style Analysis (CSA) indicates that this person is accomplished at 
analysing situations and at gaining a clear picture of the important issues, and the 
best way to deal with them. It also indicates that she will, due to ability to see a 
range of options, spend some time weighing the pros and cons before making a 
decision. Representations of these indications are very conspicuous in the 
interview and observation data. 
The respondent's MBTI response, ISTJ, is highly representative of the person that 
was identified through interview and observation. The MBTI states that this type 
of person will be particularly dependable due to her combination of preferences. It 
indicates that she will base her decision processes on a deep, solid accumulation 
of stored impressions, which will give her strong, perhaps unshakeable, ideas. 
Additionally the MBTI indicates that the respondent's judgement can be expected 
to accept responsibilities after a characteristic reflection on the information. There 
is also a strong indication that the respondent will have tact, sympathy, and 
genuine concern when dealing with people. The indications are that this type of 
person will be attracted to an occupation where systematic attention to detail is 
combined with care for people, as in the health professions. Overall, in this 
instance the MBTI provides a description of the respondent's type that is well 
supported by data from interviews and observation. 
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The respondent's managerial role appears to fit well with the subjective 
characteristics that have been identified through interview and observation, and 
with the psychological evaluations. It is apparent that her general disposition, as 
determined by her personality and her cognitive style, fits well with her expertise, 
and that it determines her actions in her managerial role. 
Case 3. 
In this case the respondent's managerial role is that of Regional Manager for a 
scientific research institute. The Regional Manager controls an establishment that 
employs approximately 120 staff, most of whom are research scientists or 
technicians. The position is responsible for the overall management of the 
institute's research output, research funding, and the institute's financial 
management. 
The respondent was, until moving into management, an expert research scientist 
with no management training. As Regional Manager he has attended several 
appropriate management courses as part of his personal development as a 
manager. The respondent no longer carries out research, but his expertise is 
valued in his managerial role, which frequently requires his involvement in the 
research of other scientists in an advisory capacity. Additionally, his expertise in 
scientific research enables him to have a good working knowledge of the business 
of the institute that he is required to manage. 
The managerial role is clearly a challenge to the respondent, and this appears to be 
the justification for him being in the role. He indicates that, in his view, his natural 
disposition is not ideal for this managerial role. As the Regional Manager, he is 
aware that the organisation for which he is responsible relies on the application of 
people's knowledge to problems. This, in his view, requires a consultative, 
democratic approach to management, which he openly admits is not his natural 
inclination. However, comments from work associates indicate that the 
respondent does achieve the desired democratic behaviour when working with 
people. 
308 
CHAPTER 8: Analysis and discussion 
It is apparent from interviews and observations that the respondent applies his 
expert analytical skills to evaluate the requirements of his managerial role. When 
he has decided, based on his analysis of the situation, what his actions should be 
to best meet his role requirements, he then follows what he perceives to be the 
appropriate behaviour to achieve his goal. Therefore, it seems that the respondent 
is able to overcome his natural inclinations and adapt to his role requirements to 
suit the occasion. 
The respondent's Cognitive Style Response (CSA) indicates that he should be 
able to analyse situations to gain a clear perspective of the important issues, and 
that he is likely to make considered decisions. It also indicates that he will 
recognise a range of options and will want to weigh the pros and cons, which may 
sometimes make him hesitant in his decision-making. This CSA evaluation aligns 
well with the respondent's apparent natural disposition, but does not account for 
his readiness to move away from his natural inclinations in situations where he 
perceives that to be a desirable action. 
The MBTI evaluation also appears to be representative of the respondent's natural 
disposition. It indicates that this type of person will use his thinking to analyse the 
world, and prefer to handle ideas and facts rather than situations and people. 
However, there are two indications provided by the MBTI evaluation that may 
help to explain the respondent's actions in psychological terms. First the MBTI 
indicates that when this type of person has to deal with details of daily living he 
will become intuitive in his approach to situations. This seems to explain the 
respondent's reliance on his expert analytical skills to resolve situations. The 
respondent's analytical skills are likely to be typical of those associated with 
expertise, that is they become automated to the extent of appearing to be intuitive 
(Ericsson, 1997; Hammond, et al., 1987; Lipshitz, 1993; Simon, 1987). Second 
the MBTI indicates that this type of person may be quite adaptable up to a point 
where one of his ruling principles is violated, and then he will stop adapting. 
Overall it seems that the respondent perceives that his managerial role demands 
certain subjective characteristics that are not his natural disposition, and as a 
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consequence makes a strong effort to adapt his abilities to suit. The respondent's 
expertise is such that he can call on his analytical skills to evaluate the 
requirements of the position. However, his analytical skills also appear to create 
awareness in the respondent that his natural way of acting is inappropriate. This in 
tum seems to activate a less dominant natural disposition to adapt to situations 
that do not conflict too strongly with the respondent's general disposition. In the 
interviews and observations the respondent has indicated that he attempts to 
monitor his actions to ensure that they are, in his view, appropriate for his 
managerial role. He also stated that he has a continual struggle to contain what he 
perceives to be his inappropriate, but naturally autocratic nature. 
To summarise, in this case the respondent's desire to satisfy the requirements of 
his managerial role have caused him to somewhat modify his subjective 
characteristics. The respondent's analytical skills, which are automatic to the 
extent of appearing intuitive, allow the respondent to apply aspects of his 
expertise to resolve the role requirements. He then attempts, apparently 
successfully, to adapt to the role requirements, as he perceives them. 
Case 4. 
The managerial role in this case is that of Regional Accountant for a scientific 
research institute. The Regional Accountant manages the accountancy functions 
of the organisation, and provides financial information to the Regional Manager. 
In addition the Regional Accountant controls the institute site security, site repairs 
and maintenance, and site safety. 
The respondent, in this case, is a chartered accountant and has been the Regional 
Accountant for two years. In her managerial role there are additional functions 
that her previous accountancy experience did not include. The respondent's main 
role is heavily dependent on her expertise in accounting, but as a manager she has 
a greater interaction with people than previously. She has her own staff to 
manage, and in addition she has to relate to people, many in non-accounting 
positions, that are outside of her control. 
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The interviews and observations indicate that the respondent is well able to handle 
her new tasks. The respondent is seen by her work associates to be very analytical 
and inclined to weigh information at length before making a decision. However, 
the respondent has found that in her managerial role, there are occasions where 
she must make decisions that do not permit the analytical deliberation to which 
she is naturally inclined. Nonetheless, when the respondent faces situations that 
involve the consideration of people, she is seen to be particularly capable. One 
work associate stated that the respondent's "personality oven,vhelms the stereo 
type of an accountant .. . she is a people person and understands people so it is 
surprising that she chose to become an accountant." 
The Repertory Grid evaluation provided some good support for the interview and 
observation data. In particular it clearly identified the respondent's separation of 
her decision-making processes, and her distinct interest in issues involving people. 
The respondent's Repertory Grid response shows an obvious separation of 
decision-making elements related to the main features of her expertise, from the 
other elements; 'knowledge', 'experience', correlate at 95%, and 'financial', 
correlates with the other two at 90%. The Repertory Grid response may also 
explain the apparent lack of correspondence between the interview and 
observation data, and MBTI that is discussed in the next paragraph. It is well 
known that the outcome from the MBTI is susceptible to the disposition of the 
respondent at the time when they complete the MBTI form. Perhaps this rather 
complex individual was more in 'people' mode than 'accountant' mode when she 
completed the form. The Rep Grid requires an interaction between the interviewer 
and the respondent, which may keep the respondent focused. In the Rep Grid 
evaluation the respondent's interest in decision-making situations that are centred 
on people is identified, once again as a separate group. The group, 'involves 
people', considered, and 'intuitive' is highly correlated at 95%, but only correlates 
with the elements related to her expertise at 75%. 
The respondent's highly analytical approach spoiled an attempt to obtain an 
evaluation of her cognitive style through an application of the Cognitive Style 
Analysis (CSA). She was unable to select answers to many of the CSA problems 
because, in her view, the range of answers from which she had to choose did not 
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provide an answer which was sufficiently correct. Therefore the CSA evaluation, 
which does not align with the perspective obtained through the interviews and 
observations, is probably not a good representation of the respondent. However 
the CSA evaluation may not be inaccurate, the MBTI evaluation, ENTP, also 
identifies a type of person who is different from the one presented in the 
interviews and observations. The only indication, from the MBTI, that appears to 
correspond with the other data is one which suggests that the respondent will tend 
to be more enthusiastic, more concerned with people, and skilful in handling 
them. The MBTI' s indication that this type of person is much drawn to 
counselling appears to be the most accurate of all. 
Overall, in this case, the use of psychological evaluations as a form of 
triangulation has not provided the anticipated support. However, the interviews 
and observations, and the Repertory Grid analysis have provided an interesting 
insight to a person who is apparently well suited to her managerial role, and who 
uses her behavioural dispositions to the roles advantage. 
Cross case analysis. 
In each case the respondent has demonstrated that his/her subjective 
characteristics determine how he/she pursues the achievement of his/her 
managerial role. Nevertheless, in each case the subjective characteristics have lead 
the respondents to follow different routes to satisfy his/her managerial role. 
In the first case, perhaps because the respondent created the managerial role that 
he occupies, the match between his subjective characteristics and his managerial 
role appears to be almost ideal. The respondent clearly follows his natural 
disposition and is able to apply his expertise unhindered, and therefore meets the 
role requirements with characteristic ease. Consequently, the managerial role 
occupied by the respondent is not seen to influence his dominant subjective 
characteristics. 
The second case is similar to the first case. Although the respondent did not create 
the managerial role that she occupies, the role is well suited to her subjective 
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characteristics. As a result, the respondent is able to follow her natural disposition, 
and apply her expertise as best she can. Therefore it can be seen that the 
respondent's natural disposition has enabled her to meet the requirements of the 
position without having to modify her natural subjective characteristics. 
The third case is different from the first two cases. In this case the respondent is 
largely working outside his domain of expertise, however he can be seen to apply 
one dominant characteristic of both his expertise, and his natural disposition, to 
overcome his lack of expertise in the managerial role. Experts in general are seen 
to possess excellent analytical skills (Ericsson, 1997; Hammond, et al., 1987; 
Lipshitz, 1993; Shanteau, 1987; Simon, 1987), and this respondent is no 
exception. However, as the Cognitive Style Analysis and the MBTI indicate, this 
respondent appears to a have a higher than usual reliance on his analytical ability 
to interact with the world. It is not therefore surprising that the respondent appears 
to rely heavily on his analytical ability to determine how he should proceed in his 
managerial role. 
Once the respondent has determined what is an appropriate response he is in a 
position to respond according to his natural independent, autocratic disposition, if 
that is what his analysis of the situation suggests. However, his analysis of the 
situation may indicate to him that a more considered, consultative, and democratic 
approach is required. If this is the conclusion reached by the respondent, then he is 
inclined to suppress his dominant disposition and adapt his actions to what he 
perceives to be a more appropriate response. This adaptive capacity is a somewhat 
limited and conscious ability which may not work in situations of strong conflict 
between the respondent's dominant natural disposition and this less dominant 
adaptive capacity. 
However, in the managerial role that the respondent occupies his expertise as a 
research scientist provides very valuable background knowledge which, combined 
with his analytical ability, appears to make him well suited to the position. A 
general disposition towards people, as was demonstrated in the first and second 
case would probably be desirable in this managerial role, and the respondent 
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recognises this, but as the MBTI indicates people of that disposition are not 
generally drawn to scientific research. 
The fourth case is a difficult one to assess. It is unlike the first and second cases in 
that the role and the respondent are not immediately seen as compatible. The 
respondent clearly has expertise as an accountant, and this is the main function of 
her managerial role. However, there are indications that her natural disposition is 
to work with people, which is similar to the first and second respondents. This is 
an apparent reversal of the third case. In this case the respondent seems to have 
the people skills that do not come naturally in the third case, but not the total 
disposition towards her occupational expertise that is so evident in the other cases. 
There is, however, one behavioural characteristic that is evident in the interviews 
and observations that may explain the respondent's interest in accounting. As the 
case report shows, the respondent continually examined the meaning of questions 
that were presented to her, apparently wanting to be sure that she understood the 
question so that an appropriate response could be given. This was particularly 
evident when she was presented with the Cognitive Style Analysis, where she had 
great difficulty accepting the answers provided. 
With the CSA, the respondent was, in many instances unable to select, what was 
to her, an appropriate response from the range of answers provided; consequently 
her response to the CSA is questionable. The respondent's desire to be sure of a 
questions meaning, and determination to select the most appropriate answer may 
also explain why the MBTI evaluation is not as clearly representative of the 
respondent as the applications of the MBTI have been it the other cases. The 
MBTI is known to be vulnerable to people who report 'particular selves' such as 
'work self' or 'ideal self' when selecting answers, or who have difficulty 
understanding the questions and in selecting acceptable responses (Myers and 
Mccaulley, 1986). 
Nonetheless, this respondent is, according to her work associates, well suited to 
the managerial role. As mentioned above, neither of the psychological evaluations 
aligned well with the data provided by interview and observation. This leads to a 
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conclusion that in this instance the responses to the psychological evaluations 
were flawed. However, the MBTI did indicate that the respondent is likely to be 
keenly interested in resolving problems, and to have a dominant interest in people 
that associates with that desire to solve problems. Therefore, there may be some 
validity in the MBTI response. In conclusion, it appears that the respondent's 
managerial role does fit with her subjective characteristics, and that her expertise 
in accounting while aligned with her natural subjective characteristics does not 
require the application of all her personal dispositions. 
In summary, the respondents' managerial roles are seen to be consistent with their 
subjective characteristics. In the first and second cases the respondent's natural 
dispositions appear to give them complete command of their roles. In the third 
case, although the respondent's natural disposition does not provide the same 
command of his managerial role that is evident in cases one and two, he has the 
ability to adapt. In this instance the respondent's subjective characteristics enable 
him to shape his managerial decision-making processes, as he perceives the need. 
In the fourth case the respondent's subjective characteristics seem to allow her 
complete command of her managerial role, although her managerial decision-
making processes require her to modify her natural inclination to deliberate at 
length before making a decision. Additionally her managerial role is apparently 
allowing this respondent to apply some of her subjective characteristics that have 
not been called upon in her role as an expert. 
******************** 
8.9 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I set out to address my overarching research question, - What 
shapes the managerial decision-making processes of an expert? - by seeking 
answers to five subordinate research questions. I examined each of the cases, 
presented as case reports in Chapter 7, in tum to seek answers to the research 
questions. After each case was been considered, I conducted a cross case analysis 
in an attempt to identify any patterns or explanations that may be present. 
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The overall impression gained from the four case studies is that the respondents 
are representative of experts as defined in the literature (see Chapter 2). They are 
confident about their ability and rely heavily on their knowledge and experience 
to process decisions. Their decision-making is considered and usually analytical. 
In three cases their decision-making processes are also very quick, perhaps giving 
the impression of being intuitive. This actually reinforces the idea that through 
extended practice and experience combined with acquired knowledge experts 
internalise an analytical ability that they can then use automatically. It may be 
considered as trained intuition (Ericsson, 1997; Hammond et al., 1987; Lipshitz, 
1993; Simon, 1987). In the fourth case the respondent, possibly due to the 
discipline in which she is an expert, is more deliberating than the other 
respondents. However, in her managerial role she has recognised a need to make 
quicker decisions, perhaps with less than optimal information. Consequently her 
decision-making processes are becoming more aligned with the other respondents. 
The cross case analyses of the case reports have identified several interesting 
findings, which may prove to be important. 
• First, overall there is a indication that experts' decision-making processes 
are shaped by their dominant subjective characteristics. Each respondent 
appears to have become an expert in a domain towards which he/she 
demonstrates a natural disposition. Having become experts, they have then 
apparently by choice moved into managerial positions, which they have 
pursued vigorously in a manner suited to their subjective characteristics. In 
each case the expert appears to consistently approach decision-making 
situations from his/her personal disposition rather than from a specific 
position that can be clearly associated with his/her domain expertise, or 
influence from their managerial role. This appears to suggest that experts' 
subjective characteristics determine how they process decisions to reach, 
what is to them a desirable and appropriate conclusion. Therefore, there 
appears to be support for the proposition put forward by Einhorn (1974) 
and Shanteau ( 1987), that experts subjective characteristics will determine 
how they process decisions. 
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• Second, there is a clear indication that the respondents may choose to deal 
with decisions that directly involve people differently from other 
decisions. More consideration is given to consequences that may arise 
from the decision process; more consultation takes place, and process 
often becomes more important than an optimal outcome. 
• Third, there is an indication that some experts may not recognise the value 
of their own expertise when working outside their domain of expertise. 
Although, when working outside their domain of expertise, the expert 
appears to use features of their expertise, such as highly developed 
analytical skills, there appears to be an inclination to be dismissive of its 
value in the new situation. 
• Fourth, there are indications that the managerial roles occupied by the 
respondents are shaped by the experts' decision-making processes. 
However, there are also indications that experts' decision-making 
processes are in tum shaped by their dominant subjective characteristics. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that managerial role performance is 
determined by the incumbents' subjective characteristics. 
• Fifth, managerial role appears to have little affect on the experts' decision-
making processes, other than to provide an arena in which they can display 
their skills. This is perhaps to be expected in view of the experts' 
dominance of the managerial role. 
In the Chapter that follows, I present a summary of the study that 1s the 
justification for this thesis, a discussion of the theoretical significance of the 
research, and consideration of the wider theoretical implications. There is also 
discussion of the limitations of my study, and suggestions for further research. 
******************* 
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Summary and Conclusion. 
9.1 Summary of the study 
This study set out to explore the idea that an expert's subjective characteristics 
may determine how that expert will process information for decision-making 
(Einhorn, 1974; Shanteau, 1987). It is accepted that a small study of this nature 
cannot expect to generalise to the population of experts, the findings relate only to 
the respondents in this studied. However, the consistency of the findings across 
the four cases suggests that consideration of the influence of subjective 
characteristics may be warranted in future studies of experts. The data obtained in 
the case studies indicates that, for the experts studied, subjective characteristics do 
determine how decisions are processed, and that there may be, as Einhorn 
suggested, many paths to a solution and apparently numerous ways to perform the 
cognitive tasks involved. 
This exploration was guided by a specific desire to answer my overarching 
research question - What shapes the managerial decision-making processes of an 
expert? The analysis of a variety of data, collected through interviews, direct 
observations, and psychological evaluations in four separate case studies, 
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indicates that the experts' decision-making processes were shaped by their 
subjective characteristics. The influence of subjective characteristics in 
determining decision-making processes was evident in both domain of expertise 
and managerial role. 
9.2 Summary of research design 
The study takes an interpretivist, qualitative approach to the research question, 
largely based on Naturalistic Inquiry procedures (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1998). Four experts, who occupy managerial roles, are the focus of 
individual case studies. Data is obtained through interviews, direct observations, 
and psychological evaluations as a triangulation procedure to provide credibility 
to the findings. The research database in the form of a 'thick description' derived 
from the four case studies is analysed in detail to answer the following five 
questions. 
Question 1. How does an expert make decisions in a managerial role? 
Question 2. How do an expert's decision-making processes influence his/her 
managerial role? 
Question 3. How does the managerial role influence the expert's decision-
making processes? 
Question 4. How does the expert's preferred decision-making style fit with 
his/her behavioural characteristics? 
Question 5. How does the expert's management role fit with his/her 
behavioural characteristics? 
Answers to these questions provide interesting and important information, which 
collectively answer my overarching research question. 
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9.3 Summary of findings 
As mentioned in the research design summary above, five questions were applied 
to the data contained in the 'thick descriptions' in an attempt to answer the main 
research question - What shapes the managerial decision-making processes of an 
expert? In this section I present a brief statement explaining what each question 
considered and what was found, and finally relate these findings to my 
overarching research question. 
Question 1 - How does an expert make decisions in a managerial role? This 
question was intended to identify any examples of pattern formation associated 
with decision-making processes, which are displayed by the respondents in the 
four case studies. Pattern formation can be thought of as the shape, or form that 
the respondent's decision-making processes take. 
Overall, there appears to be one main shaping factor that defines the respondents' 
approach to decision-making. This shaping factor appears to take the form of a 
hierarchy. The hierarchy is dominated by the respondents subjective 
characteristics which seem to have determined the respondents' career path, and 
therefore the experience/knowledge that they have gained, which in tum has lead 
them to particular managerial goals and responsibilities. 
Within the overall shaping factor six distinct patterns were identified as 
representative of the four experts' decision-making processes within their 
managerial roles. 
I. The experts continued to rely on their expertise when they moved into a 
managerial role. 
2. The experts were aware of the domain boundaries of their expertise, and 
sought assistance from what they considered to be better qualified people. 
3. The experts, in some instances adapted their decision-making processes to 
accommodate managerial requirements outside of their domain of expertise. 
4. The experts appeared to be unaware that their expertise could be valuable 
outside of their domain of expertise. 
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5. The experts' analytical skills were not domain specific. 
6. The experts distinguished between appropriate decision-making processes for 
decisions that directly involve people, and decisions that do not. 
Question 2- How do an expert's decision-making processes influence his/her 
managerial role? - This question was intended to identify how the shape of his/her 
decision-making processes, as identified in question one, influenced the 
respondent's managerial role. The term managerial role here means the functions 
carried out by the respondents in their job as a manger. 
The managerial roles undertaken by the respondents appears to be shaped by their 
decision-making processes, which in tum seem to be determined by their 
subjective characteristics. Apparently these experts approach their decision-
making from a perspective determined by their subjective characteristics rather 
than from a perspective that can be clearly associated with their expertise. The 
experts' subjective characteristics apparently determined how they would proceed 
in any given situation. Therefore, how the experts perceived the goals of their 
managerial role and the path that they would follow to accomplish those goals 
was determined by their subjective characteristics. 
Question 3 - How does the managerial role influence the expert's decision-
making processes? - This question takes an alternative perspective from the 
previous question; to consider the possibility that strong influences associated 
with managerial responsibility could alter the shape of an expert's decision-
making processes. Managerial role is defined above. 
The four experts dominate and determine their managerial roles to such an extent 
that no influence from the role is evident. This resistance to influence from the 
managerial role may be explained by the experts' subjective characteristics. The 
experts have in each case become expert in a domain towards which is he/she has 
a strong natural disposition. Furthermore, in becoming an expert they have 
assimilated extensive knowledge and experience, which forms the basis of their 
judgement, and is unlikely to be modified easily. 
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Question 4 - How do the expert's dominant decision-making processes, in the 
managerial role, fit with his/her subjective characteristics? - This question was 
intended to identify any association between the observed behaviour and 
measured behaviour. To meet this goal the shape of the respondents decision-
making processes, as determined through interviews and observation, were 
compared with the psychological evaluations. 
Three of the four cases demonstrated that the respondent's overt behaviour was 
well aligned with what the psychological evaluations predicted would take place. 
The respondents were observed to be well suited to the demands of their 
managerial roles. In the first two cases the respondents' expertise totally satisfied 
the requirements of their managerial roles, and their overt behaviour was seen to 
be well suited to their role. In both instances the respondents' psychological 
evaluations agreed with the observed behaviour. 
The third respondent's overt behaviour was seen to have two distinctly different 
forms. He defined them as autocratic and democratic. Within his domain of 
expertise he tends to be autocratic, and this is his preferred disposition, but as a 
manager he often chooses to be democratic because he considers that this is a 
better means to achieve his managerial goals. The psychological evaluation of this 
respondent strongly indicates his preferred disposition, but also indicates that he 
has a limited ability to adapt when he chooses to do so. 
The fourth case was not so clear. The respondent's overt behaviour within the 
context of her expertise aligns well with her strong preference for analytical, 
considered processing, but her overall psychological evaluation does not fit well 
with her expertise. However, her managerial role is a better fit. 
Overall the respondents' overt subjective characteristics do align closely with the 
predictions obtained through psychological evaluation. It can be argued that this is 
to be expected, because this is what the psychological evaluations where designed 
for. However, the alignment is often not as conclusive as it is in these cases, and 
non-experts may possibly have a much greater deviation (Bathurst, 1996). 
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Question 5 - How does the expert's management role fit with his/her subjective 
characteristics? - This question examines the appropriateness of the expert's 
general disposition for the particular managerial role that he/she occupies. 
The managerial roles into which the experts have moved are in each case what the 
expert has chosen as a career path. This seems to indicate that, to the experts the 
managerial role is seen to be compatible with their general predisposition, as 
determined by their idiosyncratic subjective characteristics. If it were not then 
presumably they would have selected some other career option. The information 
about the respondent obtained through the interviews and observations indicates 
that in all four cases the experts are behaviourally suited to their managerial roles. 
The psychological evaluations indicated that the respondents in cases one and two 
are well suited to their managerial roles. In case three, the psychological 
evaluation aligns well with the respondents expertise as a research scientist, but 
not so well with some of the managerial role requirements, although there is an 
indication that the respondent can adapt to some extent when he chooses to do so. 
The fourth respondent's psychological evaluation indicate subjective 
characteristics which should facilitate a successful interaction with people, which 
is now an important part of her managerial role but was not an important aspect of 
her expertise as an accountant. 
The research question - What shapes the managerial decision-making processes 
of an expert? - The research question was formulated as an umbrella under which 
experts could be studied from a behavioural perspective. The five questions 
discussed above have provided some new and interesting information to answer 
my research question, although it is clearly specific to the four cases studied and 
no generality is assumed. In particular: 
• The experts' subjective characteristics appear to determine the domain in 
which they have become expert, and consequently the managerial role that 
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The experts' managerial decision-making processes were first shaped by their 
subjective characteristics, second by their expertise, and last by their 
managerial role. 
• The experts openly dichotomised their managerial decision-making processes 
to distinguish between those decisions that directly involve people and other 
decisions. 
• Their managerial role apparently caused the four experts to call on aspects of 
their subjective characteristics, which their expertise does not exercise. 
Overall, there is a noticeable application of subjective characteristics shaping the 
managerial decision-making processes of the experts in this study. 
******************* 
9.4 Theoretical significance 
The findings of this study are theoretically significant in that they provide new 
knowledge about experts and decision-making. However, the findings relate to 
four specific cases, and transferability is neither demonstrated nor implied. A 
'thick description' of the case studies is provided in the Chapter 7 to enable 
further enquiry to be made about possible transferability. 
There is an apparent dichotomy in decision-making. 
This research identifies a clear separation in decision-making processing that 
takes place between decisions that directly involve people and other kinds of 
decision. Although existing decision theory explains many different aspects of 
decision-making, it does not address this issue. In all four case studies it is clear 
that the respondents believe that decisions that directly involve or affect people 
require greater consideration. This may be because the respondent is a 'people 
person' who tries to ensure that the people for whom he/she is responsible are 
treated appropriately, or it may be because the respondent recognises that his/her 
goals are best achieved through the co-operation of others. Whatever the reason 
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the distinction was obvious to the observer, and acknowledged by the 
respondents. 
The identification of this dichotomous outcome has taken on greater importance 
since the review of this thesis because it is now known that Shanteau has 
conducted research in this area with a similar identification of the dichotomy but 
with opposing emphasis. Shanteau's studies show a greater care with decisions 
that do not include people (personal communication, 2000). 
Experts' subjective characteristics appear to dominate. 
This research found that, in the four cases studied, each expert's subjective 
characteristics apparently determined and defined his/her actions. Although 
Einhorn (1974) and Shanteau (1987) indicated that an expert's subjective 
characteristics probably influence their decision processes, there is no indication 
in the literature that an expert's subjective characteristics actually determine how 
that expert processes decisions. In this research there are clear examples that the 
experts process information in a decision-making situation according to their 
personal disposition towards the situation faced. The training and experience that 
created their expertise are apparently only the tools used by experts to achieve 
their personal objectives. The objectives are first determined by their idiosyncratic 
subjective characteristics, and then satisfied by the selective application of 
knowledge and experience, which was predetermined by their subjective 
characteristics. 
Expertise aligns with subjective characteristics. 
Each respondent has become an expert in a domain towards which he/she 
demonstrates a strong natural disposition. The data suggests that the respondents 
have become experts in domains which suite their subjective characteristics, and 
in particular their specific approach to decision making. This finding may add 
weight to the argument that the attainment of particular expertise is associated 
with subjective characteristics, although once again no generality is assumed from 
these case studies. However, Ericsson and Chamess (1994) suggested that if this 
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link exists, it could counter their argument that expertise could be acquired by 
anyone who practices sufficiently hard and long. 
It has been stated that expertise is acquired through extensive, specific, and 
deliberate practice, and that there is no requirement for innate abilities or 
capacities (Ericsson and Chamess, 1994 ). The first part of this statement seems to 
be well supported by this research, but the second part is brought into question. 
This research indicates that there are particular subjective characteristics, which 
can be called innate abilities, and/or capacities, that determine in a very dominant 
fashion the actions of the four experts studied. Whilst this data can not challenge 
the work of Ericsson and Chamess, it does according to Denzin and Lincoln 
( 1998) call into question the generality of their statement. 
Although, Ericsson and Chamess strongly support the proposition that expertise is 
a completely learnt attribute, they do acknowledge "one critical flaw" in the 
evidence on expert performance. The people who achieve expert status "are not 
randomly assigned to their training conditions. Hence one cannot rule out the 
possibility that there is something different about those individuals who ultimately 
reach expert-level performance." Nonetheless, they consider a requirement for 
innate ability and capacity to be inconsistent "with the reviewed evidence". They 
go on to state "More plausible loci of individual differences are factors that 
predispose individuals toward engaging in deliberate practice and enable them to 
sustain high levels of practice for many years". Ericsson and Chamess suggest 
that this predisposition may be due to environmental factors, or that "preferred 
activity level and temperament may have a large genetic component. 
Furthermore, there may need to be a good fit between such predisposing factors 
and the task environment for expert level performance to develop." There are two 
important issues here. First, if there is any possibility that there is something 
different about people who become experts, and if those individual differences 
predispose those people towards the achievement of expertise, then how has the 
possibility of innate ability been eliminated? Second, if goodness of fit between 
the predisposing factors and the task environment are at all critical, then 
extensive, specific, and deliberate practice alone seems unlikely to result in the 
acquisition of expertise. 
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In addressing the first issue it is interesting that Ericsson and Chamess suggest 
that a genetic component may account for a person's disposition, while at the 
same time discounting the possibility of innate ability. Both are by definition 
present at birth, and it is difficult to distinguish between the two. Nonetheless, 
whether they are genetic or innate appears to be less important than the acceptance 
that subjective characteristics are fundamental determinants of how expertise is 
acquired. There is evidence that a hereditary, or genetic component does account 
for subjective characteristics derived through the configural model of genetic 
inheritance (Eysenck, 1995; Lykken et al., 1992). Therefore, the idea that genetic 
inheritance can account for at least some aspects of expertise appears to be valid. 
The second issue, arising from Ericsson and Chamess statements, builds on the 
first. If the acquisition of expertise is dependent upon the existence of some 
predisposing characteristics then either of two possible situations may exist. First, 
if experts are in some way collectively different from other people in respect to 
the acquisition of expertise, but otherwise the same as one another then it may be 
expected that extensive, specific, and deliberate practice could be the only 
requirement for the acquisition of expertise. However, this would suggest that all 
experts have the same predisposition, and this is simply not acceptable. A second, 
more plausible explanation would accept that the similarity between experts could 
be defined by their collective difference from non-experts, while also accepting 
that experts are different from one another. Different in that they possess an 
idiosyncratic predisposition, which will determine their goals and the distinct 
paths they will follow to achieve those goals (Eysenck, 1995). Environmental 
factors such as socio-cultural influences, location, and opportunity will 
undoubtedly influence the possibility of an individual becoming an expert, as will 
the effort that is applied to its achievement, but without the predisposition, be it 
genetic or innate, the development of expertise appears to be less likely to occur. 
The research findings presented in this thesis indicate that subjective 
characteristics of the respondents do determine both their predisposition towards 
activity level and task environment, and additionally determine how they will 
carry out associated functions. 
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Expertise may be transferable. 
This research indicates that the experts studied can, outside of their domain of 
expertise appropriately use facets of expertise, such as analytical decision-making 
skills. This is contrary to some evidence, which suggests that, outside of their 
domain of expertise experts are no better than novices (Camerer and Johnson, 
I 99 I; Carroll and Johnson, 1990). This ability is particularly evident in cases 
three and four of this research. In both cases the experts' managerial roles require 
them to make some decisions that are largely outside their domains of expertise. 
The respondents satisfy this requirement successfully by using their highly 
developed analytical skills to evaluate the role requirements, and also discover the 
appropriate paths to accomplish those requirements. 
The respondent in Case Three has an ability to analyse situations in detail, he also 
has an ability to be adaptable in situations that do not fit comfortably with his 
preferred decision-making processes. The respondent in Case Four is also highly 
analytical in her decision-making, and has available to her a wider range of 
subjective characteristics than are usually required in her domain of expertise. In 
situations outside the norm she is able to follow approaches to problem solutions 
that are different from those she would normally choose. In both cases it is seen 
that the respondents' have abilities, determined by their subjective characteristics, 
which enable them to work successfully outside their domain of expertise. 
However, experts who have subjective characteristics that do not readily apply 
outside their domain of expertise may not be able to transfer their skills in a 
similar way; they may not be able to adapt. 
********************* 
9.5 Wider theoretical implications 
Decision theory. The apparent dichotomy in decision-making processing that is 
mentioned above adds weight to the argument for a more behavioural approach to 
decision-making research (Klein et al., I 993). If as this research suggests experts 
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decision-making processes are determined by their subjective characteristics, it 
seems reasonable to expect that the decision-making processes of non-experts will 
to an extent also be determined by their subjective characteristics. Non-experts 
may not be as strongly constrained by their subjective characteristics, due to an 
absence of an extended development period in a domain, which closely satisfies 
their personal disposition, and thereby reinforces a dependence on judgements 
based on their personal disposition. Therefore external factors, such as managerial 
role may exert a greater influence than is seen to be the case with experts. 
Strategic management. Recognition of the importance of cognitive style and 
personality in strategic management is well established (Haley, 1997; Hayes & 
Allinson, 1994; Schwenk, 1995). However, the approach has been to show what 
outcomes may be expected from people with particular cognitive styles or 
personalities. Furthermore, in many instances there is confusion about what is 
cognitive style and what is personality; often the terms are interchanged. There is 
however, little consideration of the "managers cognitive trails" (Haley, 1997). 
Haley suggested that managers with different personality types might form 
different approaches to decisions. In the case studies presented in this thesis it has 
been clearly demonstrated that subjective characteristics of the respondents do 
determine how they process decisions. Additionally, it was seen that although 
managerial role provided a focus for those subjective characteristics, it did not 
appear to cause the respondents to deviate from their general disposition. This 
adds support to Haley's concern that subjective characteristics of decision makers 
responsible for strategic management decisions deserves closer scrutiny. 
For many years vocational guidance counsellors have advocated that people with 
particular subjective characteristics should be appointed to appropriate vocations. 
Both the Cognitive Style Analysis (CSA) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI) are used by counsellors for this kind of selection process (Riding, 1991 ). 
There is also evidence that human resource management uses both of these 
psychological evaluation tools for recruitment and personal development 
(Coscarelli et al., 1995). However, there is little or no evidence that Strategic 
Management is following Haley's call to develop a better understanding of the 
managers' decision processes. Therefore, my research appears to be the first to 
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provide some indication that, as Haley suggested, a manager's strategic decision-
making is largely determined by his/her subjective characteristics. 
There are often many paths to reach strategic goals but, when a path is chosen, 
achieving those strategic goals is usually the main focus. However, by selecting a 
path, which will achieve strategic goals, and also optimise implementation process 
through particular attention to the subjective characteristics of the strategic 
decision maker, there may be many additional benefits to be gained. This issue is 
particularly important when it is recognised that only 17% of US managers see 
things in personal/interpersonal dimensions, the remainder only recognising the 
technical and structural dimensions (Haley, 1997). 
********************* 
9.6 Limitations of the study 
Several limitations (repeated below) were identified in Chapter 6, section 6.4.4 
Limitations. This section identifies and considers additional limitations. 
• This is an exploratory study, which examines some potentially interesting 
behavioural aspects of four distinctly different domain experts. A study of this 
nature does not permit any firm conclusions to be made about the actions of 
other experts. At best some aspects of this study may justify further research. 
Therefore, the study does not claim any general application across areas of 
expertise, management, or decision-making. 
• Given the nature and assumptions of qualitative research the findings of my 
research could be subjected to other interpretations. 
• The psychometric tests used in this research are not intended to be 
comprehensive; they are used as additional data to aide in assessing the 
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validity of data gained through other sources, i.e. as a triangulation aide. 
Consequently no detailed psychological reports are presented. 
Respondents. It must be recognised that domain experts in any field are busy 
people with great demands placed on their time. Therefore I was fortunate to gain 
the co-operation of four experts. However, questions can rightly be asked about 
the selection process. I knew three of the respondents before my research began, 
which almost certainly influenced their decision to participate in my research. The 
fourth respondent, the accountant, was introduced by one of the other respondents. 
Perhaps because I had an established relationship with three of the respondents 
they were more sympathetic towards my research requirements than other people 
may have been. This may explain why the accountant was less open in her 
comments than the other respondents. However, I think that the respondents are 
very credible examples of experts working in managerial roles. Additionally, I am 
sure that the respondents are very professional people who have been totally 
honest in their responses to my enquiries, and that there should be no suggestion 
of bias. 
Another area of concern is that the amount of data presented may be considered 
insufficient. Much of the data obtained was repetitive, and repetition may be seen 
as confirmation of the data's validity but it does not make interesting reading in a 
thesis. An additional factor that must be considered is, as I have stated above, 
domain experts are busy people with great demands placed on their time, so 
although they willingly gave time to my project, much more than I asked for in 
fact, the information gained is very constrained by their availability. 
One further point to consider about the data collection is that the researcher 
processed much of the data as it was obtained, and it would of course be filtered 
and thereby reduced. Perhaps this unwittingly provides support for my decision 
not to use protocol analysis; it is very difficult to think about information being 
received and at the same time to make detailed records of events as they unfold. 
However, I did in Chapter 5 declare that my research approach would be that of a 
constructivist, which by definition determines that a qualitative study of this kind 
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1s constructed from the researchers observations and interpretations, with 
information that appears to the researcher to be inconsequential omitted. 
Repertory Grid. The Repertory Grid Technique was relatively unknown within 
my school of study, the associate Professor of Marketing being the only person 
who was aware of it. I had some knowledge of Kelly's work and realised that it 
would be very useful in my data collection, however there was no recent 
information available to me through library sources and it was only when I 
searched the Internet that I started to obtain information about current use. The 
mathematical requirements of the Repertory Grid Technique proved daunting, but 
the data collection interviews that form the initial part of the Repertory Grid 
Technique were seen to be very valuable and were initially the main purpose for 
using this evaluation process. The interview scripts are recognised to be very 
informative (Kelly, 1955; 1963), and my early attempts to locate user friendly 
software to process the data were not successful. There are of course several 
mathematical packages that a skilled person could use to evaluate the data, but I 
lacked the skill and did not want to jeopardise the validity of the data, so I sought 
a simple program that would allow me to input the data and produce incontestable 
output. The original software that I considered was at NZ$1500 beyond my 
student budget. After data collection was complete I was made aware of the 
facility at Calgary University, particularly the WebGridll web site. There is also 
an extensive Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) data base that forms the home 
site for links to several sites around the world, including the University of 
Wollongong in Australia, butt there is no address in New Zealand. WebGridll is a 
user friendly, dedicated facility that removes any requirement to use more generic 
statistical packages such as SPSS or SAS and importantly removes any concern 
over validity of data analysis that could exist with generic statistical packages. 
Mildred Shaw and Brian Gaines, mathematicians and computer software 
engineers, developed WebGrid II at Calgary University and have worked 
extensively on Repertory Grid analysis (see Shaw and Gains, 1998). Professor 
Shaw, now Director of software engineering at the university of Calgary, worked 
on the development of a computational model of Kelly's 'Geometry of 
Psychological Space' at London University around the time of Kelly's death and 
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went on to develop further computational models before moving to Canada. Brian 
Gaines proved helpful on several occasions when I had difficulties, and had I 
made contact earlier in my research I believe that I could have made a much better 
data collection. By collecting the data myself and then feeding it to the computer I 
missed the opportunity to allow the respondents to interact directly with the 
WebGrid II program which has the facility to question responses and to suggest 
alternatives, thereby giving respondents feedback which could improve the quality 
of the data obtained. I may therefore have obtained more knowledge from the 
analysis of that data. 
Data analysis. A qualitative researcher has to call on all his/her skills to attend to 
the various situations that arise. This "Jack [ or Jill] of all trades" is known as a 
bricoleur (Levi-Strauss, 1966). A Qualitative researcher-as-bricoleur uses 
whatever resources are available as the research evolves. The selected research 
path is largely determined by the context and what the researcher is able to do 
within that context (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998c ). A bricoleur recognises that 
his/her research is a synergistic process that involves all the things that represent 
him/her as a person. This includes among other things, gender, race, language, 
social grouping, work history, education and experience. A bricoleur also 
recognises that he/she interacts with, and is influenced by the people and the 
context that make up the research setting. Consequently, interpretation of the 
research findings is largely dependent on the researchers idiosyncratic perspective 
of events and issues. Therefore, no one interpretation can be seen to be the truth. 
Finally, given the clear benefits of hindsight, and the knowledge that I now have, I 
would take a totally different approach to this research. I now recognise that some 
areas of my research were unnecessary, and others should have received far more 
attention. I also accept that the study could have been simplified and thereby made 
easier. Nonetheless, such is life. There are I believe some interesting findings, and 
as an educational exercise it has been magnificent. 
********************** 
334 
CHAPTER 9: Conclusion. 
9.7 Areas for possible future research 
Contrary to Carroll's (1993) statement that "the literature of organisations and 
management is not concerned with the characteristics of managers and their 
behaviour" there is ample evidence that researchers in these areas are concerned 
(see for example Coscarelli et al., 1995; Hayes and Allinson, 1994; Haley, 1997; 
Shanteau, 1992; Schwenk, 1995). Further research, which considers the subjective 
characteristics of individual managers and the influence that those subjective 
characteristics have on managerial roles and organisations, appears to be 
worthwhile. 
There are, as Carroll ( 1993) states many studies that have used questionnaires and 
interviews to determine what managers do as a group. These studies present 
statistical evidence that indicates how managers go about their work (see for 
example Nutt, 1988). However, statistical evidence is rather limited in its 
application to real situations. People can be measured by statistics, but people by 
their nature do not always conform to patterns, and as a consequence there are 
many behavioural variations that are not properly explained by statistics (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1998abc ). 
Langley et al. ( 1995) point out that the management literature has tended to ignore 
the individual differences of management decision makers. However, many 
researchers accept the view that there is potentially great value in developing a 
better understanding of the subjective characteristics of the individual manager 
(Haley, 1997). Consequently, there are many opportunities for research in this 
area. 
An additional avenue for further research could pursue the findings in my research 
that each of the respondents separated decisions that involved people from those 
that did not. This has not been mentioned in the literature and is surely worth 
further study. A study could be developed to examine this separation to determine 
whether it is true for experts with cognitive styles and personality types different 
from those who featured in this research. This particularly important since I have 
become aware that Shanteau has conducted some research in this are and has 
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found evidence which aggress with this separation but finds preference given to 
non people decisions rather than to people decisions as I found (personal 
correspondence, 2000). 
Also, there must be many people who possess the appropriate subjective 
characteristics to become an expert who for various reasons have not. A study that 
identifies these people and explains why they have not become expert could add 
to the understanding of experts. 
In the context of my research, there appears to be potential to develop a new 
perspective on the decision making process of experts, a perspective which 
considers in greater detail the cognitive requirements of a task rather than the 
simply the achievement of a desired outcome. There may be many paths to a 
solution but perhaps it takes an expert to select the most appropriate for the skills 
available. Experts may be people who have exceptional cognitive clarity and 
consequently superior understanding of their environment (their world), due to the 
appropriate alignment of their personality and cognitive style with their personal 
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Please read carefully 
I have read the Information Sheet provided for this study, and the structure and intent 
of the study has been explained to me. My questions about the study have been 
answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that any future questions I may ask will 
be answered as clearly as possible. 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, or to decline to 
answer any questions. I agree to provide information in confidence to the researcher, 
and no information that I provide will be available to any other person in any form 
that can be identified with me or my employer. 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out above. 
Name: ________________ _ 
Signature: _______________ _ 
l)ate: ________ ~ 
Researcher: Peter Gilmour 
Signature: _______________ _ 
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University of Waikato 
Information Sheet 
The intent of the study is to obtain knowledge that can be used to develop a 
prescriptive learning programme for people who are training to become managers; to 
improve their application of knowledge, particularly in decision making situations. 
What I am studying. 
I am studying people who have developed an expertise in a field other than business 
management, and who have then become managers. I want to acquire information on 
how they acquire new knowledge, how they adapt their knowledge from one field to 
the other, how their personal cognitive style is reflected in their work, particularly in 
decision making situations. 
What I am looking for. 
I will be looking for information related to your specific expertise, your managerial 
functions, your cognitive functions, and the adaptation of your natural or preferred 
processes in decision making, to your work environment. 
What I would like your help with. 
My study requires some detailed information about your education, training, and 
experience, plus some discussion, observation, and a few short tests. The study can be 
broken up into short periods spaced over several days, and the program can be 
arranged to fit into any time you can make available to me. I anticipate the total time 
require to be about three to four hours. 
Potential benefit for you. 
The tests that you will be asked to complete are, a decision making test, a learning 
style inventory, a cognitive style analysis, and a personal type indicator. You should 
find the results interesting as a personal insight, and they may be useful as reference 
points for your personal development. 
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The following items are intended to elicit a clear verbal picture of you, as a person 
with specific expertise and managerial responsibility. Please be as free as you can with 
the information requested, and if you can provide additional information that you 
consider to be important please do so. 
Data synthesised from the information that you provide, will form the foundation for 
the continuation of this research. Observations and structured questions will be keyed 
to your responses, so please be as clear, precise, and unambiguous as possible. 
1. Biographical details 
F/M Age Ethnic origin 
2. A comprehensive list of all your education and training, and all your qualifications 
(to include all your development in the field of expertise, and any additional training 
including all management training). 
3. A comprehensive list of all your experience in the field of expertise, and in areas 
that are seen to be associated with that field, including all types of management. 
4. Your occupational history ( a brief description of the types of occupation and the 
approximate periods involved). 
5. Description of your current occupation (in sufficient depth for a non-specialist to be 
able to grasp) . 
6. Description of your field of expertise and your occupation within that field ie. 
specific expertise (in sufficient depth for a non-specialist to be able to grasp). 
7. Description of your managerial position, responsibilities, staff, and of the 
interaction, or overlap, between your field of expertise and your managerial 




Abdolmohammadi, M. J. & Shanteau, J. (1992). Personal attributes of expert 
auditors. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 53, 
158-172. 
Allinson, C. W. & Hayes, J (1996). The cognitive style index: A measure of 
intuition-analysis for organisational research. Journal of Management 
Studies. 33: 1 January . 
Anderson, J. R. (1995). Cognitive Psychology and its Implications. Freeman: New 
York. 
Avison, D. E. (1997). The Search for the 'Discipline' of Information Systems. In 
G. McKenzie, J. Powell and R. Usher (eds.) Understanding Social 
Research: Perspectives on Methodology and Practice. Falmer Press: 
London. 
Avolio, B. J., Kroeck, K. G. & Panek, P. E. (1985). Individual differences in 
information processing ability as a predictor of vehicle accidents. Human 
Factors. 27(5), 577-587. 
Bamouw, V. (1985). Culture and Personality. Wadsworth: Belmont, Ca. 
Baron, J. (1988). Thinking and Deciding. Cambridge University Press: UK. 
Bathurst, J. (1996). Atlas of Type in New Zealand: Occupational Supplement. idic: 
Wellington. 
Bazerman, M. H .. & Carroll, J. S. (1987). Negotiator cognition. B. M. Straw & L. 
L Cummings (eds.), Research in Organisational Behavior. 9: 247-288. 
Beach, L. R. (1996). Decision Making in the Workplace: A Unified Perspective. 
Lawrence Erlbaum: New Jersey. 
Beach, L. R. & Lipshitz, R. (1993). Why Classic Theory Is an Inappropriate 
Standard for Evaluation and Aiding Human Decision Making. In G. Klein, 
J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. Zsambok (eds.) Decision Making in 
Action: Models and Methods. Ablex: New Jersey. 
Bell, D. E., Raiffa, H. & Tversky, A. (1988). Descriptive, Normative, and 
Prescriptive Interactions in Decision Making. In Bell, D. E., Raiffa, H. & 
Tversky, A. (eds.) Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative, and 
Prescriptive Interactions. Cambridge University Press: New York. 
Bennett J. B. & Felton E. L. Jr. (1974). Managerial Decision-Making: Case 
Problems in Formulation and Implementation. GRID, INC.: Ohio. 
Berg, B. L. ( 1995). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Allyn 
and Bacon: Mass. 
REFERENCES. 
Berger, K. S. (1988). The Developing Person Through the Life Span. Worth 
Publishers: New York. 
Bernstein, P. L. (1996). Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk. Wiley: 
NY. 
Brislin, R. (1990). Applied Cross-Cultural Psychology. Sage: Newbury Park. Ca. 
Bruner, J. S. (1978). Forward. In Toward a Contemporary Psychology of 
Intuition. Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York. 
Bromley, D. B. ( 1977) Personality Description in Ordinary Language. John 
Wiley & Sons: London. 
Bowden, E. M. & Beeman, M. J. (1998). Getting the Right Idea: Semantic 
Activity in the Right Hemisphere May Help Solve Insight Problems. 
Psychological Science. No. 6 Vol. 9. 435-440 
Burtt, E. A. (1932). Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul: London. 
Camerer, C. F. & Johnson, E. J. (1991). The process- pertormance paradox in 
expert judgment. In K. A Ericsson & J. Smith (eds.) Towards a general 
theory of expertise: Prospects and limits. Cambridge University Press: 
New York. 
Carmody, D. P., Nodine, C. F. & Kundel, H. L. (1981 ). Finding lung nodules with 
and without comparative visual scanning. Perception and Psychophysics. 
29(6), 594-598. 
Carroll, B. W. (1993). The Biases of Management. Routledge: London. 
Carroll, J. S. & Johnson, E. J. (1990). Decision Research: A Field Guide. Sage: 
London. 
Carroll, J. B. & Maxwell, S. E. (1979). Individual differences m cognitive 
abilities. Annual Review of Psychology. 30: 603-640. 
Carroll, J.B. & Payne, J. W. (1976). The psychology of parole decision processes: 
A joint application of attribution theory and information processing 
psychology. In J. S. Carroll & J. W Payne (eds.), Cognition and social 
psychology. Erlbaum: Hillsdale NJ. 
Cassell, C. & Symon, G. (1994) Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research: 
A Practical Guide. SAGE Publications: London. 
Cartwright, A. ( 1996). Code-A-Text. Atlantic Coast pk. England. 
Chalmers, A. F. (1982). What is this thing called science? : an assessment of the 




Chase, W. G. & Simon, H. (1973). The Mind's Eye in Chess. In W. G. Chase 
(ed.), Visual Information Processing. Academic Press: New York. 
Cohen, M. S. (1993). The Naturalistic Basis of Decision Biases. In G. Klein, J. 
Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. Zsambok (eds.) Decision Making in 
Action: Models and Methods. Ablex: New Jersey. 
Cohen, M. D., March, J. G. & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17. 1-25. 
Connolly, T. & Koput, K. (1997). Naturalistic Decision Making and the 
Organizational Context. In Z. Shapira (ed.) Organisational Decision 
Making. Cambridge University Press: London. 
Cook, K. S. & Levi, M. (1990). The Limits of Rationality. University of Chicago 
Press: USA. 
Comer, J. (1991). In Search of More Complete Answers to Research Questions. 
Quantitative Versus Qualitative Research Methods: Is there a Way 
Forward? Journal of Advanced Nursing. 16(6): 718-27. 
Coscarelli, W. C., Burk, J. & Cotter, A. (1995). HRD and Decision-Making 
Styles. Human Resource Development Quarterly. Vol. 6. No. 4. Winter. 
383-395. 
Cosmides, L & Tooby, J. (1995). Beyond Intuition and Instinct Blindness: Toward 
an Evolutionary Rigorous Science. In J. Mehler and S. Frank (eds.), 
Cognition on Cognition. MIT Press: Cambridge Mass. 
Creswell, J. W. (1994). Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. SAGE Publications: CA. 
Daehler, H. P. (1997). A review of C Cassel and G. Symon (eds.), Qualitative 
Methods in Organisational Research: A Practical Guide. Organisational 
Studies. Vol. 18 (4). 709-724. SAGE Publications: London. 
Darlington, C. D. (1972). Introduction. In Francis Galton (1892/1972) Hereditary 
Genius. Peter Smith: Mass. 
Davis, D. L., Grove, S. J. & Knowles, P. A. (1990). An Experimental Application 
of Personality Type as an Analogue for Decision-Making Style. 
Psychological Reports. 66, 167-175. 
Deetz, S. (1996). Describing Differences in Approaches to Organization Science: 
Rethinking Burrell and Morgan and Their Legacy. Organization Science. 
Vol. 7, No.2, March-April. 
Denzin, N. K. (1978). Sociological Methods. McGraw-Hill: New York. 
343 
REFERENCES. 
Denzin, N. K. (1998). The Art and Politics of Interpretation. In N. Denzin and Y. 
Lincoln (eds.) Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials. SAGE: 
CA. 
Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (1998a). Introduction: Entering the Field of 
Qualitative Research. In N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds.) The Landscape 
of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues. SAGE: CA. 
Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (1998b). Introduction: Entering the Field of 
Qualitative Research. In N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds.) Strategies of 
Qualitative Inquiry. SAGE: CA. 
Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (1998c). Introduction: Entering the Field of 
Qualitative Research. In N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds.) Collecting and 
Interpreting Qualitative Materials. SAGE: CA. 
Digman, J. M. (1996). The Curious History of the Five-Factor Model. In J. S. 
Wiggins (ed.) The Five-Factor Model of Personality: Theoretical 
Perspective .. Guildford Press: New York. 
Doherty, M. E. (1993). A laboratory Scientist's View of Naturalistic Decision 
Making. In Klein, G., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. and Zsambok, C. (eds.) 
Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods. Ablex: New Jersey. 
Doktor, R. H. & Hamilton, W. F. ( 1973). Cognitive Style and the Acceptance of 
Management Science Recommendations. Management Science. Vol. 19, 
No. 8, April, 884-894. 
Donaldson, G. & Larsh, J. W. (1983). Decision Making at the Top: The Shaping 
of Strategic Direction. Basic Books: NY 
Dunegan, K. J. (1996). Image Compatibility and Framing. In L. R. Beach (ed.) 
Decision Making in the Workplace: A Unified Perspective. Lawrence 
Erlbaum: New Jersey. 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. & Lowe, A. (1991). Management Research: An 
Introduction. SAGE Publications: London. 
Ebbesen, E. B. & Konecni, V. J. (1975). Decision Making and Information in the 
Courts: The Setting of Bail. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 
Vol. 32, no. 5, 805-821. 
Eden, C., Jones, S. & Sims, D. (1972). Thinking in Organisations. Macmillan: 
London. 
Eden, C., Ackermann, F. & Cropper, S. ( 1992). The analysis of cause maps. 
Journal of Management Studies. 29: 3 May. 
Edwards, W. (1992). Discussion: Of human skills. Organi::ational behavior and 
Human Decision Processes. 53, 267-277. 
344 
REFERENCES. 
Einhorn, H. J. (1974). Expert Judgment: Some Necessary Conditions and an 
Example. Journal of Applied Psychology. Vol. 59, No. 5, 562-571. 
Einhorn, H. J. & Hogarth, R. M. ( 1981 ). Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes 
of Judgment and Choice. Annual Review of Psychology. 32: 53-88. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. & Zbaracki, M. J. (1992). Strategic decision making. Strategic 
Management Journal. Vol. 13, 17-37. 
Ekensberger, L. H. (1995). Activity and Action: Two Different Roads Towards an 
lntegratio of Culture into Psychology. Culture and Psychology. Vol. 1. No. 
I March. 67-80. 
Erdener, C. B. & Dunn, C. P. (1990). Content analysis. In A. S. Huff. (ed.), 
Mapping Strategic Thought. Wiley: UK. 
Ericsson, K. A. ( 1997). Deliberate Practice and the Acquisition of Expert 
Performance: An Overview. Pre-publication document to appear in H. 
Jorgensen and A. C. Lehmann (eds.) Does Practice Make Pe,fect? Current 
Theory and Research on Instrumental Music. NMH-publikasjoner : Oslo. 
Ericsson, K. A. (1997) Protocol Analysis. In W. Bechtel and G. Graham (eds.) A 
Companion to Cognitive Science. Blackwell: Cambridge. Ma. 
Ericsson, K. A. & Charness, N. (1994) Expert Performance: Its Structure and 
Acquisition. American Psychologist. Vol. 49. No. 8. 725-747. 
Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T. & Tesch-Romer, C. (1993). The Role of 
Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance. 
Psychological Review. Vol. 100. No. 3. 363-406. 
Ericsson, K. A. & Lehmann, A. C. ( 1996). Expert and Exceptional Performance: 
Evidence of Maximal Adaptation to Task Constraints. Annual Review of 
Psychology. 47: 273-305. 
Ericsson, K. A. & Oliver, W. L. (1994). Cognitive Skills. In A. M. Colman (ed.), 
Companion Encyclopedia of Psychology. Vol. I. Routledge: NY. 
Ericsson, K. A. & Simon, H. A. (1985). Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports As 
Data. MIT Press: USA. 
Ericsson, K. A. & Smith, J. (1991 ).Towards a General Theory of Expertise. Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. Australia. 
Eysenck, H. (1995). Genius: The natural histor.v of creativity. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Eysenck, H.J. & Eysenck, M. W. (1985). Personality and Individual Differences. 
Plenum Press: New York. 
345 
REFERENCES. 
Eysenck, H. J. & Wilson G. (1975). Know Your Own Personality MacMillan: 
Melbourne. 
Eysenck, M. W. (1994). Individual Differences: Normal and Abnormal. Lawrence 
Erlbaum: Hove. UK. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Row, Peterson: Evanston, 
Ill. 
Fielding, N. G. & Fielding, J. L. (1986). Linking Data. SAGE Publications: 
London. 
Firestone, W A. (1990). Accommodation: Towards a Paradigm-Praxis Dialectic. 
In Egon C. Guba (ed.) The Paradigm Dialog. Sage: Newbury Park. 
Fitting, E. (1991). Personality Type and its Influence on the Decision-Making 
Process in an Organizational Setting. PhD. Dissertation, Stanford 
University. 
Fransella, F. & Bannister, D. (1977). A Manual for The Repertory Grid 
Technique. Academic Press: London. 
Fisby, J. P. (1979). Seeing. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Gaeth, G. J. and Shanteau, J. (1984 ). Reducing the Influence of Irrelevant 
Information on Experienced Decision Makers. Organizational Behaviour 
and Human Performance. 33 263-282. 
Shaw, M. L. G. and Gaines, B. R. (2001).at:-
http://tiger.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/W ebGrid/W ebGrid.html 
Gilmour, P. J. and Comer, J. (1998). The Role of the Expert's Decision Making 
Skills in Management. ORSNZ Conference Proceedings. 
Ginsberg, A. (1994). Minding the Competition: From Mapping to Mastery. 
Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 15, 153-174. 
Gigerenzer, G. and Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Golden, B. ( 1992). The Past is Past-Or is it? The Use of Retrospective Accounts 
as Indicators of Past Strategy. Academy of Management Journal. 35:848-
860. 
Goldstein, E. B. (1989). Sensation and Perception. Wadsworth: Belmont. Ca. 
Goldstein, K. M. & Blackman, S. (1978). Cognitive Style: Five Approaches and 
Relevant Research. Wiley: New York. 
Goodenough, R. D. ( 1976). A Review of Individual Differences in Field 
Dependence as a Factor in Auto Safety. Human Factors. 18 (1), 53-62. 
346 
REFERENCES. 
Gould, S. J (1981 ). The Mis measure of Man. Norton: NY. 
Guba, E. G. (1990). The Alternative Paradigm Dialog. In Egon C. Guba (ed.) The 
Paradigm Dialog. Sage: CA. 
Guba, E. G. & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Fourth Generation Evaluation. SAGE: CA. 
Guba, E. G. & Lincoln, Y. S. (1998). Competing Paradigms in Qualitative 
Research. In N. K. Denzin, and Y. S. Lincoln, (eds.) The Landscape of 
Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues. SAGE: CA. 
Haley, U. C. V. (1997). The MBTI and Decision-Making Styles. In C. Fitzgerald 
and L. Kirby, (eds.) Developing leaders: research and applications in 
psychological type and leadership development : integrating reality and 
vision, mind and heart. Davies-Black Publishing: CA 
Hammond, K. R. ( 1992). Onward. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes. 53, 278-283. 
Hammond, K. R. (1996). Human Judgement and Social Polisy: Irreducible 
Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice. Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, UK 
Hammond, K., Hamm, R. M., Grassia, J. & Pearson T. (1987). Direct Comparison 
of the Efficacy of Intuitive and Analytical Cognition in Expert Judgement. 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. Vol. SMC-17, NO. 
5, September/ October. 
Hanson, N. R.(1958). Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual 
Foundations of Science. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Harvey, L. ( 1992). The Critical Operating Characteristic and the Evaluation of 
Expert Judgment. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision 
Processes. 53, 229-251. 
Hayes, J., & Allinson, C. W. (1994). Cognitive Style and its Relevance for 
Management Practice. British Journal of Management. Vol. 5 53-71. 
Hofstede, G. (1984) Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Related Values. Abridged Edition. Sage: London. 
Hofstede, G. (1997) Culture and Organizations: Software of the Mind. McGraw-
Hill: New York. 
Hogarth, R. M. ( 1981 ). Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional 
Aspects of Judgmental Heuristics. Psychological Bulletin. 90, 197-217. 




Huff, A. S. (1990).Mapping Strategic Thought. In A. S. Huff (Ed.), Mapping 
Strategic Thought. Wiley: UK. 
Hung, E. H. C. (1997). The Nature of Science: Problems and Perspectives. 
Wadsworth: California. 
Hunt, R. G., Krzystofiak, F. J., Meindl, J. R. & Yousry, A. M. (1989). Cognitive 
Style and Decision Making. Organizational Behaviour and Human 
Decision Processes. 44, 436-453. 
Isenberg, D, J. (1984). How Senior Managers Think. Harvard Business Review. 
November-December. 
Isenberg, D. J. (1987). Thinking and Managing: A verbal Protocol Analysis of 
Managerial Problem Solving. Academy of Management Journal. Vol. 29. 
No. 4. 775-788. 
Jensen, A. R. (1996). Giftedness and Genius: Crucial Differences. In C. P. 
Benbow and D. Lubinski (Eds.) Intellectual talent. The John Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore. 
Jick, T. D. (1983). Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in 
Action. In N J. Van Maanen (ed.) Qualitative Methodology. Sage 
Publications: CA. 
Johnson, C., Blinkhorn, S., Wood, R. & Hall, J. (1990). Modern Occupational 
Skills Tests. Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd.: Melbourne. 
Johnson, P. E., Grazioli, S., Karim, K. & Zualkernan, I. A.. (1992). Success and 
Failure in Expert Reasoning. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 53, 173-203. 
Jung, C. G. (1963). Memories, Dreams, Reflections. Recorded and edited by A. 
Jaffe. Translated by R & C Winston. HarperCollins: UK. 
Kac, M. (1985). Enigmas of Chance. Harper and Row: New York. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (1982). Judgement under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press: New York. 
Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Vols. 1 & 2 Norton: 
NY 
Kelly, G. A. (1963). A Theory of Personality; The Psychology of Personal 
Constructs, W.W. Norton: NY 
Kidder, L. H. ( 1981 ). Qualitative Research and Quasi-experimental Frameworks. 
348 
In M. B. Brewer and B. E. Collins (eds.) Scientific Enquiry and the Social 
Sciences. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco. 
REFERENCES. 
Klein, G. (1998). Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. MIT Press: 
Mass. 
Klein, G., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. and Zsambok, C. (1993.) Decision Making 
in Action: Models and Methods. Ablex: New Jersey. 
Kleindorfer, P. R., Kunreuther, H. C. & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993). Decision 
Science: An Integrative Perspective. Cambridge University Press: UK. 
Korhonen, P. & Wallenius, J. (1996). Behavioural Issues in MCDM: Neglected 
Research Questions. Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, Vol. 
5,178-182. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of 
Chicago: Chicago. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970a). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (2nd ed.) University 
of Chicago: Chicago. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970b). Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? In Lakatos, 
I. and Musgrave, A. (eds.) Criticism and the growth of knowledge. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970c). Reflections on my Critics. In Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. 
(eds.) Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
Langley, A., Mintzberg, H., Pitcher, P., Posada, E., & Saint-Macary, J. (1995). 
Opening Up Decision Making: The View From the Black Stool. 
Organizational Science. Vol. 6, No. 3, May-June. 
Laszlo, E., Artigiani, R., Combs, A. & Csanyi. V. (1996). Changing Visions. 
Human Cognitive Maps: Past, Present, and Future. Adamantine Press: 
UK. 
Lather, P.A. (1990). Reinscribing Otherwise: The Play of Values in the Practice of 
the Human Sciences. In Egon C. Guba (ed.) The Paradigm Dialog. Sage: 
Newbury Park. 
Leader. A. H. (1997). Human Problem Solving As A Sustainable Technology. 14th 
Irish Manufacturing Conference Proceedings: Dublin. 
Leedy, P. D. (1993). Practical Research: Planning and Design: Macmillan: New 
York 
Levi-Strauss, C. ( 1966). The Savage Mind. (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago. 
Lewins, F. (1993) Writing a Thesis: A Guide to its Nature and Organisation. 
Faculty of Arts, Australian National University: Canberra. 
349 
REFERENCES. 
Lewis, B. N. (1976). Avoidance of aptitude-treatment trivialities. In S. Messick 
(ed.) Individuality in Learning. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco. 
Lincoln, Y. S. & Guba, E.G. (1985). Naturalistic Inquiry. SAGE: India. 
Lipsey, R. (1975). An introduction to Positive Economics. (4th ed.) Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson: London. 
Lipshitz, R. (1989). "Either a Medal or a Corporal": The Effects of Success and 
Failure on the Evaluation of Decision Making and decision makers. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 44(3). 380-395. 
Lipshitz, R. (1994). Decision Making in Three Modes. Journal of the Theory of 
Social Behavior. 24: 1 
Littlejohn, S. W. (1992). Theories of Human Communication. (4th ed.) 
Wadsworth: Belmont. Ca. 
Loo, R. (1978). Individual differences and the perception of traffic signs. Human 
Factors. 20 (1), 65-74. 
Lykken, D. T., McGue, M., Tellegen, A. & Bouchard, T. J. (1992). Emergenisis. 
American Psychologist. 47, 1565-77. 
Maccoby, M (1987). Motivating Technical People - I. Research Management 
30(4): 42-43./ Jan/Feb. 
Maccoby, M (1987). Motivating Technical People - II. Research Management 
30(4): 43-44./ Jul/Aug. 
Maccoby, M (1987). Motivating Technical People - ill. Research Management 
30(4): 45-46./ Nov/Dec. 
March, J. (1987). The Nobel prize in economics. Science. 202, 858-861. 
March, J. (1988). Decisions and Organizations. Blackwell: Oxford. 
March, J. (1994). A Primer in Decision Making: How Decisions Happen. Free 
Press: NY. 
March, J. (1997). How Decisions Happen in Organizations. In Z. Shapira (ed.) 
Organizational Decision Making. Cambridge University Press: NY. 
March, J. & Simon, H. (1958). Organisations. Wiley: New York. 
Marris, R. & Egidi, M. (1992). In R. Marris and M. Egidi (eds.) Economics, 
Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution. Elgar: UK 
Maruyama, M. (1994). Mindscapes in Management. Dartmouth: UK. 
Mason, R. 0. & Mi troff, I. I. ( 1981 ). Challenging Strategic Planning 
Assumptions. Wiley: NY. 
350 
REFERENCES. 
Masterman, M (1970). The Nature of a Paradigm. In Lakatos I and Musgrave, A. 
(eds.) C_riticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
McKenzie, G., Powell, J. & Usher, R. (1997). Understanding Social Research: 
Perspectives on Methodology and Practice. Falmer Press: London. 
Medin, D. L. & Ross, B. H. (1992). Cognitive Psychology. Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Inc.: New York. 
Mercer, D. (1995). Scenarios Made Easy. Long Range Planning. Vol. 28. No.4. 
81-86. 
Messick, S. & Associates. (1976). Individual Learning. Jossey-Bass: Cal. 
Mihal, W. L. & Barrett, G. V. (1976). Individual Differences in Perceptual 
Processing and Their Relationship to Automobile Accident Involvement. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 61, No. 2, 229-233. 
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. (1984). Qualitative Data Analysis: A Source 
Book of New methods. SAGE: India. 
Mintzberg, H. (1976). Planning on the Left Side and Managing on the Right. 
Harvard Business Review. July-August 49-58. 
Mintzberg, H. (1978). Mintzberg's Final Paradigm. Administrative Science 
Quarterly. 23(4), 635-6. 
Mintzberg, H. (1979). The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the 
Research. Prentice-Hall: NJ. 
Mintzberg, H. (1983). An Emerging Strategy of "Direct" Research. In NJ. Van 
Maanen (ed.) Qualitative Methodology. Sage Publications: CA. 
Mintzberg, H. (1989 ). Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of 
Organisations. Macmillan: N.Y. 
Mintzberg, H. (1994).The fall and rise of strategic management. Harvard Business 
Review. Jan-Feb. 
Mintzberg, H., Raisinghani, D. & Theoret, A. ( 1976). The Structure of 
"Unstructured" Decision Processes. Administration Science Quartely. 
21 :247-275. 
Mitroff, I. I. & Kilmann, R. H. (1975). Stories Managers Tell: A New Tool for 
Organizational Problem Solving. Management Review. July. 18-28. 




Morgan, G. & Smircich, L ( 1980). The Case for Qualitative Research. Academy of 
Management Review. Vol. 5, No. 4, 491-500. 
Myers, I. B. & Mccaulley, M. H. (1986). Manual: A Guide to the Development 
and Use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Consulting Psychology Press: 
California. 
Myers, I. B. & Myers, P. (1986). Gifts Differing. Consulting Psychology Press: 
CA. 
Mykytyn, P. P. Jr. (1989). Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT): Individual 
Differences, performance, and Leaming effects. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement. 49. 4, 951-959 
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive Psychology. Prentice-Hall: New York. 
Newell, A. & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Prentice-Hall: N.J. 
Noble, M. & Sanders, A. F. ( 1980). Searching for Traffic Signals While Engaged 
in Compensatory Tracking. Human Factors, 22(1), 89-102. 
Nutt, P. C. (1989). Making Tough Decisions. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco. 
Nutt, P. C. ( 1998). How Decision Makers Evaluate Alternatives and the Influence 
of Complexity. Managemnet Science. Vol. 44, No. 8. 
O'Hear, A. (1985). What Philosophy ls: An Introduction to Contemporary 
Philosophy. Penguin: UK. 
O'Keefe, R. M. (1989). The implications of Cognitive-style Findings for 
Operations Research. Journal of the Operations Research Society. Vol. 40 
No. 5. 415-422. 
Olsen, J. R. & Biolsi, K. ( 1991 ). Techniques for representing expert knowledge. In 
K. A. Ericsson, and J. Smith (eds.) Towards a General Theory of 
Expertise. Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. Australia. 
Orasanu, J. & Connolly, T. (1993 ). The Reinvention of Decision Making. In G. 
Klein, J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. Zsambok (eds.) Decision 
Making in Action: Models and Methods. Ablex: New Jersey. 
Pandey, Y (1990).The Environment, Culture, and Behavior. In R. W. Brislin, (ed.) 
Applied Cross-Cultural Psychology. Sage: CA. 
Patel, V. L. & Groen, G. J. (1991) In K. A. Ericsson and J. Smith (eds.) Towards a 
General Theory of Expertise. Press Syndicate of the University of 
Cambridge. Australia. 
Payne, J. W. (1982). Contingent Decision Behavior. Psychological Bulletin. Vol. 
92, No. 2, 382-402. 
352 
REFERENCES. 
Payne, J. W. (1997). The Scarecrow's search: A Cognitive Psychologist's 
Perspective on Organizational Decision Making. In Z. Shapira (ed.) 
Organizational Decision Making. Cambridge University Press: NY. 
Phillips, D. C. ( 1990). Postpositivistic Science: Myths and Realities. In Egon C. 
Guba (ed.) The Paradigm Dialog. Sage: Newbury Park. 
Phillips, D. C. (1992). The Social Scientist's Bestiary: A Guide to Fabled Threats 
to, and Defences of, Naturalistic Social Science. Pergamon: Oxford. 
Popper, K. R. ( 1934/1960). The logic of scientific discovery Hutchinson,: London. 
Popper, K. (1970). Normal Science and its Dangers. In Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, 
A. (eds.) Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
Porac, J. F. & Thomas, H. (1990). Taxonomic Mental Models in Competitor 
Definition. Academy of Management Review. Vol. 15, No. 2, 224-240. 
Porter, M. (1980). Competitive Strategies: Techniques for Analysing Industries 
and Competitors. Free Press: NY. 
Power, S. J. & Lundsten, L. L. (1997). Studies That Compare Theory and Left-
Brain / Right-Brain Theory. Journal of Psychological Type. Vol. 43. 22-
28. 
Preece R. (1994 ). Starting Research. Pinter: London. 
Raifa, H. (1994 ). The Prescriptive Orientation of Decision Making: A Synthesis of 
Decision Analysis, Behavioral Decision Making, and Game Theory. In 
Sixto Rios (ed.) Decision Theory and Decision Analysis: Trends and 
Challenges. Kluwer Academic: Boston. 
Raudsepp, E. (1996). Thinking Styles and Career Success. High Technology 
Careers Magazine. Retrieved 5 June 1997 from World Wide Web 
http;//ori.careerexpo.com/pub/docs/thinking.html. 
Rayner, S. & Ridding, R. ( 1997) Towards a Categorisation of Cognitive Styles 
and Leaming Styles. Educational Psychology. Vol. 17, Nos. 1 and 2. 5-27. 
Riding, R. J. (1991 ). Cognitive Style Analysis. Leaming and Training Technology: 
Birmingham. 
Riding, R. J. (1997). On the Nature of Cognitive Style. Educational Psychology. 
Vol. 17, Nos. 1 and 2. 29-49. 
Riding, R. J., Glass, A. & Douglas, G. ( 1993). Individual Differences in Thinking: 
Cognitive and Neurophysiological Perspectives. Educational Psychology. 
Vol. 13, Nos. 3 and 4. 
353 
REFERENCES. 
Robey, D. & Taggart, W. (1981). Measuring Managers Minds: The Assessment of 
Style in Huma_n Information Processing. Academy of Management Review. 
Vol. 6. No. 3, 375-383. 
Salancik, G. R. & Brindle, M. C. (1997). The Social Ideologies of Power. In Z. 
Shapira (ed.) Organizational Decision Making. Cambridge University 
Press: NY. 
Salthouse, T. A. (1991 ). Expertise as the Circumvention of Human Processing. In 
K. A. Ericsson and J. Smith. Towards a general theory of expertise. Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. Australia. 
Schoemaker, P. J. H. & Russo, J.E. (1994). A Pyramid of Decision Approaches. 
In. S. Rios (Ed.), Decision Theory and Decision Analysis: Trends and 
Challenges. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Mass .. 
Schwandt, T. R. (1990). Paths to Social Inquiry in the Social Disciplines: 
Scientific, Constructivist, and Critical Theory Methodologies. In Egon C. 
Guba (ed.) The Paradigm Dialog. Sage: Newbury Park. 
Schwenk, C. R. (1995). Strategic Decision Making. Journal of Management. Vol. 
21, No. 471-493. 
Segall, M. H., Dasen P. R., Berry, J. W. & Poortinga, Y. H. (1990). Human 
Behaviour in Global Perspective: An introduction to cross-cultural 
psychology. Allyn and Bacon: MA. 
Shanteau, J. ( 1987). Psychological Characteristics of Expert Decision Makers. In 
J. L. Mumpower, 0. Renn, L. D. Phillips. & V. R. R. Uppullori. (eds.) 
Expert Judgment and Expert Systems. Springer-Verlag: Berlin: Germany. 
Shanteau, J. ( 1992a). Competence in Experts: The Role of Task Characteristics. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 53, 252-266. 
Shanteau, J. (1992b). The Psychology of Experts: An alternative View. In G. 
Wright and F. Bolger (eds.) Expertise and Decision Support. Plenum 
Press: New York. 
Shanteau, J. (1993). Discussion of Expertise in Auditing. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory. Vol. 12, Supplement. 
Shanteau, J. (1995). Expert Judgement and Finacial Decision Making. In Bo 
Green (ed.) Risk Behaviour and Risk Management. School of Business, 
Stockholm University : Sweeden. 
Shanteau, J & Ponds, J. (1996). The Pendulum Swings. American Journal of 
Psychology. Vol. 9. No. 4, Winter. 635-644. 
Shanteau, J. & Stewart, T. R. (1992). Why Study Expert Decision Making? Some 
Historical Perspectives and Comments. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes. 53, 95-106. 
354 
REFERENCES. 
Shapira, Z. (1997). Introduction and Overview. In Z. Shapira (ed.) Organizational 
Decision Making. Cambridge University Press: NY. 
Shaughnesy, J J. Zechmeister, E. B. (1997). Research Methods in Psychology. 
McGraw-Hill:NY 
Shephard, G. G. & Kirkwood, C. W. (1991). The Process of Eliciting a 
Judgmental Probability Distribution. Technical Report DIS 91/92-1. 
Department of Decision and Information Systems. Arizona State 
University.Fkelly 
Shaw, M. L. G. & Gaines, B. R. (1998). WebGrid 11: Developing Hierarchichical 
Knowledge Structures from Flat Grids. Retrieved March 10, 2000 from 
the University of Calgary on the World Wide Web: 
http:/ksi.cpsc.ucalgary/KA W /KA W98/saw/ 
Shiflett, S. C. (1989). Validity Evidence for the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator as a 
Measure of Hemisphere Dominance. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement. 49, 741-745. 
Simon, H. A. (1945/1957). Models of Man: Social and National. Wiley: N.Y. 
Simon, H. A. (1978). Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought. American 
Economic Association. Vol. 68 2: 1-16. 
Simon, H. A. ( 1966/1979). A Chess Mating Combinations Program. In H. A. 
Simon (Ed.) Models of Thought. Yale University: London. 
Simon, H. A. ( 1979a). Information Processing Models of Cognition. Annual 
Review of Psychology. 30: 363-396. 
Simon, H. A. ( 1979b ). Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations. The 
American Economic Review. Vol. 69. No. 4. 493-513. 
Simon, H. A. ( 1987). Making Management Decisions: The Role of Intuition and 
Emotion. Academy of Management Executive. Vol. 1. 57-63. 
Simon, H. A (1993). Strategy and Organisational Evolution. Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 14, 131-142. 
Simon, H. A. & Chase, W. G. (1973). Skill in Chess. American Scientist. 61. 394-
403. 
Simon, H. A., Egidi, M., Marris, R. & Viale, R. (1992). Economics, Bounded 
Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution. Elgar: UK. 
Simonton, D. K. ( 1980). Intuition and Analysis: A Predictive and Explanatory 
Model. Genetic Psychology Monograph. 102. 3-60. 




Skinner, B. F. (1966). An Operant Analysis of Problem Solving. In B. 
Kleinmuntz. (Ed.) Problem Solving: Research, Methods, and Theory. 
Wiley: New York. 
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About Behaviourism. Cape: London. 
Skrtic, T. M. (1990). Social Accommodation: Towards a Dialogical Discourse in 
Educational Enquiry. In Egon C. Guba (ed.) The Paradigm Dialog. Sage: 
Newbury Park. 
Smith, G. F. (1988). Managerial Problem Identification. Omega. 17(1 ), 27-36. 
Smith, J. K. (1990). Alternative Research Paradigms and the Problem Criteria. In 
Egon C. Guba (ed.) The Paradigm Dialog. Sage: Newbury Park. 
Stake, R. E. (1985). Case Study. In: Research, Policy and Practice. World 
Yearbook of Education. Nichols Publishing Co.: NY. 
Stake, R. E. (1998). Case Studies. In N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds.) Strategies of 
Qualitative Inquiry. SAGE: CA. 
Strauss, C. & Quinn, N. (1997). A cognitive theory of cultural meaning. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Stewart, T. J. (1992). A Critical Survey on the Status of Multiple Criteria Decision 
Making Theory and Practice. Omega International Journal of 
Management Science. Vol. 20, No. 5/6. 569-586. 
Stewart, V ., Stewart, A. & Fonda, N. (1981 ). Business Applications of Repertory 
Grid. McCraw-Hill: London. 
Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of Individual Differences in 
Reasoning. Lawrence Erlbaum: NJ. 
Sutherland, J. W. (1989). Towards a Strategic Management and Decision 
Technology. Klumer Academic. Dordrecht: The Netherlands. 
Sutter, A., Beck, J. & Graham, N. 1989). Contrast and Spatial Variables in 
Texture Segregation: Testing a Simple Spatial-Frequency Model. 
Perception & Psychophysics, 46 (4), 312-332. 
Swan, J. A. (1995). Exploring Knowledge and Cognitions in Decisions about 
Technological Innovation: Mapping Managerial Cognitions. Human 
Relations, Vol. 48, No. 11. 
Taggart, W. & Robey, D. (1981). Minds and Managers: On the Dual Nature of 
Human Information Processing and Management. Academy of 
Management Review. Vol. 6, No. 2. 187-195. 
356 
REFERENCES. 
Taggart, W. M., Kroeck, K. & Escoffier, M. R. (1991) Validity Evidence for the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator as a Measurment of Hemisphere Dominance. 
Educational and Psychological Measurment. 51, 775-783. 
Targett, D. (1996). Analytical Decision Making. Pitman: London. 
Tennant, M. (1988).Psychology and Adult Learning. Rutledge: London. 
Thomas & Shaw, 1976). FOCUS REP GRID 
Toolman, E. C. (1932). Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men. University of 
California Press: Ca. 
Toomela, A. (1996). How Culture Transforms Mind: A Process of Internalization. 
Culture and Psychology. Vol.2. No. 3. September. 285-305. 
Tullett, A. D. (1995). The adaptive-innovative (A-1) cognitive styles of male and 
female project managers: Some implications for the managers of change. 
Journal of Occupational and Organisational Psychology. 68, 359-365. 
Tversky, A. (1969). lntransitivity of Preference. Psychological Review. 76: 105-10. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases. Science. 185. 1124-1131. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. ( 1981 ). The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice. Science. 211 :453-58 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions. Journal of Business. Vol. 59. No. 4, pt2. 251-278. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1990). Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions. In K Schweers Cook. & M. Levi (Eds.) The Limits of 
Rationality. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
Van Maanen, J. (1983). Qualitative Methodology. SAGE Publications: CA. 
Van Maanen, J., Dabbs, J. M. Jr. & Faulkner, R. R. (1982). Varieties of 
Qualitative Research. SAGE Publications: CA. 
Watson, S. R. ( 1992). The Presumptions of Prescription. Acta Psychologica 80, 7-
31. 
Weiner, B., Runquist, W., Runquist P. A., Raven, B. H., Meyer, W. J., Leiman, 
A., Kuscher, C. L., Kleinmuntz, B. & Haber, R. N. (1977). Discovering 
Psychology. Science Research Associates, Inc.: Chicago. 
Wescott, M. R. (1968). Toward a Contemporary Psychology of Intuition. Holt, 
Rienhart and Winston: New York. 
357 
REFERENCES. 
Willemain, T. R. (1995). Model Formulation: What Experts Think About and 
When. Operations Research. Vol. 43, No. 6, November-December. 916-
932. 
Witkin, H. A. & Goodenough, D. R. (1981). Cognitive Styles: Essence and 
Origins. International University Press: New York. 
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case Study Research. Sage: California. 
Zajac, E. J. & Bazerman, M. H. (1991). Blind Spots in Industry and Competitor 
Analysis: Implications of Interfirm (MIS) Perceptions for Strategic 
Decisions. Academy of Management Review. Vol. 16, No. 1, 37-56. 
****************** 
l)iiVt:RSITY OF WAIKATO 
. UBRARY 
'\... 
358 
